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Obsah

FOREWORD

The first volume of the series AUC (Teritoriální studia) introduces contributions of six authors associated with the Department of Russian and East European Studies established in 1996 as one of the four departments of the Institute of International Studies located at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University. The work of this department focuses mainly on the northern parts of Central and Eastern Europe (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Poland and Hungary) and covers the areas of modern history, foreign policy, political systems, nationality and religious questions as well as basic problems of social, cultural, and economic development in the present times.

The mentioned contributions represent various faces of the scholar work carried out at the Department of Russian and East European Studies during the last year and reflect the manifold scale of the individual research interests of the Department fellows.

PhDr. Jiří Vykoukal, CSc.
Editor
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PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM: A CASE OF POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE AND POST-SOVIET STATES[1]

MICHAL KUBÁT

Introduction

Central and Eastern European countries have become a laboratory for political scientists because of ongoing process of transition to democracy. After being "fascinated" by the transition process itself the attention of scientists turned to the phenomenon of democracy consolidation in the newly democratizing countries.[2]

The birth of democracy there stimulated experts to consider the most convenient models of democracy; which of those models may be recommended to the newly democratizing countries and finally to what extent have been those countries inspired by already existing, largely western models. There was a serious discussion for example about the alternatives between the proportional and majority electoral systems and related systems of political parties.

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[1] The first version of this chapter has been prepared for the Czech magazine Political Science Review (see Kubát, M. *Politický režim a konsolidace demokracie v postkomunistické Evropě a postsovětském prostoru*. Politologický časopis 2/2000, pp. 131–143).

[2] GRUSZCZAK, A. *Konsolidacja demokracji: aspekty teoretyczne i praktyczne*. Ad Meritum Nr 2, 1995.

Last year tenth anniversary of the fall of communism and coming of democracy to the Central and Eastern European countries including the Czech Republic offered an opportunity for various political evaluations. One of the key questions in the discussion has become the issue of political regime. Although the subject of political regimes in general (their types, functioning, advantages and disadvantages of their particular types, etc.) hasn't been any novelty in the western political science,[3] the democracy upheaval in Central and Eastern Europe intensified the discussion and the issue came to its age of renaissance. Therefore it is highly appropriate to join the debate and present some modest comments relating to the theme.

Parliamentarism vs. Presidentialism in Theory
Never Ending Debate

As indicated above, the period after 1989 can be considered a real renaissance of the discussion about the types of political regimes. Some political scientists prefer parliamentarism, the others are more likely to support the idea of presidentialism (or semi-presidentialism). This debate will not have been apparently finished by near future because both sides join issue with strong counter-arguments.[4]

This dispute is based on various aspects. Some experts use as a basic criterion the stability of the regime according to the disposition to political crisis (co-agent of democracy survival). Another criterion may be a stability of the regime connected with the government permanence (executive power) and its efficiency. Further criterion may become some empirical observations (various additions of particular

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[3] Arend Lijphart dealt with the question of advantages and disadvantages of parliamentary and presidential regimes in chapter 5 of his book called *Democracies* (from 1984). See LIJPHART, A. *Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries.* Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1984, pp. 67–90.

[4] ANTOSZEWSKI, A. *Instytucjonalne uwarunkowania procesu decyzyjnego.* In: Antoszewski, A., Herbut, R., (eds.), *Demokracje zachodnioeuropejskie. Analiza porównawcza.* Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 1997, p. 288.

types of regimes in the world in different periods and under given circumstances). The final criterion is a social-economic effectiveness of political system or the degree of political legitimacy both of the political system as a whole or its parts.[5]

Among the scholars who give clear preference to the parliamentarism in comparison with presidentialism are for example J. Linz, A. Lijphart, A. Stepan, C. Skache or F. Riggs.[6] By contrast, G. Sartori, M. Shugart, J. Carey or T. Baylis support the counter-position in this debate.[7]

In western political science "adoration" of parliamentarism dominate to the detriment of presidentalism (or semi-presidentalism). Nevertheless Matthew Shugart and John Carey remark succinctly that the *majority of the theoretical discourses obviously favour parliamentarism but this attitude spreads slowly among the political representatives. All the new democracies constituted in the 70s, 80s but also in the 90s elected their presidents with different levels of executive power.*[8] That is a very impor-

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[5] This is only brief and cursory reference about the discussion on the defects of particular political regimes. The purpose of this article is not to describe or to intervene in such discussions which are quite theoretical. These remarks represent entrée to the following considerations. For those who are interested in that, the details can be found in Journal of Democracy No. 1/14 (1990) or in a memorial volume (1992) edited by A. Lijphart. See Lijphart, A. /ed./. *Parliamentary vs. Presidential Government.* Oxford University Press, New York 1995.

[6] See LINZ, J. J., *The Perils of Presidentialism.* Journal of Democracy Vol. 1, No. 1. 1990, LIJPHART, A. *Constitutional Choices for New Democracies.* Journal of Democracy Vol. 2, No. 1, 1991, STEPAN, A., SKACH, C. *Modele konstytucyjne a umacnianie demokracji (parlamentaryzm – system prezydencki).* Państwo i Prawo, Nr 4, 1994, RIGGS, F. *Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism: Implications for Representativeness and Legitimacy.* International Political Science Review Vol. 18, No. 3, 1997.

[7] See SARTORI, G. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes.* Macmillan Press LTD, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London 1994, SHUGART, M., CAREY, J. *Prezydenci i zgromadzenia przedstawicielskie w prezydenckich systemach sprawowania władzy.* In: Szczupaczyński, J., (ed.), *Władza i społeczeństwo 2. Antologia tekstów z zakresu socjologii polityki.* Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 1998, Baylis, T. *Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe.* World Politics Vol. 48, No. 3, 1996, NOVÁK, M. *Is There One Best 'Mode of Democracy'? Efficiency and Representativeness: 'Theoretical Revolution' or Democratic Dilemma?* Czech Sociological Review Vol. 5, No. 2, 1997.

[8] SHUGART, M., CAREY, J. *Prezydenci i zgromadzenia* ..., p. 82.

tant perception. Only the Czech Republic and Hungary (for a short period also East Germany before rejoining with West Germany) from all of the Central and East European countries turned after 1989 to pure parliamentary regime. At this point it is really necessary to make difference between the pure parliamentarism and its various forms, which were called by Sartori *semi-parliamentary forms*. These semi-parliamentary forms contain some elements characteristic for semi-presidential or even presidential regimes.[9] The supporters of parliamentarism were undoubtedly flattered by the fact that the newly democratizing countries did not accept the pure presidential regime but the triumph was not fulfilled as they mostly did not choose pure parliamentarism. In Central and Eastern Europe, as one will see, the parliamentary elements dominate only apparently.

Parliamentarism vs. Presidentialism in the Post-Communist World

World-famous Polish political scientist Jerzy J. Wiatr wants to prove in some of his latest discourses the superiority of parliamentarism over presidentialism or semi-presidentialism precisely on the example of post-Soviet and post-communist countries in Central and East Europe.[10] His conclusions, however, seem to be at least questionable.

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[9] Giovanni Sartori is not actually a supporter of parliamentarism when he says: "...*parliamentarism works when its wings are clipped, when it acquires – we could say – a semi-parliamentary form*" (SARTORI, G. *Comparative* ..., p. 109). According to him, parliamentarism functions better, the less it is parliamentary. Later on in his book from 1994 he directly adds that he supports the middle course between these extremes- pure presidentialism and pure parliamentarism- therefore he supports the idea of mixed systems (SARTORI, G. *Comparative* ..., p. 135).

[10] WIATR, J. J., *Parliamentarism vs. Presidentialism: Old Debate, New Experiences of Post-communist States*. In: Dvořáková, V. (ed.), *Succes or Failure? Ten years after*. ČSPV, SZPV, Praha 1999, pp. 10–14, Wiatr, J. J., *Socjologia polityki*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 1999, pp. 320–346.

Wiatr argues that while all of the successful young democracies accepted parliamentary regime (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia), those which chose some form of presidential regime, became usually victims of the return of authoritarianism or at least destabilization of the political system (Belarus, Croatia, Rumania, Russia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia). Similar attitude maintains J. Linz who claims that many of the states, former parts of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, which have not recently fulfilled the democratic criteria, elected presidential or semi-presidential regime. There are 26 post-communist countries. Those which chose presidentialism or appointed the presidents with strong competence have not met the democratic standards.[11]

Wiatr determines three arguments why is the presidentialism in the post-communist Europe rather the source of problems than its solution:

1) in most of the states which have chosen the presidential form of government, former communist leaders became presidents,

2) the choice of presidentialism allowed the president to secure an independent position vis-à-vis political parties,

3) strong presidency may be a wrong answer to the very real challenges of multiethnic structure of the society.[12]

Wiatr introduces main arguments in favor of the parliamentary regime :

1) parliamentary regime forces the political representatives to seek compromise not only in a case of the coalition government but also when one political party gains absolute majority. Because the prime minister in this case has to face the fractions in its own political party,

2) if the prime minister loses his support within parliament he can be easily displaced through the *votum of non-confidence*. By contrast, in presidentialism the president is absolutely

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[11] LINZ, J. J., *Introduction: Some Thoughts on Presidentialism in Post-communist Europe.* In: Taras, R. (ed.), *Post-communist Presidents.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997, p. 2.

[12] WIATR, J. J., *Parliamentarism vs. Presidentialism* ..., pp. 12–13.

irrevocable except the quasi law trials in case of violation of the constitution or the laws,

3) parliamentary regime protects the interests of national minorities because their deputies may become useful in case of government formation.[13]

Wiatr finally concludes that: *"supporters of semi-authoritarian elements are likely to choose the presidentialism, where the elected and generally irrevocable president is the chief of executive power. In some of the post-socialist countries (Belarus, Russia) the presidents were given so strong competence that the parliament found itself so weakened that the presidential regime assumed the authoritative characteristics. The decision of East and Central European countries to choose the parliamentary cabinet regime turned out to be favourable to the democratic consolidation in the region.*[14]

Consolidated and Non-Consolidated Democracy

In this kind of argumentation one can find several questionable points. Firstly it is a comparison of something that is in fact incomparable. What does mean Linz's formula *"out of 26 post-communist countries?"* Is it correct to compare for example Hungary or Poland with Belarus or Albania? What I mean is to make a clear difference between consolidated and non-consolidated democracies. We can easily use the criteria of two experts mentioned above in case of consideration which country is democratically consolidated and which is not. J. Linz (together with A. Stepan) precisely deal with this subject in the book from 1996, mainly in its first theoretical part. Essentially, in their opinion, there are two conditions for the consolidation of the democracy: completing of the transition process (free elections are crucial here) and fulfillment of the democracy framework that is to say that politicians elected in democratic way

[13] WIATR, J. J., *Socjologia polityki...*, pp. 339–340.
[14] *Ibidem*, p. 340.

govern democratically indeed: *"Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic and political or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non democratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state; Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from democratic forces; Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and non-governmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process?*[15] As the leading Czech political scientist M. Novák states in his extensive review of this book: *"only democracy itself can be consolidated democracy. According to that, Linz and Stepan leave apart liberalizing non-democratic regimes, pseudo-democracies, as well as the hybrids where coexist along with several democratic institutions also non-democratic institutions without any control of a democratic state.*"[16]

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[15] LINZ, J. J., STEPAN, A. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe.* The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London 1996, p. 6.
Wiatr determines the criteria for democracy consolidation in a similar way: 1) regular free and fair elections, 2) lawfulness (legal state) and constitution-abiding, 3) protection of human rights and political liberties, 4) absence of state discriminatory policy against the national and religious minorities. In a broader perspective Wiatr defines the democratic consolidation as a well-functioning civic society based on state-independent self-government of the organized civic groups. The state where are no (or only marginally) anti-democratic forces calling for the violence or struggling for the seccesion and the state where the majority of the population and political elite accept the democratic procedures and democratic institutions as the only legal means for realization of political interests (WIATR, J. J., *Socjologia polityki* ..., pp. 333–234).
[16] NOVÁK, M. Recenze knihy Juana J. LINZE, Alfreda STEPANA, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe.* The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore – London 1996, in: Politologická revue 1998/1, p. 115.

Therefore is it possible to ignore the difference between consolidated as well as non-consolidated democracies? Of course, it is not. Obviously Wiatr himself recognizes that when he says: *"...at the end of the 90s there were only six post-socialist countries with consolidated and basically well-functioning democratic systems: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia.*[17] Later on he continues: *"... among twenty seven post-communist states in Europe and former USSR only six can be at present defined as consolidated democracies. They are the following: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. I have considered Latvia, Macedonia, and Ukraine as borderline cases..."*[18]

There are dramatic differences among various countries of the post-communist world. It is extremely complicated to compare for example: Lukasenko's Belarus with Poland – member state of NATO. It seems to be behind the point to put on the same level Putin's Russia with its Chechen crisis or post-Miloshevic's Serbia with politically "mature" Hungary or Slovenia. Even in the post-Soviet region would be a mistake to mingle the succession states of the former Soviet Union. Is it possible to compare authocratic post-Soviet republics[19] with Baltic States (Estonia is a front runner waiting to be accepted to the EU). Another problem concerns the borderline cases as for example Romania after 1996 post-Meciar Slovakia or post-

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[17] WIATR, J. J. *Socjologia polityki* ..., p. 333.

[18] WIATR, J. J. *Parliamentarism vs. Presidentialism* ..., p. 9.

[19] Political regimes in post-Soviet republics take sometime very comical almost bizarre characteristics. In Turkmenistan for example the president Saparmurat Nijazov was declared in the end of December 1999 by Supreme Legislative Assembly a prophet and his term of office was extended with no restrictions at all. Nijazov became lifelong president of Turkmenistan (MYKISKA, M. *Turkmenistán: Nijazov – traktorista a prorok v rouše prezidentově*. Týden 15/2000, pp. 36–38). It is not exceptional to witness election outcomes with statistical results so much similar to those that we encountered in our region in the period before 1989. There were the presidential elections in Tadjikistan (in the half of November in 1999) where it was announced after some disputes that the former president Imomali Rachmonov allegedly won 96 % of votes and the turnout was according to the official data 98 %! (VLACH, T. *Tádžikistán: jak z prezidentských voleb udělat dobrý obchod*. Týden 53/99, pp. 42–43).

Tudjman Croatia. It would be unjust to characterize these countries as non-democratic but at this stage they remain to be seen non-consolidated democracies.

Table 1. Consolidated Democracies, Non-Consolidated Democracies and Non-Democracies in Post-Communist Europe and Post-Soviet States

CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY	SEMI-CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY	NON-CONCONSOLID. DEMOCRACY	MINIMAL SCALE OR ABSENCE OF DEMOCRACY
Czech Republic	Bulgaria	Albania	Armenia
Estonia	Croatia (→)*	Bosnia-Hercegovina	Azerbejdjan
Hungary	Latvia	Kirgistan (→)*	Belarus
Lithuania	Macedonia (→)*	Moldavia	Yugoslavia
Poland	Slovakia (from. 1998)	Russia	Georgia
Slovenia		Romania	Kazakhstan
		Ukraine (→)*	Tadjikistan
			Turkmenistan
			Uzbekistan

* Borderline cases.
Source: The table made by the author following the data from *Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1999*. Europa Publications Limited, London, 1999 (Fourth Edition).

Another disputed point in J. J. Wiatr's argumentation is his reluctance to differentiate within the group of consolidated democracies. He operates with the category of consolidated democracy as with a final level of the problems discussed. But even in the consolidated democracy problems can appear with functioning of the political system. In case of judging about the issue of the political regime choice, we shouldn't restrict ourselves to the question of the democracy itself and its survival (democracy vs. authoritative regime) but also to the question no less dramatic or

important and that is the optimum functioning of the democratic political system as a whole. Poland until 1997 or the present Czech Republic may be introduced as a good example. Searching for the political regime in Poland during 1989 and 1997 was not a struggle for the democratic regime substance itself, it was rather an effort to find out the most suitable political regime which would suit Poland the best.[20] Similarly the recent debate in the Czech Republic upon the constitutional and electoral engineering has not been a sign of crisis or struggle for democracy itself (despite some commentaries of journalists or statements made by certain Czech politicians who feel themselves endangered by these proposed changes). In fact, it is legitimate discussion and effort to improve the functioning of the political system in the democratically consolidated country.

In short, constitutional engineering and debate about advantages or disadvantages of particular political regimes may be but also may be not at all a sign of crisis of democracy or destabilization of a democratic political system.

Presidential Regime and Authoritarianism

There is another reason "related to the above problem" why the claim is wrong that presidential regimes are to be rejected on principle because the countries that chose such regimes failed to preserve democracy and fell prey to authoritarianism.

As mentioned above, it is crucial to distinguish among consolidated democracies, non-consolidated democracies and states with minimum level of democracy up to those with the complete absence of democracy. Presidential regime is as well as the other types (parliamentary and semi-presidential) in scientific literature linked entirely with the democratic political system. All these examples can

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[20] Bankowicz, M. *Ewolucja systemu politycznego III Rzeczypospolitej.* In: Kloczkowski, J. (ed.), *Od komunizmu do ...? Dokąd zmierza III Rzeczpospolita?* Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 1999.

be used to all intents and purposes only in relation with liberal democracy.[21] The bottom line for distinguishing these types of political regimes is the way how the separation of powers (executive, legislative and judicial) is accomplished. There is one head of state directly elected (the president is both the head of state and the prime minister) and strictly separated from the legislative power (parliament) in presidential regime. The principle of separation of powers is added by the principle of political non-responsibility of executive power (president) towards parliament. Practically, these prerequisites are to come into effect by the system of checks and balances that is to say the mutual restrictions among executive, legislative and judicial power. All of that must be complemented by the regular and free elections (presidential and parliamentary), political pluralism, lawfulness (legal state), adherence to human and civil rights and eventually other attributes of real democracy.[22]

In non-democratic regimes is valid the principle of compactness of state power or the separation of powers is only formal and it is not fulfilled in common politics because entire state power belongs de facto to one dictator, one political party or one collective leadership (i.e. military junta). Policy is above the constitution and institutions. There are no free elections and no political pluralism (or just illustratory pluralism as were Institutes of National Fronts in some former communist countries). In addition to that, in case of so called presidentialisms which hide in fact the non-democratic regime, the principle of checks and balances either does not exist or is not put in practice at all.[23]

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[21] BALL, A. R. *Modern Politics and Government.* Macmillan Education, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London 1988, p. 50, Antoszewski, A. *Reżym polityczny.* In: Jabłoński, A. W., Sobkowiak, L. (eds.), *Studia z teorii polityki. Tom I.* Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 1996, p. 84, Hague, R., Harrop, M., Breslin, S. (1998). *Comparative Government and Politics. An Introduction.* Macmillan Press, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London 1998, p. 202.

[22] BANKOWICZ, M. *Typy současné demokracie.* Parlamentní zpravodaj 06/1996, p. 222.

[23] HAGUE, R., HARROP, M., BRESLIN, S. *Comparative Government...*, pp. 215–218.

The presidential regime and authoritarianism are therefore not replaceable. At most it can be a certain facade[24] of presidentialism. Cover with no contents inside. But it has to be clear that this not only the case of presidentialism but also of the parliamentary regime. Parliamentary regime can serve as useful cover-up for non-democratic political system as well.[25]

Is that anyhow related to Wiatr's hypotheses? A large number of post-communist countries has not finished the process of democratization of its political system yet. They have neither completed the transition process towards democracy nor have reached the aim of democratic consolidation. Some states even did not initiate the process of democratization because former communist leaders took over the power there (but is there any direct link to presidentialism itself as Wiatr argues?). After the fall of communism and following disintegration of the Soviet Union many of the former top communist authorities came to power again in many of the post-Soviet countries.

For example in Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, former chief of Communist Party of former Soviet era, has been governing there since 1990 till present. The democratization in Uzbekistan is completely out of question.[26] The classic example of the democratization failure has been also in Belarus where despite some of the

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[24] Jackson, R. J., Jackson, D. *A Comparative Introduction to Political Science.* Prentice Hall, New Jersey 1997, p. 80.

[25] What comes around never goes around. The communist Czechoslovakia, which was politically and ideologically higly dogmatic state, formally produced many aspects od parliamentary regime – institute of the president of republic (rather an exception in the communist area), the system of relationships between the government and the parliament, *votum of confidence or non-confidence* procedures etc. (BANKOWICZ, M. *Systemy władzy państwowej Czechoslowacji i Czech. Studium instytucjonalno-polityczne.* Wydawnictwo PiT, Kraków 1998, p. 2). All these constitutional mechanisms were, however, only a formal matter. It is very important. The external characteristics is not sufficient. It can only be empty and meaningless. Democratic political regime becomes genuinely democratic only in the case when the declarated democratic principles are thoroughly applied in practice. The constitution which is not respected is nothing but a piece of paper (remember Stalin's "the most democratic constitution of the world").

[26] *Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1999.* Europa Publications Limited, London, 1999 (Fourth Edition).

attempts the democratization has not been even initiated.[27] From the very beginning the formal Belorussian presidentialism (pseudo-semi-presidentialism) is only a mere cover-up for the authoritative regime. In fact it has nothing in common with the semi-presidentialism and that it is why it could not fail. The similar situation can be found in other post-communist countries.

Table 2. Real and Believed (only according to the constitution) Political Regimes in Post-Communist Europe and Post-Soviet Region (consolidated democracies, non-consolidated democracies or the absence of democracy)

PARLIAMENTARY REGIME		SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL REGIME		PRESIDENTIAL REGIME	
real	believed (according to the constitution)	real	believed (according to the constitution)	real	believed (according to the constitution)
Czech Republic	Albania	Lithuania	Armenia		Georgia
Estonia	(←)* Bulgaria		Azerbejdjan		Kazakhstan (←←)**
Hungary	(←)* Latvia		Belarus		Turkmenistan
Poland	(←)* Macedonia		(←)* Croatia		Uzbekistan (←←)**
Slovenia	(←)* Slovakia		Kirgistan		
			Moldavia		
			Rumania		
			Russia		
			Tadjikistan (→→)**		
			Ukraine		
			Yugoslavia (?)***		

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[27] See OWSIANNIK, S., STRIEŁKOWA, J. *Władza a społeczeństwo, Białoruś 1991–1998.* Presspublica, Warszawa 1998.

* The borderline cases – mostly semi-consolidated democracies
** The borderline cases-countries balancing between believed semi-presidentialism and believed presidentialism. Kazakhstan does not meet the condition of one headed executive. Together with the president there is also the government chaired by prime minister. But the government is responsible to the president of the republic not to the parliament (nevertheless the president appoints the prime minister with an approval of the parliament). The similar situation is in Tadjikistan, where the president of the republic is at the same time a head of a state and chief of executive power but the head of the government is prime minister. The government there is responsible both to the parliament and to the president of the republic. Prime minister and ministers are appointed and deposed by the president with an approval of the parliament According to the constitution, Tadjikistan in contrast to Kazakhstan rather comes near to semi-presidentialism than presidentialism. In Uzbekistan the political system resembles the political system in Kazakhstan in this regard.[28]
*** Yugoslav Federation does not meet the essential prerequisite of semi-presidential regime which are the direct general elections of the federal president. In fact he is elected by Federal Assembly.
Bosna-Herzegovina is not included in the table as it has collective leadership of the state – three-member presidency.
Source: The table following the data from *Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1999*. Europa Publications Limited, London, 1999 (Fourth Edition), and Goduń, T. et al. *Leksykon systemów politycznych*. Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa 1999 and *International Constitutional Law*, Universität Würzburg., *Constitution Finder*, University of Richmond.
In: http://www.urich.edu/~jpjones/confinder/const.html.

Face-to-face with these facts it becomes evident that we can hardly speak about presidential or semi-presidential regimes in case of post-communist Europe and post-Soviet states where non-consolidated democracies has been still prevailing (authoritative regimes included). Where the genuine democracy was not established, there could not have been established presidential or semi-presidential regime and at most it has been a matter of pseudo-presidentialism or pseudo-semi-presidentialism. Therefore it is very questionable to prove the failure of presidentialism or semi-presidentialism on the examples of countries which has not become consolidated democracies yet (or has not become democracies at all)

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[28] *Eastern Europe* ..., GODUŃ, T. et al. *Leksykon systemów politycznych*. Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa 1999.

and therefore could not establish genuine working presidential or semi-presidential regime to all intents and purposes.

Political Regime in Central and Eastern Europe – Triumph of Parliamentarism?

Only six post-communist countries, if we consider Linz's and Stepan's criterion are consolidated democracies. It is the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. Other seven countries have been on their way towards democratic consolidation. This is the question of Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Macedonia, and Slovakia. The rest of the states is characterized by the lack of democratic consolidation or absence of democracy itself. Consequently the political regimes can be seriously discussed only in case of the first and with certain amount of indulgence in case of the second group of states.

It is true that in Central and Eastern Europe dominates parliamentary regime. Presidential regime did not push through and semi-presidential regimes or near semi-presidential regimes are rare in this region.[29] But it is really sufficient reason for claiming the parliamentary regime to be the only correct way to achieve consolidated democracy? Semi-presidentialism was not in any way an obstacle for the establishment of consolidated democracy in Lithuania.[30] Poland did not become a parliamentary republic until 1997 when a new constitution was accepted. During 1989–1997 there was a regime closed to semi-presidentialism in Poland which was not a cause of any destabilization of the political system and did not mean a threat to the successful process of democratic consolidation.[31] Semi-

[29] KUBÁT, M. *Ústavní změny v perspektivě srovnání se středovýchodní Evropou.* Parlamentní zpravodaj 1/2000, p. 29.

[30] The regime in Lithuania is completely different from the regime in Latvia and Estonia. The most characteristic sign is the strong position of the president. Lithuanian system of state power is based on two fundaments: parliament (Seimas) and directly elected president of the republic. (See NÖRGAARD, O. *The Baltic States after Independence.* Edward Elgar, Cheltenham-Brookfield 1995, pp. 73–76).

presidential regime in Croatia did not manage to maintain the semi-authorianism connected particularly with the deceased president Franjo Tudjman (died in 1999). Croatia is after the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2000 in hope of stepping out towards the democratic consolidation without changing its regime.[32] The similar situation was in semi-presidential Rumania which, after the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1996 (took place together), also stepped out on the difficult way leading to democratic consolidation. By contrast, in Slovakia the parliamentary regime was totally unable to prevent Meciar from coming to power there and it definitely did not contribute to the consolidation of democracy in the country. In Latvia alike, the parliamentarism itself failed to protect the interests of national minorities and therefore Latvia cannot be classified among the completely consolidated democracies.[33] Furthermore, it has to be stressed that some of the democratically consolidated countries in

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[31] Wiatr affirms that establishment of parliamentary regime in Poland was a great contribution to calm the stormy situation on the Polish political scene and stabilized the whole political system (WIATR, J. J. *Parliamentarism vs. Presidentialism* ..., p. 13). But the truth is that the main cause was the reform of the electoral system in 1993 which strengthened the majority effect and prevented further division (even scattering) of the Sejm. In semi-presidential regime, a lot of elements play their roles. The role of Polish president developed in accordance with the theory of semi-presidential regimes. (See DUVERGER, M. *A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government*. European Journal of Political Research 8/2 /June 1980). The political system in Poland was after the parliamentary elections in 1993 it means well before the new constitution was adopted in 1997 which brought about departure from semi-presidential system towards a parliamentary one (See BANKOWICZ, M. *Ewolucja systemu politycznego* ...).

[32] The situation in the post-Yugoslav republics (except Slovenia) is more complicated because of war conflicts in the region and their consequences. To talk about the failure or non-failure of any kind of political regime would be very complicated. Authoritarianism of Franjo Tudjman is tightly connected to the war in the Balkans and its consequences (GARLICCY, A. L. *Wstęp*. In: *Konstytucja Republiki Chorwacji*. Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa 1995). It is illusory to think that parliamentary regime could have prevented the war. The causes of the destabilization in the region are completely different.

[33] According to Wiatr parliamentary regime is better than presidential one because it succeeds in protecting the national minorities as their deputies are usually needed in the process of government setting. This is very optimistic statement. The problem of Russian minority in Latvia has nothing in common with the type of political

Central and Eastern Europe are parliamentary regimes but in a combination with certain non-parliamentary elements. For example Polish and Slovenian presidents are elected in direct general elections. Their position no doubt corresponds with the principles of parliamentarism but the single fact that they come out of the general elections raises their legitimacy and strenghtens their position in the political systems of those countries.

Among the parliamentary regimes in Central and Eastern Europe only the Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia the pure parliamentarism have.[34] Other countries have either semi-presidential regimes (Lithuania) or parliamentary regimes with a reinforced position of their presidents (Poland, Slovenia). Out of the countries which are at the moment on their way towards democratic consolidation only Latvia represents pure parliamentarism. The rest is formmed by the countries with semi-presidential regimes (Croatia, Rumania, Ukraine) or parliamentary regimes with strengthened position of their presidents (Bulgaria, Slovakia, Macedonia).[35]

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regime there and the Latvian parliamentary regime cannot be thus expected to bring a solution. In other countries there is also no obvious connection between the type of political regime and the status of national minorities (for example parliamentary regime in the Czech Republic and the problem of Romany people). In addition to it, deputies of national minorities are not represented in the parliament everywhere (because the electoral system won't let them in or because of the fact that these minorities are simply not organized and strong enough to push through, for example Romany people in the Czech Republic). The other problem could be also that these minorities are very small and therefore with no influence at all (for example German minority in Poland which had 4 deputies during 1993–1997 and since 1997 has had only 2 deputies out of 460 members of parliament).

[34] There was an extensive political debate in Hungary during 1989-1990 if the president should be elected by direct general elections or by the National Assembly. There was a referendum on the subject on 29th of July 1990. But it was not valid as the electoral turnout was very low – 13,8 % instead of required min. 50 % of entitled voters 1,86 % of voters voted for the direct elections). Thereupon the President of Hungary is elected by the parliament. (ROSE, R., MUNRO, N., MACKIE, T. *Elections in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1990*. University of Strathclyde, Glasgow 1998, p. 58).

[35] GODUŇ et al. *Leksykon systemów* ...

Table 3. Political Regime in Consolidated Democracies of Central and Eastern Europe

PARLIAMENTARY REGIME	PARLIAMENTARY REGIME WITH DIRECTLY ELECTED PRESIDENT	SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL REGIME
Czech Republic	Poland	Lithuania
Hungary	Slovenia	
Estonia		

Source: The table following the data from *Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1999.* Europa Publications Limited, London, 1999 (Fourth Edition), Goduń T. et al. *Leksykon system?w politycznych.* Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa 1999 and *International Constitutional Law,* Universität Würzburg, In: *Constitution Finder,* University of Richmond. In: http://www.urich.edu/~jpjones/confinder/const.html.

Table 4. Political Regime in Semi-Consolidated Democracies of Central and Eastern Europe

PARLIAMENTARY REGIME	PARLIAMENTARY REGIME WITH DIRECTLY ELECTED PRESIDENT	SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL REGIME
Latvia	Bulgaria	Croatia
	Macedonia	Rumania
	Slovakia	Ukraine

Source: The table following the data from *Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1999.* Europa Publications Limited, London, 1999 (Fourth Edition), Goduń, T. et al. *Leksykon systemów politycznych.* Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa 1999 and *International Constitutional Law,* Universität Würzburg. In: *Constitution Finder,* University of Richmond. In: http://www.urich.edu/~jpjones/confinder/const.html.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, the recent experience from the post-communist countries does not contribute largely to the discussion upon the political regimes. It is impossible to prove or disprove the absolute superiority of a single political regime over another on the basis of a constitutional theory and political practice in Central and East European countries. No political regime is ideal for all countries. It is always inevitable to take into account the specifics of each particular state and its society. Each form has to be adapted to the given circumstances.[36] The claim that parliamentary or presidential regime is under all circumstances better, better functioning and more convenient for democratic consolidation, more capable for action, etc. is unmaintainable.

In Central and Eastern Europe (consolidated and semi-consolidated democracies) the parliamentary regime prevails but in its pure form parliamentarism can be found only rarely (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Latvia). The most common is parliamentarism with strengthened presidency either by the way the presidents are elected or by particular competences given them by the constitution. The semi-presidential regime is rare in the region but Central and East Europe does not witness the its complete absence. Parliamentarism can be helpful in the process of the democratic consolidation but not always (Slovakia). Semi-presidentialism may but also may not obstruct democratic consolidation (Lithuania). The presidential regime is not truly represented in the region of Central and Eastern Europe and post-Soviet area and that is why it is difficult to prove on the basis of pseudo-presidential regimes (which have been in fact non-democratic from the beginning of their existence) the failure of the presidential regime itself.

Many elements other than the type of a political regime, however, contribute to the democratic consolidation or on the contrary

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[36] DAHL, R. A. *O demokracji*, Znak, Kraków 2000, p. 179, Dahl, R. A., *Demokracie v právním státě?* Readers International, Praha 1995, p. 69.

endanger democracy as such. It is the respect or non-respect of the democratic procedures by political elites and the transfer of political rivalry to extra-electoral and extra-parliamentary levels (a style of thoughts of political elites which admits or not the possibility of a defeat of a political rival in some other way than by democratic elections and willingness to tolerate the opposition), relationship of political elites with the media (especially towards television), the conflict related to the conciliation with the heritage of communism (overcoming the situation when the main conflict landmark of party cleavages is the relationship to the past), the type and quality of party political system, the relationship to national minorities and the way of the solution of this problem, the ability of conversion from post-communist parties to pro-system parties which can participate in a democratic game and respect its rules, the behaviour of the electorate and many other factors.[37] The question of perspective of democracy, its survival or on the contrary its collapse is very extensive and complicated theme which deserves in-depth separate discourse.

Summary

The discourse introduces the connection between the type of political regime and the level of democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern European countries. Unfortunately, the recent experience from the post-communist countries does not contribute largely to the discussion upon the political regimes. It is impossible to prove or disprove the absolute superiority of a single political

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[37] ANTOSZEWSKI, A. *Perspektywy demokracji w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej.* In: Antoszewski, A., Herbut, R. (eds.), *Demokracje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w perspektywie porównawczej.* Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 1998, HUNTINGTON, S., P. *Trzecia fala demokratyzacji.* Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1995, Linz, J. J. *Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration.* In: Linz, J. J., Stepan, A. (eds.), *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes.* The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London 1978.

regime over another on the basis of a constitutional theory and political practice in Central and East European countries. No political regime is ideal for all countries. It is always inevitable to take into account the specifics of each particular state and its society. Each form has to be adapted to the given circumstances. The claim that parliamentary or presidential regime is under all circumstances better, better functioning and more convenient for democratic consolidation, more capable for action, etc. is unmaintainable. In Central and Eastern Europe (consolidated and semi-consolidated democracies) the parliamentary regime prevails but in its pure form parliamentarism can be found only rarely (in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Latvia). The most common is parliamentarism with strengthened presidency either by the way presidents are elected or by particular competence given them by the constitution. The semi-presidential regime is rare in the region. Parliamentarism can be helpful in the process of democratic consolidation but not always (Slovakia). Semi-presidentialism may but also may not obstruct democratic consolidation (Lithuania). Presidential regime is not truly represented in the region of Central and Eastern Europe and post-Soviet area and that is why it is not difficult to prove the failure of presidential regime itself on the basis of pseudo-presidential regimes (in fact from the beginning the authoritative ones). Many elements other than the type of a political regime, however, con-tribute to democratic consolidation or on the contrary endanger democracy as such.

Translation: Kateřina Sobotková

SMERSH: THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR [38]

BOHUSLAV LITERA

One of the first acts of the Russian liberal democratic provisional government after the revolution in February 1917 was the dissolution of police units and the entire Ochranka security system which symbolized the repressive Tsarist regime. In ironic contrast the Bolsheviks, within six seeks of seizing power in October of the same year, established a political police force under Felix Dzerzhinsky in the form of an "All Russian Extraordinary Commission for the Suppression of Counterrevolution and Sabotage", known by its Russian acronym Cheka. It doubtless owed its origin to Lenin's thesis that revolution cannot exist without counterrevolution and that organs must therefore be created to protect the revolution from its enemies. [39]

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[38] The first version of this chapter has been been prepared for the Czech journal The Slavonic Review (see LITERA, B., SMĚRŠ. K činnosti sovětské vojenské kontra-rozvědky za druhé světové války. Slovanský přehled, 86, 2000, no. 1, pp. 1–24.

[39] Because of the character of the problems, the earlier Soviet literature tends to be more schematic than other work: see for example D. L. Golinkov, *Krach vrazheskogo podpolya. Iz istorii borby s kontrrevolucii v sovietskoy Rosii 1917–1924 gg.*, Moscow 1971. P. G. SOFINOV, *Ocherki istorii vsherossiskoy chrezvydhaynoy komissii 1917–1921 gg.*,

The activities of the Cheka quickly expanded to include not only all spheres of life throughout Soviet Russia but also the creation of an external intelligence service. Nor was the military excluded from its purview, although the Red Army of Workers and Peasants possessed its own system of political commissars, Party cells and military control units. However, several incidents in 1918 showed that the rapid expansion of the army and the incorporation of Tsarist officers had, despite all security measures, weakened its reliability. The Cheka presidium discussed the problems of monitoring army reliability and of military counter-intelligence in general as early as 9 April 1918 and set up a special committee to deal with them. But they were already the subject of attention by four separate organs within the Red Army, which in September 1918 were unified under the authority of the Revvoyensoviet.[40]

After military reverses in the Perm region and on the southern front at the end of 1918, the result of sabotage by former Tsarist officers, the Bolshevik government took vigorous measures. The appropriate plans were presented by a special commission formed in November 1918 and headed by Dzerzhinsky. Purges were carried out in the organs of military control, and on 19 December the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party ordered that they be merged with the Cheka military sections. "Special Sections" (*osobiye otdyela* or "OO"), answerable not to the army but to the Cheka, were established in units of the army and navy.[41]

Thus, for the first time in modern history there arose a centralized military counterintelligence service which was not answerable to a military body, which meant that the army was under the control of an agency independent of the military. The system, despite various modifications, continued throughout the existence of

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Moscow 1960. More critical work appeared in the 1990's, such as the collection of documents *VCHK-GPU. Dokumenty i materialy*, Moscow 1995. However, much remains concealed in Russian literature and source editions. The best survey is G. LEGETTA, *The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police*, Oxford 1981.

[40] S. OSTRYAKOV, *Voyennye chekisty*, Moscow 1979, 24. Revvoyensoviet was the highest Red Army collective organ until 1934.

[41] G. LEGGETT, *The Cheka*, 97 ff.

the Soviet Union and the military counterintelligence, except for a brief interlude, remained answerable to non-military security organs.

The first chief of the Special Section was the Cheka officer M. S. Kedrov. On 27 December 1918 the Cheka ordered all its provincial organizations to form Special Sections and on 4 January 1919 Kedrov ordered the creation of Special Sections in military units by merging existing military control bodies with the military sections of the Cheka. The Special Sections were thus hierarchically subordinate to the Cheka, but in their activities they betrayed a certain dualism in that they also carried out orders received from the Revvoyen-soviet. Kedrov himself became a member of the Cheka presidium.

The task of the Special Sections was to fight against counter-revolution and espionage in the army and navy, but also to carry out espionage outside the territory of Soviet Russia and in regions occupied by the White Guard. This was therefore not classic counterintelligence, but its combination with active intelligence, a combination guaranteeing the best results. The Special Sections were empowered to pursue and arrest suspects, conduct searches and in special circumstances to execute prisoners. Broader duties included dealing with desertion, criminality and corruption in the army, rooting out all anti-Soviet tendencies and providing a rear guard. From the viewpoint of Bolshevick power it was clearly a most important body, assuring the political loyalty and fighting capacity of the army. As such the Special Sections in the army participated fully in the red terror during the civil war.[42]

The Special Sections carried out essentially the same function throughout the interwar period, when they took part in the purges and repression within the Red Army. But the repression was also turned against themselves, and some of their members were imprisoned and executed. One of the key documents defining the duties of the OO at the height of the repression and just before the Second World War was a joint order by the Commissars of Defense and the Interior, K. Voroshilov and L. Beria, dated 13 January 1939.

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[42] G. LEGETT, *The Cheka*, 100 ff. *VCHK - GPU. Dokumenty i materialy*, Moscow 1995.

