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STUDIA TERRITORIALIA IV

THE 1950s: CHANGES IN TRADITIONAL RELIGIOSITY IN THE UNITED STATES?

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Abstract

Despite all the modernity of the United States, American religious life has maintained an intensity that European believers can only dream of. Historians of the twentieth century often state that American traditional Christian religiosity rose significantly in the 1950s, but sociological researches cannot prove the fact. The reason why historians and sociologists diverge in their opinions on possible increases in religiosity may dwell in the fact that both process different kind of data. When we harmonize them, it seems that the 1950s present no victory of traditional religious form over modernity. More than great change in religious life of individuals, the 1950s can be characterized by increased visualization of religious themes in public.

Keywords: religiosity, change, traditional, United States, 1950s, modernity

Tradition and Modernity

It seems that the second half of the twentieth century had been times of a distinct conflict between tradition and modernity. Tradition was represented by old ways and morals, by religion of forefathers, by the faith in God as the supreme ruler of this world and the only one who is truly good and wise in his nature. Modernity, on the contrary, declared faith in the goodness of man. Man and his reason became the measure of all things. A notable trait of this era is calling one religious tradition into question from another tradition's perspective, as well as questioning all traditions from a modern perspective. Modernity is then called into question by

those who support a return to tradition. The conflict between tradition and modernity brings about the establishment of a multicultural society that integrates individuals brought up in different traditions and modernity's supporters; on the other hand, it also foments religious fundamentalism and an imaginary "clash of civilizations."

Sociologists tended to see general correlation between growing secularization of a society and its modernity. But the United States could not fit this theoretical model. The United States is modern society that is still keeping high level of religiosity. Therefore sociologists tried to examine American religiosity by comparing it to European. Finally they suggested that American religious denominations went through set of inner changes that enabled them to remain relevant for modernizing society.[1] In contrary, the European denominations did not go through such a deep transformation. As a consequence the European societies became more secular.

In the history of the United States in the second half of the twentieth century we can notice at least two periods of increase in traditional religious practices. They are the 1950s and 1980s. Especially the 1950s are considered to be a boom of traditional Christian denominations in the United States. The question is: "Did traditional American religiosity really grow so much in the 1950s? Did it really loose in its fight with modernity in the two following decades?"

The theme of American religiosity has been examined very well and very thoroughly, especially in American publications. This is due to the importance that Americans bestow on religion and the fact that religiosity in the United States is the subject of commercial endeavors, such as pre-election polls, the sale of religious literature, as well as individual preachers' efforts to advertise themselves and make themselves visible.

In his works titled *Crossroads of American Religious Life* and *The Sixties' Spiritual Awakening: American Religion Moving from Modern to Postmodern*,[2] historian Robert S. Ellwood extensively describes the development of American religiosity in two periods which he considers crucial to

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[1] Thomas Luckmann, "The Decline of Church-Oriented Religion", in *Sociology of Religion*, ed. Roland Robertson (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), 141–151.

[2] Robert S. Ellwood, *1950: Crossroads of American Religious Life* (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000); Robert S. Ellwood, *The Sixties' Spiritual Awakening: American Religion Moving from Modern to Postmodern* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1994).

understanding contemporary American religious life. The history of American religiosity has also been compiled by Edwin Gaustad,[3] among others. A large quantity of scholarly works has been dedicated to examining the electoral behavior of American believers and the mutual influence the political and religious aspects of American life have on one another.[4] With a certain hyperbole, it can be said that every expert researching the spiritual life of Americans has a slightly different opinion on its development and present state and arrives at different conclusions in their analyses. What may be seen as a sign of the declining importance of religiosity in American life by one may be understood as a mere episode that lacks an adequately informative value by another. Therefore, conclusions regarding the decrease, or increase, of religion's influence on Americans are always tinged with a certain degree of subjectivity.

That is why the book *Religious Change in America* by Andrew M. Greeley excels in the works focusing on American religiosity.[5] It is a summary of sociological studies conducted in the United States using the same set of test questions from the 1940s up to now. There is also a summary of results from previous studies; however, these used different questions and it is possible that the methodology of their processing, or of forming the questions themselves, were not preserved. Therefore, studies conducted prior to the 1940 are presented only as a means of illustrative comparison. A declarative value is attributed only to those questions that remained unchanged from the 1940s to the 1980s. This is the only way to ensure that the maximum declarative value is achieved when summarizing all of the studies. Owing to this methodology, objectivity and research only of facts that are sociologically and statistically measurable, this publication makes an exceptional contribution to research pertaining to changes in the religious behavior of Americans.

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[3] Edwin S. Gaustad, ed., *A Documentary History of Religion in America Since 1865* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Erdmans Publishing Company, 1993).

[4] Michael Corbett, Julia Mitchell Corbett, *Politics and Religion in the United States* (New York: Garland Publishers, Inc., 1999); James L. Guth, John C. Green, eds., *The Bible and the Ballot Box: Religion and the Politics in the 1988 Election* (New York, Westview Press, 1991); Martin E. Marty et al., eds., *Religion in American Public Life: Living with Our Deepest Differences* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001); Christian Smith, ed., *The Secular Revolution: Power interests and Conflicts in the Secularization of American Public Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); V. L. Warren, *Pulpit Politics* (New York: SUNY Press, Albany, 1997).

[5] Andrew M. Greeley, *Religious Change in America* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on Social Indicators, Social Science Research Council, Harvard University Press, 1996).

Chester Gillis' book *Roman Catholicism in America* documents the development of and changes in the American Catholic Church, which is the biggest religious organization in the United States.[6] This book's importance lies in the fact that the Catholic Church, which was considered to be some kind of foreign element in the predominantly Protestant United States, went through a vast process of emancipation in the second half of the twentieth century and most Americans stopped perceiving it as something alien. This in itself is one of the fundamental changes in American religiosity.

Theoretical Approaches towards the Development of American Religiosity in the Twentieth Century

According to the evidently prevailing opinion of the social sciences, since the era of Enlightenment, i.e., the beginning of the conflict between science and religion, religious faith has been diminishing gradually at a rate that is directly proportional to the rate at which new scientific knowledge has been acquired and at which general education has progressed. Many studies about religion proceed on the assumption that people are not as grounded in religion as they were before. All indicators of a person's religious conduct should therefore give evidence of religion's declining importance in that person's life. However, American sociologists who specialize in religion started to question this assumption in the 1980s. In principle, there are currently five main models regarding the development of American religiosity in the twentieth century, namely the secularization, cyclical, episodic, stability, and growth model.

The secularization model is based on an assumption shared by many social scientists.[7] In their opinion, the religious faith of western, urbanized and industrialized peoples has been dying. The world these people live in has been stripped of its myths and so it must be science that emerges victorious from its long struggle with religion.

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[6] Chester Gillis, *Roman Catholicism in America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

[7] Notion of necessary and unavoidable secularization of a modern society was common to most sociologists since the early era of this discipline. Europe was hold to be the "cradle" of the secularization theory that was most vividly formulated by Peter Berger in his book *The Sacred Canopy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967). However, facing the raw data disproving the theory, Peter Berger later revoked his secularization theory in another book *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999).

Proponents of the cyclical model have noticed that in the United States religion has survived well beyond its predicted demise on numerous occasions. According to this model, religious life, similar to the global economy, goes through "boom-and-bust" cycles. Based on this model, America's religious "boom" periods spanned the 1950s and the 1980s, the eras of Presidents Eisenhower and Reagan, respectively.

The episodic event model is based on the assumption that changes in religion are induced by a singular event that never occurs again. These changes can then be short-term or long-term. The influence of the Second Vatican Council on American Catholicism can be regarded as an example of such a singular event.

The stability model underlines the immutability of a system of symbols and values and of the most fundamental questions that a believer asks. In this case, religion is perceived as a relatively invariable dimension of human life.[8]

The growth model is the last one. Although it seems to be the least probable variant, this theory examines the possibility of an increase in religiosity in general. Although this model is often presented in a purely academic light, we can speculate about its application in case studies of an arbitrary long-term political crisis accompanied by the threat of nuclear destruction of the world. Stress induced by such a protracted menace could then rouse a nation's inhabitants to intensify their faith in religion.

