ing their stance on the ideology behind Bush doctrine, the authors also deal with a broader understanding of Wilsonianism and its essential logic. Their different understanding of the Wilsonian vision shapes their different stance concerning Bush doctrine.

The authors come to different conclusions using different criteria, which makes the debate very interesting. The book does not provide any final collective conclusion, so, it is up to the reader which side of the debate he or she will support. This makes the book even more valuable. The Crisis of American Foreign Policy fully satisfies all attributes of the academic work and is highly recommended to anyone who is interested in American foreign policy and its influences, and especially to those who are interested in Bush foreign policy and its ideological origins.

Lenka Staňková


In US National Security and Foreign Policy Making after 9/11: Present at the Re-Creation M. Kent Bolton provides an invaluable insight into the fundamental processes of U.S. national security policymaking. The key aim of this publication is to present readers with an explanation of the processes leading to the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act (IRTPA) of 2004. In order to provide this explanation, Bolton traces the decision-making frameworks since the end of the Second World War. By doing so he is, hence, able to create a theoretical road map for understanding U.S. national security and foreign policy making since 1945.

The author suggests that the IRTPA represented a fundamental alteration in the course of U.S. national security policymaking, thus making it the first significant change of the policymaking framework since the 1947 National Security Act (NSA) came into effect. Key to Bolton's analysis is the concept of impact of foreign policy crises on creating new national security policy. He contends that there were only two such crises able to initiate the immense change in the national security bureaucracy, the first being the events surrounding the outbreak of the Cold War (1946–1950), and second the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, of September 11, 2001. These events, Bolton follows, were the central incentive for the extensive changes that became codified in the NSA and IRTPA.

The 1947 National Security Act created the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the unified and permanent Department of Defense, and established the President-NSC policymaking model. This model, Bolton argues, formed the basis of all post-WWII presidential national security and foreign policymaking decisions. While this decision-making framework proved sufficient and appropriate for the Cold War modus operandi, the unprecedented and massive terrorist attacks of 9/11 emphasized the inefficiency of the bureaucratic system in the post-Cold War world.
Bolton contends that it was the events of 9/11 that challenged the 1947 NSA status quo and hurled the United States into the environment of asymmetrical, non-state threats. He argues that the creation and enactment IRTPA and establishment of new administrative framework post-9/11 was an outcome of parallel and interconnected external systemic, societal and governmental drivers of the change vis-à-vis the foreign policy crisis. The three drivers, described in detail in separate chapters, include: (1) the 9/11 and subsequent debate about and actual intervention to Iraq; (2) “rise of the Vulcans” in President Bush’s administration; and (3) series of governmental post-mortems such as the 9/11 Commission Report, the Iraq Survey Group, and the Robb-Silberman WMD Commissions, which recommended substantial and widespread changes. All of these drivers were subsequently instilled in the IRTPA and leading to the re-creation of the U.S. national security policymaking.

Out of the main changes, Bolton stresses out the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as an essential transition in the national security decision- and policymaking model. The DNI, with full cabinet status, was charged with two major tasks drawing upon the experience of 9/11: reforming the intelligence community and improving the process of gathering, dissemination and accuracy of intelligence and other essential information to policymakers. The final chapter is therefore devoted to the intelligence-policymaking nexus as well as the review of the actions and progress of the office of the first DNI, John Negroponte.

Bolton does view the future of the IRTPA as uncertain. He presents Negroponte’s actions towards integration of the U.S. intelligence community as a relative success. It is therefore possible to suggest that the IRTPA and the DNI have had a relative positive influence on the U.S. national security and its bureaucratic framework. However, detailed look at the second main task of the DNI – the oversight of the process of gathering and providing the right and precise intelligence to decision makers – remains unfulfilled. Thus, Bolton’s claim of re-creation aspect of the IRTPA is still being challenged, even more notably with the basically unchanged structure of the NSC-President policymaking model.

Therefore, the full scope and impact of the IRTPA remains to be seen. The true re-creation character of the IRTPA will also largely depend on the ability of the DNI to overcome the different turf wars between particular agencies of the intelligence community as well as other governmental agencies such as e.g. the Department of Homeland Security.

Overall, the publication provides an invaluable insight into the processes, which led to the unchallenged position of the U.S. national security bureaucracy, as well to the attempted change to adapt the U.S. foreign and national security decision-making processes to the post-Cold War environment. Although the book is full of acronyms and details, which can be at times confusing, it presents an all-embracing analysis, essential for M.A. level students interested in U.S. national and security policymaking both before and after 9/11.

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