The Special Sections of the NKVD continued to have as their primary task the struggle against counterrevolution, espionage, and manifestations of anti-Soviet sentiment in the army and navy, but also in the border troops and those of the NKVD.[43]

The Special Sections therefore created a network of informers within military units and among the civilian populace who had any dealings with the army, and continued to have the power to arrest, conduct searches, and so forth. The approval of the Special Section of the military unit was required for the arrest of enlisted men and petty officers, while the arrest of higher ranking officers required approval from the Special Section of the NKVD and the Ministry of Defense. Special Sections were formed in all military units to brigade level, while in lower units, at the regimental level, their deputies were appointed. Chiefs of the Special Sections were also members of the Military-Political Commissions of these units.[44]

The Special Sections did not serve merely as a repressive security organ but also apparently functioned as an extra, independent channel of control by which the NKVD and its chief Beria obtained independent information concerning the state of the army, which was doubtless useful in the struggle for power. This is suggested for example by a report of the OO NKVD of the Leningrad Military Region concerning shortcomings in civil defense, dated 4 September 1939, or Beria's directive of 2 August to the Special Sections in the army concerning a number of problems arising during mobilization. Beria ordered the Special Sections to make a full report to the NKVD Special Section of all shortcomings connected with the mobilization and also of any individuals showing "defeatist" or "terrorist" tendencies.[45] The Special Services also investigated attempts by military personnel to flee the country as part of the constant struggle against desertion.

According to the NKVD organizational scheme at the end of 1939, the Special Sections formed the fourth section of the state

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[43] *Organy gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoy Otyechestvennoy voyne. Sbornik dokumentov. Tom 1, kniga 1*, Moscow 1995, 29.

[44] *Ibid.*, 30.

[45] *Ibid.*, 57–58.

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security administration (GUGB), which was in turn divided into thirteen sections corresponding partly to the types of military units (section 3, Air Force; section 4, technical units; section 5 motorized units, etc.), and partly to spheres of activity (section 1 was devoted to the army staffs, section 2 to the active intelligence). The investigative section was classified as independent.[46]

On 7 September 1940, following the occupation of eastern Poland, the Baltic States, Finland and Rumania and in connection with the sharp increase in the number of military personnel, the chief of the Special Section of State Security (OO/GUGB/NKVD) A. V. Micheyev issued an order detailing the duties of the Army Special Sections. Their chief activity was to be aimed at uncovering anti-Soviet sentiment in the army, gathering information about damage ascribed to "enemy elements or criminal negligence". The Special Sections were to focus especially on attacks against the Soviet Union, desertion, German violations of Soviet air space, terrorist and diversionary activities, all air accidents and cases of mass poisoning or infection among the troops.[47]

It is interesting that the order failed to emphasize the need for classical counter-intelligence activity by the Special Sections even though the German espionage services were conducting a massive campaign against the Soviet Union. In 1940 and the beginning of 1941 the NKVD uncovered and liquidated 66 Abwehr agencies comprising about 1,600 agents. Of these about 1,400 were in the newly attached western Soviet regions.[48]

However, the activities of the German secret services were the subject of special instructions from the Special Section of the GUGB NKVD of 30 November 1940. Here Micheyev warned that the Germans were sending not only individual agents but entire groups to gather information about the Red Army, encourage troops to

[46] A. I. KOKORIN, N. V. PETROV, eds., *Lyublyanka: VCHK - OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB. 1917–1960. Spravochnik*, Moscow 1997, 247–248. The entire NKVD included 30 main administrations.

[47] *Organy gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti, tom I, kniga I,* 248–249.

[48] S. OSTRYAKOV, *Voyennye chekisty*, 142.

desert and flee the country, and make use of the populace in the recently annexed regions of Byelorussia and the Ukraine. According to the instruction, the Abwehr made use of qualified espionage agents of the UON (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), Polish members of "illegal nationalist organizations formed in Germany", Polish military personnel returning from captivity, Poles and Ukrainians returning from France where they had been working before 1939, and refugees from western Byelorussia and the Ukraine. The Special Sections were therefore to verify contacts between soldiers and suspicious persons and where they occurred in border regions, they were to move to the rear to complete the investigation.[49]

Similar instructions in response to activity by the Abwehr and analyzing its methods are quite plentiful in the printed sources. Mikheyev for example issued a circular on 29 January 1941 detailing German espionage activities and ordering countermeasures, while on 18 April another analyzing activity by all intelligence services, not merely the German, aimed at the Soviet Union.[50]

A circular of 25 May 1941 contained a relatively detailed analysis of activity by the Abwehr and (according to Mikheyev) also the Gestapo aimed against the Soviet army, which identified the main areas of German interest, discussed their operational approach and the background of their agents (52 percent were said to be Poles, 30 percent Ukrainians).[51]

The Special Sections, however, did not limit their attention to the army. Their agents were concerned with the most varied "counter-revolutionary espionage and diversionary formations", i.e. nationalist organizations, especially on recently annexed territory. They conducted operations in cooperation with other security organizations and in some cases independently.[52] According to official Soviet

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[49] *Organy gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti, tom I, kniga 1,* 280–281.
[50] *Ibid., tom 1, kniga 2,* 22–23, 103–106.
[51] *Ibid.,* 158–160.
[52] See the circular of the chief of the 3rd Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR Mikheyev dated 22 May 1941, in *Organy gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti, tom I, kniga 2,* 152–153.

sources such operations were to be frequent. Ostrayakov asserts that from April to October 1940 38 such groups were liquidated in western Ukraine, while in western Byelorussia a large illegal organization, the Zwazek walki zbrojnej or Union of Armed Struggle set up by Polish officers, was destroyed. The group controlled eight battalions, a supply of arms, and had a membership of 2,500. It carried out espionage activities and was preparing to launch a diversionary campaign in the rear of the Red Army. Further organizations existed in Latvia and Lithuania.[53]

The events portending war took place in a situation where "specials organs of the NKVD were mobilized" and operated under orders which have remained secret down to the present. On 27 January 1941 I. I. Maslenikov, deputy commissar of the interior, ordered that "special organs of the NKVD" begin mobilization, which doubtless meant increasing their numerical strength and expanding their authority.[54]

A second substantial change was a resolution of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet which formally sanctioned a resolution of the Politburo of the Bolshevik Party separating the existing Commissariat of the Interior into two entities: the interior (NKVD) and state security (NKGB). The motive for the reorganization remains unclear. The Russian literature indicates merely that it was prompted by the prevailing political and security situation. But it is certain that the NKVD had become a colossus, concentrating vast authority and resources.

The newly formed NKGB included the Bureau of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, the Secret Political Bureau, the Kremlin Bureau, the Bureau of Investigation and several others. The NKVD continued to be responsible for border protection, civil defense, firefighting, prison administration (including prisoner of war camps), care of orphaned or deprived children, but also the construction and repair of important roads, the national archives and the civil sector.[55] L.

[53] S. OSTRYAKOV, *Voyennye chekisty*, 145.
[54] *Organy gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti, tom 1, kniga 2*, 22.
[55] *Ibid.*, 25. For the division of duties, 40–43.

Beria remained at the head of the NKVD, while his deputy V. N. Merkulov became chief of the NKGB.[56]

The reorganization removed the Special Section from control of the NKVD, and by resolution of the Central Committee of the VKS(b) and the Council of People's Commissars dated 8 February 1941 it was made the 3rd Bureau of the People's Commissariat of Defense (LKO). It continued to be headed by A. I. Mikneyev, earlier chief of the OO/GUGB/NKVD. The duties of the Third Bureau remained essentially unchanged: "struggle against counter-revolution, espionage, diversion, treason and all forms of anti-Soviet sentiment in the Red Army and Navy." Further, it was to inform the Commissar of Defense and Navy of "any compromising material concerning members of the armed forces."[57]

A central committee, composed of the interior and state security ministers together with the chiefs of the third bureaus of the Ministries of Defense and the Navy, was to coordinate the activity of the individual ministries. The committee was to meet at least once each month and was also to decide on methods, resolve conflicts over competence and plan further activity. Organs of the third bureaus of the LKO and the navy were authorized to make use of operational technology and other means possessed by the Ministry of State Security.

The chiefs of the third bureaus, however, were again subject to dual supervision. On the one hand they were subordinate to the Chief of the Third Section in the organizational scheme and on the other to the commander of the superior military unit. The chief of the Third Bureau of the division was responsible to the chief of the Third Bureau of the Corps and the Corps commander. The Chief of the Central Third Bureau was theoretically only subordinate to the Minister of Defense.[58]

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[56] T. P. KORZHIKHINA, *sovietskoye gosudarstvo i yego uchrezhdyeniya*, Moscow 1994, 387.

[57] *Organy gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti, tom I, kniga 2*, 28.

[58] *Ibid.*, 30. Documents and materials concerning the Special Sections, the Third Bureaus and later Smersh are still semi-secret, so that even when published significant parts have been omitted. For example the duties of the Third Bureaus were apparently defined in four points of which only the first two have been published.

It soon became apparent that the organizational changes and the classification of the Special Sections with their subordination to the LKO hampered communication between individual security organs to such an extent that for example the Central Committee of the VKS(b) and the Committee of People's Commissars were obliged to issue special resolutions as early as 19 April 1941. In the Third Bureau system up to the brigade level the post of deputy chief was instituted, who was subordinate to his commander and to the corresponding territorial organs of the Ministry of State Security. The Ministry of Defense, however, had no influence on the appointment, activity or dismissal of these deputies, since personnel questions in this respect were the exclusive prerogative of state security, not defense. It was the duty of the new deputies to inform the chiefs of the Third Bureau or Section of "Activities of organs of State Security related to the work of the Third Bureaus". At the same time they informed state security of all activities of the corresponding sections of the Third Bureaus. The deputy was thus in a way the legal agent in an agency which formally belonged under the LKO.

The resolution invested State Security with the authority to take over from the army any activity or agent network which it considered necessary. The army and navy, on the other hand, could request organs of State Security to turn over all matters directly concerning the army or navy. From the point of view of the division of power this meant a strengthening of the Commissariat of State Security all the more in that according to the final point of the resolution, the chairmanship of the joint committee coordinating the activities of the NKVD, NKGB and the Third Bureau was to be occupied by a representative of the Ministry of State Security.[59]

From the beginning, then, the Special Sections played a key role in the liquidation of all enemies of Bolshevik power, not merely spies and people working for foreign intelligence services. In cooperation with other security elements they created a network covering the entire territory of the military establishment. They carried out their

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[59] *Organy gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti, tom I, kniga 2,* 107–108.

functions on an immeasurably larger scale during the war and doubtless were a major factor in the victory and in the control of liberated territory.

The first months of the war, as German panzer columns penetrated, were a disaster for the Soviet Union. Though the figures vary, it is clear that by 26 November 1941 the Soviet Army had lost half a million men, with over a million wounded, half a million missing and 3.8 million taken prisoner. Nearly the entire pre-war army of 303 divisions had been destroyed. In the face of the catastrophe Stalin set about reorganizing the army. Less than a month into the war, on 17 July 1941 a resolution of the State Committee for Defense (GKO) reconstituted the Third Bureaus as Special Sections and returned them to the control of the Ministry of the Interior, where they were placed under the Bureau of Special Sections of the NKVD. The chief task of the Special Sections was once again counter-intelligence, "the struggle against espionage and treason" and "the liquidation of desertion" at the front. The Special Sections were authorized to arrest deserters and "under necessity" to execute them on the spot. Other elements of the NKVD were to provide military units with extra troops for certain operations.[60] The reorganization continued as on 20 July the Ministry of State Security was reconstituted as the Central Bureau of State Security, GUGB, within the Interior Ministry.[61]

The chief of the Special Section Micheyev, assigned to a unit in the Ukraine where he was killed in September, was replaced by the Commissar of State Security, 34-year-old V. S. Abakumov, whose star was rapidly rising.[62]

Some authors, such as A. Werth, have noted the renewal at this time of the notorious blocking units of the NKVD in order to cut off retreat and force troops to fight.[63] This, however, did not concern the

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[60] Text of the GKO resolution: *Voyenno istorichesky zhurnal* (hereafter VIZ) 1992, no. 3, 20.

[61] T. P. KORZHIKHINA, *Sovietskoye gosudarstvo*, 388.

[62] I. I. KUTNETSOV, "Stalin's Minister V. S. Abakumov 1908-1954", *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol. 12, no. 1 (March 1999), 151.

[63] A. WERTH, *Russia at War, 1941-1945*, New York 1964, 227.

Special Sections, which were not equipped for this kind of work, though they did collaborate fully with them, as the struggle against desertion and defeatist attitudes was one of their chief tasks. The Special Sections were created in the army as an instrument of political oppression, a counterintelligence organization and a tool for uncovering diversionary groups within the operations territory of the Red Army, i.e. up to 150 kilometers from the front lines. Thus they concentrated rather on intelligence activities, the formation of information networks both within army units and on the territory of the military regions as well as regions under German occupation or into which the army was to advance. The arrest of enemy agents and liquidation of their formations was the task both of the Special Sections and the internal military units of the NKVD, to whom officers of the Special Sections provided information. In view of the fact that they had detailed information about the enemy, they often assumed command of individual operations.

There is little doubt that in the first months of the war the Special Sections played a significant role in preserving the fighting capability of the Red Army, prevented its collapse and upheld its morale, however brutal their methods may have been. It appears that the first major task of their new leadership was to investigate the catastrophic defeats of the previous weeks on the Northwestern Front, which had practically collapsed under German attack, while the 34th Army was said to have lost 80 percent of its troops and all of its artillery in an unsuccessful counteroffensive. The situation at the front was first investigated by Abakumov, who was sent there at the end of August 1941 by Beria. Later, on 9 September, he was joined by further committee members N. A. Bulganin, K. A. Mereckov (deputy of the supreme command) and L. Z. Mechlis, chief of the political directorate of the Red Army.

Abakumov cooperated closely with state security captain M. I. Byelkin, chief of the Special Section of the 34th Army, who supplied him with material against a number of military commanders. Bulganin and Abakumov soon returned to Moscow, while Mereckov took over command of the new Volknov Front on 17 September and

Mechlis directed the repression until 2 October. As early as 12 September Artillery General V. S. Goncharov was executed, while General K. M. Kachanov was arrested and sentenced to death on 26 September. Several division commanders were also replaced.[64]

The re-centralization enabled the OO/GUGB/NKVD to reorganize and replenish its ranks, for in the first two years and nine months of the war "i.e. to the spring of 1944" more than six thousand members of the Special Sections had been killed.[65] At the same time they built networks which later allowed them to take offensive counterintelligence measures. The incorporation of the Special Sections into the NKVD system provided better conditions for the formation and direction of the networks left on German-occupied territory. These were directed by officers of the Special Sections, not the counterintelligence directorate of the GUGB NKVD, which was focussed more toward the rear. It was also significant that they were able to make use of various organs of the NKVD and that the Special Sections officers were independent of the military commanders. Thus they were able to concentrate on security work in its widest sense, since during the war more than 130 German espionage, diversionary and counterespionage organizations operated against the Soviets on the Eastern Front, belonging to the Army, SS, RSHA and others, which established more than sixty training facilities for spies.[66]

The German secret services, which suffered from a dearth of intelligence information about the USSR, therefore put in place a large number of agents at the beginning of the war. According to the official history of the Special Sections, during the battle for Moscow alone Soviet military counterintelligence uncovered over 200 German agents and more than 50 diversionary and espionage groups in the battle area and the rear of the Western Front. In 1941, military counterintelligence and NKVD troops protecting the rear were said to have uncovered and liquidated over a thousand enemy agents on the Western Front, 650 on the Leningrad and Southern Fronts and a

[64] M. PARRISH, *The Lesser Terror. Soviet State Security 1939–1953,* Westport 1996, 112 ff.
[65] S. OSTRYAKOV, *Voyennye chekisty,* 237.
[66] *Ibid.,* 155.

further 300 on the Northwestern Front.[67] But how many of these were actually carrying out espionage activities remains unknown.

According to available archival material, the NKVD contained about 47 bureaus as of 20 May 1941, each with multiple agencies. In this structure the Special Section was the 5th bureau of the NKVD, with 225 places in the headquarters.

Aside from the bureau secretariat, operations section and investigation agency, the Special Section bureau had nine agencies which were oriented according to the various branches of the army:

1st agency (with 3 sections) covered the Red Army General Staff, Front and Army Staffs and military intelligence.

2nd agency (5 sections) covered the Soviet Air Force including rear units, training bases, academies, civil defense and airborne troops.

3rd agency (3 sections) covered all tank formations, all artillery formations and trench mortar units.

4th agency (4 sections) directed "agent-operative" work among Special Sections at the Front according to the military types "infantry, artillery etc." and also had responsibility for anti-desertion measures and organized "blocking" operations. Its first two sections directed activities at the Fronts, while the third was focussed on the struggle against desertion, etc, and the fourth dealt with the press, courts martial and the military prosecutor's office.

5th agency (2 sections) dealt with the rear.

6th agency (4 sections) was classified as a special military unit under the NKVD " border and interior NKVD troops.

7th agency kept track of activities of the Special Sections and made records concerning traitors, spies, terrorists, deserters and other anti-Soviet elements. Its second section vetted cadres of the central committee of VKS$_{(b)}$, the Committee of Civil Defense and the Navy, personnel authorized to deal with secret information or to be sent abroad.

8th agency (2 sections) secured coded communication within the military.

[67] G. K. Cinev, "Sovietskoy voyennoy kontrrazvedke 60 let", in *Vojennye kontrrazvedchiki. Osobym Otdyelam VCHK-KGB 60 let,* Moscow 1978, 15–16.

9th agency (2 sections) dealt with the Navy.

Special Sections also oversaw the mobile artillery divisions and the Kremlin garrison.[68]

Soviet counterintelligence underwent two organizational phases during the war. The Special Sections, as they formally re-emerged in July 1941, were reorganized in April 1943. At this time the all-inclusive Ministry of the Interior was reduced by the creation of a Commissariat for State Security (NKGB), again headed by V. N. Merkulov.[69] At the same time, however, the Special Sections were separated from the NKVD and again subordinated to the Ministry of Defense as the third main counter-espionage agency of the LKO. Stalin himself gave them the title Smersh, standing for "death to spies".[70]

There are differences between Smersh and the Special Sections (though the two are essentially the same organization) resulting from the changed overall military situation, so that they operated under different circumstances. Until the end of 1942 the army conducted an essentially defensive war, so the emphasis was on strengthening discipline and morale in the military units, minimizing desertion, and counterintelligence activities. After the battle of Stalingrad, when the Red Army moved on the offensive, it began liberating occupied Soviet territory, then that of eastern and central European states. Thus Smersh was presented with a number of new tasks. There was greater emphasis on insuring the political reliability of the army, the "cleansing" of the liberated territories, liquidation of German networks remaining on these territories, but also dealing with a flood of German war prisoners and in time with the growing numbers of returning Soviet war prisoners from German camps.

The position of Smersh in the Soviet war hierarchy was strengthened by the fact that it became the chief intelligence agency, rather than one of several, and its chief Viktor S. Abakumov became deputy minister of defense, who was Stalin himself, to whom

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[68] *Lyublyanka*, 276–278.
[69] T. P. KORZHIKHINA, *Sovietskoye gosudarstvo*, 388.
[70] S. OSTRYAKOV, *Voyennye chekisty*, 179.

Abakumov had direct access. One of Abakumov's deputies was P. I. Myeshik, former chief of one of the agencies of the GUGB NKVD, and others were apparently N. N. Selivanofsky and M. I. Byelkin.[71]

The motives leading to the reorganization can only be guessed at. Soviet histories of the Special Sections stress that Smersh was created in order that "in the decisive phase of the war the defense of the country be united, armed security assured and the military leadership obliged to devote greater attention to the work of the chekists and support them with the whole might of Soviet armed force."[72] Ostryakov further emphasizes that there were ever more profound changes within the German intelligence services. More importance was given to tactical research at the expense of mounting tactical spy operations. From 1941 to 1943 the Germans are said to have sent around 55 percent of their agents to the area of the Front, 63 percent in 1944 and fully 88 percent in the last year of the war. This increases the significance of Smersh, which operated behind German lines as well as at the front lines.[73]

By placing Smersh directly under his authority Stalin weakened both the NKBD and NKGB, creating a counterweight to them, although its members were from the original NKVD. Thus Stalin concentrated in his hands the administration and control of all military activity. A further, secondary, motive was disinformation to be fed to German espionage services through the creation of the new organization. According to testimony of an Abwehr officer in March 1945 the German services had a relatively detailed notion of NKVD and Special Sections activities, but practically nothing was known about Smersh. He himself had learned of its existence only at the beginning of 1944. The Germans knew that it was the highest Soviet counterintelligence organization but they had little idea of its structure.[74]

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[71] J. J. DZIAK, *Chekisty. A History of the KGB*, Lexington 1988, 197. I. I. Kuznetsov, *Stalin's Minister*, 152. M. PARRISH, *The Lesser Terror*, 114.

[72] S. OSTRYAKOV, *Voyennye chekisty*, 178 ff.

[73] *Ibid.*, 180.

[74] *V poyedinke s Abverom. Dokumentalnoy ocherk o chekistach Leningradskogo fronta 1941–1945 gg.*, Moscow 1968, 193.

According to some authors, Smersh was also assigned to insure the personal safety of Stalin: amid rumors of an assassination attempt by the German secret services during the Teheran Conference, Abakumov's deputy S. N. Kruglov was sent to protect Stalin.[75] In fact this is an error, since Kruglov remained deputy to the interior minister Beria after the reorganization.[76]

The question of whether Smersh was in competition with the NKVD over the protection of Stalin is secondary, though the reorganization resulted in rivalry over competence and information sources. In his memoirs the chief of the NKVD 4th Agency P. Sudoplatov declares that in 1942 the NKVD together with the GRU launched an anti-German radio campaign of disinformation. At some point (though after April 1943, since he mentions Smersh and conflicts between the NKVD, NKGB and Smersh), Abakumov appeared at Sudoplatov's office to demand that all radio operations be handed over to Smersh, on the grounds that they fall within the competence of military counter-intelligence and not the NKVD. The transfer was in fact effected at the order of Sudoplatonov's superior, though the NKVD was able to retain two of the most significant operations, thanks to the personal intervention of Stalin, who was the direct recipient of their reports.[77]

Sudoplatov mentions two further moves by Abakumov against the NKVD. In 1943 he order the arrest of a high NKVD officer, V. Ilyin, outside normal channels, which required approval from the suspect's superior. Sudoplatov asserts that Abakumov intended to use Ilyin's testimony to compromise Beria and Merkulov. The same motive lay behind the arrest of Ilyin's friend the Air Force general B. Teplinsky on 28 April 1943. Both were said to have been carried out on Stalin's orders. But Ilyin refused to testify against Beria, though he remained in prison until Abakumov's arrest in 1951.[78]

At the end of 1944 Smersh agents also arrested the longtime NKVD agent Prince J. Radziwill and brought him from Poland to

[75] J. J. DZIAK, *Chekisty*, 108.
[76] V. NEKRASOV, *Trinadcat "zheleznich" narkomov*, Moscow 1995, 263.
[77] P. SUDOPLATOV, A. SUDOPLATOV, *The Special Tasks*, Boston 1994, 160.
[78] *Ibid.*, 162 ff. See also M. PARRISH, *The Lesser Terror*, 118 ff.

Moscow. Beria was said to have made great efforts to secure the release of his agent, who for example had translated during meetings with Roosevelt's special envoy A. Harriman, whom he had known before the war.[79] The incident may have resulted from an error, in which one agency was ignorant or the activities of the other, or Abakumov was trying to acquire a valuable source of information.

There is little doubt that the reorganization was motivated partly by politics, partly by the fact that the NKVD had become too large and unwieldy to handle very effectively the multitude of tasks with which it was entrusted. By dividing the NKVD and naming V. N. Merkulov commissar for state security and Abakumov chief of Smersh Stalin again weakened Beria's power base, deprived him of direct control over the most sensitive security problems, and by placing Merkulov and Abakumov in high functions he placed them in opposition to each other. On the other hand, neither Smersh nor the NKGB possessed significant military forces, which had to be supplied by the NKVD. Basically it came down to a classic case of divide and rule, in which all three organizations were supposed to cooperate but in fact competed.

Another factor, which supported Smersh's subordination to the commissariat of defense, was the Soviet police system. Like the military counterintelligence in the broadest sense, it was in fact to carry out espionage, political and security operations in the army and in occupied territories with the aim of protecting the rear or the army. All other Soviet security police organs, except for strategic intelligence, were created for activity outside the army and on Soviet territory. The internal military units of the NKVD, units of the border guard acted in the later phase of the war on foreign territory, but often in order to carry out operations conceived by other organizations. Smersh, however, was an organization which could immediately supply information useful in pacifying newly occupied territories. The army, with its several million troops, was accorded special attention both by classical counterintelligence and by agencies of political control.

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[79] M. PARRISH, *The Lesser Terror*, 119.

Whichever motive predominated in Stalin's thinking in the spring of 1943, the reorganization solved a number of problems at once. Since Abakumov had direct access to the GKO and Stalin as minister of defense, the leadership of military counterintelligence was substantially simplified. Smersh moreover was directly subordinate to Stalin and could carry out his orders without influence from other agencies. The reorganization was carried out as the army went on strategic counteroffensive.

The available Soviet sources do not reveal the internal structure of Smersh or the numbers of its agents. Shortly after the end of the war the American army attempted such an analysis on the basis of captured German material and interrogations of German intelligence officers. They concluded that at the highest level there were about 15 agencies and bureaus:

Agency for staffs: monitored staff officers in Moscow (the General Staff) and directed the activities of Smersh officers in this regard at lower levels up to the level of army staffs,

agency for troop: monitored troops in the Moscow region and directed lower-level Smersh activities,

counterintelligence agency: directed and carried out operations on enemy territory and coordinated all counterintelligence activities of Smersh units at lower levels up to the army level,

partisan movement agency: used partisan units to carry out espionage and counterespionage tasks and monitored their political loyalty,

investigative agency: carried out interrogations of all members of the military under suspicion,

personnel agency: kept records on all members of Smersh, provided for their training, assignment, promotion, etc.,

technical and communications agency: was responsible for secret radio and other contacts, monitoring of enemy communications,

military censorship agency,

information agency: evaluated reports,

cryptographic agency: provided codes and assured security of code systems,

maintenance agency: maintained buildings and installations belonged to Smersh,

troikas were military courts for misdemeanors, up to the division level,

secretariat – personnel of the chief of headquarters.

inspection agency: investigated charges brought against Smersh members and evaluated the reliability of double agents.[80]

In 1943, however, an independent unit under N. N. Salivanovsky was to be set up within Smersh with the task of placing agents and diversionary groups in the rear of the German army.[81] But it should be emphasized that the published materials do not provide a penetrating view of the Smersh organization. It may be assumed that at the highest level this organization was taken over from the Special Sections.

The American estimate of the Smersh structure from the postwar period mentions that it was created to correspond to the organizational levels of the army, not according to the military types. It appears, however, that the reality was more complex. The organizational scheme of the Special Sections from May 1942 shows that they were organized according to military types and to the various command levels of the army. It is not likely that the Smersh structure would have been fundamentally modified in 1943. The available literature and sources give no such indication, nor would it be consistent with Soviet practice. Smersh had its units in the various army command levels which reflected the structure of the headquarters and were essentially organized according to military types.

At the head of the system was the 3rd LKO headquarters, and at lower levels Smersh formations on the Fronts and in the military

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[80] *The General Staff of the United Army, Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 9 January 1948 (declassified NND 7701)*, cited by R. STEPHAN, "Smerch: The Soviet Counterintelligence during the Second World War", *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 22, 1987, 592 ff.

[81] A. SUDOPLATOV, "Sovietskaya politicheskaya i voyennaya rozvedka", in *Rossiya i Germaniya v gody vojny i mira (1941–1955)*, Moscow 1995, 275.

regions. Their basic organizational structure remained the same as that of the Special Sections. According to German sources Smersh units were deployed at the front with between 70 and 100 officers and a defense platoon of about 100 troops.

Smersh units at the level of the various armies had between 25 and 50 officers under the command usually of a colonel or major general. Units at the division level had somewhat different aims. Since they were "closer" to the troops, they concentrated more on "passive" counterintelligence and general surveillance of the units. They did not conduct active or offensive counterespionage operations against German intelligence. At the division level the units consisted of 15 to 20 officers and a smaller guard unit of 20 to 30 troops. Smersh officers were of course also deployed in lesser units and independent units of all kinds. Smersh soldiers wore the uniforms of the branches to which they were attached, without special insignia.[82]

Soviet work on the Special Sections and Smersh on the Leningrad Front gives a picture of the structure and functions of Smersh units at the division level. From photographs it is clear that the numbers of officers varied from 15 to 20 and that the main responsibility for the formation and function of information networks in the units fell to officers attached to the battalions. Each of them "selected" several chief informers, who in turn recruited others among the soldiers. Thus practically every unit and soldiers was under constant surveillance.[83]

Smersh was subordinated to the military authorities, but the corresponding commanders had no authority or operative control over the units assigned. Each unit answered only to higher Smersh

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[82] R. STEPHAN, *Smerch*, 593. J. RUTKIEWICZ, W. N. KULIKOW, *Wojska NKWD 1917–1946*, Warszawa 1998, 52. Rutkiewicz and Kulikov emphasize that the basic unit of the Special Sections was the OO division, consisting of: OO chief at the rank of State Security captain, his deputy (first lieutenant), one or two experienced agents (lieutenants), four to five other agents (second lieutenants), one interrogator (lieutenant), office personnel, interpreters and defense platoon. *Ibid.*, 51. The text does not make clear the period to which this information refers.

[83] *V poyedinke s Abverom*, 27 ff, 64 ff. The photo on p. 287 shows 16 Smersh officers of the 109th artillery division.

authorities and thus formed part of a strictly centralized independent security mechanism. Part of the counterespionage operations, and practically all of the offensive ones, were carried out by Smersh units from the army level upward. They engaged in defensive counterespionage and surveillance of units from the level of corps down to battalion, with networks of informers at lower levels. Before the reorganization in April 1943 the Special Sections came under the NKVD headquarters, feeding information to its chief, through whom it reached Beria, who in turn informed Stalin and members of the GKO. By subordinating military counterintelligence to the ministry of defense the process was radically simplified.

No information about the numerical strength of the Special Sections and Smersh is to be found in the published sources. Ostryakov only mentions the six thousand killed during the first two years and nine months of the war. Stephan estimates the total strength of Smersh in the broad range of 15 to 30 thousand officers.[84]

The American postwar survey of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence organizations concluded that Smersh undertook a variety of tasks:

Uncovering anti-Soviet activity and potential anti-Soviet elements,

measures against desertion, provocation and sabotage,

reporting any weakening of discipline and morale in the units or other weakening of preparedness,

improvement of discipline and morale,

information concerning shortcomings which might compromise preparedness, including conditions in barracks, poor training, hygienic conditions, etc.,

uncovering shortcomings in command, or conditions adversely affecting operations,

responsibility for "special measures" undertaken in Soviet lines designed to prevent withdrawal and desertion,

uncovering traitors who collaborated with the enemy under occupation,

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[84] S. OSTRYAKOV, *Vojennye chekisty*, 237. R. Stephan, *Smerch*, 596.

protection of secret materials,

protection of important military commands, especially military intelligence installations against sabotage,

discovery and liquidation of enemy agents within the army and among the civilian population who come into contact with the army,

interrogation of enemy agents and evaluation of foreign intelligence services

security for military intelligence agents before their deployment and evaluating their reliability upon return,

evaluation of all enemy materials.[85]

To this must be added the training and deployment of special agents on enemy territory, dispatch of small scouting units behind enemy lines, assuring secure contact with the army, and later other tasks as well. Counterintelligence activity including obtaining information concerning German intelligence services and actions against them, whether liquidating agents or infiltrating enemy networks or training schools. Further tasks included radio disinformation campaigns directed against the German services through double agents. Together the Soviet services, the NKVD, NKGB and Smersh, are said to have undertaken more than 90 such disinformation radio campaigns.[86]

Smersh agents also investigated all sorts of accidents at military installations. For example the deputy chief of Smersh Meshik was sent to Lublin in 1944 to investigate an explosion at a military warehouse. It was also Smersh officers who were the first Soviets to investigate the circumstances of Hitler's death.[87]

Information supplied by Smersh also doubtless played an important role in the planning of various military offensives.

[85] *Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counterintelligence,* 51, cited by R. STEPHAN, *Smerch,* 597 ff.

[86] A. SUDOPLATOV, *Sovietskya politicheskaya i voyennaya razvedka,* 282. *V poyedinke s Abverom,* 110. On the disinformation see V. V. KOROVIN, *"Pojedinki s Abverom",* *VIZH,* 1995, no. 1, 31–36.

[87] *Archiv novyeshey istorii Rossii, tom I, "Osobaya papka" I. V. Stalina. Iz materialov sekretariata NKVD-MVD SSSR 1944–1953,* Moscow 1994, 54.

According to P. Sudoplatov, for example, the NKVD reported on 7 May 1943 that the German supreme command was planning a large-scale offensive near Kursk with the code name Zitadelle. The information was obtained by its resident in London. As if in confirmation of this report, on 11 May, a Smersh unit on the Bryansk Front reported that its agent behind German lines reported a growing concentration of German troops around the town of Orel.[88] Similarly the staff of the Voronezh Front received important information from Smersh agents concerning the German defense of Kiev which aided in taking the city.[89]

In the closing phases of the war one of the important tasks of Smersh was the investigation of repatriated or liberated Soviet prisoners of war. The circumstances of their imprisonment, their behavior and opinions, membership of organizations and so forth were all brought under scrutiny. Thus Smersh was more than an agency in the struggle against the intelligence services of imperialist countries. Its officers were empowered to arrest, and in the framework of the Soviet bureaucratic system they were at once investigators, judges and jailers. Soviet work on so sensitive a theme attempts to legitimize Smersh's role and conceal the fact that it functioned as a state within the state. Thus, it is frequently emphasized that "counterespionage work by the chekists was carried out in harmony with the guidelines of state defense committee and the central organs of state security, under the constant control and leadership of the Party organization and the political organs of the Soviet army."[90]

As an organization Smersh possessed immense authority and carried out many operations independently of the NKVD and NKGB, though at the same time it made use of their resources wherever its own were insufficient. It was created not only as a classical counter-intelligence and security agency for the army, but also undertook

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[88] P. SUDOPLATOV, A. SUDOPLATOV, *The Special Tasks*, 142. For the Smersh report see *VIZH*, 1993, no. 8, 7 ff.

[89] I. I. KUZNETSOV, *Stalin's Minister*, 153.

[90] *V pojedinke s Abverom*, 297.

security and political operations in formerly occupied regions of the USSR, then later in the countries of eastern and central Europe occupied by the Soviet army, where with other agencies it was responsible for securing the rear of the army.

The many-sided character of Smersh's activities which combined classic counterespionage with political-security operations, is also evident from the official Soviet portrait. S. Ostryakov asserted that "with the shift to an offensive against the enemy, a new facet of Smersh activity opened up: the uncovering and destruction of enemy agencies left behind on occupied territories, the liquidation of diversionary and bandit formations and of traitors and Fascist criminals."[91] Thus Smersh became one of the key instruments in reestablishing control of the liberated regions of the Soviet Union and the subjugation of the occupied states of eastern Europe.

Soviet military counterintelligence operations during the Second World War may be divided into four broad categories: traditional counterespionage, securing the safety of the rear, political security actions and the investigation of criminal and political cases concerning members of the army. R. Stephan stresses that as far as the first category is concerned, "the characteristic counterespionage operations by Smersh clearly demonstrate the Soviet ability to neutralize the operations of enemy intelligence services."[92]

From the testimony of captured German intelligence officers it appears that the Soviet side deployed its agents on a truly massive scale during the war. According to Abwehr estimates there were about 130,000 of them, about 10,000 every three months. But only about 12 percent of them were planted by the Special Sections and later by Smersh, which would come to about 15,000 of their own agents for the duration of the war. Many of the Soviet agents were only summarily trained, though the Smersh agents were among the best, which brought superior results. The tactic of massive deployment enabled the Soviet side, despite heavy losses, to obtain

[91] S. OSTRYAKOV, *Voyennye chekisty*, 194.
[92] R. STEPHAN, *Smerch*, 600.

needed information and at the same time repel German counter-espionage organs.[93]

Soviet counterintelligence was interested not so much in gaining information about the German intelligence services, their agents, installations and activities, as in destroying their operations by liquidating their networks, converting their agents and using them to disseminate disinformation, and infiltrating their ranks with their own agents. It appears that the last was a Smersh specialty, especially infiltration in the German spy schools. This yielded detailed information about German agents attending these schools, whatever their nationality and offered opportunities for undermining their morale, encouraging desertion or defection. One such agent was I. S. Savchuk, who became an interpreter for the Abwehr and worked at their school at Poltava. He was able to pass on to Smersh information about 80 or so German agents and a further 30 Abwehr collaborators. Another Smersh agent went so far as to form his own network consisting of ten men at the Abwehr school at Königsberg. On his return he turned over detailed information on about 140 active Abwehr agents. Agents Michailov and Borisov worked at the Smolensk school, while an agent code named "Grishin" operated for several months in the vicinity of an unnamed Abwehr staff, where he obtained information about over a hundred German agents.[94]

The extensive infiltration was highly effective, for it provided the Special Sections and Smersh with information about current and planned German operations, deployment of agents, methods and aims of training and a quantity of other information which substantially facilitated their discovery and possible use as double agents and disseminators of disinformation. At the same time Smersh obtained information about the German services, their organization, personell and activities. It appears that the Special Sections and other Soviet organs were so successful in this direction that as early as the winter of 1942 the German intelligence services were obliged to make more use of captured Soviet agents than their own. They were forced

[93] *Ibid.*, 600 ff.
[94] S. OSTRYAKOV, *Voyennye chekisty*, 173, V. V. Korovin, *Pojedinki s Abverom*, 35 ff.

to shift from offensive to defensive activities, which yielded a far more limited stream of information, which was manifested in the possibilities for conducting the war. The situation of the German secret services on the Eastern Front worsened to the point that from 1944 they were forced to dissolve several sections for lack of material. This was the case for example of the section for evaluation of captured enemy documents Luststelle III Ost.[95]

Ostryakov asserts that the Special Sections possessed sufficient information about the Abwehr as early as the beginning of 1942, which allowed them to change from a passive to an active posture and launch a campaign for the "dismantling of the mechanism of Hitler's military intelligence". However, it appears that the change occurred somewhat later, in the winter of 1942-43,[96] a judgment confirmed by other Soviet work declaring that "by 1943 the Soviet counterintelligence overcame its difficulties of the first phase of the war and shifted to offensive activity."[97]

Special Smersh groups carried out a wide range of operations " liquidating enemy agents, occupying key positions or objects along with the first army units, often before the arrival of the main force, attacking and occupying German intelligence installations, interrogating German prisoners. There were also intelligence-gathering operations lasting several weeks, often in cooperation with partisan groups, behind German lines aimed at extracting information from German officers.[98]

After the definitive turning point in the progress of the war in 1943 the security of the rear of the Soviet army became a priority. The retreating Germans left behind their agents and diversionary groups who became Smersh targets. In August 1943 for example the Abwehr staff "Walli" ordered the creation of 200 agencies equipped with radios, to be deployed in regions which it was thought would be

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[95] R. STEPHAN, *Smerch*, 601.

[96] S. OSTRYAKOV, *Voyenniye chekisty*, 169. R. Stephan, *Smerch*, 602.

[97] N. N. KOSHELOV, B. D. LEBIN, "Za poyedinkem poyedinok", in *Voyennye kontrrazvedchiki*, 192–193.

[98] See for example *V poyedinke s Abverom*, 110.

vacated. Each was to form its own spy network. According to Ostryakov, in the region of Riga alone, Smersh groups of the 2nd Baltic Front liquidated 4 abwehr agents and a further 48 spies.[99]

Operations of this sort were closely connected with the exposure and liquidation of all "anti-Soviet elements" in regions occupied by the Soviet army. This was especially true in the western Ukraine and the Baltic region but also elsewhere where the operations of Soviet security organs were focussed on the destruction and liquidation of illegal nationalist organizations and their military forces. Units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) attacked small units of the Soviet army and stores and attempted sabotage on the railways and roads. Their greatest success was an attack along the 1st Ukrainian Front on a column under N. F. Vatutin, whom they mortally wounded.[100] But they were subsequently wiped out. In March and April 1944 Smersh in cooperation with army units and the NKVD mounted 166 operations on the 1st Ukrainian Front against UPA units and OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) networks. According to Soviet data these operations destroyed 47 UPA units and liquidated 930 of their members.[101]

Similar operations were conducted behind the lines on practically all fronts. On the 1st Byelorussian Front Smersh, supported NKVD units, destroyed more than 20 Ukrainian groups in the spring of 1944. Similar operations were carried out in re-occupied Baltic territory.[102] Their aim was not only the liquidation of enemy networks, agents and armed groups, but also of anyone standing in the way of Soviet

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[99] S. OSTRYAKOV, *Voyennye chekisty*, 188.