Owing to its history of immigration, the United States is home to nearly all of the world's religions. Mapping their development and place in American society, however, exceeds the scope of this work. It is also only possible to monitor the general development of trends in American religiosity through the religions and churches that most Americans belong to. According to Andrew M. Greeley, corresponding statistics required to evaluate American religious cultures only exist for two categories of believers: Catholics and Protestants. The amount of analytical data that reflects the culture of American Catholics is even greater than the amount of data that reflects Protestant culture. According to Greeley, Protestantism has remained practically unchanged over the last fifty years, whereas Catholicism has been subjected to major transformations that have been linked to changes in the socio-economic status of its adherents. American sociologists have three primary sources of data that catalogues changes in the religious life of the USA: the

[8] C. Geertz brings evidence for the stability model. See Clifford Geertz, *Myth, Symbol and Culture* (New York: Norton, 1973).

Gallup Organization (AIPO; The American Institute of Public Opinion), the Survey Research Centre of the University of Michigan (SRC), and the National Opinion Research Centre of the University of Chicago (NORC). These sources process data that pertains to the following denominations: Catholicism and the Baptist and Methodist movements.[9]

One fourth of America's population is Catholic, one fifth is Baptist and one sixth is Methodist. These are the key denominations in the evaluation of general trends within the population. Information about other, smaller groups can provide important supplementary information about and illustrations of trends that are being examined; however, they cannot be processed in a representative manner on a nationwide level. Further difficulties arise when processing the representative data. Emphasis must be placed on inserting this data into wider-ranging transformations that are taking place in the society being studied, then evaluating it carefully. For example, an apparent decrease of American religiosity, proven by a measurable decline in attendance at church services in the late 1960s and early 1970s, could have been caused by the life cycle of the generation that was born in huge numbers after the war (the so-called "baby boomers"). That is to say, young people are generally less religiously active than their elders. It is then necessary to distinguish the actual behavioral change from the life cycle manifestation of influential age groups that will turn to religion and its values at a later age.[10]

The question that still remains is how to examine, and possibly measure, slight changes in the field of religion that are less tangible than church service attendance. How does a people's willingness to practice their religion change? How does a people's concept of God Himself change? With regards to the complexity of the theme, I will compare publications devoted to American religiosity and so-called "objectively measurable" findings by Andrew M. Greeley. The result should harmonize both.

The Vestiges of 1930–1945

Vast changes in the religious lives of modern Americans, as well as Europeans, were to be expected after the end of the Second World War, which, to a large extent, had shattered all of the worlds past certainties. It

[9] Andrew M. Greeley, *Religious Change in America* (Cambridge, MA: Committee on Social Indicators, Social Science Research Council, Harvard University Press, 1989), 8–9.
[10] Ibid., 21–26.

is therefore interesting to look at religious life as it had existed during the years preceding the conflict, which itself had sprung from the events of the 1930s. It can be said that Great Depression in particular had a significant impact on American religiosity.

Influential theologians and thinkers Reinhold Niebuhr and Karl Barth inspired religious thinking in the USA in the 1930s. Niebuhr, the liberal author of *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, published in 1932, even separated the social utopia on which several of his contemporaries had laid their hopes from Marxism. Niebuhr emphasized that man would never be a fully rational creature; therefore, there had to be a place in his life for something that forced him to do good deeds. In his work, Karl Barth also alluded to a theological crisis connected with a disappointment in liberalism and its supposedly overly simplified vision of natural religion and human perfection. Barth's dialectical theology, also known as crisis theology, seemed to have a future as it illuminated the imperfections of this world and mankind and, subsequently, the existing state of suffering. Barth highlighted the ultimate difference between God and humanity. Purified by the sufferings of the First World War, Barth's school of theology preached that man could not find God on his own and therefore had to find God through the Holy Scripture, which was being conveyed to him with an insight that only faith could reveal.[11]

From practical point of view, it can be said that American religiosity was divided into several dissimilar segments during the first half of the twentieth century. The first segment consisted of so-called "mainstream" denominations: the Episcopal Church, the Presbyterians and the Congregationalists. These churches were clearly of Anglo-Saxon origin and had strong ties to the nation's colonial history. Altogether, these denominations only comprised about five percent of the population, but socially they had above-average sway and commanded a great deal of respect. It was mainly their representatives who made public comments on the burning questions of the day. In the first half of the twentieth century, most of the leading personalities of the American secular, as well as religious, life came from their ranks.[12]

The second group was made up of the populous and well-respected, though less prestigious, Protestant denominations from the southern states.

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[11] Eberhard Busch, *The Great Passion: An Introduction to Karl Barth's Theology* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2004), 3–13.

[12] Ellwood, *1950 Crossroads of American Religious Life*, 30.

These denominations owed their large collective membership mostly to the Second Great Awakening that had moved in synch with the western border of the United States. The Protestants comprised the Methodists (who formed the United Methodist Church in 1939 and thus put an end to the disagreement caused by the Civil War that divided the Methodists into northern and southern factions), the Baptists, the Disciples, and a number of others. In the 1930s, these denominations were integrated into the general Protestant mainstream of spirituality, which became a kind of norm and constant of American spiritual and moral life. This was also reflected in the incorporation of these churches into the Federal Council of Churches, the predecessor of the post-war National Council of Churches.

In 1939, the Federal Council of Churches included the North Baptist Church, the North Presbyterian Church, the Congregationalist Church, the Episcopal Church, the United Lutheran Church, the Syrian Orthodox Church, the Reformed and Brethren Church, the Afro-American Baptist Church, and the Methodist Church. In total, the Council churches represented twenty-one million Americans.[13] The Evangelical, Fundamentalist and Pentecostal churches remained isolated from this group. They were considered nothing more than distant relatives of the Council churches. They gained notoriety for the disenchantment they provoked during the so called "Monkey Trial" of 1925, when they aligned themselves with citizens who wanted to punish all those involved in making references to the theory of evolution at schools. Despite their formal representation in the Council, Afro-American churches also stood outside the circle of respected denominations. It could not have been otherwise in America's predominantly racist and segregated society of the 1930s.

Together with Judaism, the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches did not form part of the Federal Council of Churches. These three groups of believers were concentrated primarily in towns along the East Coast and they formed their own spiritual subcultures. In the 1930s, most of the members of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches and Judaism were new arrivals and outsiders.[14] Their life centered within their respective ethnic enclave, church or synagogue. The members of all three groups only left their subcultures when they went to work. The first generational shift and

[13] Ellwood, *1950 Crossroads of American Religious Life*, 31–32; Erwin S. Gaustad, ed., *A Documentary History of Religion in America Since 1865* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1993), 190.

[14] Gaustad, *A Documentary History*, 39, 45, 163, 192–193.

the education of their offspring enabled these groups to leave their ethnic ghettos and integrate themselves into the mainstream. The Second World War then accelerated this emancipation process considerably. However, in the 1930s, the Catholics, members of the Orthodox Church and the Jews did not engage in religious discourse with the representatives of the mainstream Protestantism that dominated American society. Emancipation of Catholics and Jews as well as their growing acceptance by the society represents one of the largest changes in American society after the Second World War.

The Crucial Decade of 1950s

In the 1950s, churches and religion in the United States primarily represented a solid barrier that would prevent communist penetration into the society. All religious denominations experienced a substantial rise in the number of their adherents. This period of post-war optimism and prosperity, together with the soldiers' return home to their families, brought many children into the world (the so-called "baby boom").

The baby boom, together with extraordinary economic prosperity, was caused by the fact that over the preceding years, many young people had postponed starting families and purchasing commodities such as cars and houses. In 1945–1960, America's population rose by almost forty million. That represents a 30 percent rise (which culminated in 1957).[15] This dramatic population increase had important repercussions. Since the 1950s, the history of the United States has basically become the history of an unusually immense young generation. Therefore, the course of the baby boom generation's life cycle has made a considerable impact on all of history's sociological parameters.

