to the Asia Pacific, and to China in particular. However, despite the title, it is not a thorough study of the U.S. strategy towards the rise of China. It rather offers snippets from the world of foreign policy making and diplomacy; it is a memoir rather than an academic study. Still, Bader shows the world of painstaking diplomacy where planning every last detail is important and even small, insignificant missteps can throw off months of planning and negotiation. The book thus offers an interesting insight for experienced students of U.S. foreign policy, the practice of diplomacy, and the U.S.–China relations. Bader writes for those who already know the basics and want an insider’s detailed account.

Jana Sehnáková


Since the end of the Second World War and, moreover, since the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion has come to be considered an intrinsic feature of U.S. foreign policy. The maintenance of a liberal world order became the hallmark of the Cold War ideological confrontation. Not only was the creation of a free, democratic world considered to be morally correct, it was also perceived to be the only world order that could fully preserve U.S. interests, safety and “way of life.” Thus, when the ideological struggle ended with the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States – from its position of world hegemon – had enough leeway to shape the world order to its liking. Yet, challenges (both internal and external) to the United States’ nearly unlimited spread of liberal values soon emerged. For a rising China, the liberal world order may not be the most strategically convenient international architecture and in the not-too-distant future, Beijing may seek to revise certain aspects of the present order. Furthermore, George W. Bush’s initiation of the intervention in Iraq in 2003 on the premises of democracy promotion has arguably done great harm to the policy – both in its perception on the international scene and amongst the U.S. population.

This edited volume, compiled by the most renowned democracy promotion scholars, maps the range of challenges and opportunities that the policy of promoting democracy faced throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and examines the individual roles of a number of U.S. presidents in the process. Given the vital importance of the policy to basic American interests and values, the subject of democracy promotion is by no means understudied in U.S. and world scholarship. But to put it simply, most research focuses on providing an (at least partial) answer to two basic questions: What type of democracy (or political system) is, in fact, being promoted? What is the proportion between the normative and practical U.S. interests (that is, value-based and material-based) while formulating the policy?

In analyzing the intellectual and practical approaches to the policy of promoting democracy (in other words, promoting a liberal world order) of a number of U.S. presidents, this
publication attempts to juxtapose the various differences and similarities of each approach and thereby provide an elaborate comparative study. In reference to the two above-mentioned questions, such a comparative approach has the potential to uncover the true intentions behind democracy promotion and thus implicitly provide the desired answers. This is where the publication fills a void in scholarship. The EU and other rising democracies (Turkey, Brazil) are steadily building their democracy support infrastructure, but none of these actors’ strategies in promoting democracy have been placed in a comparative perspective with that of the U.S. Yet it is precisely the question of “how, why and when” individual democracies promote democracy in third countries, that can provide a vantage point for examining the workings of normative and material interests in policymaking. Why does state A support democracy (or a democratic transition) in state X, while state B prefers to support democracy in state Y, rather than in state X? The same question can be applied to the decision-making of U.S. presidents. In this sense, the publication presents a valuable methodological contribution to democracy promotion research.

The volume opens with a theoretical introduction to the topic of democracy promotion, which is followed by chapters devoted to individual presidents. In the first chapter, Tony Smith of Tufts University and Harvard University graphically typifies the U.S. liberal worldview as a four-sided diamond, with each facet representing an elemental feature of the current international system. The four facets of the “liberal diamond” are U.S. hegemony, capitalism, democracy and multilateralism. These points are in essence interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Implicitly, one can assume that in the absence of a single one of these facets, the liberal world order would become unsustainable. At the same time it is necessary to ask which of the four points of the diamond is most important. In reading US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama, one can observe that each U.S. president placed emphasis on a different facet and shaped their democracy promotion policy accordingly.

Theodore Roosevelt is very seldom associated in any way with democracy promotion. However, as Adam Quinn of University of Birmingham demonstrates, Roosevelt had indeed set the groundwork for the United States to become an active force in promoting a liberal world order. It was Roosevelt’s belief that a state must be militarily strong and internationally active in order to be capable of pursuing and protecting its national interests that once and for all changed the American foreign policy course from “inward-looking” to “outward-looking.” Similarly to a number of late nineteenth / early twentieth century European statesmen, Roosevelt maintained a typically colonial and imperialist mindset. He believed that the United States should play its part “in the great work of uplifting mankind.”

---

Though unpronounced at the time, Roosevelt would have been an advocate of U.S. hegemony as the most important point of the “liberal diamond.”

Woodrow Wilson, on the other hand, preferred multilateralism. Considered to be the first proponent of “liberal internationalism” in foreign affairs, Wilson contended that democracy is built by slow habit. He knew of the pivotal role of education in fostering a truly democratic society and consequently did not believe that democracy could be simply imposed from the outside. Wilson’s primary aim was to “make the world safe for democracy” – in other words, to create a world order that would foster indigenous pressures for democratization, thereby letting democracy take root in a “natural” manner.