[100] P. APTEKAR, "NKVD protiv rasshitych sorochek. Vnutrenniye voyska i nacionalnoye dvizhenye na zapadnoy Ukraine", *Rodina*, 1999, no. 8, 126. For Ukrainian and other units in the German army see M. TEJCHMAN, *Ve službách Třetí říše. Hitlerovy zahraniční jednotky* (In the Service of the Third Reich: Hitler's Foreign Units), Prague 1999, 156 ff. J. WANNER, "Odboj a zrada v Pobaltí" (Rebellion and Treason in the Baltic), *Historický obzor* 1994, no 5, 101–108. *Ibid.*, "K otázce spolupráce orientálních národů SSSR a Němci 1941–1945" (Cooperation between Eastern Nationalities of the Soviet Union and the Germans), *Slovanský přehled*, 1994, no. 1, 115-119.

[101] S. OSTRYAKOV, *Voyennye chekisty*, 201.

[102] *Ibid.*

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occupation. Smersh carried out its operations immediately, when the area was still under army control, and assured the initial pacification. It used its agent networks and information gained earlier to direct its activities against illegal nationalist units. Further "pacification" in these territories, however, was the task of NKVD troops and NKGB personnel.[103] Smersh, however, participated in creating conditions for the re-introduction of Soviet control on occupied territory in the short term.

It appears that Abakumov and Smersh also played a role in the deportation of entire nationalities within the Soviet Union who were accused of collaboration. This was the case of the Chechens and Ingushes in February 1944, when the chief role was played by the NKVD, seconded by Smersh personnel of the Transcaucasus Corps.[104]

Smersh played a similar role on a much larger scale during the occupation of Polish territory, where one of the chief aims was the liquidation of the non-Communist Polish resistance gathered around the *Arma Krajowa* (AK). Smersh took part in uncovering AK networks and its officers often assumed leading command posts in operations. In the absence of its own armed force, larger-scale operations were carried out by NKVD troops. The role of Smersh is often therefore shrouded in secrecy, though in cases where there own troops were sufficient, Smersh groups operated independently.

The "pacification" operations in the regions of Białystok and Biała Podlaska in the autumn of 1944 may serve as an example. The operation was led and coordinated by colonel Kozakevich, deputy chief of Smersh for the 2nd Byelorussian Front. A total of ten operative groups composed of 200 "experienced personnel" from Smersh and the NKGB were sent out into the districts. These groups had at their disposal NKVD troops to the strength of three regiments. The mission of the groups was to uncover and arrest the leadership and members of the AK, agents of the Polish government-in-exile in London, members of other Polish organizations opposed

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[103] See P. Aptekar, 125 ff.
[104] I. I. KUZNYETSOV, *Stalin's Minister*, 154.

to the policies of the pro-Communist Lublin Polish Committee of National Liberation, agents of German intelligence services (though this was clearly only secondary), and to take action against groups and individuals opposing the transfer of Russian Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Ruthenian populations from Poland to the USSR.[105] In large part these were tasks which had little to do with classical counterintelligence, though Smersh made full use of such methods for other aims. In the course of operations 2,044 persons were arrested and 1,300 weapons confiscated, along with a quantity of ammunition and other equipment.[106]

Parallel and independent operations were undertaken by Smersh groups who by 1 November 1944 had captured 499 individuals in the Białystok region, "active AK members, agents of the London émigré government, German agents and other criminal elements."[107] Such relatively independent operations demonstrate that their chief aim was the liquidation of the illegal network of the Polish non-Communist resistance and the isolation of its armed units in the forests.

The GKO, headed by Stalin, ordered the creation of a system to "cleanse the rear of the Red Army from enemy elements". In the first half of January 1945 representatives or "deputies" of the three security organizations, NKVD, NKGB and Smersh, were sent to each of the Fronts to direct and coordinate repressive actions. They were provided with a further 1,050 "experienced Chekists", i.e. about 150 to a Front. They also had NKVD troops at their disposal, while the 31,000 strong NKVD units assigned to protect the rear were reinforced with a further four divisions and regiments totalling 27,900 troops.

The task was everywhere the same: "in harmony with the advance of Red Army Units to conduct all necessary Chekist operations in

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[105] See the report of V. Abakumov and Canavi (NKGB chief in Byelorussia) to L. Beria, 3 November 1944, in *Teczka Specjalna J. S. Stalina. Raporty NKWD z Polski 1944–1946*, Warszawa 1998, 90 ff.

[106] Report by Abakumov and Canavi to Beria, 13 November 1944 in *Teczka specjalna*, 107 ff.

[107] Report by Abakumov and Canavi to Beria, 3 November 1944, in *Teczka specjalna*, 91.

liberated territories, to expose and arrest members of espionage and diversionary agencies of the German intelligence services, terrorists, members of various enemy organizations, brigand and rebel groups without regard to nationality, to discover and confiscate illegal radio transmitters, arms caches, illegal printing presses and other technical equipment used by enemy agents."[108]

The broad authority granted to the deputies extended of course to arresting members of the police, administrators of prisons and concentration camps, enemy military commanders, civil servants, directors of industrial and administrative organizations, members of the press, members of Fascist organizations, authors of anti-Soviet publications, members of enemy military groups and also the so-called Russian Liberation Army, together with all other suspicious elements.[109]

The figures show that the Soviet leadership were combining normal military security operations and the elimination of remnants of the occupying German forces with the liquidation of the non-Communist resistance, nationalist groups and all "elements" considered to be anti-Soviet. It appears that in the middle of January 1945 members of Smersh of the 151st artillery division, 7th Guard Army on the 2nd Ukrainian Front also arrested the Swedish Red Cross agent R. Wallenberg, who later died in a Soviet prison.[110]

The results of the extensive security operations in the rear of the Soviet army, which lasted nearly three months, were reported to Stalin by Beria on 29 March 1945. 171,228 enemy personnel were arrested, including 7,000 agents and collaborators of enemy intelligence services, 77,000 members of Fascist organizations, over 12,000 members of "other enemy organizations", several thousand police officers, prison administrators, German civil servants, nearly

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[108] Letter from L. Beria to J. Stalin, 11 January 1945, in *Teczka specjalna*, 166. The document names all the deputies involved. For example on the 3rd Byelorussian Front the function of NKVD deputy was filled by Commissar of State Security, Second Class, Abakumov (Smersh), while his deputy was General Zelenin (NKVD) and General Luby (NKGB of the Lithuanian SSR).

[109] *Ibid.*, 166.

[110] M. PARRISH, *The Lesser Terror,* 122 ff.

13,000 "traitors collaborating with the occupiers" and over 29,000 further enemy elements. They included 101,000 Germans, 35,000 Poles, 8,000 Russians and more than 6,000 Lithuanians.[111]

Meanwhile the Soviet side strengthened the organs of the Polish provisional government, the Polish Committee of National Liberation, over which it extended its control. In October 1944 the Interior commissar I. A. Serov conducted an inspection of the Polish divisions. His alarming report led to the dispatch of 100 Smersh personnel to reinforce the Polish military counterintelligence (though Serov had requested 500), while 15 officers of the NKVD-NKGB were attached to Polish state security.[112]

With the approaching end of the war the activities of Smersh shifted toward securing the administration of occupied territories. Thus the NKVD gained authority as its personnel played the most prominent role, though in the early stages it shared information and personnel with Smersh and the NKGB. In April 1945 the GKO issued a resolution creating the post of deputy to the Front Commander for civil administration on German territory behind the 1st and 2nd Byelo-russian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts. Interior commissar I. A. Serov was appointed to the 1st Byelorussian Front, while the 2nd was covered by the state security commissar, grade 3, L. F. Canava, until now state security commissar in Byelorussia, and General P. I. Myeshik of Smersh was appointed to the 1st Ukrainian Front.[113]

The three security services, then, shared the functions, though the most important was the 1st Ukrainian Front, so that Smersh occupied the prime position. The task of these highly placed security officers was to control the activities of the German administration, liquidate spies, arrest persons working in German repressive agencies, Fascist organizations, etc. They were assigned groups of operative personnel

[111] Beria's report in *Teczka specjalna*, 225–228. For a broader view of Soviet operations against non-Communist Polish organizations see the collection *Wojna domowa czy nowa okupacja? Polska po roku 1944*, Wroclaw 1998. See especially the article by A. Paczkowski "Aparat bezpieczenstwa wobec podzemia niepodleglosciowego w latach 1944–1948", *Ibid.*, 83–101.

[112] L. Beria to Stalin and Molotov, 17 October 1944, in *Teczka specjalna*, 63–67.

[113] *Ibid.*, 253 ff.

from the NKVD and NKGB and could also make use of Smersh officers, though it appears that they were not members of these groups from the beginning. All the deputies, whatever service they belonged to, also functioned as NKVD agents, and their power of arrest also corresponded to the NKVD.[114]

The system formed in January 1945 and modified in April for Germany was intended for wartime conditions, so that in June, in the aftermath of the war, a reorganization was carried out. New NKVD deputies were appointed to the army commands in wide regions of central and eastern Europe:

On German territory for troops under G. K. Zhukov, I. A. Serov was reappointed,

on the territory of Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (I. S. Konyev), P. I. Myeshik,

in Poland for troops under K. Rokossovsky, N. N. Selivanovsky, in 1944-45 deputy chief of LKO headquarters, then NKVD deputy on the 4th Ukrainian Front and adviser to the Polish ministry of public security,

for the southern troops under F. S. Tolbuchin in Bulgaria and Rumania, A. M. Pavlov, until now commander of NKVD troops on the 3rd Ukrainian Front.[115]

Deputies of the NKVD were to "control and direct" all Soviet security agencies in the given territory, i.e. the NKVD, NKGB and Smersh. Their duties continued to include the liquidation of networks left behind by the departing enemy and the discovery and arrest of war criminals. They also directed the work of "Control and Infiltration Committees" which operated in the prison camps and arranged the repatriation of Soviet citizens, whether civilian or military. They had at their disposal NKVD troops in Germany (10 regiments),

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[114] *Ibid.*, 254.

[115] Beria to Stalin, 22 June 1945, in *Teczka specjalna*, 304 ff. Smersh had two representatives in this system: Myeshik and Selivanovsky. It remains an open question whether this was fortuitous, or reflected a plan to "occupy" the important territory separating Germany from the Soviet Union.

Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (6 regiments), Poland (15 regiments), and Rumania and Bulgaria (4 regiments).[116]

In May 1945, in anticipation of a wave of repatriated Soviet citizens, Stalin ordered the Front commanders (Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konyev, R. I. Malinkovsky, Tolbuchinov, J. I. Jeremenkov, A. V. Khrulev, Beria, Merkulov, Abakumov, and the chairman of the committee for repatriation F. I. Golikov) to establish a total of 95 camps, each with a capacity of 10,000, to which Soviet citizens were to be sent for repatriation. Civilians were investigated by commissions of the NKVD-NKGB, while military personnel were dealt with by Smersh.[117]

Smersh's duties continued to include gathering information about Soviet army officers suspected of collaboration with the Germans. The most prominent of them was A. A. Vlasov, commandant of the 2nd shock troops, who surrendered to the Germans in July 1942 south of Leningrad and at the end of the year was found at the head of the "Russian Committee", later renamed "Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia". Vlasov then began recruiting a "Russian Liberation Army". He was arrested on 12 May 1945 near Pilsen by a Smersh group supported by units of the artillery battalion of the 162nd brigade. He was taken to Dresden and Moscow, where he was tried on 1 August 1946 and executed.[118]

Smersh of course continued to carry out the same tasks it had pursued throughout the war, but as the end drew near, urgent efforts were made to identify and arrest all Soviet prisoners of war suspected of collaboration. Most of the Soviet generals were freed in April and May 1945 by allied units, mainly American, in southern and western Germany, where the Germans had sent most of the high Soviet officers. But they did not long remain free, as they were turned over to the Soviet authorities and subjected to thorough investigation by Smersh, which worked in cooperation with the Soviet government authorities in charge of repatriation. Thus they were able to operate

[116] *Ibid.*, 305.
[117] M. PARISH, *The Lesser Terror*, 131.
[118] S. OSTRJAKOV, *Voyennye chekisty*, 221. "Sudby generalskye", *VIZH*, 1993, no. 6, 21.

throughout western and central Europe, visiting prison camps and persuading or forcing Soviet citizens to return.[119]

Available sources indicate that 80 Soviet generals were captured and imprisoned and that two remained on occupied territory. Five were able to escape, 23 died in prison, 12 defected. Only 37 returned to the USSR.[120]

The first group of Soviet officers, including 29 generals arrived in Moscow from Paris on 26 April 1945. There were met by members of Smersh and taken to a secure location near Moscow where they were subjected to long, detailed interrogations. Their behavior was monitored day and night, and Smersh personnel eavesdropped on their conversations. In this state, 37 generals were investigated and "filtered".[121] Practically all the military prisoners of war were treated the same way by Smersh agents at various levels.

Abakumov sent Stalin preliminary results on 31 August 1945. Generals P. G. Ponyedyelin, P. A. Artyemenko, J. A. Yegorov, J. S. Zybin, I. P. Krupennikov, M. A. Byeleshev, A. G. Samochin, and cavalry general Lazutin had collaborated and recommended that they be imprisoned. He added that no compromising material has so far surfaced concerning Generals K. F. Lukin, I. M. Lubovcev, N. F. Michailov, A. S. Zotov, P. P. Pavlov, I. I. Melnikov, K. L. Dobroserdov, I. M. Skugarev, and I. A. Kornilov, and therefore recommended their release with the proviso that they be kept under surveillance.[122] The other generals were investigated further, with the exception of General Lukin, who had lost a leg and was left with a paralyzed arm. He had been charged by Minajev with criticizing Soviet collectivization, the justice system and the Party leadership during his imprisonment, which he strenuously denied. In view of the vagueness of the charges, Abakumov had him shifted to the list of victims.[123]

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[119] See the report by Abakumov to Stalin, 27 May 1945, in "Sudby generalskye", *VIZH*, 1992, no. 10, 24.
[120] *Ibid.*, 32.
[121] *Ibid.*, 24.
[122] *Ibid.*, 25.
[123] *Ibid.*, 26.

Stalin rejected the recommendation that the generals be freed, so that the investigation continued until December 1945. Abakumov delivered his final report on 21 December, and Stalin accepted it. 25 of the generals were to be turned over to the personnel section of the defense ministry, which was to decide on their further classification. Eleven others were to be arrested and tried for treason for joining organizations established by the Germans and carrying on anti-Soviet activities.[124] After Stalin's death all were gradually rehabilitated, some posthumously. Recently released documentation shows that only about 15 percent of the captured generals collaborated with the Nazis.[125]

This sort of action was perhaps exceptional in its scope, but it was not atypical, since it was part of the work assigned to Smersh. In the course of the war, 35 generals were unjustly accused and imprisoned or executed for treason, which included withdrawal. Since the Special Section played one of the key roles on this score, there is no doubt that they contributed to the weakening of the Soviet fighting capacity at the beginning of the war.[126]

The released documentation demonstrate that the Special Sections and later Smersh manufactured evidence (*spravki*) at the order of one of the high party, state or military functionaries. One of those who made such requests was Malenkov, secretary of the central committee of the $VKS_{(b)}$ and chief of its personnel department, responsible for selecting personnel for high posts in the Party army and nearly all other areas. Others included Beria and the defense ministers. For example, in July 1941, at Malenkov's request, the 3rd bureau of the defense commissariat (Special Section) provided

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[124] Abakumov to J. Stalin, 21.12.1945. "Sudby generalskiye", *VIZH*, 1992, no. 10, 26–32. The report contains two appendices with detailed information about the generals in both categories. For their fate and that of others including for example Vlasov see the series "Sudby generalskye" which appeared in the journal *VIZH* from 1992 to 1994. See also A. A. MASLOV, "Forgiven by Stalin. Soviet Generals who Returned from German Prisons in 1941–1945 and who were Rehabilitated", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol 12, no 2, June 1999, 173–219.

[125] M. PARRISH, *The Lesser Terror*, 134.

[126] I. I. KUZNETSOV, *Stalin's Minister*, 155.

material on J. A. Shchandenko, the commandant of the Kiev Special Corps M. P. Kirponos, the commandant of the North Caucasian Corps I. S. Konyev, and others.[127]

Especially murderous was the *spravka* requested by the defense minister S. K. Timoshenko in March 1941 on General G. M. Stern. The motive remains unknown; in any case, Stern was placed under constant surveillance by the 3rd bureau of the LKO. He was arrested during the war with other officers and executed without trial on 28 October 1941.[128]

Similarly, Abakumov uncovered a plot at the end of 1941 in the Frunze military academy, evacuated to Tashkent. Seven instructors were arrested and accused of defeatism and endorsing the German view that the defeat of the Soviet Union was inevitable. In fact they had been discussing the reasons for the Soviet defeats in the previous months and possible remedies. It appears that mere consideration of so sensitive a problem in the presence of soldiers was unacceptable.[129]

Though we have no detailed information, it appears that of the approximately 4.2 million Soviet civilians and soldiers repatriated and investigated as of 1 March 1946, 6.5 percent were left in prisons and camps of the NKVD, 58 percent were allowed to return to their homes, 19 percent were posted to military work battalions and 19 percent to army units. Officers were generally far more harshly treated than civilians or soldiers. Of the 50,400 officers freed from enemy prisons before 1 October 1944, 20,000 were posted to storm units with little chance of survival. For officers reposting to former units was practically excluded, and as a rule they ended as prisoners in the NKVD system. Without exception, repatriated individuals were viewed with grave suspicion.[130]

Repression in the Soviet Union and its army was an endless process and continued after the war. While Abakumov still led

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[127] See *VIZH*, 1994, no. 2, 6–12. Much similar documentation was published in *VIZH* from 1992 to 1994.

[128] *VIZH*, 1994, no. 3, 18–23.

[129] M. PARRISH, *The Lesser Terror*, 113.

[130] R. W. DAVIEW, *Soviet History in the Yeltsin Era*, Houndmills 1997, 167 ff.

Smersh, on 23 April 1946, Air Marshal A. A. Novikov, twice Hero of the USSR, was arrested on grounds that he was responsible for shortcomings in the air force. His case, however, was conducted by Abakumov in his new post as Minister of State Security (MGB), which he took up on 4 May 1946. Amid the postwar reorganization the commissariats were changed to the Council of Ministers and ministries and Smersh was dissolved, or rather its structure was subsumed once again into the ministry of defense under the MGB. But that is another story.

Smersh was doubtless a highly effective organization performing a whole series of functions. It was at once a counterespionage organization and an instrument of political repression. The information and spy networks which the Special Sections had inserted into even the least significant army units at the beginning of the war had a number of duties, but they made it extremely difficult for enemy intelligence services to persuade members of the Red Army to collaborate. This, in combination with further security measures and the generally closed system of the Soviet Union, meant that the German intelligence services faced enormous problems not only in recruiting agents in the Soviet Army but also in collecting necessary information.

The same networks also acted as an instrument of political control and repression, in that they were used to uncover anti-Soviet attitudes or expressions of discontent among members of the army. The Special Sections and Smersh thus assured the absolute loyalty of the Soviet armed forces to the Communist Party and to Stalin personally. Especially during the first months of the war they played an important role in maintaining fighting capacity. In the same way they were indispensable in preparing for the military offensive. On territories liberated and occupied by the Soviet Army Smersh was one of the triumvirate of security elements, and in the zone extending 150 kilometers behind the front lines they were the chief organization assuring the security of the rear. At the same time they used their information sources and counterintelligence skills to lead operations against "enemy and anti-Soviet forces" in the broadest sense of the

term. Thus they participated significantly in the liquidation of the non-Communist resistance, the nationalist movements and thus in the re-occupation of the western part of the Soviet Union and eventually also the states of eastern and central Europe.

Summary

The major means of oppression was the well-known NKVD, the Interior Ministry, respectively all the organizations that belonged to its organizational structure. During the whole existence of the USSR, counter-intelligence service (the Special Division, from 1943 the SMERS) was one of them. The sole organizational incorporation - the counter-intelligence being controlled by a different ministry than the Ministry of Defence – is a typical feature of perceiving security in a Soviet way.

Based on the archive materials and literature recently made public, though the important documents are still not accessible, the author outlined the Special Division/SMERS's basic organizational structure during the WW II. He tried to follow the reasons for the organizational changes between 1940-1945 when the counter-intelligence service was exempted from the subordination to the NKVD and then re-subordinated again. These changes have clearly taken place due to the war development and the power fight within the Stalinist elites.

Great attention is given the analysis of the large scale of SMERS's tasks during the WW II., that reveal SMERS's objectives and their actual realization. On the list of SMERS's tasks we would not only find counter-intelligence activities in the army and the military circles but at the same time it was to closely follow the political and moral state of the army and supervise the actual counter-intelligence operations against the enemy as well as support the outposted Soviet soldiers. Due to its possibilities SMERS took an active part in

operations against the Ukrainian and Polish undergrounds as well as the Baltic lands and all the countries controlled by the Soviet army. In the end of the war and shortly after, SMERS's major task was to "filter" repatriated Soviet soldiers returning from the German captivity.

It's clear that SMERS was en efficient organization dealing with many counter-intelligence operations as well as it was a means of political oppression.

Translation: Frederick L. Snider

KHRUSHCHEV AND HIS FOREIGN POLICY

MICHAL REIMAN

Documents of the Soviet leadership deposited in the Czech State Archive reveal important aspects of Soviet foreign policy in the years during which Nikita S. Khrushchev stood at its head. These documents were brought to Czechoslovakia for the information of its leadership, which was to acquaint itself from the authentic documentation with the Soviet foreign agenda. The selection of documents reaching Czechoslovakia and other countries of the Soviet block was made by the Soviet authorities, and their criteria remain unknown. Comparison of the Prague documents with the holdings in the various Russian archives is not yet possible, as they have no so far been released. Nevertheless the Prague collection is sufficiently extensive and complex to offer a picture of Soviet policy, its evaluation of the international situation and the policies of the western powers (the United States, Great Britain and France) in those years. The present study is an expanded version of the introduction to a collection of these documents, published in Brno in 2000.[131]

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[131] Michal REIMAN, Petr LUŇÁK, *Studená válka 1954–1964: sovětské dokumenty v českých archivech*. Brno, Doplněk 2000. 444 pp.

Soviet Postwar Policy

Khrushchev was one of the generation of Soviet politicians who built their careers amid the mass repression and purges of the 1930's. He began as a Communist functionary in the Donets Basin and was sent to study at the prestigious Industrial Academy in Moscow, where as the school's Party secretary he was known for his hard attitude toward "rightists" and "Trotskyites". By February 1935 he had risen to the post of Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee of the Party (VKS$_{(b)}$), replacing his one-time patron Lazar M. Kaganovich. His rise was part of maneuvering within the leadership leading to purges and the preparation of fabricated evidence against dismissed Communist leaders. Khrushchev took an active part in the purges, and as a "workers' functionary" he was able to create a strong position for himself in Moscow. When in 1938 Stalin decided to deliver the final blow against the Ukrainian leadership he sent Khrushchev to Kiev to become the new First Secretary, which won him a place on the Politburo. Khrushchev worked in Kiev for the next twelve years.[132]

Khrushchev returned to Moscow only at the end of 1949, with the fall of the Moscow Party Secretary G. M. Popov in Stalin's postwar purges.[133] Khrushchev's arrival in Moscow was the signal for fresh changes in the Soviet leadership as Stalin prepared to eliminate members of the older generation such as Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Andreyev and Kaganovich. Khrushchev joined with Malenkov and Beria, who had long worked in Moscow and had maintained close contacts since before the war. Beria, a vice premier

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[132] In later years Khrushchev maintained that during his years in Moscow and Kiev the excesses were carried out by others, including the security forces. But his responsibility for the repression and purges is demonstrated by looking at the chronology of the functions he carried out. In recent years documentation showing his part in the repression has been published in Russian and Ukrainian studies.

[133] In the "Leningrad case" a large group of high Communist functionaries originally from Leningrad were arrested. The most prominent were the deputy premier of the Soviet government Nikolaj A. Voznyesensky and the secretary of the Moscow region Alexei A. Kuznyetsov. Stalin, who once declared them his successors, had them liquidated in 1950. G. M. Popov was not arrested but relieved of his post, which Khrushchev ascribed to his own intervention with Stalin.

in the Government, was its most agile member, while from 1948 Malenkov was acting deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Party's executive secretary for the Moscow region, which that he was at Stalin's right hand, participating in one way or another in all repressive acts against leading functionaries. His own attitude toward Stalin appears to have been critical. He shared with Beria differing views on a number of points of domestic and foreign policy, but he lacked the courage openly to oppose Stalin, and he was utterly without personal charisma. Stalin thus attempted to undermine Beria's position, ease him out of leading positions and bind Malenkov closer to himself. With the same aim, he appears to have encouraged animosity among Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev.[134]

The relationships within the Soviet leadership are important because they influenced Khrushchev's later policies. Soviet postwar foreign policy as originally conceived by Stalin counted on long-term cooperation between the USSR and its western Allies Britain and the United States, the three of them sharing influence in the postwar world. The Soviet union attempted to assure for itself the strongest territorial power in Europe which could benefit from conflicts of economic and political interest between Britain and the United States. The USSR and Britain would then act as a counterweight to growing American power. As far as the Far East was concerned, this concept also counted on the Soviet Union maintaining good relations with Chaing Kai Shek's China.[135]

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[134] In earlier years Malenkov was employed in Stalin's secretariat, before being entrusted with personnel policy. He achieved an independent political position only through his wartime activities. In addition to lacking charisma, he was viewed as lacking independence and initiative. Beria, on the other hand, was full of initiative and not afraid to take independent decisions. This was apparently the reason why Stalin attempted to undermine his position. Khrushchev was the underestimated member of the trio, since having been away from Moscow he was without contacts in the central institutions and lacked a grasp of many policy areas, and though endowed with energy and drive, he lacked education, so that he seemed ill-equipped to aspire to leadership.

[135] G. P. Kynin, J. Laufer, eds., *SSSR i germansky vopros: Dokumenty iz archiva vnyeshney politiki Rossiiskoy Federacii*, Moscow 1996, 338, 358–360. (I. Maisky to V. M. Molotov, 11 January 1944).

Stalin's concept soon proved ephemeral. The western allies were of course unable to accept Soviet domination of the European continent. In view of the fundamental differences in social and political system they could not achieve the necessary harmony of views and interests with the Soviets, the foundation for long-term mutual trust. The Soviet presence in postwar central and southeastern Europe and the Soviet military dominance on the European continent amounted to dangerous changes in the balance of forces to the detriment of the western powers, which were exacerbated by the significant participation of Communists in the governments of France and Italy. This enabled Great Britain and the United States to overcome their differences and strengthened their opposition to Soviet ambitions. Conflicts between the USSR and the western posers increased, and in 1947-48 led to the de facto dissolution of the anti-Hitler coalition. With this Stalin's policy suffered a severe blow, and the USSR had to give up the ambition of influencing the fate of the world through a great-power "troika". Germany divided into two enemy states, and contrary to Soviet expectations the Americans did not withdraw their troops from Europe, remaining instead as a counterweight to Soviet military power. After 1949 the western countries under aegis of the United States built their defense organization, NATO, which permanently changed the situation in Europe. Soviet influence remained limited to the countries of East Central and Southeastern Europe, which, under pressure from the Soviet Union, kept their relation with the west to a minimum.

The new situation deprived Soviet policy of its long-term prospects. It was clear that the political and military strength of the western community, which included the most advanced countries in the world, was bound to increase. Soviet policy was especially troubled by the American lead in military technology and especially in atomic weaponry. While the USSR succeeded in developing its own atomic weapons relatively soon after the war (1949), the gap remained. Moreover, competition with the United States in the military sphere placed a great burden on the Soviet economy already weakened by war, retarded its development and reduced still further

the low standard of living of the populace. It appears that Stalin toyed with the idea of making a decisive move in Europe, making use of the decisive Soviet numerical superiority before the West could bring to bear the necessary military potential and create an atomic arsenal.[136] A feasibility test of sorts was provided in the Far East by the Korean War, which broke out in 1950 and led first to great success for the Communist North, which occupied a large part of the South. But the western countries, especially the United States, which won a mandate from the United States, became involved. The North Korean front was pushed back to the 38th parallel after the entry of Chinese "volunteers".

These events prompted the western powers to conclude a peace treaty with Japan over Soviet objections. All this limited Soviet ability to act in the Far East and Pacific regions. Nor was the basic situation changed by the victory of the Communist revolution in China in 1949, which remained very weak. In any case, the emergence of a Communist China as a "second Socialist power" complicated Soviet policy because it now had to take account of Chinese interests.

Events in Korea impressed upon the Soviet leadership the dangers of armed conflict. In his last public address in October 1952 Stalin signaled a retreat from a policy of confrontation when he declared his view that war between the "imperialist powers" would eventually be more likely than a war conducted by them against the Soviet Union. Feelers put out by Stalin in March 1952 for an agreement with the west over Germany ended in failure. They were conceived as an attempt to complicate the integration of West Germany into the

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[136] The Kremlin meeting in 1951 is described by K. Kaplan on the basis of testimony of one of the participants, the Czechoslovak minister of defense A. Čepička: See Kaplan's memoirs, *Mocní a bezmocní* (The Powerful and the Powerless), Toronto 1989, 201–202. Minutes of the meeting have also been preserved by the Rumanian defense minister Bodnaras. The latter differs from Čepička's version chiefly in that it speaks of countering an attack from the west. The content of Stalin's argumentation, however, as presented by Bodnaras, supports the notion of aggressive intent. It has been published in English translation by V. Mastný: "Did NATO Win the Cold War? Documentary Supplement", *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 3, 1999, document no. 11.

western community and weaken the position of the United States in Europe.[137] Stalin strengthened this impression after the failure of his initiative by instituting a campaign of "accelerated" building of socialism in East Germany, which in fact meant giving up on German unification and also brought about destabilization resulting from a mass flight of East Germans to the West. Soviet foreign policy was removed from the hands of Molotov, whom Stalin thereby saddled with responsibility for his own mistakes, and entrusted to Malenkov.[138] Soviet foreign policy found itself in a blind alley.

Stalin's Death and Changes in the Soviet Political Concept

It was only with Stalin's death in March 1953 that further movement was possible. Malenkov and Beria took the initiative by occupying the key political functions whose importance had been heightened during the war.[139] State power then emerged as the representative of the "all-national" war effort.[140] It was encouraged by

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[137] Stalin's well-known notes offered unification of Germany and renewal of German sovereignty within the Potsdam borders. In exchange Germany was to become neutral. Discussion of Stalin's proposals would have brought major conflicts among western countries and compromised German integration in western Europe. Therefore they did not enter negotiations. The episode, however, became the subject of intensive political discussion in Germany and in the west generally: did the notes merely reflect propaganda motives or did they represent a real chance for German unification by the end of the 1950's?

[138] Molotov was responsible for foreign policy in the Politburo of the Moscow Party Organization VKS$_{(b)}$, but his influence had been on the wane since 1949 when Vyshinsky, formerly Stalin's prosecutor, became foreign minister. A. Mikoyan, responsible for foreign commercial relations, was also weakened. Stalin argued that both made excessive concessions to the West, inferred from episodes in the immediate aftermath of the war. See A. I. MIKOYAN, *Tak bylo: Razmyshleniya o minuvshem*, Moscow 1999, 573-575.

[139] Malenkov became premier (until 1955), and was for a short time secretary of the Central Committee and until the autumn of 1954 head of the presidium of the Soviet Communist Party. Beria became first deputy prime minister and interior minister, which put him in charge of state security.

[140] "All-national" in the multi-national Soviet Union was mediated by the concept of a "Soviet People".

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specific requirements of foreign policy, which adapted itself to the role of the Soviet Union as a world power. After the war Stalin never returned to the earlier model of relations between Party and state, but continued to strengthen the role of the government and state administration. As Stalin's designated successor, Malenkov did not lay claim to the post of Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which he had occupied many years, but rather to that of prime minister. The secretary's post was left to Khrushchev.

Soon after Stalin's death it was clear that the new ruling group did not identify itself with Stalinist policies. The notion of a "personality cult" appeared in the press, and Party functionaries were given to understand that the changes were not merely an attempt to elevate a "collective leadership". The process of rehabilitation was begun for the most egregious cases of postwar repression, and the amnesty proposed by Beria meant the release of nearly one million of the two and a half million Soviet prisoners. It was expected that the situation of political prisoners would be eased. The practice of filling key posts in the non-Russian Soviet republics with ethnic Russians was discontinued. In April 1953 it was reported in the press that state security was henceforth to concentrate on its prime targets, "external enemies" and that its employees had extracted false confessions.[141]

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[141] The rehabilitation extended to the recent case of the "Jewish doctors", accused in 1952 of plotting to kill members of the Soviet leadership who were their patients. The first step was to reopen the case of the "Jewish anti-Fascist Committee", a large group of Soviet Jewish intellectuals originating during the war, who were sentenced to death in 1952 and, with one exception, executed. Beria informed the government of the circumstances surrounding the death of the leading Jewish actor S. Michoels, who was murdered in the spring of 1948 at Stalin's orders. Also reopened was the case of a leading Soviet diplomat, deputy of the foreign minister Maisky, accused of espionage. Prominent figures in the aircraft industry were rehabilitated along with air force commanders accused in 1946 of damaging Soviet interests. The case of intelligence agents accused of complicity in the "Jewish plot" was reviewed, and the famous "Leningrad case" of 1949 was reopened. All this was at the initiative of Beria, who as interior minister had access to the documentation. See R. G. PICHOYA, *SSSR: Istoriya vlasti. 1945–1991,* Moscow 1998, 102–108. V. P. NAUMOV, "Byl li zagovor Berii? Novye dokumenty o sobytiyach 1953 g.", in: *Novaya i novyeyshaya istoriya* (NNI) 5/1998, 20–22.

The changes aroused the Stalinists, as their own activities were being called into question. The conflict intensified when foreign policy came up for consideration. This was made necessary as foreign relations appeared to reach a turning point and diplomatic feelers were launched by the western powers.[142] The need to solve pressing domestic problems also played its role. Malenkov and Beria were aware of the necessity of reorienting the national economy to limit the development of heavy industry in favor of consumer production and housing, and slowing precipitous socialization in the countries of the Soviet bloc.[143] A requirement for this was progress in rocket technology and thermonuclear weaponry, where the USSR was ahead of the United States. Malenkov and Beria apparently wished to eliminate dangerous international flashpoints and reopen dialogue with their one-time partners in the anti-Hitler coalition, the United States, Britain and France. The favorable signs included disunity prevailing among the three western powers in their view of world problems and especially European security, the attempts by Great Britain and France to maintain their great power status, the continuing fears concerning Germany and its integration into the western defense structure. In the countries of the Soviet bloc, meanwhile, Malenkov and Beria tried to get rid of the worst creatures of Stalin – Rákosy in Hungary and Ulbricht in East Germany. Relations were renewed with Yugoslavia, and Beria prepared to test the wind for a possible Soviet-Yugoslav "rapprochement".[144]

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[142] Eisenhower's speech "Give Peace a Chance" of April 1953 and a similar speech by Churchill. In discussions of the western offers in the Party presidium differences arose setting Malenkov and Beria against the other members, especially the foreign minister V. M. Molotov. V. ZUBOK, C. PLESHAKOV, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*, Cambridge, Mass. 1956, 157.

[143] This idea was proposed by Malenkov at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet in August 1953 after the arrest of Beria. Beria's view may be judged from his attitude toward the "hastened building of socialism" in East Germany and Hungary. See U. V. AKSYUTIN, A. V. PYZHIKOV, *Postalinskoye obshchestvo: problema liderstva i transformacia vlasti*, Moscow 1999, 30–32, 34 ff, 43–46.

[144] The rise of Imre Nagy, as well as the "intrigues" against Ulbricht, were later ascribed to Beria. Beria's efforts to renew personal contacts with Yugoslav political leaders was even described as "treason". But it may be assumed that he could not have undertaken such initiatives without the knowledge of Malenkov. Otherwise they would have been not merely dangerous but senseless. See Aksyutin, Pazhikov, 30-34.

These initiatives, however, did not attract the necessary support from the Soviet leadership – especially when in 1953 Malenkov and Beria reacted to the growing social and political crisis in East Germany with a proposal to abandon the policy of "building Socialism". Behind this lay their attempt to revive Stalin's proposal of 1952 and bring about change in European relations at the cost of creating a united "bourgeois democratic" Germany.[145] Molotov, who after Stalin's death resumed control of the foreign ministry, rebelled against their willingness to strive for a reduction in international tensions at the cost of compromising Soviet foreign-policy interests. He embodied the continuity of a hard-line great-power concept of Soviet policy and enjoyed considerable personal authority among the Soviet leadership. Molotov was supported by defense minister Bulganin and by Khrushchev, who was also interested in getting rid of Beria as a dangerous competitor in the ongoing power struggle and in weakening Malenkov as head of the government. Beria was arrested, tried at the end of 1953 and sentenced to death.[146] Khrushchev thereby significantly strengthened his position. The Soviet leadership returned to the thesis of the "leading role of the Party", which meant the subordinate role of the Government, i.e. Malenkov. In the autumn of 1954 Malenkov was deprived of the chairmanship of the Party presidium and shortly thereafter of the premiership, which was taken over by Bulganin.

The Formulation of Khrushchev's Foreign Policy

Molotov exacted a price for his alliance with Khrushchev. Soviet foreign policy remained under his control for the next two years and new elements made themselves felt only gradually. The rejection of

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[145] See M. REIMAN, "Malenkov und die deutsche Einheit. Ergänzungen zur Diskussion über die sowjetische Deutschland. Note vom März 1952", *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 3, 1999, 456–460.

[146] Zubok, Pleshakov, 160-162. Pichoya, 109–111. The charges lodged against Beria did not include (contrary to Khrushchev's later version) responsibility for the repression and terror during the Stalin era.

Malenkov's and Beria's proposals on the German question meant that the Soviet Union lost the chance to attempt a long-term reduction of tension in Europe and foster a divergence in American and European security interests. Molotov's idea of conflict between the USSR and the West, as well as his view of the German question, remained strongly marked by the Stalin era. Criticism of Stalin disappeared from Soviet policy, and even the policy of rehabilitation underwent some revision. A new round was begun only in 1955-1956, while in the interval new political trials took place in Rumania and Czechoslovakia.[147] The causes of the conflicts within the Soviet leadership were far from clear, while at the beginning of the Eisenhower era the United States was preoccupied by threats to Western unity. This was important since it affected the West's concept of security, the role of the "nuclear deterrent", and the method of integrating West Germany into the western defense system.[148] The Soviet initiative, aiming for a shift in international relations, was launched only in the late spring of 1955 at a time when the international situation had changed markedly. In 1954 it had been definitively decided to integrate West Germany into NATO, and the USSR replied in the spring of 1955 with the formation of its East European counterpart the Warsaw Pact. The division of Europe thus took on firm lineaments.

Khrushchev's policy, as it crystallized in 1955 and 1956, betrayed a number of inconsistencies. On the one hand it incorporated points from Malenkov's and Beria's proposals (to which Khrushchev had made a contribution): it placed emphasis on consumer production, housing and agriculture, on reducing international tensions and normalizing relations with the western countries; in domestic affairs, after the elimination of Beria it turned against the state security system, replacing it with a new structure, the KGB under

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[147] In Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1954 the Slánský trial was followed by those of Švermová, Husák, Smrkovský and others, while in Rumania there was the trial of the leading postwar Communist functionary L. Patrascanu.

[148] See Petr LUŇÁK, Západ: Spojené státy a západní Evropa ve studené válce (The West: the United States and Western Europe in the Cold War), Prague 1997, 159–164.

Khrushchev's control. From this arose his return to the rehabilitation process, which also looked toward the "socialist countries", where it was to encourage removal of that portion of the leadership which had originally supported the ideas of Malenkov and Beria. In the USSR itself the process turned against Malenkov and those leaders who had contested Khrushchev's political leadership.[149] This, however, undermined the second aspect of Khrushchev's policy, his effort to distance himself from the concepts of Malenkov and Beria. Thus he emphatically appealed to traditional Communist dogma and attempted to insert it into current policy. While Malenkov and Beria were aware that the serious economic and social difficulties of the USSR and its allies demanded "retreat", Khrushchev attempted an "offensive". Moreover, in the struggle against his opponents he sought support from the army. Thus in the spring of 1954 he clearly distanced himself from Malenkov, who declared the inadmissibility of war in the nuclear age,[150] and also attacked Molotov when he joined Malenkov in declaring that only the "foundations of socialism" had been built in the USSR.[151] He encouraged the Soviet bloc countries to follow the latest Soviet solution, by which he revised Malenkov's references to the legacy of NEP. The socializing process which had been halted in 1953 received Khrushchev's blessing.