In the 1950s, the number of believers in all American denominations was rising at an even more rapid rate than the number of the nation's inhabitants. This is evident according to the documentation that certain churches kept, and most historians agree on it. The increase in the number of religious adherents is also observed in the work of Andrew M. Greeley, who gathered data from sociological studies carried out by the AIPO, the SRC and the NORC. Greeley is, however, more prudent in his evaluation of

[15] Ibid., 437.

the 1950s as a turning point leading towards Americans' heightened religious activity. He also questions the representative quality and objectivity of the data that was provided by the studies and by churches themselves. If we were to count all the people who were baptized by Catholics, we would end up with some very misleading information.[16]

The 1950s are characterized by the recognition of growing religiosity in the United States. Facing a communist threat, J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the FBI, stated: "If communists are atheists, make sure your child is a believer." President Eisenhower also repeatedly declared that belief in the Almighty was a basic manifestation of Americanism, and Congress, not wanting to be left behind, added the words "One Nation under God" to the American "Loyalty Oath" in 1954. During the following year, it decreed that the phrase "In God We Trust" was to be printed on all US dollar banknotes.[17]

In its history, the United States has never had an official state religion that would function as one of its unifying features. Nevertheless, it can be said that the Christian faith shapes one of the keystones of the American identity. During the Cold War, religious faith of any kind clearly became a strong factor unifying Americans to resist the Soviets, a country where proclaimed official faith was atheism.

The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States began to intensify as their ideologies clashed, resulting in the brutal Korean War in 1950–1953. The cold and hot war of ideologies enabled religion to mythologize the conflict and interpret it as a crusade (or a holy war) against the forces of evil. In the confrontation between the American way of life and another, strange one, Americans necessarily considered the latter to be "evil". This tendency had manifested itself among Americans as early as during the Spanish-American war in 1898. In all likelihood, it can be said that the perception of the enemy itself, whom Americans associate with the religious symbolism of evil, stems from strong religious belief.

Billy Graham represents traditional Protestant concept of religion which underlines man's sinfulness and imperfection. In 1950, Graham, an overnight evangelical star whose Protestant faith was bound to pessimism, declared that the people of the United States had only a few years to commit themselves to spiritual conversion, through which they would

[16] Greeley, *Religious Change in America*, 42–45.
[17] Gaustad, *A Documentary History*, 488.

find safety and salvation. He personified a peculiar brand of patriotism that was reflected in the following mottos: "If you want to be a patriot, become a Christian. If you want to be a loyal American, then become a loyal Christian." According to Graham, the world was divided into two warring camps. Communism, which was declaring war on God, Christ, the Bible and all religion, was America's enemy.[18] Billy James Hargis, an anti-communist and the founder of the Christian Crusade movement, said the following sentences, which characterize the atmosphere in the United States in the 1950s perfectly: "People want to be a part of something bigger. They want to belong to a unified group. They love Jesus and at the same time they are very scared. When I told them that the menace was communism, they saw it as a revelation [...]. They knew I was right without having known before what that fear was."[19]

American Catholicism Boosts its Immutable Tradition

American Catholicism of the 1950s, spearheaded by Pius XII, a strongly anticommunist Pope, shared the same dualistic concept of the world. This view was also supported by Francis Cardinal Spellman, the archbishop of New York and American Catholicism's chief spokesperson, and Msgr. Fulton J. Sheen, who was one of Catholicism's most popular clergymen. Many American Catholics had ethnic roots in East European countries; therefore, they could not forget about their co-religionists, who numbered in the tens of millions and who ended up in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence after the Second World War. It was a hellish empire that was trying to abolish religion completely and replace it with communist ideology.

The world was almost perfectly divided dualistically into a camp of the fair-minded and a camp of darkness. This corresponded with theological concepts of the world as a battlefield between good and evil principles. From the Catholic faith's perspective, it is worth mentioning that the Pope declared 1950 a holy year.[20] This was a time when everyone was supposed to re-establish their loyalty to the church and undergo a special pilgrimage to Rome to receive plenary indulgences. From the Catholics' point of view, this year then culminated in the declaration of a new dogma regarding the physical

[18] Ellwood, *1950 Crossroads of American Religious Life*, 3.
[19] Mark Sherwin, *The Extremists* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), 110.
[20] Ellwood, *1950 Crossroads of American Religious Life*, 131.

assumption of the Virgin Mary.[21] This new dogma was widely discussed among Catholic intellectuals. During the period of the spiritual battle with communism, this dogma was deeply symbolic and was to confirm the power, immutability and conviction of the Catholic faith. For Catholics, the year 1950 marked officially a return to the faith of their fathers, a return to tradition. The Catholic Church wanted to be a solid rock of certainty in a world that indulged in materialism, despite the fact that its self-confidence had been shaken by the horrors of the war, concentration camps, gulags and nuclear explosions.

With admiration, the Catholic Church looked to the Thomism-imbued Middle Ages, and to the period of certainty generated by the Counter-Reformation movement. The works of writers such as Thomas Merton (*The Seven-Storey Mountain*) then contributed to the temporary restoration of the monastic movement of American Catholics.[22] In the post-war history of the twentieth century, the greatest academic interest in Catholic seminaries was shown in 1950. It seems that in the 1950s, all Americans longed for something stable in their lives.

Years of Change

The National Council of Churches, which united 29 denominations, most of them Protestant, and consisted of 31 million people altogether, was founded in Cleveland in late November 1950. It can be said that these were beginnings of an ecumenical effort being made by Protestant Americans. The founding of the Council, however, divided American Protestants into denominations that cooperated with the Council and other denominations, mostly Unitarians and Universalists, who were too liberal for the Council. 30 million Roman Catholics also understandably remained detached from the Council.[23]

However, under the influence of the perceived communist threat, strong antipathies between American Catholics and Protestants were overcome in the 1950s. The Catholic Church was no longer seen as a foreign element in American society. The irony of this is that some historians, such as Robert S. Ellwood or Warren L. Vinz, ascribed this on the fact that Joseph McCarthy, a popular senator of the 1950s who sparked hysteria over a communist

[21] This move damaged ecumenical relations of Catholics with Protestant denominations, because Protestants do not acknowledge the special position of saints and the Virgin Mary. They disapprove any Marian worship. l.c.

[22] Chester Gillis, *Roman Catholicism in America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 75.

[23] Gaustad, *A Documentary History*, 456.

conspiracy in the United States, was a Catholic.[24] The Catholic Church's strong anti-communist sentiments, however, certainly helped persuade many Americans that their Catholic compatriots were as patriotic and as willing to confront the communist menace as they were.

In addition to transforming Catholics' social status, which culminated in the 1960s when John F. Kennedy became the President of the United States, the 1950s also brought about a change in the status of inhabitants of Jewish origin. After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, predominantly evangelical Protestants, emphasizing the literary interpretation of the biblical prophecy of Armageddon, the valley where according to biblical prophecy, the final battle between the forces of good and evil would be waged, began to feel an obligation to support the Jewish State and the Jewish nation in its struggle for survival.[25] Thanks to evangelical Christians, Judaism then officially moved out of society's margins to become the third-most influential religion in the USA. The changes in the social status of Catholics and Jews were the most distinct religious transformations to take place in the 1950s.

The sad reality was that most of the nation's churches were strictly racially segregated. Many churches had signs telling black or "colored" believers to visit the neighborhood church that was intended for them.[26] However, a change was developing quietly and unnoticed in this matter as well. In 1950, Martin Luther King Jr., a student of Crozer Seminary in Pennsylvania, was introduced to Mahatma Gandhi's teachings about passive resistance and non-violence. That same year, a man named Malcolm Little was imprisoned. He subsequently adopted Islam and became a black activist known as Malcolm X. The path towards the dramatic changes that American society experienced in the 1960s thus became open not only in terms of the soul but also in terms of civil and human rights.

What Data Can Reveal

According to the opinions of historians and eyewitnesses, the 1950s saw the signs of a return to traditional tried-and-true values. Names like Auschwitz, Treblinka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki presented a clear message that progress, science, and faith in humanity had failed. The

[24] Warren L. Vinz, *Pulpit Politics* (New York: SUNY Press, Albany, 1997), 116.
[25] Gaustad, *A Documentary History*, 442–448.
[26] Gillis, *Roman Catholicism in America*, 81.

above-mentioned sites of tragic events were perceived as a consequence of too much modern faith. Consequently, it was easy for educated believers to see the dangers of the fruits of enlightenment that the Church had always fought against. Therefore, it was necessary that the 1950s bore traces of "counter-reformation and contra revolution."