The 1930s presented a sudden challenge to democratic regimes. The Great Depression gave way to a number of populist and authoritarian regimes in Europe and president Franklin D. Roosevelt quickly understood the need to focus on strengthening democracy at home to withstand similar domestic political pressures. For FDR, a strong democracy at home was a prerequisite to fight autocracy abroad. He also provided one of the first formulations of what later became the so-called democratic peace theory: in 1936 he noted that “autocracy in world affairs endangers peace and that such threats do not spring from the nations devoted to the democratic ideal.”

This vision was shared by Harry S. Truman. Set into the bipolar ideological confrontation, the support for emerging democracies became the focal point of Truman’s foreign policy (most notably represented by the aid provided to Greece and Turkey). However, as Martin H. Folly of Brunel University argues in his chapter, during the Truman administration, being “democratic” became too simplistically equated with being “anti-communist.” During the entire Cold War this turned out to be a precedent that led the United States to support any regime opposed to the Soviet Union. As a consequence, Washington labeled seemingly undemocratic regimes as “democratic” only to legitimize its support to them. In turn, the United States was often accused of hypocrisy and applying double standards in dealing with foreign nations.

John F. Kennedy can be considered to be the first U.S. president to attempt to institutionalize democracy promotion in some form. Surrounded by a team of advisers from academia, Kennedy fell for the idea of “nation-building” and “modernization theory.” For Kennedy, “nation-building” was a potential means by which the United States could contain the Soviet Union by literally imposing democracy (or a pro-U.S. regime) in underdeveloped countries; the objective was to show Third World political elites that democracy is a more attractive political model than communism. To pursue this goal, the Kennedy administration founded the Peace Corps and more importantly the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1961. Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, slightly

---

3 The democratic peace theory states that democratic regimes do not engage in military conflict with other democratic states. For a discussion see Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).

4 Modernization theory claims that the growth of per capita GDP has a causal effect on democratization – i.e. the higher the per capita GDP, the more society will struggle for political freedoms.
shifted the focus from outward-looking democracy promotion to a more inward-looking policy of strengthening democracy at home (although this shift was most likely caused by developments in the civil rights movement). Johnson’s lack of a profound strategic interest in supporting democracy abroad was manifested, for example, by his lukewarm reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy is most often associated with his emphasis on human rights. Though his human rights agenda should be perceived as an intrinsic part of his democracy promotion efforts; by highlighting the communist bloc’s breaches of human rights, he gave a voice to Russian and Eastern European dissidents and put the Soviet Union ideologically on the defensive. Although efforts have been made to measure the impact of Carter’s human rights agenda across the globe, none have conclusively proven that the policies affected the behavior of rights-abusing governments. Nevertheless, John Dumbrell of Durham University concludes that Carter was never given enough credit for playing his part in toppling the Soviet Union. Carter’s approach to democracy promotion, he claims, can be labeled as “post-imperialist” – meaning that the moral and normative imperatives played a sincere and decisive role in shaping the policy.

While for Carter the main facet of the “liberal diamond” was democracy (or democratic values), for Ronald Reagan it was a form of U.S. hegemony. Reagan was a staunch proponent of a United States that sets the example for all the rest to follow. He did not propose to remake the world in America’s image, but wished to “inspire people everywhere.” In terms of his democracy promotion policy, Reagan’s 1982 speech in Westminster became a focal point. In the speech, he outlined his vision to “foster the infrastructure of democracy” and a few months later, he presented legislation to Congress to set up the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and its affiliated institutes. The “infrastructure of democracy” that Reagan created reflected his vision of how democratic governments should be installed in third countries. Reagan was mostly sympathetic to civil society, or indigenous democratic movements. In this sense, his administration was committed to a “bottom-up” construction of democracy. Focusing on the grassroots level, Reagan envisaged a novel idea of giving direct grants to non-governmental organizations in third countries. This approach has proven successful and it remains in place until present day.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union presented U.S. foreign policy with the challenge of reformulating its core priorities. A number of voices claimed that to keep America safe, containment must be succeeded by democracy promotion as the main feature of foreign policy. Bill Clinton’s administration was keen on integrating democracy promotion into its foreign policy strategy and in the event openly added another aspect to it – that is, the spread of capitalism. The Clinton administration emphasized the necessity to foster “market democracies” around the globe and with this stated goal the total amount of aid allocated to supporting democracy rose from 100 million to 700 million dollars during the eight years

---

5 Namely the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the Center for International Private Enterprise and the Free Trade Union Institute.
of his presidency. However, Clinton’s mistake, identified by the chapter’s author Nicolas Bouchet, was that he equated Boris Yeltsin with Russian democracy and supported him under any circumstances. This led to further criticism, which claimed that despite the nearly unlimited opportunities to spread liberalism and democracy after the demise of the Soviet Union, Clinton never fully used the chance and in fact “squandered the potential.” But perhaps Clinton’s presidency, in fact, exposed the limits of spreading democratic values around the world: in the 1990s, the U.S. only supported processes that were already happening.