Khrushchev appeared on the international stage in the spring of 1955, shortly after Malenkov was removed as premier. The Western powers were not expecting a significant change in Soviet policy. The situation at the end of 1954 was dominated by the integration of West Germany into NATO and the emergence of the Warsaw Pact.[152]

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[149] In the Soviet Block these were chiefly individuals who carried out Malenkov's policy – Nagy in Hungary or Zápotocký in Czechoslovakia. In East Germany Khrushchev supported the newly reconsolidated Ulbricht, who had been threatened by the policies of Malenkov and Beria and by the events of June 1953. In the USSR Khrushchev attempted to get rid of Molotov and members of the older political generation along with Malenkov.

[150] Zubok, Pleshakov, 166–168.

[151] "Sto sorok besed s Molotovym", in: *Dnevnika F. Chuyeva* (hereafter Chuyev), Moscow 1991, 347–349.

[152] Adam B. ULAM, *The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II*, New York 1971, 217–225.

Nevertheless, once his position was consolidated, Khrushchev took the initiative. In May there was the agreement restoring Austrian sovereignty and securing its neutrality. With the troops of the great powers withdrawn from Austria, the door was open, from the Soviet viewpoint, for negotiations concerning Germany. Through French mediation the Soviet government opened talks with West Germany which led to a visit by Chancellor Adenauer to Moscow in September 1955 and the establishment of diplomatic relations.[153] Also important was the visit by Khrushchev and Bulganin to Yugoslavia in June 1955 at which Khrushchev admitted Stalin's responsibility for the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict of 1948.[154] He thereby eliminated a conflict which had burden Soviet policy in the Balkans and Mediterranean.

These steps were followed by Soviet disarmament proposals which took account of Western wishes expressed earlier, and a proposal for a European agreement on collective security which framed Soviet views on peace in Europe and on a resolution of the German question. These proposals attempted to make use of the divergence in the position of the Western powers,[155] but they did not consider sufficiently developments in Western defense thinking since the beginning of the Eisenhower administration. On Germany, they were based on the existence of two German states, in contrast to the original plans of Malenkov and Beria. A German peace treaty would end the state of war with Germany and should be separated from the question of German unification, which should be decided by an agreement between both

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[153] A. HILLGRUBER, *Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1986: die "deutsche Frage" in der Weltpolitik*, 8th edition, Stuttgart Berlin Cologne Kohlhammer 1995, 63 ff. The visit has been regarded as setting the seal on the division of Germany, since it took place even though the USSR rejected the claim of West Germany to represent all of Germany. The establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and the Soviet Union was an important factor in the international situation.

[154] The visit was prepared by a secret correspondence between the Soviet and Yugoslav leadership, initiated with a letter from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party dated 22 June 1954, in which the Yugoslavs were offered normalization of relations between the two countries and also between the two "parties". See "Sovietsko-yugoslavskiye otnosheniya: Iz dokumentov yulskovo plenuma CK KPSS 1955 g" in, *Istorichesky archiv* 1999, no. 2, 3-63 (introductory note and Khrushchev's report).

[155] ULAM, 232 ff.

German states. The Allies should withdraw from Germany. Khrushchev's proposals turned against West Germany, against its incorporation into NATO, and thus against the current Western concept of security based on the primacy of conflict between the USSR and the West. Moreover, they torpedoed West Germany's claim to exclusive representation of all Germany and implied a recognition of East Germany by the western countries. Therefore they were unacceptable to the West, even though they represented a step forward, in that they permitted a renewal of the earlier anti-Hitler coalition among the great powers.

When after an interval of ten years the leaders of all the great powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France) gathered at Geneva, there was a marked change in the atmosphere. The USSR visibly attempted to renew the friendly ties that had marked the earlier alliance and had been broken under Stalin and Truman. One of the members of the Soviet delegation was Marshal G. K. Zhukov, who engaged in personal diplomacy by meeting Eisenhower, who had led the allied forces on the Western Front. Zhukov was apparently marked down for a prominent role in future Soviet foreign policy. The positions remained far apart, but there began a period in which both sides renewed intensive contacts and defined the problems and attitudes which in the coming years would determine the themes of their talks: a solution to the German question, security problems, and disarmament, especially the containment or elimination of the nuclear threat. Aside from their propaganda value, the Soviet proposals would reduce the economic burden of military spending. At the same time they aimed to equalize the mutual threats that could be brought to bear by the United States and the USSR and neutralize the scientific and technological superiority of the West. Thus arms controls depended on substantial reductions, and later total disarmament, since in Khrushchev's view controls without an agreement on total disarmament were no more than espionage, which would give the West an advantage.[156]

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[156] See Luňák, 214–216. For the official Soviet assessment, V. G. Trukhanovsky, ed, *Istoria mezhdunarodnikh otnosheny i vneshney politiki SSSR*, vol. 3 (1945–1967) ed. I. A. Kirilin (hereafter Trukhanovsky), Moscow 1967, 224–227.

During this period relations between the USSR and the West came increasingly to be influenced by the situation in Asia, in north and central Africa, and then also in Latin America, where the consequences of the disintegration of the colonial empires of the western countries – Great Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands – made themselves felt. The revolution in Egypt at the beginning of the 1950's and the rise of the nationalist Nasser regime brought tensions with Britain and France over control of the Suez Canal and a deepening of the conflict between Israel and the Arab states. To this was added the complicated situation in the Indian subcontinent. The new national states, meanwhile, attempted to distance themselves from the conflict between East and West, which limited their space for maneuver and the pursuit of their own interests. They joined in an association of "nonaligned" countries in which, along with India and Egypt, Yugoslavia played a prominent role. This group opposed colonialism and issued resolutions that often had an anti-Western tenor.

Soviet policy, which followed an isolationist course under Stalin, did not react in time to exert significant influence on these developments. But the situation changed in 1955, when Khrushchev attempted to confront the construction of a western military alliance in Asia and searched for ways to offset western policy. China contributed on this score by intensifying relations with India, Indonesia and other countries, resulting in a conference of 29 nonaligned countries of Asia and Africa at Bandung in Indonesia. It opened in April 1955 and roundly condemned colonialism, and the Soviet Union benefited from the principle of peaceful co-existence which, under the Indian concept of "panchashila", the conference adopted. Thus in the autumn of 1955 Khrushchev and Bulganin traveled to India, Burma and Afghanistan, then later to Indonesia and other countries. They significantly increased Soviet influence in Asia and enabled the USSR to develop closer contacts with the nonaligned movement.[157] This was

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[157] Letter from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to the Czechoslovak Party on the results of the journey by Khrushchev and Bulganin, 7 January 1956, in Reiman, Luňák, 47–53.

abetted by closer Soviet relations with Yugoslavia and Nasser's Egypt, engaged in an ever sharper conflict with Great Britain, France and Israel.[158] Thus a new prospect was opened up for fresh conflicts between the Soviet Union and the West, which quickly extinguished the "spirit of Geneva". But at the same time a fact not adequately appreciated by Khrushchev was that the disintegration of the colonial system undermined the status of Great Britain and France and increased their dependence on American support, which of course significantly limited the flexibility of Soviet policy.

The 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and Foreign Policy

The foreign policy enunciated by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956 was as contradictory as his earlier policies.[159] The meeting was well received by the public, especially in the USSR and the countries of the Soviet bloc, since it seemed to open the way to reforms and a lessening of repression. The principle of "collective decision making" was to prevail among the political leadership, and living standards were to be improved. This resolution was based on a harsh criticism of Stalin's repressive policies which Khrushchev delivered at a closed session of the congress. It was not entirely consistent: negative aspects of Soviet history were traced to Stalin's political and personal shortcomings, so that the rehabilitation process was in effect limited to conformist communists, was lengthened over a period of years and became one of the factors

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[158] England and France defended the claims of the Suez Canal Company, which was to be nationalized, and were concerned over the strategically important connection to Asia. Israel had every reason to fear that Egyptian control of Suez would threaten its security, even its very existence.

[159] See *SS syezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovietskogo Soyuza 14–25 fevralya 1956 goda: stenograficheksy otchet*, 2 volumes, Moscow 1956. Of special significance was Khrushchev's report to the Central Committee in volume 1, 9-120. His speech on the "cult of personality" and its consequences was only published for internal use in the USSR and was never made available in unabridged form abroad.

closing off the road towards a democratization of the system. At the time, however, the simple fact that Stalin had come in for criticism had a positive effect.

The political concept presented by Khrushchev was strongly influenced by the optimistic assessment of the state and the prospects of "socialism". Khrushchev proceeded from the assumption that the Soviet economy could reach American levels within decades both in terms of total volume and per capita production.[160] This result was to be obtained through increased economic efficiency stemming from improved planning in the USSR and economic coordination among the Soviet bloc countries. Khrushchev's plans were marked by an elemental, ideologically motivated imperialism, manifested in the global reach of his foreign policy aims. The economic and political efforts of the USSR and the Soviet bloc would lead to the "victory of socialism over capitalism throughout the world".

Like his predecessor Malenkov, Khrushchev was aware of the ruinous consequences of war in the atomic age. He saw the danger in the policies of the United States and its allies, who regarded it as the last defense against "socialism". This view implied a heightened attention to armaments. Khrushchev, however, spoke of averting war and stressed the peaceful coexistence of countries with "differing social systems". His concept ascribed great significance to negotiation and agreement among the powers, while he hoped to assure Soviet successes through heightened tension. "Peaceful coexistence" did not imply a "reconciliation of ideologies", nor did he intend to preserve the status quo between "capitalism" and "socialism", resolving instead to erode the former from within through support of anti-government movements. He sought allies in third-world countries, where opposition to colonialism was weakening current regimes. Like Stalin during the war, he appealed to the "democratic" and "socialist" public, offering his support to a range of leftist organizations and personalities. Though this sort of cooperation was intended to assure

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[160] The original target was the 1970's; later, when this appeared unlikely, it was postponed to the 1980's without comment.

"peaceful coexistence", he spoke at the same time of "national roads to socialism", meaning that Communists would respect their non-Communist partners and not resort to civil war. This was meant to quiet the fears of the Western public in the face of eventual Communist successes. The paradox was that its main effect was on the public and politics of the Soviet bloc countries, where a right to different "models" of socialism seemed to be implied. The congress appeared to endorse a loosening of relations among "socialist states" and cooperation on equal terms.

On the whole the foreign policy approved at the congress had a confrontational character. It grew out of the conditions of the atomic age and the dangers presented by armed conflict among the great powers. It also reflected the new political balance occasioned by the end of the colonial system and the rise of new independent states. At the same time it reflected the continuing antagonism between East and West and thus brought no promise of fundamental changes in relations.

The contradictions in Khrushchev's concept surfaced soon after the congress. Criticism of the Stalinist regime roused the public to press for quick changes to the system, but Soviet policy had no ready answer to such appeals, which were a kind of revenge for Khrushchev's efforts to minimize economic and social difficulties. In June 1956 serious disturbances by workers broke out in Poznan which led to changes in the Polish government and Communist Party. These events evoked similar demands in Hungary, where rioting escalated into a national revolution which was only quelled by Soviet military intervention.

Soviet foreign policy was severely inhibited. When in the autumn of 1956 the Suez conflict ended with a war by Britain, France and Israel against Egypt, the Soviet Union was in no position to intervene in any effective way. Therefore it limited itself to threats against the two Western powers, which again worsened East-West relations. Though the war heightened Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria, the initiative in the region was taken by the United States which achieved an end to the conflict and suggested measures which were to contain

the "Communist threat". The situation in the Middle East was temporarily stabilized.[161]

The events of the autumn of 1956 showed that the chief problem of Soviet foreign policy was that its foundations remained unconsolidated. Events in Poland and Hungary impaired the stability of the Soviet bloc for a long time and also created opposition to the policies begun by the 20th Party Congress. This opposition was progressively joined by the greater part of the Party leadership, who for a variety of reasons endeavored to eject Khrushchev.[162] The Chinese leadership distanced itself from Khrushchev. From 1953 to 1955 relations between Khrushchev and Mao had generally improved, as Khrushchev's struggle against Malenkov suited Mao's program of rapid socialization which was meeting opposition from the Chinese leadership. After the 20th Party Congress relations began to deteriorate as Mao reacted coldly to the criticism of Stalin and failed to endorse the foreign policy resolutions of the Congress. The Chinese, confronted with the existence of the nationalist government in Taiwan recognized by the United Nations as the legitimate representative of China, reserved the right to impose its authority on the island, while Khrushchev's notion of "peaceful coexistence" tied their hands. These pressures evoked a "consolidating" tendency in Communist policy which resulted in a worsening of relations with Yugoslavia.

The situation began to change only in mid-1957, when Khrushchev succeeded in thwarting a move by the opposition to unseat him as First Secretary of the Party, then eliminated his

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[161] ULAM, 254–264. See also Information from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on talks between Gromyko and Dulles, in Reiman, Luňák, 55–69. The document also reflects the weakened international standing of Britain and France flowing from the Suez crisis.

[162] The core of the opposition was an influential group of politicians including Molotiv, Malenkov and Kaganovich, supported by the current "president" Voroshilov and eventually by politicians from the Khrushchev camp – the premier Bulganin, Khrushchev's onetime foreign minister Shepilov, and others. At one point the opposition gained the upper hand in the Party presidium. See A. B. BEZBORO-DOV, *Istoria Rossii, noveyshye vremya 1945–1999* (hereafter Bezborodov), Moscow 1999, 88 ff.

opponents within the leadership.[163] In the autumn Khrushchev concentrated in his hands the functions of premier, recently vacated, and first secretary of the Party.[164] He thereby gained full control of the agencies of political power and hence a clear mandate to direct foreign policy and participate in international negotiations. At an international meeting of Communist parties in Moscow in November 1957 Khrushchev, in exchange for concessions in the interpretation of resolutions of the 20th Congress, won confirmation of the "leading role" of the USSR in setting the policies of the Communist Parties. But unity proved elusive because of the conflicts between the Soviet and Chinese Parties continued to deepen even though they were temporarily muffled. In any case, the stage was set for Khrushchev to launch a broad foreign policy offensive.[165]

Soviet Policy and the Diplomatic Offensive 1958-1960

The Soviet foreign policy offensive of 1958-1960, which ended amid the events leading to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis the following year, represented a not entirely realistic effort to put into practice the ideas adopted at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. It was not a "defensive" policy: after the turbulence of 1956-1957, Khrushchev needed to demonstrate his ability to carry out an "offensive" policy.[166]

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[163] See Pichoya, 171-186.

[164] With the resignation of Bulganin the leading candidate, Marshal G. K. Zhukov was eliminated by Khrushchev in the autumn of 1957 from the Party leadership for supposedly attempting to remove the army from Party control. As premier Zhukov would have been a personality domestically as well as internationally, as political and military leaders of the war years continued to occupy top positions in the Western countries (Eisenhower, de Gaulle, Macmillan).

[165] The limitations placed on Khrushchev's foreign policy are indicated in the way Gromyko conducted his talks with Dulles in the autumn of 1957, when the leadership changes came up for discussion. He vehemently protested against the suggestion that they would have a positive effect on Soviet policy. See Reiman-Luňák, 55–69.

[166] In the extensive literature on the German question from 1958 to 1962, which played a key role in Soviet activities, it is often discussed whether Khrushchev's concept

Khrushchev presented his plans to an extraordinary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party at the beginning of 1959. They were based ultimately on an illusory assessment of the prospects for the Soviet economy in the world. The volume of Soviet industrial production was estimated at half that of the United States, agricultural production 20 to 25 percent lower. According to the figures, however, Soviet industrial production exceeded that of Britain, France and West Germany combined. It was assumed, moreover, that growth would continue at 8 to 9 percent annually, while that of the United States and Western Europe remained at around 2 percent. Thus, the Soviet Union should overtake the United States in overall production as well as production per capita at the beginning of the 1970's. By this time the countries of the "world socialist system? should be contributing over half the world's industrial production.[167] These figures became the basis for a seven-year plan for economic development (1959–1965).

These plans were important for Soviet foreign policy in that they determined its tasks and suggested a time frame in which to accomplish them. The "spirit of Geneva" was completely dissolved in the events of 1956, while the distrust between East and West increased with new realities. The careful attempt by Dulles to interpret Khrushchev's victory over the opposition in the USSR as a return to "Geneva" was sharply rejected by Gromyko.[168] Khrushchev apparently did not trust the possibilities offered by normal negotiations and thus opted for a confrontational approach. He was partly influenced by the delicate state of Sino-Soviet relations. The Communist government, still denied great-power status and the right to represent China in the United Nations, had little interest in seeing

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was "defensive" or "aggressive". Similar uncertainty surrounds the origins of his "peace offensive". The answer must be sought in the actions which created the real situation and the possibilities within which Soviet policy had to operate. Khrushchev's concept was "offensive" in so far as it aimed at changing European realities, although its goal was not violent change.

[167] *Vneocherednoy XXI syezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovietskogo Soyuza, 27 yanuarya – 5 fevralya 1959 g., Stenografichesky otchet,* vol. 1, Moscow 1959, 63–67.

[168] See n. 35 above.

improved relations between the Soviet Union and the West. This had an impact on the methods that Khrushchev selected in carrying out his policy, whose aims took little account of the complications inherent in international problems. Soviet diplomacy strove for quick and clear-cut results, and it often overestimated the means at its disposal. Thus it provoked a number of crises, which in the end proved counterproductive.

The general situation appeared favorable for the Soviet Union. In October 1957 the USSR sent the first satellite into space and confirmed its edge over the United States in rocket technology. For the first time since the war the United States felt itself vulnerable to the danger of atomic attack.[169] The Western countries found themselves caught off guard, which deepened the differences among NATO members as Europe found itself more exposed to atomic attack than the United States. A further source of contention was the continuing division between the "victors" and the "defeated" and the fear of an eventual re-emergence of Germany with the right to participate in atomic arms policy.[170]

Relations with the West thus remained complicated. The special relationship between the United States and Great Britain remained from the Second World War. Britain developed its own atomic weapons at the beginning of the 1950's and after Sputnik pressed the United States for help in developing its atomic arsenal. This confirmed their special relationship within the western alliance, which was further deepened with the rise of de Gaulle's Fifth Republic when France attempted to strengthen its position and develop its own security. As these were based on closer ties with West Germany (in itself problematic, as fears of a strong Germany remained intact), France's relations with Britain and the United States suffered.

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[169] Luňák, 162 ff. Later research has called into doubt the extent of the Soviet advantage, though at the time the West was convinced.

[170] The effort by West Germany to become an atomic power, expressed in a resolution of the Bundestag in the spring of 1958, became a prime subject of Soviet diplomacy, used to justify Soviet proposals on the German questions. See ALBRECHT, et al., Geschichte der Bundesrepublik: Beitrage, Cologue 1980, 274 ff.

Thus Soviet policy was presented with opportunities for developing its own initiatives, which received approval at the conference of Communist parties in Moscow in November 1957. In February 1958 President Eisenhower spoke in favor of Soviet proposals for talks at the highest level.[171] Western hopes for a change in Soviet policy after the strengthening of Khrushchev's position appear to have persisted. The Soviet government prepared a list of problems tabled during the Geneva talks, whose ventilation could "improve the international situation", of which the German question took first place. Conceptual themes were discussed at meetings of the Comecon countries and the Warsaw Pact at the end of May 1958.[172] In August 1958, amid the heightened tensions caused by Chinese military activity in the Straits of Taiwan, the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, which thereafter should become a "disarmament zone" between East and West. The Western powers would withdraw their forces behind their own borders, while the USSR would withdraw its troops from Poland and Hungary as well as Germany.[173] At the same time the USSR promised agreement with Polish plans to create a "nuclear free zone" in Central Europe and with proposals for a substantial reduction of conventional armed forces. West Berlin was to become a free city whose existence

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[171] Reiman, Luňák 71–76 for reports of conversations between the Soviet ambassador and Eisenhower.

[172] Reiman, Luňák, 77–80: information on Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Pact, 24 May 1958, presented to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party by the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister V. David. On the occasion of the parallel Comecon meeting Walter Ulbricht presented a request for economic help from the other socialist countries to assure the stability of East Germany. Czech translation of the letter is in the State Central Archive, Prague. Other documents there do not suggest that Ulbricht exerted influence on the basic concept of Khrushchev's policy on Germany. Rather they suggest concessions to the views of the Polish foreign minister Rapacki, who did not favor sharpening tensions with the West. Ulbricht hoped to use the crisis to improve the position of East Germany within the Soviet bloc and win massive amounts of aid. The documents also suggest the active participation by the SED leadership in measures designed to implement Soviet proposals regarding transit links with West Berlin.

[173] Khrushchev used these formulations at the 21st Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The withdrawal was meant to underline the seriousness of Soviet aims, in view of the still fresh events of 1956.

would be guaranteed by international agreement. The German peace treaty would be concluded by both German states or by common institutions created by them for the purpose. Unification itself should not be a subject of the treaty but would be left to future agreement between the sovereign German states.

From a long-term perspective these proposals presented no real threat to the West. A weak East Germany, deprived of the daily presence and support of Soviet troops, would be fully occupied with its own problems. Soviet military withdrawal from Poland and Hungary would heighten the pressure for independence. But at the given moment these proposals were unacceptable to the West for a number of reasons: they conflicted with the current trend of Western defense and security policy, which posited a (perhaps unrealistically) strong Soviet Union; would lead to recognition de facto and perhaps de jure of East Germany and drive a wedge between themselves and West Germany. Moreover, withdrawal of western troops from West Germany would not only disturb the defense system but also call into question the American military presence in Europe and undermine confidence in American guarantees.[174] Changes in the status of West Berlin would violate the spirit and letter of the Potsdam Agreement, which evoked reservations on the Soviet side as well.[175]

The Soviet proposals as a whole did not form a suitable basis for agreement. The Soviet leadership appears to have misjudged the situation, exaggerating the differences of opinion among the Western countries and its own ability to exert pressure.[176] The tactic chosen at

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[174] Hillgruber, 67–69. The attitude of the West German government was significant for that of the West as a whole, and it was openly negative, a source of additional irritation for the Soviet side.

[175] A. I. MIKOYAN, *Tak bylo: Razmyshlenya o minuvshem*, Moscow 1999, 604 ff. The Potsdam agreement treated Berlin as a whole, not merely West Berlin. The USSR could not unilaterally change the conditions for Western military presence in Berlin.

[176] See Information on conversations between Khrushchev and Prime Minister Macmillan during his visit to the USSR, 21 February–3 March 1959, especially the Soviet proposal for the German peace treaty. See also minutes of talks between Czechoslovak premier Široký and other Czechoslovak leaders and Soviet foreign minister Gromyko concerning the Geneva conference of foreign ministers, 6 August 1959. Both in Reiman, Luňák, 81–89, 105–110.

the end of 1958 provoked a dangerous worsening of the international situation. In two notes, dated 27 November 1958 and 10 January 1959, the Soviet leadership set a six-month term for the West to agree to a German peace treaty. After that time the USSR and its allies would conclude a separate peace with East Germany. This treaty would terminate claims by the Western powers in Berlin and control of road access to the city would revert to the German Democratic Republic. Should the Western powers fail to respect East German sovereignty by forcing access to Berlin, the Soviet Union reserved the right to act in accordance with its treaty obligations toward the German Democratic Republic, i.e. to use armed force.[177]

The Soviet notes, together with declarations by Khrushchev and other leaders led to sharply heightened tensions, and the eventuality of using military force was given consideration. But this in turn encouraged a more sober assessment. In January 1959 A. Mikoyan travelled to Washington to explain to Eisenhower and Dulles the aims of the Soviet leaders and express hopes for a peaceful resolution. The visit was not a success, but neither side wished for war, looking instead for avenues for honorable withdrawal. At the end of February 1959 prime minister Macmillan began a ten-day visit to Moscow at his own initiative. After a difficult start, the talks showed that both sides sought compromise. The Soviets softened their demands, while Macmillan suggested regular meetings at the highest level.[178] Amid reduced tensions a meeting of the foreign ministers of the four great powers opened in Geneva, where both sides presented suggestions for resolving disputes. Prospects for greatly improved relations improved beyond expectation, and several prominent American figures followed the British visits to Moscow.[179] In July 1959 Khrushchev was invited to visit the United States, where a number of contentious

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[177] Hillgruber, 67–70. Also contains an interpretation of West German policy regarding the Soviet notes.

[178] Reiman, Luňák, 81–89.

[179] The West German government opposed negotiations, but remained isolated in the Western camp, a position abetted by Dulles's resignation in April 1959. See Hillgruber, 67–72. Reiman, Luňák, 105–110.

issues would come up for discussion: in addition to the German question, disarmament, controls, a halt to nuclear testing, development of economic and cultural relations.

A Thaw in Relations

Khrushchev left for his two-week visit to the United States in the middle of September, which was to set the seal on the improved atmosphere and prepare further high-level meetings.[180] Both sides sought a *modus vivendi* and showed understanding for the differences of outlook. A significant factor was the personal understanding established between Eisenhower and Khrushchev at the presidential retreat at Camp David. Their respective positions drew no closer, but it was clear that relations could develop favorably based on the status quo and its gradual evolution. Even now Khrushchev did not abandon his tendency to apply pressure, as when before the United Nations he submitted his surprise proposals for complete and immediate disarmament and an end to colonialism. A new feature of the situation was of course the fact that Khrushchev emphasized the significance of the continuing disarmament negotiations. Though his proposals complicated these negotiations, they also relieved the pressure for a prompt solution to the German problem. Thus Khrushchev acceded to Eisenhower's request that he refrains from relying on ultimatums.[181]

Of special significance were the agreements for new high-level meetings favored by the USSR. At first Soviet diplomats thought in terms of heads of governments of a larger number of countries, which could turn the meetings into a propaganda tribune without

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[180] The visit was preceded by an exchange of notes between the two leaders. Its course was reported to Soviet allies, and in October 1959 Gromyko provided detailed information for Soviet bloc ambassadors. Reiman, Luňák, 111–117, 129–134.

[181] This conclusion is confirmed in the memoirs of Khrushchev's son: Sergei KHRUSHCHEV, *Nikita Khrushchev: krizisy i rakety: vzglyad iznutri*, Moscow 1994, 466. He asserts that the Berlin crisis was de facto terminated at Camp David, though he kept the Berlin problem alive for future use in his dealings with the West.

hope of real results. After Macmillan's visit to Moscow, the model adopted was that of the four-power Geneva conference. It appeared that these meetings could be institutionalized as an instrument for negotiation between the two camps, a corrective to the prevailing polarization.[182] The stress on the primacy of the victorious powers strengthened the position of Britain and France, while France, the object of policy in this context, remained outside the system. The chances for success appeared to be heightened by the fact that China, which belonged to the original "big five", remained on the side-lines.[183] The USSR appeared to have gained the opportunity to represent Chinese interests at the summit meetings and thereby exert influence over Chinese attitudes. It was significant that Eisenhower asked Khrushchev to pass along American wishes to China. The new construct also had the support of France, which saw in it another chance to secure its great-power status.

With Khrushchev's visit better East-West relations seem to have been secured. Diplomats worked on agendas, while Eisenhower planned a visit to the Soviet Union. These preparations, however, were not free from serious problems. The Soviet side continued to press for its proposals for a German peace agreement and expected that an acceptable compromise could be achieved.[184] In talks aimed at reaching a consensus on disarmament, Khrushchev continued to link measures against nuclear armament to an agreement on general disarmament. In the spring of 1960 Khrushchev rejected plans to

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[182] See notes of the Soviet government to those of the United States, Great Britain and France concerning the German question and on high-level conferences, Reiman, Luňák, 97–104. The possibility of institutionalizing the meetings was expressed by Macmillan in Moscow in March 1959, but it was not discussed between Khrushchev and Eisenhower.

[183] This advantage was illusory, since China, because of its continuing problems with Taiwan and representation in the United nations eventually torpedoed the plan with its opposition.

[184] See minutes of a meeting of Khrushchev with Czechoslovak Party leaders at Smolenice near Bratislava, 1 June 1960, Reiman, Luňák, 193–209.

[185] See correspondence between Khrushchev and Eisenhower on nuclear arms limitations, 3-21 March 1960, Reiman, Luňák, 147–149.

create a joint American-European atomic force.[185] The serious differences between France and the USSR stemmed mainly from Soviet support for the Algerian National Liberation Front, and the two held incompatible views on the German question despite persistent French fears. Nevertheless, talks between de Gaulle and Khrushchev in Paris in March and April 1960 achieved a measure of compromise.[186] The Soviet side could therefore view the upcoming meeting as a serious step toward "reducing international tension" and "liquidating the cold war".[187]

In the middle of May 1960 the favorable trend in East-West relations was unexpectedly interrupted as the leaders were already gathering in Paris. The cause was the shooting down of the American U-2 spy plane on 1 May, which Khrushchev announced just before the opening of the conference. He demanded an apology from Eisenhower, making it a condition of his participation in the conference. Eisenhower took a conciliatory line but declined to offer an apology as the flight was part of American security strategy.[188] The conference was cancelled. Eisenhower's presidency ended in January 1961, and relations Soviet-American relations remained frozen for the next six months.

The reasons behind Khrushchev's obstruction have often been discussed, with both political and personal motivations brought to

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[186] A significant narrowing of differences was achieved on the German question, disarmament initiatives, and policy toward colonial countries especially in Africa. Minutes of the meetings (23 and 24 March, 1 April 1960) are published in *Istoricheský archiv*, 1996, no. 1, 29–39; no. 2, 105–132. De Gaulle summarized the situation regarding Germany as follows: "Our positions are not identical, but I do not believe they are incompatible in principle, or that they will persist forever. The essential difference is whether we should sign a peace treaty with Germany now, or whether we should wait. In any case, on the eve of the summit meeting I believe that our governments have no irreconcilable differences concerning the German question." Khrushchev replied: "The differences in our positions on this question are external in character. In their essence, they are quite close." Khrushchev later stressed the rapprochement of views on a number of occasions.

[187] See Reiman, Luňák, 136.

[188] Eisenhower was willing to suspend flights for the duration of his administration, i.e. until January 1961.

bear.[189] Khrushchev's act was of course not the result of impulse but a considered political decision, even if the motives are unclear. Khrushchev appears to have lost interest in the meeting at the last moment.[190] The consequences for the USSR and the rest of the world were extremely adverse. One can only agree with Mikoyan that Khrushchev thereby ruined the chance to relax East-West tensions. Both sides were obliged to pay for the failure with huge outlays for arms.[191] The significance of four-power relations had in fact been dissolved, and all Khrushchev's feverish activity from 1958 to 1960 had produced no tangible result.

J. F. Kennedy and the Failure of Khrushchev's Foreign Policy Concept

The next step in Soviet foreign policy came only with the inauguration of J. F. Kennedy in January 1961, by which time the world situation had begun fundamentally to change. Sino-Soviet

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[189] Mikoyan, who was a member of the Soviet leadership, speaks of Khrushchev's "inadmissible hysteria". Mikoyan, 605. Nor is the situation clarified by the memoirs of Sergei N. Khrushchev (vol. 2, 7–37). It appears that Khrushchev's attitude in Paris was premeditated and that the U-2 incident could be used to strengthen his negotiating position. He is said to have changed his mind on the flight to Paris, when it became clear that no apology would be forthcoming from Eisenhower. To leave the incident without consequences, however, would be a demonstration of weakness. Khrushchev's behavior has also been ascribed to personal bitterness at being "betrayed" by Eisenhower after the rapport established at Camp David. Such feelings were also evident in Khrushchev's positions and moods during talks with J. F. Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961.

[190] His reaction was not purely impulsive. According to his own testimony, Khrushchev considered the violation of Soviet air space to be a provocation aimed against the summit meeting which he traced to the CIA while absolving Eisenhower. It is more probable, however, that Khrushchev had lowered his expectations of the gains to be realized from the summit. The Soviet side, however, was committed to the summit by a carefully prepared public campaign. At the same time there was a sharpening of the Sino-Soviet dispute, which later the same year became the subject of a special international meeting of Communist parties and quickly accelerated into an open quarrel. (Zubok/Pleshakov, 229–235). An unsatisfactory result in Paris could have appeared to Khrushchev as a source of difficulties at home.

[191] Mikoyan, 605.

to be a two-edged sword, as Soviet support for movements of national liberation incurred financial obligations and the number of long-term trouble spots multiplied around the world – Korea, Indochina, the Middle East, Algeria, Ghana, the Belgian Congo, Cuba and so forth – which involved the Soviet Union in repeated confrontation with the West, especially the United States, and served to poison the atmosphere.[196] The real gains for Soviet policy were few. Many of the pro-Soviet national regimes continued to exist only with Soviet help, while the advantage to the USSR amounted to the appearance of a growing Soviet influence, together with an improved constituency for voting in the United Nations. Whenever the new regimes succeeded in consolidating their position and independence, Soviet influence waned.

These difficulties were important since by 1960 the negative effects of poor and unrealistic economic planning were beginning to appear within the Soviet Union. Economic growth slowed and was unable to cover the growing expenses of global policy, which in turn increased domestic political tensions. In October 1961 Khrushchev submitted a new Party program, which estimated that the country would overtake the United States in per capita production within twenty years – which, however, added a decade to the estimate delivered in 1959.

The reforms did not accomplish their aims, as Khrushchev came to rely on improvised changes in economic plans and ad hoc intervention in administrative matters. The situation also affected the highly sensitive military sphere, leading to a significant reduction in the numerical strength of the armed forces even as triumphs of military technology were exaggerated, which provoked great dissatisfaction in influential circles. After 1960 military expenditures

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[196] This is confirmed by the preparations for the Khrushchev-Kennedy summit of June 1961, where the greatest attention was devoted to the conflicts in Laos, the Belgian Congo and to Cuba. See minutes of talks between Khrushchev and the American ambassador L. Thompson in Novosibirsk, 22 February 1961, and minutes of talks between J. F. Kennedy and Khrushchev at Vienna at the beginning of June 1961, Reiman, Luňák, 169–184, 210–261.

relations had become ever more acrimonious, as armed conflicts broke out between China and India over the Tibetan border. In view of its friendly relations with India, the Soviet Union preserved a neutral attitude, which the Chinese regarded as a violation of the "principle" of supporting fellow socialist states in international conflicts. The Chinese leadership were also vexed by their dependence on the USSR in international affairs as well as Soviet unwillingness to share atomic secrets with them. The dispute grew to such an extent that it was made the subject of an international meeting to Communist parties, which, however, did little to prevent further escalation.[192] The quarrel prompted the Albanian leadership to break off military cooperation with the USSR, closing down Soviet bases on the Adriatic and initiating a period of steadily worsening relations.[193] Similar difficulties appeared in relations with Rumania, which was able to extract a measure of independence from the Sino-Soviet quarrel.[194] For the West all this signaled a significant weakening of Khrushchev's position within the "Socialist camp".

The rapid disintegration of the Western colonial empires was also a serious factor in the world situation. Khrushchev continued to regard it as a positive development, and frequent Soviet demands for the immediate elimination of colonialism won support at the United Nations and among third world countries.[195] But the process proved

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[192] The talks took place in Bucharest from 24 to 26 June 1960. Both sides presented extensive ideological arguments to support their respective positions. Documentation is in the A. Novotný Archive, State Central Archive, Prague. See Zubok/ Pleshakov, 229–235.

[193] Minutes of talks between N. S. Khrushchev and Czechoslovak Party leaders at Smolenice near Bratislava 1 June 1961, Reiman, Luňák, 193-209 (Khrushchev's assessment of relations with Albania and China).

[194] The Bucharest conference provided the opportunity for closer contacts between the Rumanian and Chinese Parties. The conflict with the Soviets may be traced to Soviet efforts to remove the Rumanian dictator G. Gheoghiu-Dej, who was regarded as a Stalinist relic, aside from opposing Khrushchev's plans to form economic regions within the Soviet bloc without regard to national borders, which Rumania regarded as abrogation of its sovereignty.

[195] During his visit to the United States Khrushchev presented before the United Nations his "declaration of Independence for Colonial Lands and Nations". Bezborodov, 131.

rose significantly, which in turn slowed improvements in living standards and increased social tensions.[197]

With the election of J. F. Kennedy a new generation, less influenced by the experience of the Second World War, appeared on the political scene. It took a pragmatic approach to international affairs and eschewed Khrushchev's ideological approach. In March Kennedy, through his ambassador in Moscow L. Thompson, suggested to Khrushchev that the achievement of "a degree of cooperation" between the United States and the Soviet Union would represent "a significant contribution to world security, where peace and order could prevail". He therefore proposed the creation of a means of contact which would permit a calm, unofficial consideration of disputed interests and help to overcome misunderstandings. In conversations with Gromyko the same month he urged the importance of an approach which would preserve the prestige of both powers and enable them to avoid steps which would complicate their relations and thereby threaten peace.[198]

The change of administration in the United States prompted Khrushchev to proceed more cautiously. He was aware of the difficulties he faced in dealing with a younger American generation which he did not well understand,[199] but did not modify the essence of his proposals even when Kennedy clearly signaled unwillingness to consider any solution legitimizing the division of Germany and voiced doubts about the practicality of Soviet proposals for total disarmament.

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[197] Bezborodov, 94.

[198] Reiman, Luňák, 185 ff, 187–193.

[199] Khrushchev's attitude toward Kennedy underwent a certain development. At first he believed the Democrat victory would promote better Soviet-American relations and formed a positive view of Kennedy, whom he had never met and whose background was unfamiliar to him. His assessment changed abruptly with the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961, carried out by Cuban contras with Kennedy's blessing (Zubok/Pleshakov, 237–243), which led him to underestimate Kennedy's intelligence and speak slightingly of his youth and inexperience, comparing him unfavorably to the former Secretary of State Dulles. See the minutes of Khrushchev's meeting with Czechoslovak leaders 1 June 1961, cited above, and minutes of the meeting between Khrushchev and Italian premier A. Fanfani in Moscow, 2 August 1961, Reiman, Luňák, 193, 199, 265–306 (especially 279 ff).

Khrushchev's attitude and ideologically conditioned approach foretold difficulties for his meeting with Kennedy in Vienna at the beginning of June 1961.[200] On the one hand the Soviet leader underestimated the new president, and on the other he was unsure what reaction to expect to Soviet proposals or to Soviet negotiating methods. His main focus continued to be the German peace treaty and complete disarmament, which the Soviets tied firmly to the prohibition of nuclear tests. There was also the question of Laos, where both powers were involved in a civil war which promised few gains for either side.

From the beginning the talks progressed differently from those at the end of the Eisenhower era. Kennedy proved to be less pliant than Eisenhower. He refused to discuss Khrushchev's proposals for Germany because in his view they touched on the balance of forces in Europe and declared that their acceptance would call into question the reliability of the United States as the guarantor of its allies' security. He saw no need for a substantial change in the status quo in Germany and was unwilling to make concessions on the Western presence in Berlin.[201] The Kennedy administration made no secret of the key importance it attached to the West German alliance. American representatives had warned Khrushchev on various occasions that a Soviet ultimatum on the question of the Western presence in Berlin could provoke an armed conflict, and Kennedy reiterated this position in Vienna. He also refused to tie the prohibition of nuclear testing to the question of complete disarmament. It was clear that he preferred military means for assuring security and that his priority remained the creation of a control system to monitor the military measures taken by the other side.

In these circumstances the meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev could bring no significant breakthroughs, though they

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[200] Complete Soviet transcript, Reiman, Lunák, 210–262.
[201] Transcript of the Vienna meeting, Reiman, Luňák, 254–258, also in FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. V, Soviet Union, 173–230.

reached agreement on the secondary question of ending the war in Laos, on which Khrushchev had not counted at first.[202] The disarmament proposals were referred to the appropriate committees at the United Nations and thereby postponed indefinitely.[203]

The Vienna meeting made it clear that with the new administration in Washington any effort to resolve the "Berlin question" without regard to the Western powers raised the threat of armed conflict. The Soviet leadership was faced with the task of rethinking its basic stance and negotiating tactics, as the new situation left little room for a dramatic shift in international relations, which, it appeared, could be stabilized and gradually improved on the basis of the status quo. But Soviet policy, still in ideological and political thrall to its "peace offensive" as the means of achieving quick advantages, found it difficult to accept this view. Concessions on the original demands concerning Germany or the disarmament question would throw Khrushchev's political and ideological positions open to doubt. To abandon the course that had been set would bring a disastrous loss of prestige, so that he was obliged to stick with his original assumptions and try to bring about gradual changes without perceptibly softening his "offensive" rhetoric.

After Vienna, Khrushchev, still hoping for a "quick" solution to the German problem, offered a detailed outline of his policy to the Italian premier A. Fanfani, who visited Moscow in August 1961.[204] He indicated willingness to negotiate with the Western powers but did not alter the basic content of his proposals. He spoke emotionally and urgently, clearly in an effort to influence the position of other European countries through Fanfani. In the autumn and winter, a similar message was carried to Western countries by Gromyko and other Soviet diplomats.[205] It was more than mere rhetoric. At a

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[202] See Khrushchev's meeting with Czechoslovak leaders at Smolenice, 1 June 1961, Reiman, Luňák, 200.