The era's literature has preserved the reactions of prominent theologians and philosophers to the pressing issues of the time. However, the question is to be posed here: "To what extent was the thinking of neo-Thomists Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gibson reflected in the lives of common Catholic believers?" and "To what extent did the reflections of Karl Barth, Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr influence Americans of the Protestant faith?" The matter can be sketched by sociological studies that have been carried out systematically in the USA since 1947. One of the flaws of these studies is that they do not allow for comparison between the 1950s and previous eras. Most of these studies are able to relate, in quantitative terms, the upswing in American religious life in the 1950s only through comparison between the indicators of the 1950s and the years that followed, which have been considered a period of religion's decline. In spite of these deficits, the aforementioned studies can provide a new perspective on the assessment of American religiosity in general. It is enough to be aware of the fact that people have a general tendency to regard the present as an era suffering from the degeneration of traditional values while they idealize preceding eras.

Most social phenomena connected with religious belief indicate a high degree of stability and invariability over the course of time. Whenever there are changes in the religious faith of the American people, social studies show that these changes do not apply to fundamental religious doctrines. They have not changed in any way over the last forty years, during which time the studies have been carried out. AIPO data shows that in every survey that has been conducted since the 1944 nine out of ten Americans have said they believe in God. For the sake of comparison, the actual percentage was 97 percent in 1944 and 95 percent in 1981. In 1952, 77 percent of respondents affirmed that they believed in the divinity of Jesus Christ, while in 1983 this figure was 76 percent. AIPO data reflects the fact that God plays a very important role in the lives of the American people. In 1985, respondents from the countries listed below stated how important God was in their lives on a scale of one to ten points. Americans gave God's importance a score of 8.2, the Irish 8.0, Italians 6.9, Spanish 6.4, British 5.7,

and Swedes 3.9. It follows that American religiosity is much stronger than that of other nations in the modern, technology-bloated West.[27] The studies of 1944–1985 did not reflect any evident changes in the American people's belief in the afterlife. Three quarters of the respondents said they believed in the afterlife, 6–7 percent were not sure, and one fifth did not believe in it. The study also revealed that most respondents who believed in the afterlife also believed in the existence of Heaven. In 1952, this figure stood at 71 percent and in 1980 it was 70 percent. However, belief in the existence of Hell dropped from 58 percent in 1952 to 53 percent in 1980. According to the studies, belief in the afterlife not only remained the same; it was not even dependent on the age and education of the respondents.

It was possible to prove the decline in the literal perception of the Bible as an absolute and word-for-word description of the truth. Literal interpretation of the Bible decreased from 65 percent to 38 percent in 1963–1968. Similarly, faith in the infallibility of the Bible also experienced a decline. The highest drop in terms of the literal interpretation of the Bible occurred among Catholics, who were not bound as tightly to its dogma as evangelical Protestants.[28]

Thus it seems that there were only minor changes in American religiosity for which developments in the Catholic Church can be blamed. With the exception of certain external signs that directed society's attention towards religion, American religiosity itself did not change significantly; it neither grew nor waned. There were changes connected with believers leaving the main Protestant denominations to join smaller ones. That was the only major change registered among American Protestants.

According to AIPO data from 1937, 73 percent of population were members of one church or another. This figure actually rose to 76 percent in 1947, and dropped to 67 percent in 1982. However, Andrew Greeley interprets this fall as a consequence of the high proportion of young people in the population.[29] Greeley identifies with the description of American religiosity's development on the basis of stability model. In theory, this model fully describes religiosity's development among American Protestants, Catholics and Jews. It seems thus more than sufficient for describing major behavioral traits of the American population.

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[27] Greeley, *Religious Change in America*, 13.
[28] Ibid., 17.
[29] Ibid., 57.

Conclusion

From the point of view based on the analysis of literature dedicated to American religiosity's development in the second half of the twentiets century, it is evident that religious life in the United States has gone through at least two eras during which it captured society's attention and dominated communication media. These two peaks were the 1950s and the 1980s. At first glance, the decades between, before and after them must seem like periods of a decline in the intensity of religious life and its social significance. However, the truth of the matter is more complicated. The results of sociological studies in this field disprove any dramatic shifts in the meaning that religion has had for the American as an individual.

Thorough analysis of the 1950s (alleged) increase in spirituality revealed a clear association with the distinct visualization of religious themes in public. American society, which has traditionally been deeply rooted in religion, probably needed to cope with the modern horrors it had just witnessed. Therefore, in the 1950s Americans felt a strong need to reinforce each other's belief.

In 1950s, religion could still explain the meaning of a person's life and his position in the world better than science with its merciless natural laws. In all likelihood, this was the main reason that society gave religion so much publicity. The fact that the phrase "In God We Trust" appeared on all new banknotes in 1955 does not necessarily signify that Americans believed less in God in previous years. However, the 1950s saw the revival of the traditional religiosity that was highly suspicious of modern changes because it was pining for the return to *ad fontes* – return to the world from which it had emerged, the traditional world that most religious fundamentalists were longing for.

When evaluating historians' contributions based primarily on period literature, which, according to society's demands, favors religious themes in one decade somewhat more than in another, regardless of the intensity of the population's actual religious life, it is necessary to proceed as carefully as when assessing the value of sociological studies. An illustration of this point can be found in an odd sociological discovery that 95 percent of Americans believe in God and 2 percent of Americans never pray. What logically follows out of this is the fact that a total of three percent of Americans pray but do not believe in God. If we theologically interpret a prayer as a dialogue

with God and not as, say, a Zen meditation, this means that 3 percent of Americans pray to a God they do not believe in.[30]

The historical and sociological perspectives on the development of American religiosity reveal some interesting information. However, it is necessary to realize that this information is a part of a much larger mosaic that, in all probability, we will never be able to monitor fully. American religiosity has definitely gone through some changes but these changes pertain more to the manifestations of this religiosity in later decades, particularly among American Catholics. In all likelihood, the key change in the religiosity of the 1950s was the amount of publicity that religion was being given throughout the decade.

[30] Ibid., 66.

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STUDIA TERRITORIALIA IV

ITALIAN IDENTITY BETWEEN TRADITION AND MODERNITY

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Abstract

The paper deals with the topic od tradition and modernity in Italy with respect to the division of the country to rich North and poor South. After decades this division is persistent more than it had been expected. There were many regimes (monarchy, republic, fascism) and political and development strategies trying to come to terms with it; however, it is working, causing crises and sometimes taking the forms of semi-separatism or open separatism movements aiming at the political and territorial dismemberment of the country. Even the fact that Italy is the firm part of the Euroepan Union has not released the tensions between developed and underdeveloped parts od the state. Hence the Italian identity is stigmatized by this situation since regional or local affiliation is sometimes much stronger than the national one and people in the North do not feel often to be of the same origin like their Southern countryfellows.

Keywords: Italy, modernity, tradition, Risorgimento, identity

"We built Italy, and now we must build Italians," the words that crowned in a peculiar way the process of unification of Italy. This thought – believed by many to be true to this day, as these who follow it support the argument that Italians still have to be built – is a perfect expression of the problem of Italian identity, or rather of the problem of its lack. Once the unification had been completed, Italy materialised on the political map of Europe as a fairly large state. Yet from its earliest days, the Italian state ran into a major obstacle resulting from the lack of historical tradition to refer to in order to build the *ethos* of the state. For before the nineteenth century there had been no form of statehood on the peninsula that Italy would be the

direct successor of. The newly established state brought an entirely new phenomenon: with no history, tradition or common values and culture. The problem with the non-existent Italian nation was even worse, as it was only to crystallise around the unified state. The founders of Italy believed the new state to be the nation-forming factor; to perform the task of creating the Italian nation properly, the state was forced to restrain and discipline various particular and regional interests. An Italian was primarily to be an Italian, and not a Roman, Genoese, Milanese, Piedmontese, Venetian, Tuscan or Sicilian.

"The young Sabaudian monarchy," wrote Simona Colarizi, an Italian historian, "lying on the fringe of the Olympus of the powers that be, assumed the physiognomy of a liberal state on the road to democracy: there could be no other way. Liberals and democrats were those Italians who fought for the birth of the state, and it was the liberal values that its institutional constitution was based on."[1] Italy was the work of the *Risorgimento*: a major nineteenth century ideological and political movement that aimed at the unification of territories inhabited by Italians into a single state. The establishment of the new state was based on the political structures and institutions of the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont, which made the postulates of the *Risorgimento* its official political programme. Yet the goals of the *Risorgimento* went beyond purely political matters: the goals encompassed also quick development of a modern and progressive society in Italy. Unfortunately, to quote Stanley G. Payne, "after 1860 much of this task turned out to be put off into infinity, while many patriots considered the new Italian system – oligarchic, elitist, and economically tight – a pathetic decay or betrayal of high aspirations."[2] The Italian state was dominated by the elite composed of the bourgeoisie and aristocracy of the North, which disregarded and held in contempt the poor South of the country. Constitutional monarchy was unacceptable for the republican faction, whose great political and intellectual leader, Giuseppe Mazzini, was forced into emigration. A fairly tight system of power, which lasted until the First World War, was developed with election rights enjoyed only by those who could meet the high property qualifications. The country's economy was weak, and even despite an acceleration of the modern industrialisation processes in the 1890s, Italy was up to the First World War a predominantly agricultural country, much poorer than other West European states.