The final two chapters discuss the contribution of the two latest presidents – George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Although a first impression may point to the assumption that the policies of Bush and Obama are vastly different, a closer look reveals that, in fact, their approaches to democracy promotion bear many similarities.

Tony Smith admits that “however controversial [Bush’s] policies may have been, there is at least agreement about one thing: that by associating his intervention in Iraq with the idea of democracy promotion it did great damage to the idea.” Smith goes on to say that due to Bush’s policies, democracy promotion “almost became a dirty word.” No matter if the Bush administration’s democracy promotion policies were sincerely driven by normative ideals or by purely material interests, it is quite clear today that the policies were counterproductive. As Timothy J. Lynch of University of Melbourne asserts: “Bush’s deluded pursuit of democracy […] resulted in the diminution of American power and prestige.” To underline the deleterious effects of Bush’s policies, Lynch argues that the 2003 Iran Democracy Act and the 2006 Iran Freedom and Support Act “convincing the Iranian government to seek a nuclear deterrent.”

With such a legacy of democracy promotion left over by the preceding administration, Barack Obama entered the White House determined to significantly shift the U.S. approach to democracy support. However, as Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace says, the shift only occurred on the rhetorical level. “Rather than jettison [Bush’s approach to democracy promotion], Obama recalibrated it for a more global audience.” The Obama administration (at least in its first term) was cautious not to sound like the preceding administration in preaching other countries on how to govern and relied more on the multilateral facet of the “liberal diamond.” Nevertheless, Obama was forced to tailor his approach to democracy assistance in relation with the so-called Arab Spring uprisings that swept nearly the entire Middle East. Hence, the overall budget allocated to democracy, governance and human rights assistance increased from 2.24 million dollars in 2008 to 2.48 million dollars in 2010.

But Carothers points to another critical observation. In connection with the Arab Spring, Obama was often criticized for his irresoluteness and his lack of a coherent strategy to deal with the developments. Here, Carothers notes that while democratization of Eastern

---

6 The 2003 Iran Democracy Act pledged “to support transparent, full democracy in Iran”; the 2006 Iran Freedom and Support Act claimed “to hold the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and to support a transition to democracy in Iran.”
Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall was a clear strategic imperative for the United States, democratization of the Middle East was a dilemma that could possibly jeopardize American interest in the region (such as access to Gulf oil, cooperation on counterterrorism, etc.). This observation shows a much broader picture, which could form the conclusion of the entire publication – but only if there was a concluding chapter.

Despite the publication’s lack of a comprehensive conclusion that would place all the examined approaches to democracy promotion in a common perspective, the reader is compelled to make constant comparisons between the divergent policies of each president.

Apart from examining the presidents’ emphasis on the various facets of the “liberal diamond,” it is interesting to also look at their respective regions of focus. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, paid most attention to Latin America (hence the so-called Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine\(^7\)); Franklin D. Roosevelt to democracy at home; Kennedy focused on the Third World countries; Truman on Europe and Bush on the Middle East. From this list one can observe that the application of democracy promotion policies fittingly correlates with U.S. geopolitical and strategic interests. In Theodore Roosevelt’s time, a safe “near abroad” was crucial to national security and served as a buffer against the (waning) European powers. During Franklin D. Roosevelt’s era, the danger to U.S. democracy came first from the inside and later from the outside and Roosevelt chose war to protect democracy. Truman identified the growing Soviet influence in Europe as a threat to U.S. interests and envisaged plans to support regimes that could be saved from the Kremlin’s expanding sphere of influence. A similar approach was overtaken by Kennedy, who furthered the concept of employing democracy promotion as a soft power weapon in the ideological confrontation of the Cold War. Finally for Bush, the greatest danger to U.S. national security was terrorism that originated in the Middle East and therefore he focused his democracy promotion policies particularly on this region.

*US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama* shows that nearly every U.S. president pursued the Wilsonian vision of “making the world safe for democracy.” Although this is a noble goal, at the same time it is basically a euphemism for “making the world safe for U.S. democracy.” This statement, however, is not intended in a pejorative manner. As for any other nation, national interests come first for the United States. The reviewed publication demonstrates that historically, U.S. presidents always needed to have a geopolitical or material interest that compelled them to formulate democracy promotion policies.

*Jan Hornát*

---

\(^7\) The corollary stated that the United States had the responsibility to preserve order and protect life and property in Latin American countries (and more broadly in the Western Hemisphere) and that Washington reserved the right to intervene in any conflict between European powers and these states.