[203] Soviet transcript of the Vienna meeting, Reiman, Luňák, 210–262.

[204] Transcript of conversations between N. S. Khrushchev and Italian premier A. Fanfani, Moscow, 2 August 1961, Reiman, Luňák, 265–306.

[205] Transcripts of Gromyko's meetings with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and L. Thompson. Reiman, Luňák, 314–327, 330–340, 341–350, 351–359.

meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in July 1961 a plan was presented for securing a separate peace with East Germany, to be followed by a new policy for transit to West Berlin. The treaty was apparently envisioned by the beginning of 1962.[206]

At this point there was a decisive shift in Soviet policy which was to have great significance for the future. Negotiations on the "German question" initiated by the Soviet Union and fears for the fate of Berlin led to a new wave of emigrations from East Germany to the West. Soviet proposals on Germany destabilized East Germany and necessitated countermeasures. At the Warsaw Pact meeting in July, where Khrushchev spoke at length, Walter Ulbricht, surely with Soviet blessings, proposed restrictions on free movement into West Berlin.[207] We know nothing of the discussion which presumably followed, though Ulbricht's suggestions were doubtless accepted. The Soviet leadership apparently concluded that the Western powers would leave open the question of free movement within Berlin and leave it up to the Soviets. This meant the construction of the notorious Wall, which began on 13 August 1961.[208] It prompted the Western powers to a military alert, but it did provide grounds for armed conflict: the borders of west Berlin were respected, nor was traffic through checkpoints interrupted. Short of risking war, there was no alternative to accepting the fait accompli.

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[206] Reiman, Luňák, 308-313. Meeting of First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of the Warsaw Pact Countries, 3–5 August 1961. The excerpt from Ulbricht's speech is devoted to justifying measures to be taken on the border with West Germany.

[207] Zubok/Pleshakov, 248–253. See Reiman, Luňák, 308–313, for the Ulbricht speech.

[208] It is worth noting that the documents in the archive of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party do not make it clear that the Berlin Wall was discussed at the meeting. However, after 1987 the USSR (A. Yakovlev) denied responsibility for the original decision. Thus a thorough analysis of Khrushchev's conversations with Fanfani would be helpful on this score, since they took place on the same days as the Warsaw meetings. Khrushchev gave Fanfani a detailed explanation of the Soviet stance on the German peace treaty, but there is nothing concrete pointing to the later construction of the Wall. Since Khrushchev counted on Fanfani conveying his views to his Western colleagues, it is possible that the Wall was proposed by East Germany, which is in line with the fact that the concrete proposals at the meeting were delivered by Ulbricht.

It is now difficult to judge whether the Berlin Wall represented a shift in the Soviet approach to the German question or only a trial balloon to assess Western reaction in case of a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Soviet rhetoric over the next months continued to stress the necessity of a prompt treaty. But the reality within Germany had changed significantly. The Wall created conditions for the long-term stabilization of the East, as its existence was no longer called into question by mass emigrations. The Americans clearly suggested that they were willing to accept the new situation in Berlin and attempted to secure West Berlin through the road connections, which the Soviets could use as a means to apply pressure.[209] At the same time it was clear that the long-term Soviet aims following the "German offensive", the removal of allied forces from Germany and withdrawal of Germany from NATO, were unattainable. Meanwhile the accelerating pace of European integration altered the European context of the German question. A great obstacle for Soviet policy in Germany was the continuing Franco-German rapprochement and the agreement signed at the beginning of 1963 which created a new tandem in Europe which also included military cooperation.[210] The Soviets therefore gradually revised their earlier goals, ceasing to insist on a German peace treaty and the transformation of Berlin into a free city. When in the summer of 1962 Ulbricht attempted to resuscitate the demand for a treaty, he received no support from Khrushchev, who shortly afterward complained to the Czechoslovak president Novotný about Ulbricht's stance, which threatened a new sharpening of the international situation, to be paid for by the USSR at the expense of the living standards of its people.[211] No separate peace treaty was ever signed. It was replaced in June 1964 by an agreement

[209] Conversations of Gromyko with Rusk, 21 September in New York, Reiman, Luňák, 314–327. Declaration of Gromyko to Ambassador Thompson, 12 January 1962, 330–340. Information on meetings between A. Gromyko and L. Thompson, 341–359.

[210] Letter from the Soviet Government to the West German Government outlining the Soviet position on Franco-German cooperation, 5 February 1963, Reiman, Luňák, 366–372.

[211] Conversations of the Czechoslovak delegation with Khrushchev, Moscow, 7–8 June 1962, Reiman, Luňák 360–361.

by which the USSR guaranteed East German sovereignty and the integrity of its borders.

The expiration of Khrushchev's "peace offensive" was also manifested in the negotiations over Soviet disarmament proposals. In the autumn of 1961 the United States and the USSR reached a compromise enabling them to present a joint disarmament plan to the United Nations. Outwardly the situation appeared promising, but it proved impossible fully to reconcile their positions. The USSR was betting on conventional forces, in which they held the edge on the European continent, and the United States on the nuclear deterrent. While nuclear disarmament remained the priority for the Soviets, the Americans emphasized the importance of arms controls, as the Soviets countered that controls without disarmament amounted to mere "espionage". With no overall solution in sight, compromise was reached only on certain details.

The Soviet Union continued its considerable activities in developing countries and scored points with its demands for an end to colonialism. Nevertheless it encountered increasing difficulties as conflicts multiplied raising the possibility of direct confrontation between the superpowers: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia in Indochina; Israel and the Arab countries in the Middle East; and Cuba, which influenced the situation in Latin America. The situation in these regions continued to demand huge outlays, but they had little impact on the balance of forces. It was in this no-win situation that Khrushchev decided in the autumn of 1962 to deploy Soviet rockets with nuclear warheads in Cuba.[212] This was done secretly, so that the Americans were presented with a fait accompli. If allowed to stand, the move posed an immediate threat to American population centers, including the capital. The response was a naval blockade of Cuba directed against Soviet shipping and an acute threat of war. The situation was resolved only by the exchange of urgent missions

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[212] This is the subject of a vast literature in English and Russian. The Prague collection contains only one relevant document: a report by Mikoyan to Czechoslovak ambassador Růžek concerning his visit to Cuba and the United States, given at the Soviet embassy in Washington, 29 November 1962. Reiman, Luňák, 362–366.

between Kennedy and Khrushchev, who was obliged to back down and withdraw the rockets in exchange for vague American promises to refrain from invading Cuba. For Khrushchev this meant a grave loss of authority and prestige.

Nor did the situation elsewhere develop along more promising lines. In the Middle East – in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Palestinian organizations – Soviet influence was blocked not only by American diplomacy but also by the absolute Israeli military preponderance in the region. In Indochina the United States became increasingly involved in what proved to be a disastrous war, but the Soviets gained little from the American losses. China controlled access to the area, and the Vietnamese relationship with the USSR was not one of utter dependence. The Vietnamese leadership maintained a somewhat distant relationship with the Soviet advisers in the country.

It was becoming clear that the Soviets had invested great resources in projects that led to no substantial gains. The leadership found it increasingly difficult to come up with new initiatives. The balance of forces between the two camps remained unchanged, and little in the way of gains could be expected from diplomatic efforts. In the long term, this situation favored the West, with its far more developed economic, technological and scientific foundations.

Khrushchev's "Peace Offensive" and the Countries of the "Socialist Camp"

The theme of Khrushchev's "peace offensive" is intimately bound up with relations between the Soviet Union and its allies. The Prague collection of documents itself testifies that the Socialist countries were kept informed, and not merely formally, of foreign policy developments. Aside from the documents sent by the Soviet leadership, there were numerous meetings and bilateral conferences among the various leaders.

The countries of the Socialist camp are often characterized as Soviet "satellites". The term expresses their strong dependence on the

USSR; nevertheless, it is somewhat distorting. The dependence developed in the aftermath of the war, when international relations were governed by brute force and military occupation. In time, however, the political and economic structures in these countries evolved, while frequent changes prevented great consolidation of governmental and administrative apparatus. Developments were punctuated by repeated intervention by Soviet agencies and advisers. This period ended only in the years 1953-1956, when the USSR acknowledged the "mistakes and deformations" of the past, limited its intervention in the affairs of its allies, and institutionalized its relations with them. The Comecon was set up, while the Information Bureau of Communist Parties, the agency of political control of the European Communist parties was abolished and the coordination of political and military affairs was institutionalized in the Warsaw Pact and its agencies.

Relations between the USSR and its allies, however, cannot be compared to those existing among Western countries. The differences in Soviet social and political regime alone played a significant role here, giving the tensions and disagreements that occurred within the bloc a different form and expression. Relations were conducted largely amid secrecy which was broken only when open conflict erupted. It is also significant that unlike the Western community with its great power constituents (the United States, Britain, France) and large countries who had temporarily lost great-power status (West Germany, Italy), the Soviet bloc consisted of small to middling states without the ability to make an independent entrance on the international stage. Within the Socialist camp the only great powers were the USSR and the People's Republic of China, whose international position was complicated by the fact that it was denied recognition by the western powers and the United Nations as the legitimate representative of China.

All these circumstances influenced the results of Khrushchev's foreign policy. Soviet domination within the Socialist camp remained intact after Stalin's death. When it faltered in 1956 it was bolstered by military intervention in Hungary, which placed limits on the degree

of permissible divergence. The institutionalization of relations within the bloc, however, also limited the possibilities for Soviet control of developments within the individual states. As they consolidated their political structure, they began more and more to express their own views and interests, so that regardless of Soviet wishes, numerous differences and even disputes arose within the camp. A further factor contributing to the failure of Khrushchev's policies was the dispute between the USSR and China, which from 1960 appeared increasingly difficult to overcome. The sudden worsening of relations became the subject of meetings of Communist parties at Bucharest in June and at Moscow in October 1960.

The attitude of the other Socialist countries also played a role. The reservations expressed by Poland and to a lesser extent by Hungary over Khrushchev's confrontational methods obliged the Soviets to take account of initiatives by the Polish foreign minister Rapacki. The East German leadership, on the other hand, maintained pressure on Khrushchev to press the German question and preserve an anti-West German stance. Ulbricht's attitude influenced the Soviet demands for "concrete measures" in Germany which were to accompany the conclusion of a peace treaty. Ulbricht's efforts to keep the treaty question open in 1962, as we have seen, led to serious differences between him and Khrushchev.[213]

Toward the end of the Khrushchev era it was chiefly Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia which maintained a conformist stance towards the Soviet Union, which reflected their relations with their neighbors and their economic interests.[214]

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[213] See transcript of conversations between the Czechoslovak delegation and Khrushchev, Moscow, 7–8 June 1962, Reiman-Luňák, 360-361. The Soviet leadership had figures suggesting that East German losses in the event of a German crisis could amount to 1.8 billion marks in domestic commerce alone. This probably explains Khrushchev's remark that the USSR would have to pay for Ulbricht's policy at the expense of the living standards of its citizens.

[214] See transcript of meeting between Khrushchev and Novotný, Gomulka and Ulbricht in Warsaw, 21 July 1964, Reiman, Luňák, 379–387.

Khrushchev's "Peace Offensive" in Perspective

As Khrushchev's foreign policy wound down at the end of 1962, it was clear that none of its chief goals set at the 20th Party Congress had been achieved. The German "offensive" had failed, along with the disarmament proposals, while relations with the West remained far from normal. Of the package of multilateral disarmament agreements which Khrushchev pursued, only that prohibiting nuclear testing was duly signed, in August 1963. It was one of the few points on which Khrushchev and Kennedy agreed.[215]

Nevertheless, Khrushchev's policies cannot be judged unequivocally. The process had begun by which the USSR was partly opened to the world after the death of Stalin. Khrushchev himself was the first Soviet leader to travel extensively abroad and seek personal contacts with political leaders and the public. Although his confrontational methods led to dangerous crises (Suez 1956, Berlin 1958-59, Cuba 1962), East-West relations had eased since the days of Stalin, and it was possible to negotiate on a range of disputed questions and establish a modicum of economic, scientific and cultural contacts. Khrushchev won significant popularity abroad with his criticism of Stalin and his efforts at reform, but his impulsive and unconventional behavior also made an impression. His policies evoked a complex response in developing countries as well as a number of crises, but they also accelerated the dismantling of the colonial system.

The positive response evoked by Khrushchev's policies by some of his contemporaries in the West as well as the East should not lead to the conclusion that he had turned Soviet policy from Marxist universalism toward superpower pragmatism. His plans were based on an unrealistic estimate of Soviet assets and prospects. The expression was the attempt to "encircle capitalism". The confrontational policies which sparked international crises appear to have

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[215] It is significant that the agreement covered tests in the atmosphere, at sea and in space but not underground testing, where the powers remained divided over the question of controls.

prevented the achievement of a number of East-West agreements. Nor can the dissipation of Soviet resources in military expenditure and aid to the third world be ignored. With this Khrushchev's policies undermined the basis for the domestic reforms that he had proclaimed.

Summary

This study is based on a large variety of Soviet documents from Khrushchev era to be found in A. Novotny's archiv, and was used for internal information of the Czechoslovak leaders on current Soviet activities concerning foreign policy issues. The major part of the documents is related to the period of 1955-1962, and demonstrates mostly the Soviet relations to the Western Powers, first of all the USA. The first part of the study deals with Khrushchev political conception originating from the revised conception by Malenkov and Beria. Contrary to this often sketchy conception by Malenkov and Beria who intended to change the relations to the West attempting to reduce the Soviet sphere of influence, first of all by leaving out Germany, and redefining social-economic priorities; Khrushchev, on the other side, decided for an ideologically motivated global policy. He made it public at the 20th Summit of the Communist party of the USSR (KSSS) in February 1956. We can thus consider Khrushchev the author of the Soviet global policy conception. This policy, however, lacked credibility due to the internal criticism of the Stalin's terror and atrocities as well as the political events in Poland and the Soviet occupation of Hungary that have shaken the Soviet block. Khrushchev's conception was based on maintaining the status quo in Europe and denying the status quo in the developing countries. He suggested that such status quo was an attempt to maintain colonies by the Western Powers, and he tried to undermine their influence there. In Europe the conception brought about the German question, which

Khrushchev had conditioned the peace treaty. By this he attempted to legalize the existence of the Eastern Germany by the West, and at the same time, to give Berlin a separate political status. This conception aimed at undermining the Western community and fragmentation of the united Germany that was not acceptable for the West. The only positive feature about this conception was the fact that he made communication between East and West possible. The two different points of view thus could start to approach each other, a basis for negotiating questionable and conflicting issues could be created as well as mechanisms diminishing the danger of possible conflicts in the future. Khrushchev's conception was a success till 1960 with four summits taking place on the current European issues and mutual relations between the two blocks. This trend stopped suddenly after Khrushchev ruined the Four Powers Summit in Paris in May 1960. It was a landmark to start a new period concerning foreign political situation. On one side, fast evolving conflict between Soviet Union and China considerably weakened Soviet international position; and on the other side Kennedy's administration came to power in the USA. This brought about the new pro-German policy by the USA, and its firm position towards Khrushchev's attempts to destabilize political situation in the developing countries. Khrushchev, at the top of it, had to face internal social-economic failures. From 1962 Khrushchev's foreign policy conception proved unsuccessful, and the Soviets had to step back not only in the German question but also in the Cuban crisis. The global aspect of the Soviet foreign policy however survived all these failures.

Translation: Frederick L. Snider

THE FOREIGN FACTOR AND THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL EMANCIPATION IN RUSSIA'S WESTERN BORDERLANDS

LUBOŠ ŠVEC

The appearance of national states is understood as the successful outcome of the process of national emancipation among small European nationalities. This process, often mechanically interpreted as the creation of individual states was always the aim of the national movement, the fulfillment of the "national dream", the "centuries of yearning". It was realized through a combination of internal processes during which, as a produce but also as a component of the process of industrialization, the modern Central and Eastern European nations were formed during a propitious international situation. Such a situation occurred in Europe with the creation of a power vacuum in the Ottoman Empire during the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, and immediately thereafter in the Habsburg and Tsarist monarchies at the close of the First World War at a time when the national movement was in its final, mass phase. The thesis of the national movement as an ancient struggle for political independence thus cannot be applied everywhere; rather, it was determined by time and place.[216] When the old supranational

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[216] M. HROCH, *V národním zájmu* (In the National Interest), Prague 1996, 105–106.

empires, with their feudal survivals, collapsed under the burden of military defeat or the negative economic and social impact of the war which showed up the internal weaknesses, the newly formed modern nationalities with complete (or nearly complete) structures were able to offer an alternative to the old multi-ethnic empires. At this moment the significance of the foreign factor grew, as an opportune constellation of international forces combined with the support of the victorious powers interested in the maximum weakening of their enemy or its de facto extinction, was a condition for the internationalization of the problem and the assertion of a variety of national states. Political and military support from the great powers was of such vital importance for the new states that their very existence appeared to their enemies to be the work of the enemy great powers who had imposed their political and military hegemony in the region by using the national movements and their struggle against the incumbent holders of power. Such a view of the problem, relying purely on the arithmetic of power without taking into account modernizing changes leading to the creation of civil societies of an industrial type and constituted on the national principle,[217] was characteristic of the departing old elite. But Soviet historiography applied this view in its interpretation of the genesis of the independent Baltic states as the result of anti-Soviet intervention by western imperialists, whose aim was to suppress the revolution and create a "cordon sanitaire" against it where they could establish their economic hegemony.[218] Similarly, Polish historians of the time considered the rise of the Lithuanian state to be the fruit of "German intrigues".[219] We find a similar judgment concerning the origins of Czechoslovakia (as the "child", the "favorite" of the Allies) in an effort to minimize the role of the domestic resistance movement.

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[217] See A. GELLNER, *Národy a nacionalismus* (Nations and Nationalism), Prague 1993, 7–8.

[218] *Istoria Latviskoi SSR*, 2nd ed., Riga 1971, 446, 484 ff. *Istoria Estonskoi SSR*, Tallinn 1987, 124–132. V. SIPOLS, *Taynaya diplomatiya*, Riga 1968, 59.

[219] P. LOSSOWSKI, *Konflikt polsko-litewski 1918–1920*, Warszawa 1996, 35.

The question of the importance of the great powers in the establishment of the new states also arose in the discussions within the new political elites over which group played the decisive role. A clear example was the controversy between supporters of President Masaryk, stressing the importance of the foreign resistance which he led, and the representatives of the domestic resistance, who emphasized their own role and the coup of 28 October 1918 as the key factors. In Poland an analogous argument between Dmowski and Pilsudski concerned the role of Allied diplomacy and military aid in the creation of the country's borders.

Although the international factor played the most significant role in the closing phase of the process of national emancipation, it was also present in various forms also in earlier phases of the national movement. It bore on the demands for political independence which appeared quite soon in some cases as part of the political program in the phase of national agitation, as the patriots attempted to link their cause to international politics. This occurred primarily where the national program appealed to an earlier independent political existence, perhaps combined with religious differentiation and suppression. Such cases included movements of the "insurgent" type – the Balkan movements and those in Poland, Norway, and with certain reservations, Ireland.[220] Help extended by the great powers to the various national movements against the Ottoman Empire were closely connected with their particular interests, establishing their influence in the Balkans and securing what they could of the legacy of the "sick man on the Bosporus". Support for resistance to Ottoman oppression arose from religious and ethnic similarities which enabled Russia especially to appear in the role of protector of the process of national emancipation among the Bulgarians and Serbs, partly also the Greeks and Rumanians. Russia's opponents in the international power game were Great Britain, which attempted to prevent the penetration of Russian influence to the Mediterranean,

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[220] M. HROCH, *Evropská národní hnutí v 19. století* (European National Movements in the 19th Century), Prague 1986, 365–366.

France, which was similarly motivated up to a point, and especially the Habsburg Monarchy, which had territorial interests in the Balkans and was joined at the end of the 19th century by Germany which just before the First World War supported the creation of an Albanian state, together with Italy, to counter Serbian expansion. Great power intervention in the formation of the Balkan map and the creation of small, quarrelsome national states gave rise to the pejorative term "Balkanization". But great power support in the creation of national states did not automatically ensure their permanent influence, as the new political elites attempted to escape from too close an embrace by their protector, as may be seen for example in the abandonment of pro-Russian orientation by Bulgaria and, for a time, Serbia.

The Nationalities of the Western Borderlands of Russia

But can international influences also be traced in the case of national movements among the "non-historical" nations, such as the Latvians, Estonians or the Finns, who remained outside the interest of international politics until the end of the First World War? The Latvians and Estonians found themselves in a special situation in that, like the Finns or the Lithuanians, they lived under a double domination – regional and imperial. The Latvians and Estonians lived in three Baltic provinces (some Latvians also lived in eastern Lettland, Latgale, which was part of the gubernium of Vitebsk), where their political overlords were the Baltic German landowners. The Swedish nobility and intelligentsia occupied a similar position in Finland and the Polish noblemen in Lithuania. At the same time, the territory formed part of the Russian empire. Finland, attached in 1809, had its administrative autonomy guaranteed by the monarch, and its peasants enjoyed personal freedom. The kingdom of Poland (Congress Poland) had even greater autonomy. The Baltic gubernia or provinces came under the administrative authority of St. Petersburg, although the Tsars granted the German Baltic nobility

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certain privilegia, including freedom of religion for the Lutheran church, the inviolability of their landed property, an autonomous administrative system based on the regional diets and staffed by the local nobility, a German system of justice and German as the administrative language. The diets controlled education, communications, taxation, the Lutheran church and legislation.[221]

Within the Habsburg Monarchy, the Slovaks and the Croats represented an analogous situation in which ethnic groups lived under a double domination, in this case Hungarian and Austrian.

Conditions of Incorporation in Russia and the Attitude of the Nobility

In the first phase the only partner of the Tsarist officials was the old nobility, who were obliged to reconcile themselves to annexation by Russia, and with varying degrees of success they became integrated into the conditions of the Tsarist monarchy. In the interests of a rapid pacification of the new western territories the Russian rulers offered the estates extensive privileges as a guarantee of autonomy – in Estonia and Livonia in 1710 and a century later, in 1809 in Finland, which contrasted sharply with the earlier Swedish centralism. While the Baltic German and Swedish-Finnish nobility assumed important posts in the Tsarist bureaucracy, army and diplomacy, the Polish aristocracy – after exerting episodic though far from insignificant influence over Alexander I at the beginning of the 19th century, proved unable to preserve the autonomy of Congress Poland, at that time the most extensive under Russian administration. Unsuccessful uprisings in 1830–31 and 1863–64 brought about a crisis in Russian attitudes towards

[221] On the Baltic German conception, focussing on the defense of historical estates privilege and autonomy see R. WITTRAM, *Baltische Geschichte*, Munich 1954. M. HAETZEL, *Der Abbau der deutschen ständischen Selbstverwaltung in den Ostseeprovinzen Russlands 1855–1905*, Marburg-Lahn 1977. For the view of Latvian Soviet historiography, M. Duhanovs, *Baltijas muižniecība laikmetu maioā*, Riga 1986. On the Baltic gubernia in the framework of the Russian empire, *Nacionalnye okrainy Rossiskoy imperii: stanovlenie i razvitiye sistemy upravleniya*, Moscow 1997, 187–196.

the Poles, now regarded as rebels seeking to reverse the Russian advance and threatening the stability of the western borderlands. Further prominent factors included the Polish devotion to Catholicism as a rival religion and the domination of Polish magnates over the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Orthodox peasantry. [222] Amid the harsh repression launched by the Tsarist authorities, European public opinion was firmly on the side of the Poles, and the appeals of France and Great Britain for moderation only stimulated Russian nationalism.[223] On the other hand, the Russian measures received the support of Prussia.

The privileges of 1710 conferred by Tsar Peter I, who had taken Estonia and Livonia from Sweden, have been characterized as "legal agreements drawn up in the spirit of Medieval covenants between estates and rulers".[224] They formed the legal basis of the autonomy of the Baltic provinces within the Russian imperial system down to the beginning of the 20th century, and they were confirmed by successive rulers until the accession of Alexander III. The Baltic estates had influential spokesmen at the Russian court, and since their incorporation they acted as a reservoir of personnel for the Russian bureaucracy, diplomacy and army whose absolute loyalty was highly prized by the Tsars. The Baltic nobility also acted as mediators with the European nobility. Although this bastion of conservatism was somewhat eroded under the pressure of Russian unification, it was able successfully to defend its administrative institutions and the noble monopoly within the local diets. The social conflict between the Baltic German estate holders and their Latvian and Estonian peasants compromised the position of the Baltic estates at the imperial court and was used by the Russian bureaucracy to justify centralizing intervention in the Baltic gubernia and to call into question the legitimacy of aristocratic privileges.

[222] E. THADEN, *Russia's Western Borderlands 1710-1870*, Princeton 1984. T. WEEKS, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914*, Northern Illinois University Press 1996, 74–80.

[223] D. GEYER, "Funktionen des russischen Nationalismus 1860-1885", in H. A. Winkler, ed., *Nationalismus*, Königstein 1978, 173–186.

[224] R. Wittram, *Op. cit.*, 133.

In Finland the peasants were free and formed one of the estates, and relations between the political elite, most of whom were Swedish-speaking (though there were a growing number of Finnish background) and the peasantry were not adversarial. Social stability in the land was strengthened by the reliability of the conservative political elite at the imperial court. Finland, existing as a separate entity since its incorporation in 1809, was the only frontier area to preserve, and from the 1860's even to extend, its autonomy. No longer a backward province of Sweden, it became one of the most advanced regions of the Russian empire and found itself in immediate proximity to the political center.

In contrast to the Polish nobility, the Baltic German aristocrats served as mediators between Russia and the European courts, and their bureaucratic efficiency and loyalty were much appreciated by the rulers. Despite the russification of the Baltic provinces in the years before the First World War, the feudal diets remained at the head of local administration without undergoing reform.

The character of these relations was significant for the national movements as well, since it influenced the attitude of the political center toward the regions and their noble elites, which in turn had its impact on the indigenous non-dominant ethnic groups. For example the repression following the second Polish uprising had the effect of delaying the beginning of the phase of national agitation among the Lithuanians.

Intellectual Interest in National Cultures and the Response from Abroad

Part of our investigation involves the question of how the European public was able to learn anything about the non-dominant ethnic groups of the Russian western frontier. In the first half of the 19th century the participation of Latvians and Estonians in Phase A of the national movement was minimal, and the role was assumed by Baltic German scholars. The Latvians were first introduced to the

European public by the *philosophe* Garlieb Merkel, whose book entitled "The Latvians, Particularly in Livonia, at the End of the Philosophical Century" and published in Leipzig in 1796 vividly described the plight of the unfree peasantry and became a significant document in the struggle to end serfdom. With its abolition the book lost its currency, but Merkel continued to write, was often cited and became an inspiration for Latvian patriots. In the first half of the 19th century the interest of German linguists in the archaic Baltic languages and folk poetry was responsible for drawing European attention to the Latvians and Lithuanians. This is borne out for example by the early Czech edition of Lithuanian folksongs – *dain* – by Ladislav Čelakovský two years after the appearance of the German edition by L. Rhesa in 1825,[225] or the article by Erazim Vocel on the Estonian national movement in the Journal of the Bohemian Museum.[226] The Lithuanians were known thanks not only to philological and ethnographic interest but also to Polish romantic writers such as Mickiewicz and Kraszewski, supporters of land patriotism. Lithuanian scholars and writers were also active and were recruited primarily from the ranks of the small landholders.

Although European awareness of Finland and its people, mediated by Swedish speaking scholars, was far greater, Finland remained outside the sphere of political interest after the Napoleonic wars. Finnish culture and folklore became more widely known in the mid-1830's with the publication of Lönnrot's reconstruction of the national epic the *Kalevala*, which was translated into a number of languages.[227] Unlike the Latvians and Estonians, who lacked an intelligentsia at this point and whose interests were represented in a paternalistic way by German scholars, there was a larger proportion

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[225] L. ŘEHÁČEK, "Baltistika na pražské universitě" (Baltic Studies at the University of Prague), in *Praha-Vilnius*, Prague 1981, 45–51.

[226] E. Vocel, "Učená společnost estonská v Derptu" (The Estonian Learned Society at Derpt), ČČM 20, 1846, 264–278. K. Havlíček, "Cizozemci v Rusích" (Foreigners in Russia), ČČM 20, 1846, 95–132. See V. Macura, *Znamení zrodu* (An Omen of Birth), 2nd edition, Prague 1995, 160–165.

[227] T. CIEŚLAK, *Historia Finlandii*, Wroclaw 1983, 140.

of Finns among the educated classes. A fair amount of literature appeared in Finnish, although it was not considered a language of "higher culture".

International Aspects of the National Movement

In the first phase the non-dominant ethnic groups did not exceed the role of object. As a subject, the modern nation began to be defined with the creation of an intelligentsia which formulated a national program based on language. A few patriots who were only just formulating the national program and looking for support did emerge as spokesmen of the nation, but their legitimacy was far from assured and their ethnic group continued to be regarded as victims without much of a future to be fought over by the dominant nations. It remained to be seen whether the Latvians and Estonians would be germanized of russified and the Lithuanians russified or polonized.

In formulating their program some groups of patriots attempted to place their nation in a broader context in order to overcome their current weakness and isolation. Latvian patriots thus stressed their kinship with the Slavs and the Russian ambience as a defense against germanization,[228] even though their intellectual world and way of life were far more influenced by German culture than Russian. Estonian patriots sought to stress affinity with the Finns, who served as a cultural model and offered inclusion in the wider Finno-Ugric context. Among the Lithuanians, the impulse to emphasize kinship with the Slavs faded as they sought to escape Russian domination as well as Polish social and cultural hegemony. It was replaced by reminiscence of past greatness, especially the Medieval Lithuanian state under Grand Duke Witold stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. On a practical level Lithuanian patriots followed and sought help from more advanced national movements such as those of the Finns, Czechs and Bulgarians.

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[228] K. BIEZBÁRDIS, *Der Sprach- und Bildungskampf in den baltischen Provinzen Russlands*, Bautzen 1865, 4–5.

The search for connections with other nations was not limited to the intellectual sphere but had a practical dimension as well. In cases of double domination the external factor cannot be limited to international influences and their role in the formation of the national movement, for here the foreign factor operated within a single state when the patriots took advantage of tensions between the local political elite and the Tsarist bureaucracy to act in partnership with the imperial government or with the Russian liberals. Where there was no tradition of political independence or where the geographical integrity of the land was seen as an obstacle to the development of the ethnic nation, as was the case among the Latvians and Estonians, the demands of the patriots aimed to reduce local autonomy and further integration with Russia. Tsarism acted to some degree as an external pressure and the Russian liberals became the patriots' intellectual and political allies.[229] International political events were not strongly reflected in this phase of the national movement, but the international factor was brought to bear in relations between the local political and cultural elite and the state. The autonomy enjoyed by the Baltic gubernia, whose diets were occupied until the 20th century exclusively by the Baltic German nobility, represented an obstacle to the Latvian and Estonian national movements because of its social impenetrability. Thus from the 1860's to the beginning of the 1880's the patriots pressed for the introduction of the Russian system of elections for the local administration, which was more liberal than the Baltic feudal system. Although the Young Latvian and Young Estonian pro-Russian attitude has been deplored as tactical rather than principled,[230] it is important to take into account the hopes pinned on the liberal reforms of Alexander II and the possibilities they offered to the Latvian intelligentsia and the emerging class of Latvian entrepreneurs for integration into the imperial context.[231] The ideologue and

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[229] R. J. MISIUNAS, "The Russian Liberals and the Baltic Lands 1861–1917, in *National Movements in the Baltic Countries during the 19th Century*, Uppsala 1985, 85–110.

[230] G. APALS, *Jaunlatviešu kustības raksturs 19. gadsimta 50. un 60. gados (1856–1868)*, doctoral dissertation, Riga-Stockholm 1993, 77.

[231] A. ŠVĀBE, *Latvijas vēsture 1800–1914*, Uppsala 1958, 417 ff.

organizer of the Latvian national movement Krišjánis Valdemárs defined the role of his countrymen as Russia's "Dutchmen" on the Baltic. His pragmatic approach accented the economic self-realization of the Latvians, and in russification he saw no obstacle to the development of Latvian national life.[232] It should be remembered that the new Latvian and Estonian intelligentsia, thanks to the Baltic Germans' hold on the local gubernia, were obliged to seek careers in the context of the Russian empire. In their reaction to the socially conservative system, therefore, they sought allies among the Russian liberals, tried to establish contacts at court and among the high officials of the state administration in order to break the hegemony of the Baltic German estates.

The unification of Germany played a significant role in relations between the Baltic provinces and the center. The German national movement (like the Italian), though unfolding under different conditions, served as an inspiration for European national movements generally. In regions where the modern nations in the process of formation were attempting to emancipate themselves from German culture and the old German-speaking elites, the reaction took on a mirror image. The appearance of a strong state changed the balance of forces on the European stage. For Chancellor Bismarck good relations with Russia were axiomatic, and except for the episode in 1865 when he characterized Russian religious policy in the Baltic provinces as barbaric, he pointedly expressed his lack of interest in the Baltic Germans and remained impervious to pressure from German liberals for intervention on their behalf.[233] The crystallization of a new great power on the Baltic, however, raised the question of the German character of the Baltic gubernia.[234] The administrative consolidation and cultural russification introduced from the 1960's

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[232] P. Lazda, "The Phenomenon of Russophilism in the Development of Latvian Nationalism in the 19th Century", in *National Movements in the Baltic Countries during the 19th Century*, Uppsala 1985, 129–135. A. PLAKANS, *The Latvians*, Stanford 1995, 95.

[233] M. HALTZEL, *Der Abbau der deutschen ständischen Selbstverwaltung in den Ostseeprovinzen Russlands 1855–1905*, Marburg 1977, 54.

[234] S. IKSAKOV, *Ostzejsky vopros v russkoi pechati 1860-kh godov*, Tartu 1961, 30.

were part of the modernizing reform of the Russian state but also a response to the fact that Russia was no longer alone on the Baltic. While Alexander II failed to take notice of the Slavophile campaign against the autonomy of the Baltic gubernia, the situation changed with the rising influence of Russian nationalism at the court of Alexander III in the 1880's, when intensive cultural Russification was launched in the Baltic provinces. In response the Baltic Germans were unable to present a united front. The erosion of autonomy and the russification prompted some politicians and intellectuals to emigrate to Germany,[235] where they worked to arouse interest among the German public and sought in vain to enlist the Berlin government in their cause. Meanwhile, however, despite their waning influence, the Baltic German aristocracy retained its conservative loyalty to Tsarism, while the urban middle classes profited from an expanding economy.[236]

Even before the unification of Germany, the operations of the British fleet in the Baltic and its artillery bombardment of the Finnish coast, including Helsinki, during the Crimean War, obliged the Russians to strengthen their military presence. The weakening of Russia and the looming crisis prompted some of the Swedish-speaking emigrants from Finland to consider reunification with Sweden and the creation of a Scandinavian Union.[237] The question of Finnish neutrality came up for discussion. As a country Finland remained loyal. The leader of the Finnish national movement Johan Wilhelm Snellmann rejected the projects of the Swedish émigrés and emphasized his loyal stance, in an attempt to eliminate the Swedish nobility as the traditional partner of the Tsarist administration and replace it with a Finnish variant. In the escalating conflict between proponents of Finns and Swedes Snellmann was able, with the support of Russian officials well aware of the need for a counter-

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[235] The proportion of Germans in the population fell along with their numbers. From 1881 to 1897 the numbers fell from 180,423 to 152,936. See M. Haltzel, *Op. cit.*, 73.
[236] D. KIRBY, *The Baltic World 1772–1993*, London-New York 1995, 177–179. A. HENDRIKSSON, *The Tsar's Most Loyal Germans,* Boulder 1963.
[237] D. Kirby, ed., *Finland and Russia 1808–1920*, London 1975, 44.

weight to the pro-Swedish movement, to have Finnish officially declared an equal administrative language. A further success was the Tsar's assent to calling the first Finnish parliament since 1809, which began to function regularly in September 1863. Alexander II was motivated not only by the need for reform but also by foreign policy and a desire, amid the diplomatic isolation caused by the suppression of the Polish uprising, to present to the world an attitude of toleration towards his imperial possessions. The growth of Finnish autonomy and Russian acquiescence in the de facto economic independence of the country (with its separate customs and monetary arrangements) increased its stability along with its political ties to the court, but it also called forth opposition from the Slavophile liberals. Finland had become a distinct economic entity.[238] Finnish autonomy was regarded by the Slavophiles as a threat,[239] while for the non-Russian peoples it became a model.

The case of Lithuania after the suppression of the second Polish uprising was quite different. The Tsarist repression against the Polish nobility, the intelligentsia and the Catholic church sorely afflicted Lithuanian society and provoked a belated rise of national agitation. In order to isolate Lithuanians from Polish influence, the Tsarist authorities permitted the sale of land to the peasantry after the abolition of serfdom under more advantageous conditions than prevailed in Russia and provided stipendia for the sons of Lithuanian farmers at Russian universities. But along with these concessions came a prohibition of Lithuanian books in Roman type in 1864-65, and later in German script as well. Lithuanian patriots attempted without success to soften the repression with protestations of loyalty. In 1884 an attempt by Jonas Šliupas to lift the ban on printing by expressing moral solidarity with Russia, loyalty to the Tsarist regime, and rejection of Polish influence was rebuffed by the authorities. The Russian press welcomed the emancipation of the Lithuanian national journal Aušra (Dawn) from Polish cultural influence but feared that a

[238] V. POCHLEBKIN, SSSR - Finlandiya, Moscow 1975, 110 ff.
[239] O. JUSSILA, "Finland from Province to State", in: Finland: People, Nation, State, London 1989, 85–101.

lifting of the prohibition would contribute to renewal of a "Polish-Latin spirit" in Lithuania. Moreover it viewed *Ausra* as a result of Prussian anti-Russian intrigue and insisted that the paper was being financed by Chancellor Bismarck.[240]

Russian absolutism with its strict censorship prevented the emergence of a free press. Thus publication abroad became important for the oppressed nations and the Russian opposition alike. The Swedish-Finnish anti-Tsarist movement of course found opportunities in Sweden. During the 1860's a series of works by Latvian and Estonian patriots appeared in the German lands, and one of its aims was to win over the German liberals. Numerous publications defending Baltic autonomy also appeared in the German lands, while at the same time the opposing Slavophile faction also took the opportunity to publish beyond the reach of Tsarist censorship. Thus the first part of J. Samarin's *Okraiina Rossii* appeared in 1868 in Prague. The significance of publishing opportunities outside the control of the traditional provincial elites is also to be seen in the example of the Young Latvian paper *Peterburgas Avizes*, published in St. Petersburg where the censor was the Young Latvian ideologue K. Valdemārs.

But for the Lithuanian movement publication abroad was of prime significance. Lesser Lithuania, a region of East Prussia with a Lithuanian-speaking population, became a publishing center from which books were smuggled in large quantities into Tsarist Lithuania. But such activity had little influence on the Prussian Lithuanians, who remained loyal subjects of the Prussian king. The period of intensive cooperation, when Prussia, focussing on German unification, tended to accommodate Russian wishes, ended in the mid-1870's.[241] The Tsarist government sought to combat anti-Russian propaganda by diplomatic means, while the chief interest of the Prussian police was concentrated on threats to the social system in general – anarchists

[240] J. OCHMAŃSKI, *Litewski ruch narodowo-kulturalny w XIX wieku (do 1890 r.)*, Warszawa 1965, 148–150.
[241] V. MERKYS, *Knygnešiu laikai 1864–1904*, Vilnius 1994, 341–357.

and socialists as well as Polish conspirators. Beginning in the 1870's, the second most important publication center for Lithuanian organizations after Prussia was provided by Lithuanian immigrants in the United States. The importance of publishing abroad is suggested by the fact that between 1865 and 1904 69 percent of Lithuanian books were published in Lesser Lithuania, 20.3 percent in the United States and 3.6 percent elsewhere in Germany. Thanks largely to the Lithuanian emigration in the New World modern political and cultural ideas began to penetrate into Lithuania at the end of the century. Lithuanian émigrés in western Europe and the United States also initiated the independent Lithuanian ethnographic exhibition at the Paris World's Fair in 1900, at which they were for the first time presented as a separate ethnic entity.