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1 Simona Colarizi, *Storia del novecento italiano* (Milano: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 2000), 6.
2 Stanley G. Payne, *Il fascismo* (Roma: Newton & Compton Editori, 1999), 69.

The problems related to the lack of common national identity among the inhabitants of the young state were quick to surface. Many of them were only, in the words of Colarizi, "Italians on paper",[3] as they felt no marked change in their social and political status, treating Italy with the same indifference they exhibited towards the Habsburg, Bourbon or papal rule. National culture was being born in pain. Moreover, the scope of its impact was highly limited. This was caused partly by the high level of illiteracy and partly by the lack of a common language. Many inhabitants did not speak Italian but a variety of dialects, while so-called "high society", the royal family included, spoke French. It is generally believed that Italian was not established in its capacity of the commonly used language until the 1960s when it spread thanks to the television.

Attempts were made to use the development of colonial empire to make up for lack of success in internal policy, yet even those plans failed. France beat Italy subjugating Tunisia in 1881. Italians were only successful with founding small colonies in Eritrea and Somalia. An attempt to subjugate Ethiopia ended in a disgraceful defeat at Adua (1896) – the only victory of African troops over European armies in the nineteenth century. "In consequence," as Stanley G. Payne rightly noticed, "Italy could not become Europe's 'sixth power', and was left with the role of a country similar to Spain, Greece or Portugal, only slightly larger."[4] The general spirit improved slightly after the victory in the Turkish war (1911–1912) that gave Italy Libya and several islands in the Aegean Sea.

In May 1915, Italy joined the Entente in the First World War, and benefited from the conflict: the Conference of Versailles gave Italy Trento, Trieste, Upper Adige, Istria and Dalmatia that had previously been under Austro-Hungarian rule. Consequently, the war became a kind of next stage of the *Risorgimento*, and it resulted in taking over territories believed to be Italian. Nevertheless, Italy did not receive Fiume (Rijeka), which resulted in resentment throughout the country and withdrawal from the Peace conference.

In 1919, Italian political stage saw the appearance of the fascist movement led by a former socialist, Benito Mussolini who made skilful use of frustration in the society caused by hard economic conditions and not entirely satisfactory results of the war. It was commonly believed that the

[3] Colarizi, *Storia del novecento italiano*, 6.
[4] Ibid.

Italian victory was "crippled" (*vittoria mutilata*). Fascism was spreading fast. After the March on Rome (28 October 1922), the fascists seized power, and Mussolini assumed the post of the Prime Minister. The triumph of fascism put an end to the liberal period in the Italian history, which had begun with the establishment of the state. Now the state abruptly entered a new era.

The first years of Mussolini's government marked the state with a specific semi-dictatorship. The Prime Minister led a multi-party government, with only three other fascist ministers. The new cabinet did not seem very different from the previous ones. New qualities were beginning to appear, however. In November 1922, the Parliament granted Mussolini the right to rule by decrees for a year, which was to help to ease economic problems. A month later, the Fascist Grand Council (*Gran Consiglio del Fascismo*) was established; formally, it was the managing body of the fascist party, yet the Council's prerogatives went much further. The Council began to influence directly the policy of the state, and in 1928 it became an official organ of the state and eclipsed the parliament. In January 1923, the party's *squadri* were turned into voluntary national security militia (*Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale*), which became a state institution. Mussolini's government scored certain economic and social successes, and was especially praised for the introduction of peace in the country. Little wonder that its authority was on the rise, and the National Fascist Party (*Partito Nazionale Fascista*, PNF) enrolled new members by thousands. Towards the end of November 1921, the Fascist Party had nearly 300,000 members to reach 5 million in 1943.[5]

A major crisis followed the kidnap and later murder of a socialist MP, Giacomo Matteotti, by fascist thugs on 10 June 1924. The connections of Matteotti's killers with high-ranking government officials were disclosed. Even though personal involvement of Mussolini has never been proved, he was definitely responsible politically. This is what the outraged general public believed, as it turned away from the head of the government. Opposition MPs withdrew from the works of the parliament and, following Roman plebeians from the fifth century BC, announced "Aventine secession". Fascists found themselves deep in defensive, and Mussolini himself believed in the possibility of being dismissed. Much like in 1922, the final decision was up to the King. Yet, despite numerous incentives, the politically apathetic Vittorio Emanuele III decided not to step in again.

[5] John Pollard, *The Fascist Experience in Italy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 62.

After some time, convinced that he was no longer in jeopardy, Mussolini began his counteroffensive. On 3 January 1925 he delivered his famous address to the Parliament, announcing a sudden political turn. Twenty-six months after the March on Rome, Mussolini proclaimed "complete power for complete fascism", which was tantamount to transition into full-fledged dictatorship. What is more, he assumed personal responsibility for the Matteotti murder, speaking swaggeringly that "if fascism has become a criminal association, then I am the leader of this criminal association."[6] For the first time, the police was ordered to arrest a group of political opponents, and opposition MPs who wanted to return to the Parliament were not allowed to.

Soon, the role of the Parliament was reduced only to approving governmental decrees. In the election of 1929, the voters received only one list, which they could support or reject. Eventually, it was supported by almost all voters. A decade later the parliament was dissolved, and its capacity of political representation was taken by the nominated Chamber of Fasces and Corporations (*Camera dei Fasci e delle Corporazioni*). Mussolini consolidated vast power in his hands. In addition to being the Prime Minister he presided over eight departments. He became *Il Duce* – the infallible leader of fascism and Italy. The slogans: "The Duce is always right" (*Il Duce ha sempre ragione*) and "To believe, to obey, to fight" (*Credere, obbedire, combattere*) became official slogans. Both the legal and educational systems were fully fascistised. In 1926, after three unsuccessful attempts at Mussolini's life (in one of them he suffered a slight nose wound), all political parties save the PNF and all non-fascist trade unions were declared illegal.

Duce announced that the Italian state was totalitarian (*stato totalitario*). The fundamental principle of such a state was "nothing against the state, nothing outside the state, nothing without the state."[7] A leading fascist philosopher, Giovanni Gentile, wrote that "for fascism, everything is in the state, and nothing human or spiritual may exist or have any value outside the state. In this sense, fascism is totalitarian, and a fascist state provides the synthesis and unity of all the values: it shapes, realizes, and develops the entire life of the nation."[8] Fascism thus primarily attempted the consolidation of

[6] Quoted in Payne, *Il fascismo*, 126.
[7] Quoted in Karl Dietrich Bracher, "Totalitarismo", in *Enciclopedia del Novecento*, vol. VII (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1984), 721.
[8] Giovanni Gentile, *Che cosa è il fascismo* (Firenze: La Fenice, 1925), 37.

the state, and then its transformation towards totalitarianism. The nation and the national identity were important – true, yet they could develop only within the framework of the totalitarian state. The omnipotent state referred to the ideas of national solidarity and tolerated no political, social, class or professional conflict, hence the corporations that became its basic structure. Those accused of anti-state and subversive activity faced a special tribunal, whose decisions were secret, and sentences severe, especially after the reinstitution of the capital punishment in 1927.

The totalitarian concept of the state was combined with the quest for the new, powerful national identity of Italians. The tradition of ancient Rome became a great myth that was to support the national identity. The Italian nation was announced the inheritor and continuator of the Romans, and if it was so, greatness and grandeur had to be its appointed lot, so the nation was to strive to develop its own empire. "Latinity," wrote Paolo Viola, "became something akin to a civil religion, whose task was to reinforce the efforts of the Italians to regain the greatness that was their due."[9] The moment of assuming control over the country by the fascists was considered the beginning of the new era: the Fascist era (*era fascista*).