The Mass Phase of the National Movement

When the inspection tour of Senator Manasein in 1882-83 prompted the Tsarist bureaucracy to exploit regional antagonisms in its campaign for unification and russification and to ignore the demands of the national movements, there was no longer any incentive for them to seek accommodation with the regime, and Tsarism became an obstacle for them. While the Latvian and Estonian elite were able to profit from growing opportunities for careers in the imperial service, some of the conservative Latvian leaders drew closer to the Baltic Germans. The politically suppressed nations were becoming internally differentiated in the 1890's as social problems took on greater urgency. Russification in the Baltic provinces slowed but did not stop the Latvian and Estonian national movements, whose democratic wing added criticism of the regime and demands for social change to their national program. The old conception of a national monolith gave way to a more differentiated political scene. Currents of political opinion sought ideological allies in Russia and abroad according to their place in the political spectrum. Thus for example the worker's movement looked for to German, Russian or

Polish Socialists, while the Liberals cooperated to a degree with the Russian Constitutional Democrats, the Cadets. At the beginning of the new century the radical left first voiced the idea of independence, but did not go beyond speculation.

The revolution of 1905 allowed the ventilation of the demands of the suppressed peoples of Russia, but the resolutions adopted by Baltic national congresses limited themselves to demands for autonomy and the democratization of political conditions in Russia.[242]

The situation in Finland developed quite differently. The dismantling of autonomy, carried out from the end of the 1890's by Governor Bobrikov, abetted rapprochement among the various political currents in the country. The more conservative Old Finns attempted to keep the conflict a purely Finnish affair and sought a solution through "appeasement", while the more radical Swedish and Young Finnish liberals favored joining with other national movements in Russia and searched for allies beyond the borders of Russia. The Finns appealed to European public opinion and seized every occasion to bring their conflict between an international forum and to internationalize the question of Finnish autonomy. Publicity abroad was organized by the Committee for Foreign Propaganda founded by the leading Finnish lawyer Leo Mechelin. One of the results was a petition addressed to Tsar Nicholas which was signed by a thousand European prominent figures in European cultural and intellectual life. The Finnish pavilion at the Paris World's Fair of 1900, mentioned earlier, offered another opportunity to increase Finnish visibility. Finnish politicians set out to create the image of a culturally distinct and economically mature land within the west European cultural framework which was being threatened from the east. Fears inspired by Russification led some extremists to consider emigration

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[242] U. GÉRMANIS, "Die Autonomie und Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen der Letten", in *Von den baltischen Provinzen zu den baltischen Staaten 1917-1918*, Marburg 1971, 1-68. E. MOTIEKA, "The Great Assembly of Vilnius, 1905", *Lithuanian Historical Studies*, I, 1996, 84-96. T. RAUN, *The Revolution of 1905 and the Movement for Estonian National Autonomy*, Princeton 1969.

and the establishment of Finnish colonies in Canada or Cuba. The Russo-Japanese war was seen as an opportunity to take advantage of Russian weakness. Radical Finnish politicians lent their support to Japan, while one of their leaders K. Zilliacus even passed secret information to the Japanese attaché in Stockholm and became a central figure in distributing Japanese subsidies to the anti-Tsarist resistance.[243]

When, after a temporary halt during the revolution of 1905, the Russian government renewed the campaign of unification in the years before the First World War, the Finns reactivated their foreign policy. In 1910 they convened a panel of international experts in London to judge the Russian measures. While the Finns never became as well known in western Europe as the Poles or the Hungarians, their struggle to maintain their autonomy certainly did not pass unnoticed. It is of course necessary to differentiate between the interests of the Swedish public (Stockholm was the center of Finnish emigration) and those of Britain or Germany. Finnish foreign propaganda did not achieve the goal of stopping the Russian campaign, but as far as the European public was concerned Finland became established as a distinct political entity which was joined to but not identical with Russia.[244]

The Russo-Japanese war also presented other national movements with the chance to intensify their activity. The Polish Socialists, in their unrelenting struggle against Tsarism, also became beneficiaries of Japanese subsidies, as were the Georgian Socialists and Russian Socialist Revolutionaries. But Japanese interest in supporting national and social movements as a means of weakening its enemy was limited to financial support for propaganda, terrorist attacks and espionage for the duration of the war.[245]

The Russo-Japanese war exposed important destabilizing factors in the Tsarist monarchy – the opposition of the non-Russian nations

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[243] R. ŚWIETEK, *Lodowa ściana: Sekrety politgiki Józefa Piłsudskiego 1904–1918*, Cracow 1998, 314.

[244] J. PAASIVIRTA, *Finland and Europe: International Crises in the Period of Autonomy 1808–1914*, London 1981, 178 ff.

[245] R. ŚWIETEK, *Op. cit.*, 344.

against nationalist oppression, and the social-revolutionary movement – which the German and Austrian secret services and general staffs began to exploit as they made plans for a joint offensive against Russia. As early as 1871 the Chief of the German General Staff Helmuth von Moltke considered the possibilities offered by an uprising of Finns, Caucasian peoples or Poles. A renewed Polish state would stand as a bastion against "half-Asiatic" Russia. In 1906 Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg suggested the idea of a reconstituted Poland to Kaiser Wilhelm but ran into opposition from conservatives well aware of the dangers it presented, so that it was left for further consideration to the Austrians, who were less averse to the prospect of an independent Poland.[246] However, support for the movements of dissatisfied nationalities remained confined to espionage purposes down to the outbreak of war.

The Internationalization of the Question of Oppressed Nations during the First World War

During the First World War the opposing sides began to make use of the national movements to the detriment of their enemies. But it is necessary to distinguish between the utilitarian military uses of dissatisfaction (such as the Czech Legions, Pilsudski's Polish Legions, the Finnish Huntsmen) at the beginning of the war, and the complicated path leading to international support for the dissolution of the old multinational monarchies which had after all been one of the constants of European politics.

The fall of the Tsarist state at the end of the First World War presented an ideal situation for bringing about the independence of the peripheral regions. In 1917 there was a fundamental change in the general atmosphere with the recognition of the right of nations to self determination, whether in the forms suggested by Woodrow Wilson or the Russian Bolsheviks. Thus new elements were added to

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[246] *Ibid.*, 555–561.

international politics. The liberation of Central and Eastern European peoples from oppression became a watchword of the movement toward democratization but the goal was subordinated to concrete political interests. While the recognition of Finnish, Polish or Czechoslovak independence was not long in coming, the western powers hesitated over Latvia and Estonia until January 1921 and Lithuania to the end of 1922.

The mobilization was accompanied by promises to the minority peoples. At the beginning of the war the political leaders of the Baltic peoples loyally supported Tsarist war aims, while the demands of several of the national movements were integrated with Russian nationalist goals – for example the annexation of Prussian Lesser Lithuania. The political leaders associated participation in the war with the fulfillment of further national demands as well – the division of the Baltic provinces according to the national principle and the granting of autonomy. The war offered an opportunity to activate the national movements on the basis of organizations caring for war refugees. The Tsarist administration exploited German-Latvian antagonisms in the formation of Latvian units in the summer of 1915, the first to be set up on the national principle. The old socially determined antagonism, deepened by the revolution of 1905, together with the notive of defending the land against the enemy, strengthened national cohesion, so that the Latvian units became among the most reliable in the Tsarist army.

The national movements were used by both sides in their effort to weaken the enemy. the central powers concentrated their attention on Russia as the weakest member, socially and nationally, of the allied camp. As part of its plan to revolutionize and eliminate Russia Germany supported the formation of the Finnish Huntsman units and the Polish Legions under Pilsudski. Under the direction of the German secret service the League of Foreign Peoples was set up with the aim of drawing world attention (and especially that of President Wilson) to national oppression in Russia. The League succeeded in attracting support from representatives of the Lithuanian émigré community (Juozas Gabrys), the Finnish (Hermann Gummerus), the

Ukrainian (Volodymir Stepanskivsky), the Estonian Polish (Michal Lempicki) and the Baltic Germans led by Friedrich von der Ropp, who played a central role in forming the organization and convening its Lausanne congress in June 1916. Despite the participation of the agent who was to represent Estonia, the antagonism between Latvians and Baltic Germans on the one hand and Estonians and Baltic Germans on the other, it was impossible to secure the representation of both Baltic nations.[247] The activation of the League corresponded to the decision not to return the German-occupied territory for the duration of the war and to secure the border of East Prussia by creating a Polish-Baltic buffer zone, expressed in a speech by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to the Reichstag on 5 April 1916. In this context a Polish state was proclaimed in November 1916. In the summer of 1917 the German occupation authorities agreed to the formation of a Lithuanian representative institution, the Lithuanian Council, in 1917 for liaison with the local populace. A second motive was the effect on the international stage, as the move was presented as "liberation" from Russian oppression rather than the run-up to annexation by Germany, to be preceded by the formation of a Lithuanian puppet state as a counterweight to the Polish state set up on formerly Tsarist territory. The Lithuanian strategy differed from the approach of other Baltic nationalities not only because of the German occupation. Leaders of the strong Lithuanian-American community had already demanded the internationalization of the Lithuanian question in the autumn of 1914 and recognition of the autonomy of a Lithuanian-Latvian federation. In 1915, before the German occupation, they, along with their émigré countrymen in western Europe, demanded complete independence.[248]

The February revolution in Russia partially satisfied Latvian and Estonian demands for national autonomy while also easing tensions

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[247] S. ZETTERBERG, *Die Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands 1916–1918*, Helsinki 1978. See also the German anti-German reaction and the vision of post-war Eastern Europe by T. G. Masaryk, *Nová Evropa*, Brno 1994.

[248] A. TARULIS, *American-Baltic Relations 1918–1922: The Struggle over Recognition*, Washington 1965, 2 ff.

with the Finns. The Bolshevik revolution went even further in the recognition of the right to national self-determination and extended full autonomy to non-Russian nationalities. Recognition of the right to national self-determination did not mean automatic agreement with the idea of independence, which was fully subordinated to the needs of social revolution. In practice the Bolshevik government recognized only Finnish independence. The Bolshevik revolution in Russia had a fundamental impact on the decision to seek political independence, in that it called into question the legitimacy of the central government. Opposition to the Soviet system on the part of nationalist leaders representing the spectrum from the conservative right to reformist socialists led to the proclamation of Estonian independence on 24 February 1918 and of Latvian somewhat later, on 18 November, because of the German occupation. A further factor was the Peace of Brest-Litovsk and its addendum of August 1918 by which the Soviets were obliged to give up Poland, Lithuania, the Baltic, Finland and the Ukraine.[249]

Towards the end of the war, then, there were three possible types of development: a conservative type favored by the central powers (plans to form vassal monarchies in the former border territories); the Allies' plans for political democratization (though not necessarily, as the aim was to retain Russia in the struggle against the central powers); and Soviet Russia with its plans for social revolution. The measure of success of each variant was the strength of its backer, for the dominant power determined the character of the region. The Russian center was able to retain the culturally identical regions of its western border (Ukraine, Byelorussia) but not those nations with a different identity. While the White Russians categorically rejected any separation of the border regions (the more liberal currents accepted at most the independence of Poland and Finland), the Soviet government, after the failure to spread the revolution, concentrated

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[249] The breakup of the Russian empire was a more protracted and painful process than that of the Austrian Monarchy. See M. ENGMANN, "Consequences of Dissolving an Empire: the Habsburg and Romanov Cases", in *Emancipation and Interdependence*, Uppsala 1994, 21–33.

on stabilizing the Russian heartland. For tactical reasons, motivated by the need to deprive anti-Soviet groups of their bases, it concluded peace agreements in 1920 which recognized the independence of the new states and gave up all claims to them.

Allied support was clearly the decisive factor in the origin and preservation of the Baltic states. The Allies gave de facto recognition to the national governments even before the actual formation of the states (the Estonian in May 1918, the Latvian a week before its birth on 18 November 1918, although neither had any power), in order to prevent annexation by Germany, and later through direct military support they halted the spread of revolution and union with Soviet Russia.

This support was conditional, determined by the global interests of the great powers. It also varied. Britain adopted a positive attitude toward the Baltic states because of its economic interests in the region; it could also profit politically from Russian losses on the coast. France, giving preference to a global political approach, only gave up on a Russian restoration in the autumn of 1920. London supported the independence of Lithuania against Polish aspirations, which were supported by France.[250]

The case of Finland also depended on the support of the dominant power, although here the internal political factor played the most important role. The civil war was an internal conflict in which German intervention contributed to the victory of the Whites. The change in the balance of forces in Europe, however, led to the suppression of the Germanophile conservative current represented by

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[250] E. ANDERSONS, "Die baltische Frage und die internationale Politik der Alliierten und assozierten Mächte bis zum November 1918", in *Von ...* , 255–274. *Ibid.*, "Die baltische Frage und die internationale Politik der Alliierten und assozierten Mächte 1918–1920", in *"Von den baltischen Provinzen zu den baltischen Staaten 1918–1920*, Marburg 1977, 327–377. K. JANNSSEN, "Die baltische Okkupationspolitik des Deutschen Reiches", in *Von den baltischen ...*, *1917–1918*, 217–254. H. VOLKMANN, "Das Deutsche Reich und die baltischen Staaten 1918 bis 1920", in *Von den baltischen ... 1918–1920*, 378–408. For the attitude of the United States, A. TARULIS, *American-Baltic ...* O. HOVI, *The Baltic Area in British Policy 1918–1921*, Helsinki 1980. K. HOVI, *Cordon Sanitaire or Bariere de l'Est?*, Turku 1975.

P. Svinhifvud and the emergence of a republic. The Allies then recognized Finland de jure at the beginning of May 1919, once they had received assurances of a pro-allied stance and a democratic development in the country.[251]

Conclusions

In conclusion I shall try to summarize in several points the conditions for the rise of the national states on the western borders of the Russian empire. International events were not strongly reflected in the first two phases of the national movement, although the international factor made itself felt in relations between the local political and cultural elite and the state.

The foreign factor exerted influence only indirectly, as in the foregoing example – an unsuccessful military conflict exposed the weakness of the old multinational monarchy (the thesis of expansive foreign policy as a means of resolving or drawing attention away from domestic problems, though in this case with the opposite effect), and caused an escalation of internal tensions, leading to efforts at reform. The crises at the end of the 1850's and in 1905, which Russia overcame, were not accompanied by such foreign pressure that the legitimacy of the central authority was compromised in the region under study.

One of the preconditions for the emergence of a national state was the existence of a political leadership with mass support (which did not exclude the possibility of various kinds of national state). The public was activated when it felt itself under threat (from war, or economic or social crisis) and accepted the authority of the national

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[251] J. PAASIVIRTA, *The Victors in World War I and Finland. Finland's Relations with the British, French and the United States Governments in 1918–1919* Helsinki 1965, 79–109. *Ibid., Finland and Europe: The Early Years of Independence 1917–1939,* Helsinki 1988, 160–166, 109–215. E. SUNDBÄCK, "Convenient Buffer between Scandinavia and Russia", *Great Britain, Scandinavia and the Birth of Finland after the First World War. Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 42,* 1994, 355–375.

political leadership in place of the traditional hierarchy. It is necessary to remember the role of the national and social consensus and the necessity of meeting the demands of social groups – for example, at first the Bolsheviks enjoyed strong support from the Latvian soldiers, the rural and industrial proletariat and the poorer peasantry, but also among the intellectual left, who were satisfied with autonomy within the Russian framework. Failure to meet demands for land reform and revolutionary excesses reduced their support. Authority did not depend merely on the measure of national support stratified socially and sometimes also territorially (for example the weak national awareness displayed by the Prussian Lithuanians). The authority of the national leadership transforming itself into a state institution was increased if it was able to gain the support of representatives of other ethnic groups living on the same territory (for the Lithuanians, Jews and Byelorussians). As a rule there was a sharp conflict between the old and emerging elites (the suppressed peoples against the Russian state, but also Latvians and Estonians against the Baltic Germans, and Lithuanians against Poles). Only in Finland did an external threat play a role, i.e. in unification before the First World War, and later the threat of the Bolshevik revolution became an element serving to integrate the elite. The civil war, however, divided Finnish society socially and its effects were felt into the 1930's.

The growth of dissatisfaction with the old system because of its weakness and the deep crisis of the multinational empire served to set the mechanism of independence in movement. The political, social and economic attractions of the center and the character of the ties of dependence of the periphery were of significance. For example, the economic separation of Finland met no obstacles. On the other hand, the existence of the Baltic states without economic ties to Russia was unthinkable for most.

In the absence of a favorable international situation which contributed to the paralysis of the traditional dominant powers and negated the legitimacy of the center (separated by another state, coup d'état), the above mentioned factors had no chance of coming into play. The development of the national movement toward an

independent state may be understood as a historically complex process leading from the role of an object of events to that of an international political subject. An important role was played by the level of interest on the part of the dominant power in weakening a competing state (which envisions making use of the dissatisfaction of suppressed peoples for military aims, espionage, support for the opposition in an effort to create domestic instability, support for demands for autonomy). This, however, did not yet mean approval of separation. More important was the decision to seriously weaken or even definitively destroy the enemy empire (by supporting the national movement even to secession, the decision to build a new international system, the influence of Wilson's ideas). The function of internal destabilization, however, could also be performed by the social movement.

In order for the new state to be recognized, it was important to have at least some of the attributes of statehood in place, at least in elementary form, before the proclamation of the state – the existence of a tradition of statehood, autonomy, or some manifestation of active resistance (for example an independent army, a partisan movement or other military or paramilitary organization) such as existed among the Czechs or Poles. Peoples with a tradition of statehood were more readily accepted when their cause was presented as a renewal of statehood, while the states formed by the "non-historical" peoples aroused misgivings long after the war (Latvia, Estonia). It was also important to convince the appropriate power of the new state's prospects: its stability, trustworthiness, and its "usefulness" in the new European constellation. Recognition could be held up by uncertainty over borders or quarrels with neighbors (such as that between Lithuania and Poland). Economic aspects were also of significance: economic viability, maturity, trade links, sufficiency of raw materials, etc. The vital necessity of the Baltic ports for Russia as a "commercial window" to Europe was the most widespread argument against secession. Diplomats also took into consideration the geographical extent and the population of the national state. It was necessary to overcome skepticism about the costs of maintaining

the new state and fears of "balkanizing" the region. Location was a further factor – at the periphery (Finland), at the crossroads of political and economic interests (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia), as was the interest of the appropriate power in the role envisioned for the new state in the postwar international system – after the failure of hopes for a restoration of Russia more or less in its pre-war borders (defended for geopolitical reasons most ardently by France) the idea of the "cordon sanitaire" between Soviet Russia and Germany and its integration into international trade. The motif of the cordon sanitaire, dictated by political and economic considerations, later appeared as a mirror image in the Soviet approach during 1920-21.

Summary

This essay deals with the external influence on national movements demonstrated on the national-liberating process of the Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, and Finnish national ethnics in the North-Western parts of the czarist Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and its broader Eastern European and Central European context. The author based his typology on M. Hroch's evolutionary phases of national movements division comprising of three stages: the stage of the scientific interest, national agitation, and mass movement development; and follows the level of the external influence in the particular stages. The most significant influence of the external can be seen in the last stage of the nation-liberating process, although it can be traced through all the stages. At the last stage, however, the external factor embodies a very important role as the activists of the suppressed ethnic attempt to draw international attention to the minority's position, introduce it as a specific subject, and gain the international support against the status quo elite or state. There is a certain distinction between movements that could prove some kind of autonomy or historical tradition of statehood

(the Finnish and partly the Lithuanians), and ethnics that didn't share the same experience (the Latvians, the Estonians). The liberating attempts could only come true in case of a considerable weakening of the old power center and traditional elites, leading to power vacuum in the region. The second important precondition was to gain the support of the great European powers and convince them about viability of the newly formed national states and their usefulness for the post-war system. Such political and military support of the European powers proved to be of a decisive importance for arising national states, as the end of WW I demonstrated.

Translation: Frederick L. Snider

KONECZNY, KUCHARZEWSKI AND ZIENTARA: THREE POLISH SURVEYS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY[252]

JIŘÍ VYKOUKAL

Polish-Russian relations have been burdened by numerous mutual insults as well as stereotyping, and it is instructive to examine how this fact has manifested itself in the several general treatments of Russian history that have appeared in Poland in the course of the 20th century. Some of them have been innovative in that they have rounded off and systematized past experiences in ways that subsequently influenced Polish views of Russia and had their impact on concrete political acts. Since these works were written and published in the inter-war period, when Poland's relations with Russia were, at best, cool but correct and also reflected this state of affairs, they could not be welcomed in postwar Poland. They were published mainly by émigré publishing houses and appeared in Poland only in the 1980's, the work of clandestine presses. New editions appeared legally only after 1989.[253]

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[252] The first version of this paper appeared in the Czech journal Slovanský přehled (Slavonic Review), see VYKOUKAL, J., *Polské vidění Ruska: příklad negativního stereotypu (IV. Syntézy kanonické i nekanonické)*. Slovanský přehled, 86, 2000, č. 2, pp. 215–238.

[253] Of the "official" surveys of Russian history that appeared in postwar Poland, three should be mentioned which are still cited today (I shall give the latest editions from

Two of the reissues of these works merit special attention. The author of the first is Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949), the "Polish Spengler",[254] known chiefly for his historicising treatment of civilizations, one of which appeared in Britain after the Second World War with a preface by Arnold Toynbee.[255] Koneczny was a professor at Stephen Bathory University in Vilna until 1929, when as an adherent of the National Democrats he was forced into retirement by the authoritarian regime (*sanacja*). Thereafter he lived in Cracow, where he taught briefly at the Jagellon University in 1945. I shall examine one of his "secondary" works, on Russian history, which was published in two volumes in 1917 and 1929. In the interval he published an abridged version in 1921, which was reissued in 1997.[256]

The history of Russia, which covers the period from Kievan Rus to the First World War, was divided into five chronological sections: Ancient Rus to the Mongol invasions (1263), The Grand Principality

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the 1980's, which reflected the fewest restrictions): Ludwik BAZYLOW, *Historia Rosji*, 2 volumes, Warszawa 1985 (a one-volume version appeared the same year in the series World History, published by the Wroclaw press Ossolineum); Jerzy OCHMAŃSKI, *Dzieje Rosji do r. 1861*, Warszawa-Poznań 1980; Zbigniew Wójcik, *Dzieje Rosji 1533–1801*, Warszawa 1981.

[254] For biographical details see Andrzej SZWARC, "Koneczny Feliks", in *Słownik historyków polskich*, Warszawa 1994, 240–241.

[255] Of the best known works I should mention *Polskie Logos i Ethnos* (1921), *O wielości cywilizacji* (1935, English edition London 1963), Of the histories of "civilizations" there is *Cywilizacja bizantyńska, cywilizacja żydowska*. Koneczny is also said to have planned a history of Ottoman civilization which would have completed a set of studies of cultures which threatened the western Latin sphere. See Jędrzej Giertych's preface to Koneczny's *Cywilizacja żydowska*, Warszawa 1995, 5.

[256] Feliks KONECZNY, *Dzieje Rosji od najdawniejszych do najnowszych czasów*, Warszawa 1997. Original two-volume version: Feliks KONECZNY, *Dzieje Rosji*, Warszawa 1917 (covers the period to 1449), Feliks KONECZNY, *Litwa a Moskwa w latach 1449-1492 (Dziejów Rosji, t. II)* Wilno 1929. First edition of abridged version, Feliks KONECZNY, *Dzieje Rosji od najdawniejszych do najnowszych czasów*, Warszawa 1921. The first postwar abridged edition appeared in London as Feliks KONECZNY, *The Origins of Modern Russia*, London 1984, as did the third volume of the survey: Feliks KONECZNY, *Dzieje Rosji, T. III: Schyłek Iwana III 1492-1505*, London 1984. The current Polish edition appeared at the conservative *Antyk* publishing house, which subscribes to the Polish national democratic tradition.

of Moscow, 1263–1449, a transitional phase from 1449–1505, Muscovy through the reign of Peter I (1505–1725), and Imperial Russia, 1725–1914. Koneczny derives his view of Russian history by contrasting it with that of Poland, which reveals two areas of difference. In the first place, while the content of Polish history is given (i.e. by its western Latin and Roman Catholic kernel) and changes only as regards form, the changes in Russian history are more often a matter of content rather than form. As the text further shows, Koneczny has in mind the fact that Russia holds fast to form, which in times of bewildering change provides at least the semblance of continuity and order. Hence the disposition toward autocracy (the most elementary form of government) which endures through various orientations, or the vacillation between East and West and the tendency to regard itself as a special type of civilization, or the tendency to accept models which have no tradition within Russia, where there exist no mechanisms for assimilating external impulses or transforming them into agencies of further development. The second area of difference concerns the fact that Russia has not yet begun to work on its "being", since the course of its history has never forced it to any intensive exercise of its own intellectual potential. Here Koneczny does not mean to suggest that Russian history consists merely of situations and periods in which the people are exposed to oppression; he simply declares that all impulses here are diffused, without giving rise to elements leading to substantive change: "Life there, especially on the banks of the Volga, flowed broadly, without depth."[257]

Koneczny identifies as the chief element, axis or dimension of Russian history its amorphous quality, its ability to swallow whole the most varied external impulses. Russia is neither the counterpart nor the negation of Western Europe; it has no content of its own, it exists without constituent elements. In so far as it can be defined, it must be on the basis of some concrete semblance which is the result of

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[257] Feliks KONECZNY, *Dzieje Rosji od najdawniejszych do najnowszych czasów*, Warszawa 1997, 1.

penetration and influence from other civilizations which are strong in content and well rounded. Thus Koneczny adopts a neutral position in the old dispute over the relation between *Rus* and *Russia*, since there is not much difference between the two in any case in that both represent a "civilization without an identity". It is no accident that Koneczny did not include Russia among the types of civilization which he regarded as key (Latin, Byzantine, Jewish, Turkish). Rather it was a type which absorbed certain elements from other civilizations or acted as a parasite upon them.

Nor does Koneczny recognize the eastern liturgy as a positive or formative feature of Russian history, because like earlier or later impulses (the followers of Rurik, the Mongols) it is merely one of the foreign influences repeatedly brought to bear upon a cultural void. The Varangian element was unable to create a state because it had no interest in the Russian space, only using it as a transitional territory leading to the Mediterranean. As a loose confederation of clans, it never created a systematic political territory or anything resembling a state organization.[258] Similarly, Byzantine Christianity failed to create an authentic Christianity but merely introduced a dual system in which paganism provided the content and Christianity the form. Since the first of Rurik's dynasty regarded their residence on Russian territory as temporary, they were not vitally interested in the question of religious organization, and the state-forming content of the Byzantine mission was soon allowed to atrophy. Nor does Koneczny see the Mongol invasion as a formative element, again for several reasons. The "Mongolization" of the eastern Slavic territories had occurred earlier, during the Cuman incursions, when a Mongol-Slavonic culture had been created which in turn served to suppress Byzantine influences and contributed to the disorganization of Russian territory. The conquest of the Russian space was not part of the Mongol's plans: they were only interested in subjugating the Cumans, who had earlier fled before the Mongols from central Asia.

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[258] F. KONECZNY, *Op. cit.*, 11.

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But their arrival provoked the Russian princes, who defended the Cumans, to whom they were bound by ties of kinship (Mstislav the Brave and his Cuman father-in-law). With the catastrophic defeat at Kalka Rus became the focus of Mongol attention.[259]

The only formative elements which could have crystallized the Russian space culturally came from Poland (the first contact came in 981), though not always by optimal means. In 1448–49 peace was concluded bringing to an end the dispute over the Lithuanian-Russian regions and laying down a border between Russia and Poland, i.e. the West.[260] The ecclesiastical union formed in 1596 in Brest, could have no authentic influence in Russia, since it depended on Polish eastward expansion – without powerful support its weak Catholic content would have been again swallowed up by Russia, resulting in the conviction that the Pope had been converted to Orthodoxy. The western pressure on Russia ended with the Cossack wars, and Muscovy began to expand westward. Poland was gradually "orientalized", the Kievan cultural center disappeared, the chance was lost to create a Russian (in the sense pertaining to "Rus" rather than "Russia") nation, and under Russian influence (in the sense pertaining to "Russia" rather than "Rus") the "graft of European culture" in the East expired.[261]

With Peter I ("the Great" was what he called himself) there began a period in which the feverish rush to acquire "European" values itself revealed perfectly the antagonism between form and content, as a state was created outside the society, which moreover was indifferent to that society. In the tracks of the reforms under Peter and Catherine, however, elements of Latin culture began to penetrate involuntarily into Russia, whose presence Koneczny perceives in the development of literature or the foundation of universities – but he does not claim that this resulted in a direct "Latinization" of Russia, rather that within Russia there arose fruitful disputes or paradoxes (university = autocracy

[259] *Ibid.*, 28.
[260] *Ibid.*, 61.
[261] *Ibid.*, 150.

versus autonomy, literature = autocracy versus creative freedom), which possess a positive aspect for the future in that they contribute to Russia's europeanization, the cultivation of national feeling.[262] However, since the absorbent effect of the Russian space once again comes into play, reforms and disputes are not carried through to the end and call forth internal stress, which is relieved in the old and tested manner – by expansion, this time at the expense of Poland. The breakup of the Polish-Lithuanian state between 1772 and 1795 meant that Russia entered Europe as a geographical element, but acquired nothing therefrom since it lacked the necessary mechanisms for adopting certain values. Thus the contact instead produced a profound disorientation which is palpable through most of the 19th century.[263]

The Russian environment thus produced several new situations. Increasingly stretched between Europe and Asia (parallel engagements in the Balkans and in Central Asia), Russia collapses in upon itself, when (as the Crimean War demonstrates) it is unable to compete militarily with the West (which it considers decadent) and meanwhile the Congress of Berlin humiliates it by forcing it to give up the fruit of its advance in the Balkans. Russia forms apologetic and critical variants of its further existence and development. The apologetic variant is formulated by N. N. Danilevsky in his theses on the rottenness of the West and Russian patronage of the Slavic world, all the while preserving absolutism as the quintessence of the spirit of Russian history. The critical variant is represented by radical movements and groups (nihilism, terrorism, socialism) who, however, are just as indifferent as the absolutists to the real society and operate on programs that amount to social fiction.[264]

The second moment comes with developments after the Crimean War, when the industrial revolution begins in Russia. Unlike the reforms of Peter and Catherine, which merely reproduced "form without content", industrialization represents a real innovation in the

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[262] *Ibid.,* 192.
[263] *Ibid.,* 212.
[264] *Ibid.,* 231.

history of western influence on Russia. For that reason, this revolution is "indigestible" for the Russian environment, because independently of conservative Panslavism or proto-socialist radicalism, it creates within this environment a truly European model of economic relations which, being unrestrainable, emphasizes the increasing Russian dependence on capitalism, its technological and financial strength. Proof of the fact that industrialization first introduced an element into Russia which it was unable to control or rework to fit in with its experience was the economic policy of S. J. Witte, which Koneczny assesses as an unsuccessful attempt to use European developments in support of Russian absolutism. By its advance westward (the annexation of Poland and the rest) Russia created an insoluble cultural dilemma for its own identity (Slavophiles and Westernizers). The industrial revolution exposed its structural dilemma, the incompatibility of archaic absolutism and modern industrialism.[265] The two conflicts which after 1905 (the war with Japan and the revolution) merged into one practical problem – the renewal of external forces and the end of absolutism – brought the Polish question into prominence. Its "external" solution, or the settlement of the position of the Polish Kingdom within Russia, could, in relation to Germany and Austria-Hungary, strengthen the external position of Russia, its "internal" solution, or merging Polish and Russian constitutionalism, could bring with it an internal regeneration of the Russian state. But the Russian system was paralyzed, and the European crisis offered the last opportunity – to use the war to secure the prestige of Russian autocracy.[266]

The author of the second re-edition is Jan Kucharzewski (1876-1952), a historian and politician (premier of the Polish government set up under Austro-German patronage in November 1917), who spent the inter-war years in Poland and after 1940 emigrated to Switzerland and the United States, where he died.[267] In 1924

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[265] *Ibid.*, 274.

[266] *Ibid.*, 293.

[267] Biographical data in Andrzej SZWARC, "Kucharzewski Jan", in *Słownik historyków polskich*, Warszawa 1994, 274–275.

Kucharzewski published the first volume of his substantial series of studies collectively entitled *Od białego do czerwonego caratu*, which appeared in seven volumes until 1935 and covered Russian history from the period when Muscovy began to emancipate itself from Tatar domination to the reign of Nicholas II. A further three volumes dealing with the Soviet Union until the Second World War were destroyed during the Warsaw Uprising and the author never reconstructed them. Instead he prepared an abridged version of his work while in exile, which was published in New York in 1949 as *The Origin of Modern Russia* and appeared in Polish in London (both editions were supported by the Polish émigré community). The first legal edition in Poland appeared in 1990.[268]

The work is divided into twelve chapters which combine a chronological and thematic approach. The author has selected key periods, to each of which he assigns a theme which he considers to be of key importance and which give concrete shape to the central idea of his work. The first chapter (*Świeca Iwana Kality*) summarizes the essential background of modern Russian history, partly through the author's interpretation and partly through commentary on the "Russian Journey" of Adolph de Custine of 1843, which in Poland and elsewhere was often cited as revealing the true face of Russia.[269] The

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[268] I shall cite the following edition: Jan KUCHARZEWSKI, *Od białego do czerwonego caratu*, Gdańsk 1990. In the original edition, the volumes appeared as follows: I. *Epoka mikołajewska*, II. *Dwa światy*, III. *Lata przełomu: Romanow, Pugaczow, czy Pestel*, IV. *Wyzwolenie ludów*, V. *Terroryści*, VI. *Rządy Aleksandra III – Ku reakcji*, VII. *Triumf reakcji*. The work began to appear illegally in Poland in 1986, first as Jan KUCHARZEWSKI, *Od białego do czerwonego caratu*, Tom I, II, Warszawa, Głos, 1986, a second edition as Jan KUCHARZEWSKI, *Od białego do czerwonego caratu*, Tom I, II, Warszawa, Maraton, 1986, and a third edition as Jan KUCHARZEWSKI, *Od białego do czerwonego caratu*, Tom I, II, Warszawa, Krąg, 1988.

[269] De Custine published his work in Paris in 1843 under the title *La Russie en 1839*. George Kennan, among others, considers that de Custine intended an "eastern" version of de Tocqueville's analysis of American democracy which provided an accurate picture of Russian despotism. The first post-Communist Polish edition appeared in 1989: Astolphe Markiz DE CUSTINE, *Listy z Rosji. Rosja w 1839 roku*, Kraków 1989, 249 pp.

second chapter (*Lud*) deals with the position of the Russian *muzbik* and the countryside generally, the third (*Niepokój inteligencji*) the fate of the Russian intelligentsia after the Napoleonic Wars, the fourth (*Ku tamtemu brzegowi*) Herzen and the genesis of the Russian critique of Western civilization and conviction of Russian superiority, the fifth (*Nihilista*) the motivations of Russian political and cultural radicalism, the sixth (*Bakunin*) a leading representative of the foregoing, the seventh (*Fatalna sprawa*) Polish influence on Russian political culture, the eighth (*Przestrogi*) the relationship between Russian and Polish revolutionary movements, the ninth (*Rozstajne drogi*) the differences that emerged at the time of the January Uprising, the tenth (*Tatarski Grakchus*) Russian-Polish relations in the aftermath of the January Uprising, the eleventh (*Zwiastuni*) the intellectual and political background of the Russian Revolution, and the twelfth (*Demokracja socjalna*) the ideology and policies of Russian Marxism to 1917.

Like Koneczny, Kucharzewski begins by presenting his vision of Russian history, to which he adheres throughout the work. According to Kucharzewski the basis of Russian history is the connection between expansion and despotism. What Muscovy (not historically identical with present-day Russia) proclaimed as unification of the nation was in fact only an expedient fiction, a belated justification for expansion which destroyed the individuality of the conquered territories and adapted them to its own model. A certain equalization became: "...the instinct of the government and of the nation, too".[270] Within such a "system" there exists a balance between domestic and foreign policy, which became mutually supplementary during the period when Russia came into closer contact with Europe as Russian help was sought in the wars against the Turks. During this contact two facts were underlined: Europe was fascinated by Russian massiveness, but it underestimated the Russian intellect, or cunning, so that Muscovy was always able to get the better of the Europeans.

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[270] Jan KUCHARZEWSKI, *Od białego do czerwonego caratu*, Gdańsk 1990, 9.

Russia always respected strength, and was capable of enduring military defeat, while it could not tolerate diplomatic defeat. A war could be won the second time around, but an "intellectual" defeat simply underlined what Russia feared the most: the recognition that it was a backward land: "It was a snobbery of civilization, based on dissimulation in order to win a good name in the world."[271]

After consideration of the "system" and its internal and external manifestations Kucharzewski presents two further protagonists of Russian history: the people and the intelligentsia. In the first case, the situation is clear: the peasantry represent the dark, primitive, uneducated mass, who, since the system did nothing to change their position, simply settled into their lot and freed themselves from it only occasionally (and temporarily) through numerous peasant uprisings which were sparked by a combination of intolerable oppression and a fanatical faith in the existence of mythical *ukaz* which was said to grant their freedom. The oppressed people represent a source of social catastrophe of unbelievable dimensions. The road from emphasis on the system to emphasis on the people is "the road from the white tsar to the red tsar, whose image lived in the masses ... The arms of the popular tsar will not be the double-headed Byzantine eagle but rather the red cock".[272]

Kucharzewski arrives at a similar dead end when considering the intelligentsia. The first generation of Russian intellectuals who had a chance to introduce something of the European spirit into Russia, the generation of the Napoleonic Wars and the make-believe liberalism under Alexander, was brought to heel after the Decemberist uprising, while the ensuing generation, brought up under Nicholas I and his successors, had no such chance. Chaadayev's fate (his critique of prevailing conditions was not punished but rather declared to be the fruit of a disturbed mind) was the exception confirming the rule.[273] With the political break during the reign of Alexander I, access to

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271 *Ibid.,* 11.
272 *Ibid.,* 70.
273 *Ibid.,* 103.

civilized methods of resolving the situation was closed off, and the intelligentsia were faced with a fateful choice of options: should they support absolutism or seek its destruction by equally despotic methods? Thus tsarist absolutism limits the formulation of a conception of freedom within the framework of law and civil society. Its nemesis will be equally tyrannical, and despotism will have given birth to more despotism.[274]

During the 19th century several so far separate trends began to amalgamate into a recognizable form. The subjugation of the church to the state resulted in the secularization of the intelligentsia (i.e. the appearance of fashionable atheism in the 1850's), who, however, in the secular sphere communicate only with absolutist political and intellectual models and thus lose contact with the European conception of politics. In fact, a gathering opposition to Europe emerged, which subconsciously reflected Russian cultural inferiority, for which a solution was sought which included an apocalyptic vision. Within this backward Russia would wreak revenge on "arrogant" Europe. Hence the strong inclination toward socialism, which proclaims the equality of all nations or reduces the national element in favor of a new concept, and also toward anarchism, which proclaims the possibility of action. The sources of catastrophe are with a certain satisfaction defined in the "dark" countryside, upon which the intelligentsia, like the state, feeds parasitically. But the intellectuals cannot bring about its reform and only heighten its explosive quality which will engulf the entire world: Russia will avenge the injustice wrought by history by destroying history and installing a new world without history. According to Kucharzewski three basic elements became defined in the 1850's which composed the solution of the Russian predicament launched in 1917: the mirror effect of political tyranny, the rural revolution, and the effort to supersede the cultural deficit.[275]

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[274] *Ibid.*, 111.
[275] *Ibid.*, 159.

Subsequent development only fills out this bare outline, revealing the face of the coming revolution. Kucharzewski traces the metamorphosis from the example of A. I. Herzen, who transferred the idea of liberation from the European context to that of Russian imperialism with its national and pan-Slavic potential. He believes that Herzen already embodied the fateful schism within the Russian mentality: Europe = Enlightenment; Russia = instinct. With Herzen instinct begins to suppress enlightenment. The shell of a superficial Europeanized culture begins to crack and the old dream returns: Moscow will again become the Third Rome, but "on the far bank" – it will no longer be Moscow leading the world according to European rules, but rather Moscow destroying the world in order to build a new one on its ruins. This prefigures not only the Russian Revolution, but also the fundamental attitude of all "underdeveloped nations" who aim to punish the haughty West by their revolt.[276]

Beginning with the fifth chapter Kucharzewski specifies the means by which the Herzen matrix will be filled out. The nihilist (the figure of Bazarov from Turgenev's "Fathers and Children") represents the generational split within the Russian family of the 1850's and 1860's against the background of the atheistic mode which followed the defeat in the Crimean War. Religion is replaced by a materialist dogma, a sort of "monodeism" against the background of erupting barbarism – all that transcends this dogma, any kind of civilization or culture, is *nihil* and must be destroyed.[277] Nihilism from desperation unites the intelligentsia with the countryside to form a fateful wedge identical with blunt, non-transcendent and dogmatic materialism. Fateful because it appears to be the only solution to the consequences of the blow which Russia received from the reforms of Peter I. The reform "plowed up" the upper classes without touching the lower, for whom culture and civilization remained alien. Figuratively speaking, the "head" of the society attempted to move at

[276] *Ibid.*, 165.
[277] *Ibid.*, 178.

great speed, while the "feet" remained unmoved. The nihilist intelligentsia, then, is the body which the feet carry, but it will be a body without a head. Bazarov is the prototype of such an intellectual ("a university educated Pugachev"), whom Turgenev must kill off, since he would otherwise set off an annihilating conflagration.[278]

The basic outline of this conflagration is given by Bakunin, whose early vision of revolt recalls Robespierre, though he goes further when he combines the yearning to destroy and the yearning to create into a single instinct, which he called "fury".[279] At first, until the revolutions of 1848-49, this ambivalent instinct is connected to emerging European Communism, but with the failure of revolution it is applied to Russia: the European revolution failed and Bakunin, like Herzen, looks to the "far bank", like a Chiliastic prophet looking to the East for the coming of the new Messiah. Meanwhile he begins to lay out in greater detail his conception of revolution, which must be world-wide and combine elements of anarchy and despotism, in which anarchy mirrors the dark explosiveness of the peasant masses and despotism the inability to become free of the absolutism of the Russian experience.[280]

Kucharzewski finds one obstacle which acts as a brake on Russian expansion (whether fuelled by absolutism or opposition to it) and the spread of despotism: this obstacle was and remains Poland. Kucharzewski illustrates the negativity of Russian thinking about Poland with Karamzin's memoranda to Alexander I. As a peaceful nation embodying freedom, Poland represents the antithesis of Russia, which is aggressive and despotic. If the attitude of the Russian regime to Poland is clear, what of the opposition's attitude? Kucharzewski points to the example of the Decemberists who, despite the legend of Russian-Polish friendship propagated by radical elements of the Polish emigration, were generally hostile toward Poland and willing to concede at most a limited Polish autonomy but

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[278] *Ibid.*, 187.
[279] *Ibid.*, 194-195.
[280] *Ibid.*, 225.

certainly not partnership. The motivation for such an attitude may be illustrated again by the example of Herzen: if the old world is to be destroyed in the name of the Slavonic element, then strong and Catholic (or Latin and "de-Slavicized) Poland must be forcibly returned to the Slavic family – an impossibility if Poland were independent.[281] Russian Slavic or Panslavic ideology thus became a common dimension of Russian despotism and the Russian opposition to it; it was the expression of the denial of the West. In this situation Poland always preferred union with Western civilization before the chimera of an aggressive Eastern Slavism.[282]

The first Russian revolutionaries were informed of the "cultural deficit" of their country by, among others, the Polish "migr's, but they refused to accept this information, instead reproaching the Poles on two counts: their respect for tradition (which excluded revolutionary radicalism) and their patriotism (which excluded participation in the universal Slavic revolution). For them Poland was thinkable only as part of the Slavic revolution, which would regenerate the land as a firm part of the Slavic world: thus the Russian revolution took over the methods of the regime and demonstrated (as Michelet wrote during the January Uprising in Poland) that Russia represents barbaric force and enmity toward the West. But barbarity is not merely endemic in Russian tradition, it is constantly renewed by the existence of the dark countryside, which sooner or later will throw off the yoke of state despotism and call forth a revolution which will be channeled only through revolutionary despotism.[283]

Russia and Poland began definitively to part ways at the beginning of the 1860's – in the sense that the earlier illusion of the possibility of joint action disappeared as mutually antipathy set in. The agrarian reforms, which evoked praise from the West, and the brutal police

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[281] *Ibid.*, 250.
[282] *Ibid.*, 266. In contemporary Russia these arguments are often used by proponents of "sacral" geopolitics, represented for example by the controversial political scientist Alexander Dugin.
[283] *Ibid.*, 194–195.

intervention against the Warsaw disturbances at the beginning of 1861, which evoked criticism from the West, placed Russia in a difficult position. Russia was vitally concerned to maintain its prestige in the West, but the prominence of the Polish question raised fears that Catholic Poland would serve as a wedge which could allow the West to penetrate into Orthodox Russia. Kucharzewski illustrates the genesis of this phobia using the example of the journalist and politician Michail Nikiforovich Katkov, who made aversion to Poland one of the foundation stones of Russian conservatism. Katkov did not invent this attitude, he merely gave precision to an existing mood. It was also turned against the opposition at home and in exile, which was accused of having been "de-Russified" through connivance with the Polish-Catholic-Jesuit conspiracy which was behind the January Uprising.[284] The Russian liberals did not remain far behind, and if before the uprising they regarded the Polish question with a mixture of condescension and patronage, during its course they deplored the violence, while the other Russian political currents were seized with nationalist fury.[285]

Nor did the revolutionaries break ranks when they came to regard the Polish uprising as a manifestation of nationalism. But they added a twist. Not only did nationalism impede universal revolution, it also created political strength, as the example of Italian unification was beginning to show. As nationalism moved eastward, any concessions to Poland could provoke a chain reaction in the other provinces of the empire and, what was worse, Polish ambitions could become united to those of Byelorussia and the Ukraine.[286] The final moment of the Polish-Russian divorce was the irresponsible dilettantism of Russian radical circles which shortly before the uprising assured the Poles that their revolutions would unfold together, that the Russian revolutionaries would guarantee the neutrality of the army. What in fact happened was that from the shadow of an illusory struggle of

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[284] *Ibid.*, 306, 309.
[285] *Ibid.*, 322.
[286] *Ibid.*, 331.

two conceptions of Russia (the revolutionary against the despotic) a new scheme emerged: Great Russian messianism, which had no intention of respecting the Polish viewpoint.[287]

If M. N. Katkov articulated the attitude of the Russian public toward the Polish question and the January Uprising, then General Michail Muravyev gave free reign to these views during its suppression. He was the embodiment of Russian expectations, a strong and merciless man who cannot be accused of any kind of sympathy with the Poles. Russia applauded his methods and his legend raised him to the status of Marshal Suvorov, remembered for his bloody settling of accounts with Warsaw at the end of Kosciuszko's uprising. Muravyev was a transitional figure who combined two trends: the definitive inauguration of an anti-Polish course (control of Poland to guarantee Russian security), and the refutation of the opposition movement of the 1860's (any opposition will hereafter compete with the regime strictly as an alternative despotism).[288] The policy of state integration, which came with the defeat of the January Uprising and was ubiquitous by the end of the 1870's, was only a repetition of the measures instituted by Ivan III against Novgorod: – ... only the body remained; the Polish spirit flew off to become part of the Great Russian spirit.?[289] Thus Russia closed off the road to any sort of reform (i.e. through Europe) and the solution to its problems eventually passed into the hands of the Red successors to tsarist despotism.

These formed a vehicle for their activities in the emerging workers' movement, when the First International was set up amid the quarrels between Marx and Mazzini. Bakunin, who represented a third formative element in this combination, bided his time in the background and used the quarrels to his own advantage. Meanwhile he worked out his own program (the *Revolutionary Catechism* and *Organization*), making use of a number of European (organizational) principles for the enrichment of Russian messianism, while at the

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[287] *Ibid.*, 358.
[288] *Ibid.*, 404–406.

same time eliminating any European element from his conception (his attacks on education, culture and science). He intensified his attack on religion and pointed to the practical uses of the "furies" which lurk in the human (i.e. Russian) spirit as the chief source of the coming apocalyptic uprising against the existing order.[290]

In typical Russian style, he took over from Europe its techno-logical and organizational models without the ability to appreciate their cultural origin and context. This style of thinking came to the fore in the disputes between Bakunin and Marx, when the program of European socialism, aimed at putting over its own ideas for the accomplishment of a certain measure of social progress, was elimi-nated from the Russian program, which was unwilling to allow capita-lism to mature, preferring to take advantage of its weaknesses to carry through an immediate social revolution which, with the help of an anarchist-despotic government, would destroy the state and its social order. As the various potential centers of the European revolution faded and the socialist movement shifted to an evolutio-nary model of development, Bakunin formulated and defended the basic prototype of the Russian revolutionary. He located the fundamental impulse of revolution in the destruction of all moral and legal norms and the crushing of human individuality.[291]

Bakunin thus formed a model which was incorporated into the theory and practice of Russian social democracy as a special type of socialist movement, which in the person of G. V. Plechanov began to represent the nationally exclusive and aggressive model of socialism which took over wholesale the despotic and intolerant legacy of Russian absolutism. The beginnings of Russian social democracy and Russian Marxism belong to the period of terrorist attacks on the regime and the highlighting of the Jacobin type of revolution, which again is merely a metamorphosis of Russian state terrorism against its own people.[292] Russian Marxism, however, already predicated terror

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[289] *Ibid.*, 408.
[290] *Ibid.*, 448.
[291] *Ibid.*, 460.

not only as a method of achieving power but also as the means of retaining it, applicable also to the enemies, the creators and even the avant-garde of the revolution. Russian Marxism also arose under the influence of the anti-Jewish pogroms and was saturated with a Jewish element which saw in socialism the natural chance to avenge the wrongs it had suffered. In the relationship between its regime and its people, Russia had been pushed through the centuries toward extremity, and it could be aroused by an extreme reaction. Since the country lacked the type of conservative middle class which in France stopped the Jacobin fury, the way was open for political extremism. In its search for social support Russian socialism turned to the lowest masses and played on their instincts with the simple promise of legalized theft. But since it knew that the expropriators would become owners and acquire the mental habits of those whose property they destroyed, it had to incorporate a permanent despotism, which would allow the permanent deracination of humanity, turning people into automatons.[293]

This element was present at the split within Russian social democracy into Menshevik and Bolshevik factions. The latter at first defended the conception of revolution as "bourgeois-democratic" but soon abandoned this position. The bourgeoisie was weak, but it was the only element able to direct society. On the other hand, this weakness of the bourgeoisie, together with the antipathy of the peasantry, could be used to win a monopoly of power. This solution to their dilemma reveals the Bolsheviks as the true heirs of Russian political culture: faithful to their political nature, they grope almost instinctively toward despotic power. Equally instinctively, the society, accustomed to being ruled, subjugates itself to them: inconveniences from constitutionalism to the originally autonomous soviets could be easily dealt with through political force. To ward off the threat of counter-revolution, the Bolsheviks turned over the propertied classes

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[292] *Ibid.,* 476.
[293] *Ibid.,* 484.

to the tender mercies of the people, so that through "circuses" they were also able to provide them with "bread".[294]

The third work takes us ahead by several decades, when in the first half of the 1980's the posthumous work of the medievalist Benedykt Zientara (1928-1983)[295] appeared illegally, a study of the relation between despotism and democracy in Russian history.[296] Zientara focuses on the period from Kievan-Novgorod Russia to the reign of Catherine II. But the work only appears to be handicapped thereby in relation to the other two: while it does not cover the 19th or 20th centuries (the completion of the absolutist system and the continuity between absolutism and Bolshevik totalitarianism), it does in fact concern precisely these segments of Russian history, in which most historians (not merely Polish) have sought the constituent elements of Russian autocracy and Soviet dictatorship. This chronological focus is divided into five parts combining chronological and thematic approaches: Rurik's legacy (until the Tatar invasions), the Tatar Yoke (1238-1240), The Gosudar of All Russia (the genesis of autocracy and the concept of the Third Rome), the road to absolutism (the Time of Troubles and the first Romanovs), and the great metamorphosis (Russia under Peter I and Catherine II).

In the first chapter Zientara introduces the basic features of the east Slavic space, to which he gives both geographic and climatic definition (a transit region for nomadic Asian groups, substantial distance from western Europe (advantage for the separation from German influence, avoiding the extinction that befell the Elbe and Baltic Slavs), and a considerable number of ethic groups as potential nations and states, whose final number, however, was decided by the

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[294] *Ibid.*, 500-505.
[295] Biographical data are in Marek BARAŃSKI, "Zientara Benedykt", in *Słownik history-ków polskich*, 581-582. Among his best known works is *Świt narodów europejskich* published in 1985 (second edition, Warszawa 1996).
[296] Benedykt ZIENTARA, *Dawna Rosja. Despotyzm i demokracja*, Warszawa 1995, 157 pp. The work appeared illegally as Benedykt Zientara, *Despotyzm i tradycje demokra-tyczne w dawnej historii Polski*, Kraków 1985. 31 pp.

structure of waterways,[297] by means of which the Varangians penetrated into the region, founding on the banks of the Dnieper a state later called Rus after one of the Varangian groups. Here Zientara encounters the so-called Norman theory in Russian historiography, on which he adopts a moderate line. According to him some of the local ethnic groups would sooner or later form states, but the Norman arrival speeded up the process by offering their model which endured because the Norman presence was long-term. Thus he admits the importance of the external factor in the origin of Russian statehood. At the same time Zientara asserts that the east Slavic environment soon absorbed this incursion; cultural and linguistic assimilation took place as can be seen by the Slavic names given to members of Rurik's dynasty. With the stabilization of Rurik's state along the axis of the Dnieper, it encountered its first obstacles in eastern Europe (Poland, the Steppe invaders and the eastern Bulgarians) and elsewhere (Norman, Arabic and Byzantine influences), and it expanded chiefly into territory settled by Baltic and Finnish groups.[298]

The fact that Rurik's state was founded on ties of kinship was one obstacle to its integration; another was paganism. Thus the adoption of Christianity at some point became a political imperative. Unlike the west Slavic states which vegetated on the periphery of Latin Christianity and were the objects of the policies which led to the extinction of the Elbe and Baltic Slavs, the Russian space lay within the sphere of influence of eastern Christianity, of Constantinople ("the treasure-house of Mediterranean civilization"). The result was a "massive and rapid" cultural flowering in Russia, which can be "measured by comparison with its west Slavic neighbors."[299] The fact that eastern Christianity penetrated into eastern Europe through the Slavonic liturgy led to an enormous growth in education (again immeasurably greater than among the western Slavs, where Christianization took place through the "foreign" medium of Latin), so that by the 11th and 12th centuries it

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[297] Benedykt ZIENTARA, *Dawna Rosja. Despotyzm i demokracja*, Warszawa 1995, 15.
[298] *Ibid.*, 24–25.
[299] *Ibid.*, 27.

is possible to speak of basic literacy among broad segments of the society, a rich literature, both in translation and autonomous, and also the fact that education and knowledge of languages were considered a necessary component of dynastic education.[300]

The adhesion of the Russian space to eastern Christianity did not mean the closure of roads to the West, as is shown by numerous dynastic ties, especially with the Polish Piasts but also with west European courts. For the western Slavs of Central Europe and the eastern Slavs of Eastern Europe the quarrel between the eastern and western churches played no role, because the language problem was not so formidable here as it was in the Mediterranean region, where Latin and Greek competed not only in the religious sphere but also politically and commercially. Zientara, however, dates the true schism to 1204, when the Crusaders plundered Constantinople and provoked that aversion of aggressive and intolerant Latin Christianity which later spread (thanks for example the advance of the Teutonic Knights along the Baltic coast and into northern Russia) also among the eastern Slavs.[301] In comparison with the western Slavs, who despite accepting Latin Christianity still had to confront the claims of the Empire, the acceptance of the eastern liturgy did not mean political subordination to Byzantium. On the other hand, not even the existence of a unified ecclesiastical organization of the western type could have ensured the effective integration of the state. Family quarrels broke out in Rurik's dynasty from the 11th century, resulting in the disintegration of Kievan Rus in the following century which, however, was not accompanied by cultural decline. On the contrary, Zientara maintains that the decay of political structures and the halt to territorial expansion were accompanied by an unusual cultural, economic and commercial development within the Russian space, evidence of which is found in the famous "Song of Igor's Campaign" (whose validity for the beginning of the 13th century Zientara does

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[300] *Ibid.*, 29.
[301] *Ibid.*, 31.

not call into question). But the political decline weakened the Russian space in relation to neighboring states (the Poles, Hungarians, Lithuanians and Teutonic Knights), who attempted to tear it apart. But the greatest influence was the gathering incursion of the Polovtsi or Cumans, which pushed the population westward (Red Rus, bordering on Poland), but also northward (the region of Rostov-Suzdal), where "New Russia" originated. The decay of the Russian space at the end of the 12th century was not connected with the original inheritance arrangements of Rurik's dynasty, but it allowed the rise of territorial units with differing political and economic structures: Kievan Rus (the future Ukraine), the Rostov-Suzdal region (the future Russia or Muscovy), southwestern Red Rus (the territory of Galicia), the territory under the control of Great Novgorod and the western part of the Russo-Lithuanian borderland, later called Byelorussia or White Russia (Minsk) and Black Russia (Grodna). To these differentiations ethnic differences were added in time.[302]

The Mongol invasion in the 1230's and 1240's had two consequences, according to Zientara: the political disintegration of the Russian space was speeded up, and it was torn away from Europe: not only did it lose contact with western Europe, but the Byzantine empire never recovered from the shock of 1204 and lost its capacity for cultural expansion. "Russia" was thus isolated from the surrounding world and controlled by a special, terroristic regime which for two centuries made the populations of occupied territories the instruments of its domination. Both these factors, however, operated unevenly. The western regions escaped Tatar influence, so that "Red Rus" was able to maintain contact with Poland and Hungary, finally falling under their influence, while the White Russian and Ukrainian regions also avoided the Tatars but came to be dominated by the Lithuanian state; also exempt from Tatar control were the regions around Novgorod and Pskov. The Tatars directly ruled only the region of Rostov-Suzdal.[303]

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[302] *Ibid.*, 36–37.
[303] *Ibid.*, 52.

In northern Russia, which had been a refuge since the time of the Cuman invasions, there existed side by side two distinct political systems: the later Muscovite despotism, and the early Novgorod democracy. Zientara devotes more attention to the Novgorod model which, with all its advantages and drawbacks he evaluates as that thread of Russian tradition to which Russian liberalism pointed as evidence that the Russian psyche is not inevitably condemned to passivity in the face of violence and despotism.[304] The Novgorod model, of course, was not democratic in the modern sense, but it represented a sovereign feudal-democratic republic governed by an oligarchic group of merchants, boyars and clergy, in which certain aspects of the rule of law are in evidence – the subordination of proprietary and personal rights and liberties to the court, free disposal of land, or the possibility to change one's status following upon increased wealth.

Zientara believes that Novgorod cannot be classified among the city-states of the ancient world or the renaissance, but unfortunately he gives no further guideline (such as possible comparison with the Hansa model, etc.); he merely asserts that Novgorod's political liberties and its contacts with the western world represented a thorn in the side of the political system that arose in the Rostov-Suzdal region, inspired by the despotic Tatar model. Since Novgorod was torn by domestic strife from the 14th century, its lower classes were willing to join with Moscow against the boyars (although the author does not deal with the objection that Novgorod can hardly be called "democratic" if its populace preferred Muscovy). Moreover, the city was dependent on grain supplies from the Rostov-Suzdal region and their interruption threatened famine, further increasing the radicalism of the lower classes. Aversion toward Novgorod was supported by Great Russian society, which helped to overcome the political division of the land – the struggle against Novgorod was a struggle for national (sic.) unity which, however, was to "come about

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[304] *Ibid.*, 45.

through despotic power, destroying the Novgorod democratic tradition."[305] Moscow's pressure on the city intensified once Novgorod began contact with Jagellonian Poland, whose model it considered superior to Moscow's. In an age of unification Novgorod's separatism might be viewed as an anachronism; however, the price of unity was a state model foreign to Russian tradition which gave the ruler unlimited power.[306]

The Muscovite system arose from different circumstances from that of Novgorod. Once the Tatars finished with their destruction, they did not change the political system or the rulers. Their only interest was to exploit the conquered territory, what they did through selected Russian princes, who exploited their own people in the interests of a foreign power and punished them for disloyalty. The most effective in this regard were the Muscovite princes, of whom Ivan Kalita reached the highest position. He strengthened Muscovy economically, secured the transfer of the Metropolitan from Kiev, began the colonization of territory inhabited by Finno-Ugric speaking peoples, and secured Tatar recognition for the hereditary rights of his successors. Tatar power began to weaken during this period, and in 1380 Dmitri Donskoi attempted to overthrow it at the battle of Kulikovo and gain credit for Moscow as the unifier of the entire Russian space through the union of Orthodoxy and patriotism. Aside from declining Tatar power (conflict between the Volga Tatars and the Uzbek Khan) a certain role was played also by Lithuania, which, still in its pagan stage and well disposed to Orthodoxy, was able for a time to act as a serious rival of Moscow. Prince Jagello had his last chance to limit Muscovite power at the time of the battle of Kulikovo, when he promised support to Khan Mamai but withdrew it at the last moment. According to Zientara he could not afford to support the Tatars for fear of inciting his Orthodox subjects to revolt (though it should be added that the battle of Kulikovo did not pit

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[305] *Ibid.*, 57.
[306] *Ibid.*, 59.

"holy Russia" against the Tatars: it was rather between the Russian-Tatar army – Volga Tatars – and troops of the Khan Mamai of the Golden Horde). With Jagello's acceptance of Catholicism after the conclusion of personal union with Poland, Moscow had won the contest for Russia, and from this point Lithuanian influence in the region waned, and contact with Lithuania was regarded as treasonous.[307]

By the end of the 15th century Moscow had liquidated most of the independent political entities within the Russian space and began to take territory that had earlier been filled by Lithuania if the Tartars were not able to prevent it. In competition with Muscovite Russia, which was more effective, the Polish-Lithuanian state overlooked the loss of territory to Russia. Zientara declares that he does not intend to defend Lithuanian territorial annexation, and that from the Russian viewpoint the reconquest of these territories was not only justified but taken as compensation for wrongs committed by Russia's neighbors as it labored under the Tatar yoke.[308] The policy of unification had the general support of the Russian populace, which was concentrated especially on the person of the prince, Ivan III, who led Russia out of political and territorial disintegration to place it on the level of a significant power in the eyes of Europe, which began to compete for its favor, as did the Balkan Slavs who looked to it for liberation from the Turks.

The growth of Russia's international significance was further confirm by its claim on the political and religious legacy of the extinct Byzantine empire. If the Muscovite goal until now had been the acquisition of Russian territory, the doctrine of the Third Rome introduced a mystical-messianic concept which could be used to support annexations outside this region. At the same time a quarrel began in Russia between the ruler and the boyars, stemming from the dissatisfaction of the courtiers with the boyars' traditional method of

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[307] *Ibid.*, 70.
[308] *Ibid.*, 72.

state administration (the principles of *kormleniye* and *mestnichestvo*). Hopes for reform were placed in the person of Ivan IV, later called "the Terrible", who in 1550 instituted a series of changes (such as the codification of civil and canon law) to limit the power of the boyars. To prevent possible opposition from the boyar elite, the courtiers were removed to Moscow, and in 1550 and 1566 the *zemsky sobor* or national council was convened to confirm the reforms. This "diet" was to some extent a product of Polish-Lithuanian influence on the Russian political system, but it represented an outward imitation, since Russian society was not sufficiently mature to make use of parliamentarianism: the *sobor* was subject to the will of "God and the Tsar". The fragility of this quasi-parliamentarianism was demonstrated when Ivan the Terrible began to pursue his enemies and no power was found capable of halting him. Zientara ascribes this passivity to habits that became ingrained during the Tatar period. With the domestic watershed, Russian expansion began in the south and the north, which is important in that it was directed at non-Russian regions. If the earlier expansion had been justified as unification of the Russian lands (Zientara admits that Lithuanian Rus, without regard to the changes that it had undergone, was by tradition and religion close to Muscovite Russia), expansion exceeded these bounds under Ivan IV, to end with the tsar's death in resistance to Russian advance – the Livonian Wars – and the collapse of the internal structure of Muscovite Russia – the Time of Troubles.[309]

In the struggles that followed the death of Ivan the Terrible Zientara does not underestimate the fact that the accession of Boris Godunov was confirmed by the *sobor*, which demonstrated both the possibility of a ruler who does not regard the state as his property and the continued existence of that state after the extinction of the dynasty. Godunov, however, did not seize his chance, and the Time of Troubles ensued, one of the low points of Russian-Polish ambivalence. On the one hand there was the Russian hatred towards

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[309] *Ibid.,* 92.

the Poles caused partly by the Union of Brest, which forced the Orthodox population to apply for the Uniat church, and partly by the behavior of the Polish nobility who arrived with the pretender to plunder and rape Russia;[310] on the other there was the Russian regard for the Polish-Lithuanian state and its search there for a model which would enable Russia to turn toward the West and accept a Polish ruler, which would reduce the odds favoring the survival of absolutism. However, the chance was lost under the first pretender because of his support by the Polish army and also because of boyar fears of a peasant uprising in favor of Dmitri. After the overthrow of the first pretender Vasili Shuyski was elected tsar, who was important for the fact of being elected (though it was essentially an ad hoc election by a handful of supporters) and for having sworn to uphold the law (not to punish without trial or persecute relatives of the accused). Similar elements came into play in the treaty for the accession of the Polish prince Vladislav to the Russian throne (February and August 1610), when the notion arose of a division of power among the ruler, the diet and the boyar duma. Thus the Time of Troubles contained one positive feature: the state, until now considered to be the tsar's property, was shown to be able to exist without the tsar: the possibility emerged that the ruler's office might be subordinated to the state, which was no longer identified exclusively with the boyars and courtiers but included the idea of "the people of the Muscovite state", who had the right to elect, judge and punish the tsar.[311]

This "people", however, rose up against the Poles (in which the Orthodox church was involved) and gradually won over the Russian burghers, the Cossack units and other groups who succeeded in expelling the Poles from Muscovy. In 1613 a diet representing the courtiers and the towns elected Michael Romanov as the new tsar. He was thought to be a weak personality holding out little prospect of a

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[310] *Ibid.*, 94.
[311] *Ibid.*, 100.

return to the days of Ivan the Terrible. Though the first election in 1613 duly considered the dynastic aspect (Michael's kinship with Rurik), this tsar was elected by the entire country, and this factor was strong enough to allow his successor Alexei to be re-elected in 1645. Zientara considers the 17th century to be especially important, since it was then that the society, after the tragic experience with Ivan the Terrible and the Time of Troubles, attempted to assure its influence on the administration of the state, which would have avoided extreme forms of both despotism and oligarchy. At this time also Russia began to be aware of its backwardness vis a vis the West, although in a somewhat schizophrenic manner: the state was incapable of undertaking a radical "westernization", and after its experience with Poland, the society, which wished to reform the state, reacted irritably to any hint of "Latinism" and also to attempts at progressive modernization, as evidenced by the schism provoked by elementary liturgical revision. Thus the society was torn between traditionalist xenophobia and yearning for new things, which in the case of the court were found in the Protestant regions of the Baltic, Scandinavia and Germany, or, in the case of the nobility and burghers, in Roman Catholic or Uniate Poland. In the latter case contact was facilitated by linguistic kinship fostered by new fashions and literature and also by the idea of political reform in the spirit of a division of power among the main political subjects, which at that time also included the towns – a circumstance which distinguished the Russian situation from Polish estates parliamentarianism in which the nobility held a monopoly of power.[312]

The diets, however, did not create a balanced political model, which Zientara discusses in connection with the legal codification of 1648-49 (the *Ulozheniya*), which may have represented a kind of political progress but was also a step backward in that it subjugated the formerly free peasantry to their lords – not only the old aristocracy but chiefly the new nobility with whom the ruler packed

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[312] *Ibid.,* 106.

the duma. In exchange for land and authority the new noblemen allowed themselves to be pressed into the tsar's service, while a peasantry tied to the land was a means of assuring agricultural production in troubled times. This new group, dependent upon the ruler, had no interest in an independent diet and was willing to leave its convocation up to the will of the tsar. In this way the society's control over the source of power was adroitly neutralized if not destroyed. When disturbances broke out in Moscow over the replacement of silver coinage with copper at the beginning of the 1660's, the tsar was able brutally to suppress them without fear of opposition. The brief "elective" era ended as Feodor III was confirmed as heir by a handful of people. Subsequent disturbances such as the Razin uprising showed that the instincts of the new elite were correct: the central power alone could deal with them effectively. With the help of the new nobility the ruler also began to eliminate the boyar oligarchy by tying them to honors and positions that represented a financial drain, while the new nobles acquired not only land but also local offices which they exploited on the old principle of *kormleniya*. Military careers represented a further possibility and laid the groundwork for further expansion. Still, tsarist autocracy was not yet complete, as the conflicts following the death of Alexei showed, when interest in European impulses increased (F. M. Rtishchev, A. Ordin-Nashchokin or V. V. Golitsyn), leaving the way open for the reforms of Peter I.[313]

Zientara considers Peter I to be the key figure in modern Russian history. He does not doubt the rational motives for his political reforms, though he adds that these reforms evinced certain special features. Peter himself grew up in abnormal circumstances (the bloody conflicts prior to his accession) which could not prepare him to rule. Thus his reforms were conceived in an ad hoc manner, without background or preparation. Moreover, he did not discern the far-reaching consequences of some of his reforms, since his interest focussed on

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[313] *Ibid.,* 113.

their immediate practical effects. These factors were further filtered through political experiences and the Russian cultural environment, which regarded autocracy as the only law. The reforms, which were to bring about a great metamorphosis on the Western model, often operated only on the surface, affecting only a narrow segment at the top of Russian society, leaving aside Peter's German, Dutch and English favorites. The rest of society welcomed the reforms with a good deal of scepticism and hostility which was eventually broken when it was recognized that here lay the road to advancement for those aspiring to join the elite. Zientara believes that the vicissitudes provoked by the reforms may be traced to Peter's definitive abandonment of the Polish model for one found much farther to the West, which was partly attributable to Polish weakness at the end of the 17th century which rendered it incapable of providing inspiration for reform.[314]

Zientara devotes a good deal of attention to various aspects of the political reform, especially Peter's success in liquidating the remains of the boyar aristocracy through legal means and replacing them with a new nobility employed in the service of the state, in which they were classified according to the well-known system. Thus the nobles were bound to the state and the peasants to the landowning nobility. The Cossacks held out the longest in the defense of their freedom but were eventually dealt with according to the principle *divide et impera* as the leadership was set against the rank and file. The dangers of Cossack autonomy were illustrated by the Mazepa affair, so that Peter I and Catherine II dealt with the problem by various means including forced resettlement.[315]

Peter I built the Russian political system on firm foundations which lasted into the 19th century. They consisted of institutions (the army, state bureaucracy, police, the church) and depended partly on cohesion between the institutional and extra-institutional components of the system, which affected the rural population (the

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[314] *Ibid.,* 120.
[315] *Ibid.,* 126.

legend of the good tsar and his evil counsellors). This cohesion and mutual interdependence became the chief principle of policy as the superficiality of the reforms became clear – as for example when officials proved incapable of carrying out their duties and incompatible instructions had to be applied. The reforms under Peter and Catherine led to superficial Europeanization but also to strengthening the absolutism and expansionism of the Russian state. They eliminated possibilities for an authentic metamorphosis including for example establishing legal and institutional norms and securing continuity in times of succession crises, during which the aristocratic oligarchy proved unable to take advantage of a weakened central power to introduce norms not dependent upon the state. This leads to an important conclusion regarding the subsequent history of Russia: the absence of a non-personal political mechanism rendered political conditions dependent upon personal ties, in which autocracy always stood at the top. But a deep crisis affecting the system as a physical as well as an abstract entity (such as the First World War and the Revolution of 1917), given the absence of a developed institutional framework not dependent upon physical elites, could only result in utter chaos, opening the way to extremist forces.[316]

Conclusions

The three authors offer different views of Russian history. As noted earlier, Feliks Koneczny was a supporter of the National Democratic Party, which saw in union with Russia a guarantee for the further existence of Poland. From 1905 to 1914 Koneczny was editor of the journal *Świat Słowiański*, which was accused of pan-Slavic and pro-Russian tendencies during the period when the party was divided over R. Dmowski's New Slavic program. His work also reflected to a certain extent the *endecja* attitude towards Russia, and it betrays an

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[316] *Ibid.*, 130–134.

interesting emphasis on practicality which does not conflict with a strongly Catholic-messianic background. Koneczny insists on the special position of western Latin civilization in relation to Russia, and he views Russian culture and politics with contempt, although when he comes across elements comparable to the social background of *endecja* ideology (a middle class of entrepreneurs and industrialists) he emphasizes them – in his discussion not only of the industrial revolution but also for example the communications factor in the beginnings of Kievan Rus or the reign of Ivan Kalita, who fascinates him more for his commercial than his political talents. Thus trade, industry and the Latin cultural framework are the elements that Koneczny emphasizes in Russian history whether he is considering the period of the Tatar invasions, Ivan the Terrible or Catherine II.

On the other hand, Koneczny is hugely critical whenever he detects a failure of legal culture, leading him to conclude an inability to create statehood and a civilized social order. Ivan Kalita unified Russia economically, but that unity lacked a legal basis, and the absence of law leads to the impossibility of separating power from economics: when Ivan Kalita lends money on part of the "princely" rights to estates outside Moscow it is not for the economic development of the land but to further his political rule. Preserving the difference in legal standards between Lithuania and Russia after 1386 means different relations between power and the people. Russia takes over the Mongol principle of *karmleniye*, while the absence of law clears the way for tsarist terror. The Polish-Russian discussions over occupation of the throne and alliance against the Turks. Moscow is simply unable to comprehend the principle of a voluntary alliance between nations. The list goes on.

A further element is Koneczny's aversion towards the German element in Russian history. The long thread of German-Russian alliance runs through the centuries, always to the detriment of Poland – from the Crusaders, who instead of going to war against the Tatars turned against "Catholic Poland"[317] and for centuries denied Russia

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[317] F. KONECZNY, *Op. cit.*, 29.

access to the sea, to the Russian-Habsburg-Crusader conspiracy against Poland during the Russo-Lithuanian war of 1512–1522, to the influence of "unprincipled" German Protestantism under Catherine II, to the Prussian attempt to use Poland against Russia (it was Prussia which provoked the January Uprising), to Russia's confirmation of absolutism for its own benefit against Poland. Using the example of Russo-German *Hassliebe*, Koneczny reflects on the place of the Polish question between Germany and Russia. But he goes further, replacing the German offer with a Polish one. Thus, as Medieval Poland, during its struggles with the amorphous Russian space, had the chance to give Russia order, though Russia was unable to accept it, so later Poland had the chance to assist Russian acceptance of at least the outline of a system which would enable it to Europeanize.

But the cultural inferiority of Russia is only seemingly negative. Since the country is no more than an empty form without any content of its own, there is always a chance that it can be filled with something concrete, an eventuality impossible in more developed civilizations (the Byzantine, Jewish, Turkish or Latin). In other words, Russia continues to be the object of a latent struggle among the "established" civilizations, which have always competed to establish themselves there and decide the shape of its civilization. The problem, then, is not only the conflict between Poland and Russia but that between developed civilizations over the Russian space, which exists in a pre-civilized or extra-civilized stage. As each of the great types of civilization is defined by a developed religious sphere and Russia is not regarded as an independent civilization, Koneczny appears to consider it to be still a pagan land. Thus Poland's relation to Russia includes some sort of delayed Christianizing mission which, together with a certain type of faith will also bring a certain system of rules, i.e. law. From this it appears that his secret wish is that Russia should be conclusively "impregnated" with the Latin type, by which he means the Roman Catholic type.

Koneczny finds justification for the Catholic accent in the fact that Russia had earlier used impulses from the sphere of Latin

civilization, although in a distorted, Protestant guise, which satisfied its admiration for European technology. Russia also admired Protestant hostility towards the Papacy, which was connected with contempt for Catholic rulers for "sharing power" with the Pope.[318] But the Protestant import eventually proved ineffective and only deepened the problem of Russian identity. In an analogous way other imports, from Byzantine Christianity to Mongol government or Jewish influence, also failed: "The Turkish-Slavonic cultures become interwoven with fragments of Jewish civilization, which was true of Muscovite culture as well as Russian. Within Christendom the Orthodox church is the closest to Judaism."[319]

The connection with the doctrines of the National Democrats is again apparent: they prefer alliance with Russia against Germany partly because of practical experiences with germanization under Prussian annexation and partly out of a relatively accurate historical analysis and the social position of the Polish people between Russia and Germany. Political ideology and the accompanying historical conception of the *endecja* expressed and defended the interests of the emerging Polish middle classes, for whom Germany represented a greater threat to the national interest than backward Russia, for whom they felt respect as a great power but also despised as a barbarous land with a barbarous religion. At the same time German pressure, which fell on Poland from a higher stage of development, pushed the *endeks* towards Russia, where they were at a far greater advantage competing with the weak Russian middle class and could advance more easily than in Germany, where, moreover, Protestantism favors Orthodoxy and the threat of alliance with Russia looms. The accent on the Latin element in the Roman liturgy represented the minimum necessity for identity which would enable the Polish middle class to operate freely in the Russian cultural milieu without the threat of "de-nationalization". Thus Koneczny

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[318] *Ibid.*, 161.
[319] F. KONECZNY, *Cywilizacja żydowska*, 211.

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offers a scheme of Russian history which demonstrates that the Poles must, within the bounds of possibility, leave open the channels of communication with Russia. They must not allow the quarrels between the two nationalities to go as far as to shut off the dialogue which holds out the possibility of mutual influence. On the other hand, exchanges must not be too free, because in view of the inequalities of power and sheer size it will be chiefly the Polish environment that is threatened by Russian "breadth" and faced with the prospect of losing its inner content and identity.[320]

Kucharzewski's view makes the opposite impression. If Koneczny's notion of the emptiness of Russian history gives the country a certain chance and does not see the Russo-Polish quarrel as the only dominant element in mutual relations, Kucharzewski is uncompromising. He defines Russia in exclusively negative terms, and the few elements indicating faint chances of amendment amount to the exceptions confirming the rule.

While Koneczny looks for the possibilities for mutual influence or signs of the utter contrariness of the Polish and Russian milieu in the occurrence of concrete elements drawn from from a broader historical or sociological plan (the economic mentality of Ivan Kalita versus the absence of a legal basis for economic development, etc.), Kucharzewski draws from another broad plan the thesis of the incompatibility of the two milieus. This plan is based on a general and merciless contempt for Russia, its barbaric civilization, its inert structure formed in the Mongol period and accompanying Russian history from its Muscovite beginnings to the Bolshevik system.

Kucharzewski is interesting in this sense primarily in that he belongs to a group of authors who shortly before the First World War formed and developed the concept of a single basic Russian historical formation embracing the period before and after 1917.

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320 Roman Dmowski was a sharp critic of passivity, which he considered a greater evil than active germanization. Roman DMOWSKI, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*, Wrocław 1996, 48.

Absolutism and Bolshevism are merely variations on a single theme. They represent different forms, but in content they are the same manifestation of that basic structure which defines modern Russia. It is also interesting that while the first generation of the creators of the one-dimensional model of Russian history make conclusions about Bolshevism from earlier Russian history, the passage of time also revealed the possibility of projecting back experience with Bolshevism onto earlier Russian history. That apparently immobile structure was alive after all, brought to life by people who attempt to arrange past events in the light of more recent experience of Russia.

This way of thinking about Russia, which especially after the Second World War influenced several historians (Tibor Szamuely, Richard Pipes, Alexandr Janov), brings with it a number of risks. One is the personal attitude of the scholars who seek either to rationalize Soviet domination of their own countries (notable where Russian power left traces in the pre-Bolshevik period), or to explain and justify their former admiration for the Soviet regime (notable in all countries of the former Soviet bloc) or prove the historical legitimacy of socialist or Communist ideas by presenting actual socialism as their distortion by Russian barbarism. The results of such considerations are parallels between Ivan the Terrible and Stalin, Orthodox ideology and Bolshevism, the idea of the Third Rome and the Comintern, and so forth.

Kucharzewski's work is characteristic of this type of thinking. He draws parallels between aggressive acts in earlier Russian history and the Bolshevik period, assigning all of them to the monolithic structure of barbarism which is the ubiquitous dimension of Russian history. It is the thread originating in the Mongol period which runs through all subsequent development. Kucharzewski locates the first manifestation of this barbarism in the liquidation of independent Novgorod which, unconquered by either the Mongols or Moscow, represents the original Rus as opposed to the later Russia and was finally defeated by a combination of cunning and cruelty: "This pearl of the Russian land was destroyed by a breed brought up in

the savage school of Mongol thralldom."[321] The fall and enslavement of Novgorod prefigured the enslavement of Poland at the end of the 18thcentury which, though it occurred three centuries later, proceeded according to the same scenario, which according to Kucharzewski endured unchanged into the 20th century. Once it has decided to acquire a certain territory, Moscow first takes it under its "protection", solicits the favor of the lower classes by discrediting their superiors (dangerous since they form a reservoir of traditions of freedom and independence), then searches for a pretext to intervene in domestic affairs and through its influence over the lower classes demands formal subjugation of the land. A "tragedy" is acted out with accusations of treason and collusion with the enemy, until "occupation of the country is accompanied by executions and mass deportations of the upper classes, who are replaced by new people from Moscow."[322]

Conceived in such a structure, of course, Russian history has no chance, especially when after experience with the Bolsheviks the new Soviet regime begins to project back into the past and an inexorable chain of determinism emerges in which the Bolsheviks form the final and necessary link. It amounts to the permanent cultivation of barbarism. Russia became superficially European, but in fact it gave rise to forms by which barbarism could be channeled until the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.