In 1933, Germany fell under the sway of Adolf Hitler, who had always had much respect for Mussolini and considered Duce his political master. Mussolini was gradually warming to Hitler. But still in the 1920s he refused to send Hitler his autographed photo, and later – in private circles – frequently referred to the German nazism as a "parody of fascism". In the second half of the 1930s the Duce was forced to count with Hitler, especially as the dynamics of the Third Reich greatly exceeded the capacity of Italy. The two countries under two variations of fascism kept converging. Yet in this frame, Mussolini sadly found himself to be in an increasingly greater degree the *dictator minor*, as the role of the *dictator maior* was reserved for the German *Führer*. In 1938, under the influence of Hitler, Mussolini announced the concept of "Italian racism", which was accompanied by the introduction of anti-Jewish legislation.

Envying Germans their conquest, while he himself could boast only of conquering Ethiopia (and not without a great effort) in 1936, and eager to participate, together with Germany, in the new division of the world to make reference to the imperial tradition of ancient Rome, Mussolini made Italy join the Second World War in June 1940. While Italian soldiers fought

[9] Paolo Viola, *Il Novecento* (Torino: Einaudi, 2000), 96.

bravely at the fronts of the First World War, now they displayed utmost military awkwardness and lack of commitment to Mussolini's war, which was not theirs. For this reason Italy's martial involvement was a huge succession of defeats: a fact that shook the fascist regime and made the Duce lose his authority. On 25 July 1943, the Fascist Grand Council resolved to strip Mussolini of his power. Following this change, King Vittorio Emanuele III had him arrested and the post of the Prime Minister entrusted to Marshal Pietro Badoglio, whose government opened negotiations with the Allies and later declared war on Germany. Confined in the mountain resort of Gran Sasso in the Apennines, Mussolini was rescued in a spectacular raid of German troops operating on Hitler's personal order and commanded by Colonel Otto Skorzenny. After the Duce had been brought to Germany, on 17 September 1943, fulfilling Hitler's command, he announced on Munich radio the dethronement of the Sabaudian dynasty and the establishment of the Italian Social Republic (*Repubblica Sociale Italiana*). Fully under German control, this bantam puppet state with its capital in the town of Salò situated over Garda Lake in northern part of Italy was controlled by German troops. After a time the Italian fascism was returning to its republican roots which was to be reflected in the new name of the party: Fascist Republican Party (*Partito Fascista Repubblicano*, PFR). At the same time Mussolini returned to highly leftist slogans, advocating "socialisation of economy" which practical establishment in the Salò Republic was forestalled only by the Germans.

The history of the Salò Republic turned out to be an episode of less than two years. Towards the end of April 1945, when Germany was certain to lose, Mussolini escorted by an SS squad attempted to flee to Switzerland. On 27 April, the column was stopped at Dongo, close to the Swiss border by the Italian partisans. Dressed in German officer's uniform Mussolini was identified and arrested. The next day, the Duce was executed at Como together with his long-time mistress, Claretta Petacci, who chose to die by his side. On 29 April, their bodies, hanging by their feet, were publicly displayed in Piazzale Loreto in Milan. This kind of macabre spectacle was a fascist invention: they did the same in the recent past with the bodies of captured partisans. There came the time for revenge.

The end of the Italian dictator was a tragic one, yet so was the fate he had prepared for his nation, bereaving it of freedom for many long years and engaging it in the anguish of war. Mussolini's mistake was not copied in Spain by his protégé, General Francisco Franco who – capable of saying

"no" to Hitler – not only survived the war unscathed but also managed to remain in power for decades, not unlike another disciple of the Duce: António Salazar in Portugal.

Fascism made its mark – clear and permanent – not only on the Italian state but also on the entire Italian national conscience, which it distorted through its manipulations. An eminent Italian philosopher of liberal predisposition, Benedetto Croce (who went through a period of fascination with fascism, as he believed it to have some points in common with liberalism) expressed a highly controversial opinion while speaking in front of the Legislative Assembly in September 1945: "From 1860 to 1922, Italy was one of the most democratic countries of the world, since its development was non-ruptured and generally fast progressing on the path of democracy, naturally democracy of liberal style, as each true democracy is."[10] Thus Croce expected that the post-war Italian state will be a simple continuation of the pre-1922 Italy, and considered the fascist period an interruption of the natural historical continuity – a certain ellipsis in the history of the country. Disregarding the opinion that the pre-fascist Italy was a blooming democracy, a theory that cannot stand up to the facts, Croce was mistaken in two matters. Firstly, in suggesting that fascism was an episode of little consequence and a taxing historical blunder whose experience can be fairly easily overcome, and secondly, in preaching to bridge the gap between the pre-fascist period and the post-fascist future – which was an act impossible to accomplish as post-war Italy had to become an entirely new political entity. The formula of a liberal pre-1922 state was strongly discredited. There was a rather common opinion that the helplessness and errors of liberal system as well as its misalignment to the real needs of the nation provided the climate for the rise of fascism. After the war, Italy thus had to take shape following a double negation: rejecting both fascism and the model of the state that preceded it.

In the referendum of 2 June 1946, Italian citizens supported republic rejecting monarchy. At the same time the elections to the Constitutional National Assembly, a body that was to work out the constitution formula for the new, republican Italy, were held. Three parties, namely Christian Democracy (*Democrazia Cristiana*, DC), Italian Communist Party (*Partito Comunista Italiano*, PCI), and Italian Socialist Party (*Partito Socialista Italiano*, PSI), obtained together nearly 75 per cent of votes. For many

[10] Quoted in Paolo Alatri, *Le origini del fascismo* (Roma: Editori Laterza, 1956), 163.

years, until the late 1980s, these three parties were the leading actors of the country's political stage and they were decisively influencing the face of Italy.[11]

The Constitution of 1948 was to be a powerful contradiction of the fascist period. The memory of Benito Mussolini's dictatorship resulted in the weakening of executive powers and the strengthening of legislative. However, the parliament and cabinet system could not pass muster in a country famous for its hot temper, where the people treat politics as a highly emotional game. The consequence was the weakness of Italian government. No control could be exerted by the president, as his prerogatives mostly consisted of purely representational functions.

Throughout Europe, Italy was perceived as the country of chaos and lack of stabilisation. The most representative example was lack of stable ruling coalitions. Cabinets changed as if in a kaleidoscope, so that an average Italian government remained in force no more than ten months. Yet, any new government did not differ much from its predecessor, as it was composed of the same factions, and frequently shared ministers with them. Political games began to be the new reality, existing for their own sake. This resulted in a progressive alienation of politics and its severance from society. Political practice of republican Italy strongly reinforced the political parties. They began to take primacy over state institutions – a phenomenon that has developed at such a scale nowhere else. A condition favourable for this was the fact that no political formation obtained sufficient electoral support to govern independently. Even an alliance of two parties would not suffice to form a government. Governmental alliances had to encompass multiple players – four or five as a rule. In Italy, the decision about the shape of the government and both its programme and personal facet – which is of fundamental importance for democracy – was not made when it should have been, that is during the election, but at the forum of post-election bickering between the elites of the leading parties. The vote decisive for the matters of the state was in fact cast by party secretariats operating beyond civic control. This resulted in the hegemony of parties in Italian politics, this peculiar promotion of parties being achieved at the price of deforming democracy. Even academic constitutional law textbooks, which cannot be held frivolous, have always devoted much space to the question of

[11] See http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/i/italy/italy-constituent-assembly-election-1946.html (last accessed on 11 January 2010).

partocracy (*partitocrazia*).[12] Partocracy, whose fullest manifestation was to be the Republic of Italy, was considered a degenerated democracy. Political parties, having taken over sovereign rights belonging to the nation, made sovereign decisions about the course and the future of the state, nominating head posts in all institutions by the virtue of nomenclature arrangements. The phenomenon, to quote Leopoldo Elia, "of a party occupying the state" became a highly negative political phenomenon specific to Italy.[13] Andrea Manzella, in turn, spoke of "partycratic state".[14]

As could easily be guessed, Christian Democracy became the symbol of partocracy, as from the end of the war to 1994 it formed the core of all the Italian cabinets. What can be perceived as a paradox, the accusation of partocracy was put forth against Christian Democrats even by their allies, who not only felt perfectly at ease in the thus formed mechanism of control of the parties over the state, but who were also capable of drawing appropriate profits from this situation. The leader of the Italian Republican Party (*Partito Repubblicano Italiano*, PRI), Giorgio La Malfa recognised that "Christian Democracy became identified with the state", and added that it was "sufficient to think of the nature of the control of Christian Democracy over the life of the entire country – the banks, RAI [public TV and radio – M. B.], public institutions – to understand that the manner of voting in the elections depends on these power structures and on this unusually powerful nomenclature."[15] He was supported by the leader of the liberals (*Partito Liberale Italiano*, PLI), Renato Altissimo, who claimed that "Christian Democracy, with the mere 30 per cent of votes ensured 90 per cent of power."[16]

Only on rare occasions did the Christian Democrats rule single-handedly as a minority cabinet. Government alliances, which connected Christian Democrats to the parties of the so-called "constitutional arch" (*arco costituzionale*), that is the republicans, liberals, social-democrats, and the strongest faction in this group, namely, socialists, were a rule. Because of the continuous changes at the top and frequent breakdowns of the cabinets, Italy became legendary for its lack of political alternatives.