Understood thus, Russia can be dealt with only on the basis of force, the only means by which the Russian *milieu* can be penetrated by Europe (Kucharzewski points to the Napoleonic Wars as the single moment when Europe began to penetrate into Russia), by which Russia can be obliged to accept European norms and halt the expansion of Russian barbarism westward. In this conception, however, the historian is only filling out a mosaic whose outline already exists. He undertakes no analysis, only illustrates a historical "fact" with

[321] J. KUCHARZEWSKI, *Op. cit.*, 25.
[322] *Ibid.*, 26.

concrete examples. Such an approach does not exclude the possibility of suggestive observations, perceptions, comparisons or interpretations of detail, but it does not allow them full development by forcing them into a preconceived scheme. Kucharzewski uses this method of comparison on a number of cases aside from the example of the Muscovite subjugation of Novgorod and the Sovietization of Poland.

This conception is all the more interesting in that its author began as an adherent of the National Democrats, with whom, however he got into quarrels, always over policy toward Russia. This first occurred in 1911 in connection with Dmowski's decision to end his well-known boycott of Russian schools, which led to a schism within the National League which also carried Kucharzewski, who considered the decision premature and damaging to Poland's position, out of the organization.[323] But the dispute ran deeper than the particular episode and concerned the future direction of Polish policy toward the annexing power. In the expectation of war between the occupying powers Dmowski defended orientation toward Russia and against the German-Austrian bloc. But since prospects for a positive response from Russia to a proffer of Polish loyalty were minimal, the National Democratic Party disintegrated as groups left to support either Germany or Austria, then Pilsudski's activists. The second and definitive parting of ways between Kucharzewski and the *endeks* occurred in 1916, when the "pro-Russian" program of Roman Dmowski, who represented the exiled Central Polish Agency, was opposed by a group around Kucharzewski (including the historian Szymon Askenazy), who after the proclamation of the Act of 5 November of that year definitively went over to the side of the activists.[324] However, it cannot

[323] Krzystof KAWALEC, *Roman Dmowski*. Warszawa 1996, 145-147.

[324] Władysław POBÓG-MALINOWSKI, *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski. 1864–1945. Tom pierwszy 1864–1919*, Paris 1953, 296, 336-338. From the end of 1915 Kucharzewski published a series of brochures on the future of Poland and Polish-Russian relations which embrace the pro-activist viewpoint ("La Pologne et la guerre", "La nation polonaise", "Reflexions sur le probleme polonais", "L'Europe et le probleme polonais"). See K. Kawalec, 173-174.

be said that Kucharzewski underwent any fundamental change of views in the sefse of exchanging a positive view of Russia for a negative one: the "pro-Russian" stance of the National Democrats was tactical, an expression of their anti-German stance and did not differ greatly from the views of the activist group around Pilsudski. At the same time it resulted from the different experiences of Poles under Russian or Prussian annexation.

The last work, written during the marhal law in Poland, presents an atypical synthesis for several reasons. Benedykt Zientara was a historian of the early Medieval period focusing on the history of Central and Western Europe. However, as Bronisław Nowak has written, he was exceptional in that he "did not flee from those problems which plagued his nation."[325] A second noteworthy point is that, while it appeared illegally, the book evoked practically no comment not only because of an absence of public discussion but because it was not anti-Russian and thus did not fulfill expectations associated with underground historical literature. A third source of dissimilarity emerges from a comparison not only with the two foregoing works (leaving aside the "official" surveys which appeared after the war in the state publishing houses) but also with most of the "independent" Polish studies of Russian themes.

Zientara affirms this difference in the introduction to his book, in which he underlines those moments of Russian history in which "the democratic yearnings of society appeared, coming to the defense of the individual, as well as the variety of customs, opinions and attitudes adopted in the face of despotism before their enforced unification."[326] Zientara admits that the reader searching here for a mockery of Russian society or a catalogue of the eternal negative qualities of the Russian nation will be disappointed. He views the features of the Russian national character as the results of a tragic history. Nor are they necessarily irreversible. B. Nowak remarks in his

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[325] Bronislaw Nowak, preface to Benedykt ZIENTARA's *Dawna Rosja*, 5.
[326] B. ZIENTARA, *Op. cit.*, 9.

preface that glasnost and perestroika enabled changes in Poland of which the Poles themselves could scarcely dream – though these changes were for the removal distortions that Russia itself had introduced several decades earlier. The author's dedication, paraphrasing Mickiewicz (*przyjaciołom Moskalom*), is to those Russians who strove for the repudiation of notorious traditions and looked for new avenues of development for their society.[327]

Comparing Zientara's book with the two earlier studies, which even today retain an almost canonical status, we detect a certain fecklessness and inconsistency. This is traceable to the author's attempt to temper the prevailing negative Polish view of Russian history with something more positive. Along with the despotic paradigm there were other political currents presaging 19th century Russian liberalism (although this is assumed rather than documented). Zientara implicitly addresses future Russian democrats who, on the basis of a transformed picture of Russia, will withdraw themselves from the Russian structure and (as a subtext) adopt an attitude toward Poland that is different from that of the current Soviet regime.

The result of Zientara's efforts is a model of Russian history which, like the other works, works on the principle of Procrustes' bed, so that the facts are shaped to fit the form, although in this case the effect is meant to be rehabilitating. It should be added parenthetically, and not by way of making an excuse but rather of clarifying the situation, that Zientara's book was written quickly, in extraordinarily difficult circumstances, shortly before the author's death. Zientara asserts that modern Russian liberal and democratic politics may be traced back to the intellectual foundation of Novgorod democracy, the tradition of the *sobor* and the efforts of the nobility to limit the power of the ruler in the 17th century. But since he does not deal directly with these matters in his study, he merely posits a relationship, introducing "democratic" elements into an

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[327] *Ibid.,* 10.

earlier period and uses them to show the existence of a "proto-democracy" in Russian history. The result is a certain inconsistency which may be illustrated with the idea of the *sobor* tradition. Vasili Shuysky was not only the first elected tsar (elected by a crowd which was later recognized as representing the nation), but the first ruler who – ... *złożył uroczystą przysięgę przestrzegania praworządności.*"[328] Several pages on we learn that the era of elected tsars ended with the *Ulozheniya* legal codification: "Alexei himself chose his son Feodor III (1676–1682) as his successor and the function of confirming the choice was assumed by a random crowd."[329] Both rulers, then, were elected by the momentary action of a handful of people, but in the first case the elements of election are interpolated (this was a democratic era), while in the second a similar handful of people is neither legitimate nor democratic (the democratic era was at an end), because it simply confirmed an autocrat.

By taking this approach Zientara does not in principle distinguish himself from the other two authors; the only difference is his content, which they would regard as naive. But something more substantial also emerges: that during the century that separates the "classical" Polish historians and Zientara, there is a constant structure to the understanding of Russian history. Its basic feature is that it includes not only an interpretation of a certain portion of world history, but rather represents the Polish view of Russian history, an analysis of the phenomenon or Russia for Poland. It presents a rationalization of various phases and guises of the mutual relationship of the two, viewed through various layers and phases of the nation building process and political co-existence. It is the viewpoint of a national historiography as part of the intellectual baggage of a national state.

Zientara's synthesis, however, is different in one respect. One half of it consists of a certain structured understanding of Russian history

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[328] *Ibid.,* 96.
[329] *Ibid.,* 109.

and uses approaches appropriate to that structure. The other half, however, withdraws from this structure and takes a different approach. Here Zientara does not consider Russia to be an entity without history as does Feliks Koneczny, nor does he ascribe to it any inherently negative property, as does Jan Kucharzewski. At one point he declares that from the Russian perspective the territorial reconquest at the expense of Poland-Lithuania was entirely justified and surrenders the option of bringing to bear a Polish perspective. Elsewhere he asserts that tradition and faith form an inalienable connection between that territory and Russia, or that Poland lost the respect of Russia because of its decline and weakness. Here Zientara expresses willingness to offset the negative balance (recalling the rampage of the Poles in the Kremlin) and assume responsibility for some of the "sins of the past".[330]

Here he also shows something more substantial: the opinion that Russian history is as legitimate as Polish history or that of any other nation, that it is part of a single historical family. Zientara's more or less forced positive attitude toward Russian history is not an aim in itself, but in combination with the idea of its equality with other national histories it expresses an effort to take up an open and accommodating position which will depend neither on a negative scheme or on a deliberate exploitation of the Russian historical process. Russia is no mysterious "Sphynx" nor the embodiment of evil. In its history it had and continues to have the possibility of making choices, a fact which negates the possibility of a monolithic interpretation and holds out the hope of overcoming difficulties. In short, a certain investment of trust in Russia is necessary – to which, however, a devil's advocate might reply that its history must also be thus understood and used by the Russians themselves.

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[330] *Ibid.,* 72, 90-91, 94, 120.

Summary

Polish views of Russian history, often extremist and burdened by the dramatic course of relations between the two countries, have produced a number of interesting surveys, chiefly during the 20th century. These views have systematized the experience of mutual relations and in some cases have had their impact on Polish policy toward Russia. Some of them have also become popular outside of Poland, whether because they inspired a broader European or worldwide reflection on the Russian problem, or because they coincided with currently prevailing views. This article compares three significant conceptions, by Feliks Koneczny, Jan Kucharzewski and Benedykt Zientara. Each of these authors was the "child of his times", and each devised a unique view of Russian history. The surveys by the first two historians originated in the inter-war period and present interpretations of the "black legend" of Russian history. The third author wrote during the war and attempted to correct the "black legend". All three show, despite their differences, that Polish views of Russian history contain a strong element of expediency: they represent the standpoint of a national historiography as part of the intellectual equipment of the national state.

Translation: Frederick L. Snider

MYCHAJLO HRUŠEVSKY
AND HIS RELATIONS TO BOHEMIA
AND TO THE CZECH SCHOLARSHIP

BOHDAN ZILYNSKYJ

In autumn 1996 Ukraine, Czech Republic and some other countries have commemorated the 130th anniversary of the Ukrainian university professor, Mychajlo Hruševsky's birth.[331] An exhibition providing basic information on the founder of the Ukrainian national historiography, his life as well as his literary works took place in the National museum of Prague. To a certain extent, documents proving Hruševsky's long-lasting relation to the Czech environment, Prague in particular, were on exhibit too. A newly unveiled tablet on a house in Prague 7, where Hruševsky stayed several times, is to remind of it as well. The Czech president handed over his Ukrainian counterpart, L. Kučma an entire collection of copies of documents concerning Mychajlo Hruševsky discovered in the Czech archives.

All these celebrations contributed to presenting this essay, which attempts to summarize documents on Mychajlo Hruševsky's relations and bonds to the Czech environment. This preliminary image is based on sources partly forgotten, or unknown yet, originating mostly from

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[331] From the large bibligraphy on Mychajlo Hruševsky published in Ukraine in the last decade, a book to be mentioned is *Velykyj ukrajinec (Materialy z žytt'a ta dijalnosti M. S. Hruševskoho)*, Kyjiv 1992.

Czech archives. This essay presents Hruševsky's correspondence to the Czech historians as well as his stays in Bohemia in the early phase of the First republic, and last but not least, Czech reflections on Hruševsky's scholar and political activities. Each of these issues would deserve to be dealt with more closely. Nonetheless, a seemingly very personal topic turns out to be one of the most important expressions of the Czech-Ukrainian relations as they were dramatically and inconsistently shaped from the end of 19th century up to 30s of the 20th century.

So far, everything seems to prove the fact that the first Czech comments on Hruševsky's historiographic achievements only date back to the year 1894 when he entered the Lvov university. At that time, Hruševsky's phenomenal work in the field of research, publishing, and organization broke out and lasted for another 20 years before moving his activities to the Eastern Ukraine after 1905. In 1896 Josef Pekař, then young Czech historian, recognized Hruševsky's activities in a short note.[332] The same author made another honorable mention in the updated version of the rapport nine years later.[333] Hruševsky's work was positively, though more briefly, commented on by Lubor Niederle and shortly annotated by Čeněk Zíbrt.[334]

Despite the number of comments on Hruševsky, Czech historians' attention paid to his work is only fragmentary until 1905. At least, Czech historiography started to recognize the existence of independent Ukrainian historiography, something unheard of till 1890s.

The revolutionary events of 1905 shifted understanding of the Ukrainian question in the Czarist empire to a more political level. Current Russian censorship precautions concerning the Ukrainian writings were partly lifted. The political challenge opened up for

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[332] J. P., In the year 1893 *Tovaryystvo imeny Ševčenka*, a Small Russian publishing house was reconstructed..., the Český časopis historický (Czech Historical Review) 2, 1896, pp 132–133.

[333] J. P., We often hear that of all Slavic nations, dialects repectively, the Ukraine people stand closest to us, the Český časopis historický 10, 1911, pp 468-469.

[334] Niederle commented on two minor works by Hruševsky in *Bibliografie české historie* for the year 1904, Prague 1905, pp 30 (nr. 956 and 957). Zíbrt's short annotations were published in the Časopis českého muzea (Journal of the Museum) 79, 1905, pp 197 and 80, 1906, pp 484.

Hruševsky on the political battle field in Russia, and the way he was able to seize the opportunity draw attention of the Czech historians who studied his scholar work. In years 1908 and 1909 the first two major reviews on so far published volumes of Hruševsky's History of Ukraine, or rather its German translation, appeared. Their authors represented two generations of scholars – Karel Kadlec (1865–1928) and Jan Slavík (1885–1978).

Kadlec was Hruševsky's peer, and was able to follow the whole spectrum of contemporary scholar literature published in the Slavic countries as well as in Hungary in the field of juristic history that was familiar to him. His interest in the Slavic juristic history, however based on scrupulous scientific work in Kadlec's case, originated from the prevailing post-romantic Slavonic enthusiasm shared and promoted by Kadlec during his university years in mid 1880s. Already then he expressed interest in the Ukrainian question.[335]

Jan Slavík, on the other side, belonged to the generation of Kadlec's and Pekař's pupils, and failed to share the all-Slav enthusiasm in his professional and researcher's interest. Instead it was replaced with more profound interests in Russian historiography while the Ukrainian question was only mentioned randomly as a part of it.[336]

Despite his words of acknowledgement, Slavík expressed discontent with some of Hruševsky's thesis, especially with historian's interpretation of the very beginning of the Ukrainian national history.[337] Kadlec on the other hand was undoubtedly the most distinct and very enthusiastic promoter of the work of the Ukrainian historian,

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[335] See Kadlec's article from "Z literatury rusinské" (O literárním obrodu Rusinův rakouských a o rusínských čítárnách národních), Literární listy (Velké Meziříčí) 10, 1888–1889, pp 23–24, 46, 63–64.

[336] The work of Jan Slavík has been most consistently studied by Jaroslav Bouček who is also the author of Slavík's detailed bibiliography.

[337] Slavík's review of the first volume of Hruševsky's Geschichte des ukrainischen (ruthenischen) Volkes, Leipzig 1906, was published in the Český časopis historický 14, 1908, pp 214–217; the review of the seventh volume of Istorija Ukrajiny – Rusi was published in the Český časopis historický 16, 1910, pp 335–339 (together with his evaluation of Ivan Krypjakevyč's similarly focused edition that was published at the same time).

and his evaluation of Hruševsky's work is very positive.[338] He also showed deep understanding and consent to the political aspirations of the Ukrainians, while Slavík was more sceptical. Sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation was, however, an indisputable fact for him as well.

Besides the above mentioned reviews, Kadlec's article on Hruševsky published in the Slavonic Review (Slovanský přehled) has to be mentioned, too.[339] Kadlec closely followed all scholar and popular works by Hruševsky until 1914, and thus became the most dedicated Czech historian to promote the Ukrainian author in Bohemia.[340]

All above mentioned materials suggest that Hruševsky was one of the leading spirits of the Ukrainian nation whose activities before 1914 were a key for some Czech humanists to understanding political and intellectual aspirations of the Russian and Austrian Ukrainians. The Czech perception of Hruševsky's activities could not be threatened by the unusual appearance of the poet, journalist, ethnographer, historian and literary historian, Ivan Franko who entered the Czech intellectual world in his specific way already in 1890s.[341]

Hruševsky was highly praised for his scholar work by Czech historians. The First class of the Czech Academy (ČAVV) suggested Hruševsky to become a foreign member on 11th November 1911. The Austrian Kaiser Franz Joseph didn't approve of his membership for unknown reasons on 1st December, and thus Hruševsky's membership

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[338] Kadlec co-reviewed the same German translation of Hruševsky's work and the 6th volume of *Istorija Ukrajiny – Rusi* in *Sborník věd právních a státních* 9 , 1908–1909, pp 298–305.

[339] K. KADLEC, Mychajlo HRUŠEVSKYJ, *Slovanský přehled* 11, 1908–1909, pp 163–167. This study became the basis of an anonymous entry on Hruševsky in *Ottův slovník naučný* encyclopedia, volume 28 (attachements), Prague 1909, pp 603.

[340] See reports on the Russian version of *The Illustrated History of Ukraine* in *Sborník věd právních a státních* 13, 1912–1913, pp 196, and the Russian version of *The History of the Ukrainian Cossacks*, ibid 13, 1912–1913, pp 437–442, and 15, 1914–1915, pp 57–60.

[341] See a contemporary study by Zina GENYK – BEREZOVSKÁ, *Ivan Franko and the Czech literature*, Slavia 55, 1986, pp 295–302.

[342] Hruševsky's membership in The Czech Academy of Science was dealt with by Alena Šlechtová and Josef Levora in *členové ČAVU 1890–1952*, Prague 1989, pp 510. See also *Věstník ČAVU* 20, 1911. pp 470.

stayed unresolved for the next eight years.[342] Probably as a reaction to this situation, Hruševsky was presented with membership by another Czech scholar society – *The Czech Royal Society of Science* (KČSN). Six existing members of KČSN, mostly linguists and historians, suggested Hruševsky to become a foreign member of KČSN. Among the petitioners we can find names such as L. Niederle, J. Zubatý, J. Goll, F. Pastrnek, and J. Kalousek, i.e. two historians from the older generation. The recommendation paper portrayed Hruševsky as "the most influential Ukrainian historian, representing the literary and scientific aspirations of Ukraine in Galicia as well as Kiev", who is "the leading figure of the Ukrainian nation".[343] At the General Assembly of KČSN on 7th January 1914 Hruševsky was finally proclaimed the member.[344]

It would be wrong to assume that this double-acknowledgement paid to Hruševsky by the Czech scholar societies was to prove the unconditional reception of his scientific thesis on the sovereignty of Ukraine and its history. One year before Hruševsky, in 1913, a Russian professor from Kiev university, Timofej Florinskij was elected a foreign member of KČSN despite the fact that he opposed the Ukrainian separatism as well as Hruševsky's thesis, and was considered a thorough Ukrainophobe.

It is not a coincidence that at the same time when Hruševsky's work started to draw attention of the Czech scholars, representatives of the Russophile oriented Kramář line among journalists and politicians followed Hruševsky's activities with disbelief and criticism.[345] This criticism towards Hruševsky's activities was later shared by a number of Czechs living in Ukraine.

Already before the outbreak of the World War I. which had a different impact and consequences, on both the Czech and Ukrainian

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[343] This recommendation paper is kept in the Archive of the Czech Academy of Science, fount KČSN, file 17 (personal files of members).

[344] The election of Hruševsky as well as his profile was included in the Výroční zpráva KČSN for the year 1913, Prague 1914, pp 9–10. Historian's letter of gratitude written in Lvov in Ukrainian on 26th January 1914 is filed in the Archive of the Czech Academy of Science, fount KČSN, in Hrusevsky's personal file.

[345] See the article *Profesor Gruševský* /sic!/ in Národní listy 48, 1908, nr. 143, (24.5.), pp 1.

nations respectively, the formal spectrum of Hruševsky's relations to the Czech environment was closing up in quite a distinct way. At the same time Hruševsky tried to find a platform in the Ukrainian periodicals for already existing Czech-Ukrainian relations in the field of social sciences. The scholar revue *Ukrajina* that started to appear in the beginning of 1914 under Hruševsky's supervision was to fill up the gap. A few foreign historians were asked for cooperation. Besides the above mentioned Karel Kadlec, who did contribute to the periodical[346], another young Czech literary historian, Josef Volf was invited. Hruševsky's letter to Volf from June 1914 hints at the vast spectrum of problems to be dealt with in the periodical with the help of Czech historians.[347] The war bringing about persecution of the Ukrainian press by the czarist regime though disabled this cooperation for at least ten years.

Hruševsky , who returned to Eastern Ukraine, was shortly seized by the Czarist authorities and expelled somewhere to central Russia. Historian's contacts to Bohemia were thus interrupted, and his fate could hardly draw much attention in the rapidly evolving war events. The same can be said about the period after the March revolution in Russia in 1917 when Hruševsky became the leading figure of the Ukrainian political movement and its Central Council. In Bohemia he was mostly perceived for his state-forming ambitions. At the time however, Czechs were absorbed with their own national and state aspirations. In 1918 Czech policy was to a growing extent relying on the Western Allied powers, while the Ukrainian hopes were – from the lack of other possibilities - directed the other way. This fact was hindering positive reception of Hruševsky's state-forming attempts,

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[346] Kadlec published his review on Ž. Perič's study on the problem of the old-time household (*zádruha*) in Serbia in the first issue of the periodical on pages 142–143. Kadlec's name was listed on the cover page among the external contributors of the published issues of the periodical.

[347] Hrusevsky's letter from 19th June 1914 written on the original *Ukrajina* periodical letter-paper is preserved in Josef Volf's personal heritage in the Literary Archive attached to *Památník národního písemnictví* (Memorial of National Literature).

and often led to wrong conclusions depicting Hruševsky as a "traitor", "Austrian agent", etc.[348]

It was this inconvenient period, however, that enabled Hruševsky to play a much more important role, than anytime before. A tiny literary collection called "Ukraine and Ukrainians" dedicated to a mass reader caused the change.[349] The book was prepared by a national-socialistic journalist and poet, not well known František S. Frabša. If the book were compiled by a historian, it would have likely given more lasting and realistic picture of Ukraine in the years of revolutionary changes within the old world.

Due to the way the book was worked up, only few reviews on the book appeared in the Czech periodicals and literary papers before it disappeared again.[350] It was soon surpassed by events of much bigger importance for the Czech national interests. Later on, nevertheless, calls for a complete and better presentation of Hruševsky's work prevailed. By the end of March 1919, O. Bočkovsky, a significant Ukrainian journalist living in Bohemia, suggested historian Jaroslav Bidlo – Marie Nosková to be the translator of Hruševsky's illustrated history of Ukraine.[351] By a coincidence, there were good conditions for Hruševsky to fasten his ties to the Czech lands due to the adverse development in the independent Ukrainian state. Such ideal conditions were never to be repeated again.

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[348] Critical views are represented by Josef DŮRICH, V českých službách, Klášter nad Jizerou 1921, pp 76, 79, and 84–85, See also Fedor DOUBRAVA's Tragedie Slovanstva a Francie, Prague 1921, pp 4,6.

[349] M. HRUSEVSKY, Ukrajina a Ukrajinci, Prague 1918. František Švejda's publishing house that published the book was so far only focused on publishing of theatre plays.

[350] A daily Národní politika nr. 36, 1918, nr. 126 (2. 6.), Nedělní zábavná a poučná příloha pp 2; the magazine Česká svoboda nr. 1, 1918, nr. 2 (31. 5), pp 9; Lípa nr. 1 1917–1918, pp 799-800; Naše doba periodical 29, 1918–1919, pp 466; Zlatá Praha nr. 35, 1917–1918, pp 491; Sborník české společnosti zeměvědné, nr. 24, 1918, pp 66; and with a delay also Česká revue 19, 1919–1920, pp 402. This survey of reflections on the book may not be complete.

[351] Bočkovsky's letter to Bidlo from 15th March 1919 is preserved in the heritage of Jaroslav Bidlo in the Archive of the Czech Academy of Sciences.

The immigration office for Czech soldiers returning from the front aligned to the Ministery of Defence operating in Stanislav confirmed Hruševsky's departure for abroad on 14th april 1919. The historian is surprisingly listed as a representative member of the Ukrainian Direktorium. The following day Hruševsky has crossed the Ukrainian border and started his five years long stay out of Ukraine. The exact chronology of his travel is not known but with the help of different sources it is worth trying to discover.[352] Hruševsky's itinerary from the years 1919-1920 shows incredible flexibility within the realm of mid-western Europe marked by Paris, Geneve, Berlin, Vienna, and Prague. The Czech metropolis belonged to places of higher priorities to Hruševsky's program abroad. That's why he spent quite a lot of time in Bohemia between 1919–1920.

On 18th April 1919 Hruševsky came to Prague, and stayed till mid June. In the time to come he set off for Paris and Luzern, and then back again to Prague in mid August. In the end of September he set off for Vienna and Berlin. He returned to Prague for a short time, and shortly continued to Geneve by the end of October. He stays in Geneve, Bern, and Paris till mid January 1920. According to the information available Hruševsky stayed in Prague partly in February and most of the summer, as well as in November. He stayed in Prague in January the next year as well. Then the most intensive period of Hruševsky's encounters with Prague was closing up.

The former highest situated representative of the Ukrainian state was pushed out to the margines of Ukrainian political life. Despite this he used to present himself in Europe not as a historian, but rather as a politician and journalist. This was due the fact that he was the major negotiator of The Ukrainian Social Revolutionary Party (SRP) in Europe, a role that was laid upon him before leaving Galician Ukraine in April 1919. Hruševsky and other representatives of the

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[352] The main source of information for the period till February 1920 may be Hruševsky's essay *V peršij delegaciji Ukrajinskoji partiji socialistiv-revoljucioneriv* (kviteň 1919 r. – ljutyj 1920 r.). *Boritesja - poborete*, nr. 3 (November 1920), pp 47–60, nr. 7 (February–March 1921), pp 28–54.

party opposed the current political situation in Ukraine represented by the Direktorium, headed by Symon Petljura and the coalition parties, that have been sharing the power on the Ukraine political scene between 1919 – 1920. Hruševsky was aware of the necessity to compromise with the Soviet Russia to preserve the Ukrainian statehood were the SRP would have its place.

Until the occupation of the remaining Ukraine territory by the Bolshevik army in November 1920, Hruševsky didn't succeed, however, in pushing this concept through. It was not acceptable for the Bolshevik representatives, and the Soviet part of Ukraine either. Putting the Eser strategy across within the Ukrainian exile though must have complicated achieving another conception represented by Symon Petljura who proclaimed hostility to the Soviet Russia relying on foreign allies. It turned out that only the newly formed Poland following its own political interests would qualify as an ally at that time. Hruševsky criticized Petljura's orientation on Poland heavily in mid June 1920. His ideas were published in the Czech social-democrat daily Právo lidu.[353]

Even in Czech settings Hruševsky seemed rather a politician, journalist, and organizer than a historian. Hruševsky was devoted to his organizational activities so much, that he was not even able to maintain the Czech-Ukrainian scholar relations. He only tried to win over several Czech professionals from *L'Europe Orientale* magazine he was engaged with as a co-author from September 1919 to January 1920 in Paris. The Czech historians however were too preoccupied with problems of their own country to even react to Hruševsky's insistence.[354] There was no way how to amplify Hruševsky's contacts with the Czech professionals. Karel Kadlec was no longer showing his interest in his Ukraine college's work. He was later replaced by historian prof. Jaroslav Bidlo who paid some attention to the Ukraine

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[353] Mich. HRUŠEVSKY /sic!/, *Ukrajina, Russko, a Polsko*, Právo lidu 31, 1920, nr. 139 (15.6.), pp 2–3.

[354] A summary only was published in the issue Nr. 7 from 1st December 1919 by Jaromír NEČAS, *Les Polonais en Galicie*, pp 219–221.

question after 1918.[355] At that time, Bidlo edited the social-scientific part of the *Časopis Národního muzea* where the Ukraine question was given large publicity. He did interest himself in Hruševsky's work till it closed up.

During his stays in Czechoslovakia, Hruševsky used to live in the flat of Oleksandr Žukovsky, his close political colleague. Žukovsky lived with his wife at corner of Dobrovského and Ovenecká streets not far from the Letná Park from January 1920 to May 1921. The flat was used as the Foreign Mission of the in Prague Headquarters. Part of the would-be *Ukraine Sociological Institute* library was moved here as well. Hruševsky combined his Prague stays with moments of peace in the Czech countryside. Not even here did he put his work aside. Up to the day, there are only records on his stays in Sedmihorky, Vysoká u Mělníka and Karlovy Vary.[356]

It is not easy to characterize Hruševsky's activities in Czechoslovakia. He was involved in coordinating of the party policy, he took part in several negotiations and conferences, he wrote some articles, answered letters (there are records on open letters written by Hruševsky to various addressees), and organized purchases for the above mentioned library.

All the mentioned activities were topped up by occasional meetings with the Czech political representatives. There are, however, no reliable information on the frequency and range of those meetings. We can assume a closer political cooperation with Social democracy representatives. Among documents hinting at such cooperation is not only Hruševsky's article in *Pravo lidu* daily, but also the fact that Hruševsky's informational booklets in French were

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[355] For the first time Bidlo showed his significant interest by his rapport on the 3rd edition of the *Illustrated History of Ukraine* published in the Český časopis historický 25, 1919, pp 156.

[356] Hruševsky stayed in Karlovy Vary after 20th August 1919 where he met with the Ukrainian Interior Minister Temnycky, and then again at the same time next year. In June and July 1920 he stayed in Harasov (near Kokořín) and Sedmihorky as it is proved by the date of publishing of the article on the tasks of Ukraine members of the SRP, see *Boritesja – poborete*, nr. 1 (September 1920), pp 51.

gradually published in Social Democracy's printing house.[357] On the other side, there are no such hints to be found in the case of the Czechoslovak National-Socialist Party despite its warm, though short-termed relation to the Ukrainian question.

What was most significant were the meetings with Czechoslovak president, T. G. Masaryk having taken place at least twice (20. 8. 1919 and 21. 9. 1920).[358] The meetings must have been useful for both sides. The president was briefed on the current situation in Ukraine and Hruševsky, the former political representative could share his ideas about the future prospects of Ukraine. On the other side, Hruševsky could seize the opportunity to make Masaryk aware of the needs of Ukrainians, and discuss the problems of the Ukrainian military and civilian refugees to Czechoslovakia in 1920.

Hruševsky was not only trying to defend his own position but he was talking in the name of the arising Ukrainian emigration that he, in fact, represented despite the already existing non-official diplomatic Ukrainian mission headed by Maksym Slavinsky. The new edition of Hruševsky's work On the "Latest Ukrainian-Russian Relations" published in the Czech translation in August 1919 originated from this environment.[359] This was the second and last Hruševsky's work published in the Czech translation as a separate book.

Despite the odds, the Czech scholars still regarded Hruševsky mostly as their colleague of a different nationality in 1919. It was publicly confirmed at the Czech Academy of Science (ČAVU) general assembly on 2nd July 1919 and the regular monthly meeting of ČAVU on15th November 1919 where the historian was proclaimed the member.[360]

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[357] Mychajlo HRUŠEVSKYJ, Ukrajina a Rusko, Prague 1919. The booklet was published as the 10th – 11th volume of the series Explore Ukraine..

[358] Hruševsky mentions his meetings with Masaryk and journalist Scot Viator in V peršij delagaciji, p. 51. For the audience with the president see the Archive of the Presidential Office, label D 7290/25.

[359] La lutte sociale et politique en Ukraine (1917, 1918, 1919), pp 1 (Prague) 1920 is the work concerned.

[360] Věstník ČAVU 28–29, 1919–1920, Prague 1920, pp 129. The enrolment documents were signed by Karel Kadlec, the then secretary in chief of the particular branch of ČAVU.

Hruševsky was briefed on his membership in a letter from 9th December to Geneva. In his response from 20th December he thanked the assembly and took this honour "as if it were given through him to the whole Ukrainian nation".[361]

Hruševsky's activities in Bohemia culminated in 1920. Right after he realized that he can not meet his political targets with the help of the Czechoslovak authorities, the necessary condition of his permanent settlement in Prague. While in some cases, Hruševsky met with understanding (formalities concerning his passport for example), in other cases it was not considered necessary, or needful to help him achieve his targets. Due to the current lack of flats in Prague, all attempts to find him a flat failed as well as an adequate space for the Ukrainian Sociological Institute and the library. These facts led Hruševsky to permanently resettle to Austria in autumn 1920. Austria then became quite a stable base for him till the beginning of 1924.

There was a new chance for Hruševsky to move back to Czechoslovakia. From 1923 the *Ukrainian Industrial Academy* in Poděbrady representatives negotiated with Hruševsky, in September Hruševsky was contacted by the *Ukrainian Higher Pedagogical Institute* in Prague representatives. Both institutes were interested in Hruševsky as a teacher. It's right so to assume that Hruševsky would have had the best presumptions to devote himself fully to scholar and teaching activities, if he had moved back to Bohemia, since he was no longer engaged in politics at that time. This circumstance might have also intensified his contacts with the Czech scholar community. This construct had, however, never come true which made him move back to the Soviet Ukraine. He returned back to Kiev in the beginning of 1924.[362]

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[361] The Archive of the Czech Academy of Science, fount ČAVU, file 211, label nr. 259.
[362] Olha ZUBKO, *Ukrajinski vysoki školy v Čecho-Slovaččyni ta M. Hruševskyj - vtračeni možlyvosti včenoho ta emihraciji (1920–1924)*, manuscript of so far not published work comprising of 11 pp. I'd like to thank the author who let me become familiar with her work.

After re-emigration, Hruševsky was allowed, from his position of the leading member of the *Ukrainian Academy of Science*, to accomplish his ideas on the development of the Ukrainian national, politically neutral historical science before Stalin's machinery started to mercilessly tighten the screw. Hruševsky tried to upkeep his relations with his Czech colleges, especially J.Bidlo and Jiří Polívka, and he came into touch with the *Prager Presse* editorial board.[363] At that time he started to show interest in the Czech religious and literary influences on Ukrainian spiritual life in the 15th Century. He consulted this topic with Jiří Polívka in his correspondence before publishing the "History of the Ukrainian Literature".[364]

His letters reveals his attempts to intensify cooperation between the Czech and Ukrainian Academies of Science. That was why several Czech scholars were given membership in the Ukrainian Academy of Science. Hruševsky also tried to gain larger publicity for the achievements of the Ukrainian science in Czech periodicals. Due to the political situation such attempts were not welcome, and so the real output of Hruševsky's effort didn't live up to his expectations. Hruševsky failed to maintain permanent cooperation between the Czech scholars and the *Ukrajina,* the newly reborn scholar periodical. The most significant, though rather symbolical tribute to the Ukrainian scientist, were the articles by Czech scientists published in the Special Jubilee Edition devoted to Hruševsky's 60 years anniversary in 1926.[365]

There are no records of correspondence between Hruševsky and Czech historians after 1928. We do not know why these contacts

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[363] Hrusevsky's correspondence with his Czech colleges was not published yet, although it deserves to be analysed more closely.

[364] M. HRUŠEVSKY, *Vplyvy českoho nacionalnoho ruchu XIV-XV vikiv v ukrajinskim zytt'u i tvorčosty, jak problema doslidu (Kilka zamitok i deziderat),* Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Ševčenka, tom 141–143, Lviv 1925, pp 1–13, was reprinted in Hruševsky's *Istorija ukrajiskoji literatury,* tom 5, Kyjiv 1926, pp 53–73 in the *Vidhomony českoho religijno-nacionalnoho ruchu* chapter.

[365] Czech scholars J. Bidlo, L. Niederle, and J. Polívka contributed to the *Special Jubilee Edition* published in Kiev in 1928.

didn't continue while the correspondence between Hruševsky and some of his Ukrainian colleges abroad went on till the beginning of 1931. Hruševsky followed new Czech historical studies after 1928 and reviewed some of them, mainly Slavistic works, in the *Ukrajina* periodical.[366] Even this channel of contacts disappeared after Hruševsky was removed from Ukraine in early 1931. Since then the historian's name only appeared in the Czech periodicals at the turn of 1934, 1935 when he died.[367] The best-informed voice came from Jaroslav Bidlo, Hruševsky's peer, who could devote him, thanks to his membership in ČAVU, an official obituary in the form of a separately published booklet.[368]

In years that followed after 1945 it was only possible for a short period of time to evaluate Hruševsky from the position of a scholar, rather than politician's.[369] The critical approach to Hruševsky created in the USSR shortly became the norm in Czechoslovakia as well, and there was no way to discuss it after February 1948.[370] Obscuring facts and misinterpreting the Ukrainian history became notorious, and

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[366] In 1929 Hruševsky informed about Bidlo's book *Dějiny Slovanů*, a new collection of essays, tribute to the same author, and Frank WOLLMANN's book *Slovesnost Slovanů*. In 1930 another collection of essays seized attention of Hruševsky, Václav Novotny's miscellany (a book dedicated to him by his students) on Slav geographical images, statistics, the constitutional establishment and philosophy, and the book by Josef JIRASEK *Russia and Us*.

[367] In the very end of Hruševsky's life an entry on Hrusevsky appeared in *Ottův slovník naučný* encyclopedia, volume 2, part 2, Prague 1933, pp 1261. A few obituaries from the press appeared in the bibliography : *One Hundred Fifty Years of Czech-Ukrainian Literary Encounters (1814–1964)*, Prague 1968, pp 237 and in a book that followed: *Ukrainian Literature in the Czech Context in the Years 1965–1994*, Prague 1999, pp 271.

[368] Jaroslav Bidlo, Michal Hrusevskyj, Prague 1935. It later became a source of information for Volodymyr MOTORNYJ – Mychajlo HNAŤUK, *Dijalnisť M. Hruševskoho v ocinci českoji akademičnoji hromadskosti, in: Mychajlo Hruševskyj i Zachidna Ukrajina*, Lviv 1995, pp 61–65. The evolution of Bidlo's approach to Hruševky's work needs more informational sources, i.e. Bidlo's article Mychajlo Hruševsky, Prager Presse 6, 1926, nr. 267 (29. 11.), pp 3.

[369] Josef MACŮREK, *Dějepisectví evropského východu*, Prague 1946, pp 226–228.

[370] The renewed fight against Hruševsky's conception of the Ukrainian history was summed up by Vincenc CHARVÁT, *Odsudek dějinné koncepce M. Hruševského a jeho školy*, Slovanský přehled 33, 1947, pp 98–99.

Hruševsky was considered a condemnable representative of s.c. "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" even in Czechoslovakia. Only the effort of Vladimír Hostička has rehabilitated the image of Mychajlo Hruševsky among the Czech scholar community after long years of distortion.[371]

Summary

The author collected basic information on the leading Ukrainian historian Mychajlo Hruševsky's relationship to the Czech historiography and Bohemia. The first part of the essay deals with reviews, annotations, and materials of various kind devoted to Hruševsky's work published in Czech periodicals from 1896 and then in larger extent after 1908. Most of them were related to Hruševsky's multi-volume History of Ukraine. The first information available on this work was provided by juristic-historian Karel Kadlec (till 1918), and Slav nations historian Jaroslav Bidlo (after 1919). Further on, two minor works by Hruševsky published in the Czech translation in 1918 and 1919 are dealt with in the essay. They aimed at introducing Ukraine to the Czech reader and providing information on the Ukrainian-Russian relations. Hruševsky's stays in Prague and other parts of Bohemia are surveyed in the part dealing with Hruševsky's five years long lasting emigration. Finally, Prague didn't become Hruševsky's place of permanent residence, it played an important role, however, in the period from May 1919 to the beginning of 1921. During this time the Ukrainian historian and the former leader of the Ukrainian parliament repeatedly met with the Czechoslovak president T. G. Masaryk. Several informational booklets in French by Hruševsky

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[371] Vladimír Hostička, M. S. Hruševskyj a jeho pojetí dějin východních Slovanů, in: Střední a východní Evropa v krizi XX. století, Prague 1998, pp 151–160. It is an adjusted form of the paper delivered in September 1996.

were published in Prague in order to arise the European consciousness about various aspects of Ukraine. This proves the fact that, for a short period of time, Hruševsky became the leading representative of the Ukraininan emigration in Czechoslovakia in the early stage of its existence.

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