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[12] See *Diritto costituzionale* (Napoli: Edizioni Simone, 1992), 95.
[13] Leopoldo Elia, "La peculiarità e l'evoluzione del sistema italiano riguardo ai partiti politici", in *Sindacato e sistema democratico* (Bologna: il Mulino, 1975), 178.
[14] Andrea Manzella, *Il parlamento* (Bologna: il Mulino, 1991), 58.
[15] Quoted in *Przegląd Międzynarodowy* (Polska Agencja Prasowa), 30 August 1991.
[16] Ibid.

New governments, as has already been mentioned, were practically in the same political fashion as the old ones. Petrification of the governing political system favoured corruption, which eventually turned out to be the decisive factor behind the political change of 1990s. Here one ought to pose a question about the sources of this lack of political alternatives and no change of political elites, astonishing in a democratic system. The answer seems relatively easy: any potential change in Italy was blocked by what is frequently referred to as "the C factor", namely the presence of the Communist Party – the strongest communist party of the Western world – which for many years was believed to be a formation working against the system, that is questioning the foundations of the state's constitution and calling for radical changes. Until 1989, which brought about the decay of global communism, Italy, as Giorgio La Malfa rightly noticed was a "front state".[17] In other words, it was a Western democracy most threatened by communism. "We had," continued La Malfa, "a system with an opposition so radical that it could only be sentenced to remaining outside of the system."[18] This resulted in no possibility of a left-wing opposition to the governing system, with even lesser option for a rightist opposition as the Italian right wing was represented by a formation of fascist provenience, i.e. Italian Social Movement – National Right Wing (*Movimento Sociale Italiano – Destra Nazionale*, MSI-DN).[19]

Thus the political stage of the country was dominated by the fundamental opposition of two huge parties, each of which represented approximately 30 per cent of electoral votes: the eternally governing Christian Democrats and the Communist Party – always in opposition as lastingly subjected to the operation of the specific *conventio ad excludendum*.[20] For nearly five decades major groups of electorate followed negative – and not positive – motivation in their political behaviour, voting not "for" but "against". Many of the votes cast for Christian Democrats did not support their programme but were just an opposition against communism. The situation

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[17] Giorgio La Malfa and Giuseppe Turani, *Le ragioni di una svolta* (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer Editori, 1992), 1.

[18] Ibid., 55.

[19] See Piero Ignazi, *Il polo escluso. Profilo storico del Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Bologna: il Mulino, 1989); and Marek Bankowicz, "Faszyzm w życiu politycznym powojennych Włoch", in *Rozvoj české společnosti v Evropské unii*, vol. III, ed. Jakub Končelík, Barbara Köpplová, Irena Prázová and Jiří Vykoukal (Praha: MatfyzPress, 2004), 197–210.

[20] Cf. Pietro Scoppola, *La repubblica dei partiti. Evoluzione e crisi di un sistema politico 1945–1996* (Bologna: il Mulino, 1997), 425.

in the Italian party system was referred to as an imperfect two-party system (*bipartitismo imperfetto*).[21] The essence of the imperfectness of the Italian two-party system was that the two big parties mentioned above did not alter in government. The deadlock in the system of power and no exchange of the state's ruling class brought about numerous negative phenomena, including the partocracy mentioned above, as well as corruption and the obscure connections between the politicians and the world of organised crime, i.e. the mafia.

Despite all this, it is to be remembered that post-war Italy achieved major economic progress, becoming one of Europe's most powerful economies. The standard of life improved greatly, especially due to the impressive economic boom of 1950s and 1960s, generally referred to as the "economic miracle" (*miracolo economico*). The crisis in politics, a phenomenon fairly permanent, was in a way mastered and separated from the life of the society and from economic processes which followed their own course. Giulio Andreotti, one of the leading politicians of post-war Italy, who served seven times as the Prime Minister, claimed that Italians found a method of governing in crisis, and as a consequence there appeared the phenomenon of "stable instability".[22] The situation in the country was perfectly portrayed by the French press: the headline over a description of contemporary Italy went "But it does move!" (*Eppur si muove!*). In this context, the words attributed to Galileo received a new significance, meaning that despite all the limitations, crises and trouble Italy does move forward.[23]

In 1989, Central and Eastern Europe was the stage of the famous "autumn of the nations", in whose consequence the world communist system fell. Everything suggested that this fact should lead to certain processes and changes of values within PCI, yet not deep enough to allow speaking about any fundamental turn. Only few believed that soon a radical political change would take place in Italy. Since 1956, Italian Communists heeded no commands issued by Moscow; they did away with the principle of unity of the world's communist movement, working out the idea of the "Italian path to socialism". This standpoint and at the same time the party's independence found their expression, for instance, in PCI's support

[21] The first to use this term was Giorgio Galli, who used it for the title of his book, *Il bipartitismo imperfetto. Comunisti e democristiani in Italia* (Bologna: il Mulino 1966).
[22] Giulio Andreotti, *Governare con la crisi* (Milano: Rizzoli, 1991), 421.
[23] See Janina Zakrzewska, *Ustrój polityczny Republiki Włoskiej* (Warszawa: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1986), 14.

of the Prague Spring of 1968 and subsequent determined disapproval of the military intervention of communist states in Czechoslovakia.[24] In 1970s, under the leadership of Enrico Berlinguer, the PCI clearly chose the strategy of Euro-communism: an attempt to reconcile the traditional ideals of the communist movement and the requirements of parliamentary democracy and free market economy. At that time Italian Communists were already openly criticising the so-called real socialism, acknowledging that Soviet Union and other communist countries perverted Marxism, in whose name these states imposed highly repressive dictatorships. This resulted in what Paul Ginsborg, a British historian specialising in Italian affairs, called "atrophy of Italian communism".[25] Yet, the PCI – less and less communist in its programme and political line – retained its historical name.

Nevertheless, the 1989 fiasco of communism both in its capacity of a system of government and an ideology posed a certain challenge for Italian communists, as it forced them to look for a new identity in the changed reality of the world. The view that the communist collar was more and more oppressive and restrictive for the party and for that reason should be done away with gaining grounds. In 1990, during the extraordinary congress of the PCI a decision to terminate the 69-year-long history of the party and to reject Marxist and Leninist heritage was reached.[26] PCI was replaced by the Democratic Party of the Left Wing (*Partito Democratico della Sinistra*, PDS), which defined itself as a democratic party working on the grounds of reformist socialism. The orthodox wing of the old Communist Party, which never came to terms with its dissolution and considered such a step a "political treason", formed a group under the name of Communist Refoundation Party (*Rifondazione Comunista*, RC) which later – a fact worth emphasising – did not undergo political diminution and was always capable of securing parliamentary representation, though markedly smaller than that of the PDS.

The events of 1989 made many observers of the Italian political stage put forth a theory that, with the communists facing the trouble caused by

[24] See Paolo Demartis, "PCI e Cecoslovacchia: la forma e la sostanza", *Mondo Operaio* (January–February 1989): 15–18.

[25] See Paul Ginsborg, *L'Italia del tempo presente. Famiglia, società civile, Stato 1980–1996* (Torino: Einaudi, 1998), 293–309.

[26] See the documents of the nineteenth Congress of the PCI, and especially the programme presentation of the then leader of the party, Achille Occhetto, entitled "A new beginning: the constituent phase of a new political formation", *The Italian Communists* (January–March 1990), 100–59.

the need to transform their identity, Christian Democracy would continue its hegemony in the state and dictate political conditions in Italy for decades to come. It was said that Italy would move from "imperfect two-party system" to the system of a single dominant party. Yet these forecasts never came true.

The wave of major corruption scandals in 1992–1993 led to the political "earthquake". The media announced corruption and fraud with the involvement of the leading representatives of the political class nearly every day. There was a time in 1992 that prosecution conducted inquiries against every third member of the parliament, including five party leaders, four former Prime Ministers, and many members of former governments. The parliamentary election of March 1994 wiped nearly all the previous political establishment from the political stage. Changes of party names and symbols, e.g. in 1994 Christian Democrats reformed into Italian Popular Party (*Partito Popolare Italiano*, PPI), were to no avail, not unlike the removal of the most disgraced politicians. The voters, disgusted with the vastness of disclosed corruption, staked especially on *Forza Italia* (FI), a formation set up two months before the elections by the billionaire tycoon Silvio Berlusconi; they also supported the forces enjoying the opinion of anti-system parties like the Northern League (*Lega Nord,* LN) using federalist slogans and not excluding the dissolution of the Italian state, and the National Alliance (*Alleanza Nazionale*, AN) based on the neo-fascist MSI-DN. Post-communists were the only party of the traditional system to survive politically, yet this was possible only due to the fact that with no participation in central authorities they were safe from major scandals. Berlusconi achieved a success unprecedented in a state with established democratic regime. He made a party which after but two months of existence won the election with the highest share of votes (21 per cent) and the largest number of MPs.[27]

The elections of 1994 are considered a turning point opening a new period in the history of Italy. This found reflection in the naming convention: it was said that the First Italian Republic was replaced by the Second Italian Republic. This naming convention, however, was exaggerated and did not find support in facts. Although parties that had governed the country

[27] Interesting material on the establishment of *Forza Italia* and the campaign ran by the group before the elections of 1994 can be found in Emanuela Poli in the book entitled *Forza Italia. Strutture, leadership e radicamento territoriale* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2001), 43–71. See also Ginsborg, *L'Italia del tempo presente*, 538–56.

continually since the end of the Second World War were removed from the government, despite many attempts no significant constitutional changes were effectuated, and therefore the system remained what it used to be.

In the 1990s the cracks in the construction of the Italian state appeared for the first time on such a scale that was major and perceptible. The danger of Balkanisation of Italy due to the multiplication of internal conflicts and emphasising the opposition of individual parts of the state began to loom large. This process was related primarily to the activity of the ever more influential Northern League, which joined the club of the most important participants in Italian politics. The League called in question the integrity of the state as well as justification and advisability of further continuation of the Republic of Italy in its present form.

The Northern League, as Umberto Venturini correctly remarked, is the "most controversial political party of Italy".[28] The formation dates back to 1979, when unknown to anyone would-be physician, Umberto Bossi, established North-Western Union of Lombardy for Autonomy (in Italian – UNOLPA), which was soon transformed into Lombard Autonomist League (*Lega Lombarda*, LL) that was eventually replaced by the Northern League in 1991.[29] Bossi's grouping started as an organisation gathering Lombard separatists. The more moderate ones spoke of the need to ensure broad autonomy for Lombardy within federalised Italy, while the radicals openly put forth their idea to dissolve Italy and establish independent Lombardy. Bossi himself kept on playing angles and changing his mind, including either federalist or independence slogans into his programme. The League recognised as its patron Alberto da Guissano, a knight whose forces defeated the armies of Frederic Barbarossa at the Battle of Legnano in 1176. The ancient event was to be the source of *ethos* for the Lombards – a nation separate and clearly distinct from Italians. Later, the Celtic origin of Lombards was strongly emphasised.[30] This was accompanied by the feeding of the antagonism between the North and the South. Nowadays, the League proclaimed, the Lombard nation is forced to defend its own history, culture

[28] Umberto Venturini, "A Biographical Profile of Three Emerging Leaders: Mario Segni – Giorgio La Malfa – Umberto Bossi", *Italian Journal. A Bi-Monthly Digest of Italian Affairs* No. 2–3 (1992): 15.

[29] The genesis and operation of the Lombard Autonomist League are appropriately characterised by Daniele Vimercati in the book entitled *I lombardi alla nuova crociata. La Lega dall'esordio al trionfo* (Milano: Mursia, 1990).

[30] See Guido Caldiron, *La destra plurale* (Roma: Manifestolibri, 2001), 62–63.

and language, and social and moral values in the hard strife against the aliens, including Italians, especially those from the South. For that reason, the national identity of the Lombards must be stirred up so as to develop among them a sense of community on one hand, and a feeling of otherness – if not superiority over aliens on the other. One of the League's manifestos said: "It does not matter how old you are, what you do and what political tendency you follow. The only thing important is the fact that you are – that we are – Lombards."[31] Here we deal with a specific sacralisation of the Lombard nation, considered in plain words better than others. Ostensible manifestation of hostility towards outsiders brought the charges of racism against the League. In his analysis, Luigi Manconi referred to the League's activists as to the "entrepreneurs active in the field of intolerance".[32] Bossi realised that his faction was perceived as racist and populist. "They say," he wrote in his autobiography, "that I am closely related to Jean-Marie Le Pen, and that the League is the voice of the racist Lombardy."[33] He would, however, stalwartly oppose such a classification, claiming that he turned the attention to the rights of Lombardy and its people not for racist or populist but for federalist reasons, for it was the federalism that formed – he believed – the core of the League's programme. Moreover, Bossi disagreed with analogies made between him and Mussolini. He would argue that the similarities were none, especially that unlike Mussolini who "marched on Rome" he would lead a "march from Rome".[34] His "march from Rome" was to be the symbol of the federalist and decentralist option of the League.

The League has always been perceived as a group making reference to the regional nationalism, criticising what they believed to be the centralised Italian state and its institutions, controlled by, to quote verbatim, "Roman parties".[35] It was not, however, only an anti-party and anti-institutional group; it went further: it was an anti-system formation, if not an anti-state one. It did postulate, as has been mentioned above, abolishment of Italy by breaking the country into independent regions.

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[31] Quoted in Ilvo Diamanti, *La Lega* (Roma: Donzelli Editore, 1993), 56.

[32] Luigi Manconi, "Imprenditori dell'intolleranza", in *I razzismi reali*, ed. Laura Balbo and Luigi Manconi (Milano: Rizzoli, 1992), 82–87.

[33] Umberto Bossi and Daniele Vimercati, *Vento dal Nord. La mia Lega, la mia vita* (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer Editori, 1992), 143.

[34] Daniele Vimercati, "La storia", in *La Rivoluzione. La Lega: storie e idee*, ed. Umberto Bossi and Daniele Vimercati (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer Editori, 1993), 109.

[35] See Gianni Statera, *Come votano gli italiani. Dal bipartitismo imperfetto alla crisi del sistema politico* (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer Editori, 1993), 52.

The League's radicalism climaxed in mid 1990s. On 15 September 1996, in Venice, in the presence of 20,000 supporters, Bossi announced the independence of Padania: a new sovereign state to encompass northern and central Italy, namely the Aosta Valley, Emilia-Romagna, Friuli – Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Lombardy, Marche, Piedmont, Tuscany, Trident – Upper Adige, Umbria, and Veneto. Neither the Padan State nor any other political construct of a similar character has ever existed. The name of Padania was devised by Bossi himself, as he assumed that there exists historical, cultural and socio-economical identity of the "people of the Po valley".[36] The Padanian Declaration of Independence was modelled on the 1776 American Declaration of Independence. "We, the nations of Padania," it reads, "solemnly announce: Padania is a federalist, independent, and sovereign Republic."[37] After the declaration, the Italian flag went down the mast and was replaced with the green and white flag of Padania. Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, then the President of Italy, warned Bossi that although the Italian state guaranteed its citizens freedom of speech, it could not tolerate illegal acts. A criminal case against Bossi and other leaders of the League was considered. It was finally rejected as the support for independence of Padania turned out to be marginal (only 7 per cent of Italian citizens declared support for the idea of independent Padania). With the passage of time, the initiative turned into a political peculiarity. After a few years the Northern League underwent another political evolution, calmed down, and without official repudiation of the idea of independent Padania, began announcing that it actually would aim at the federalisation of Italy. What is more, the political success of the League was over, as it went down in the polls. Progressive weakness of the League enforced both smaller dynamism in its operation and decreasing the radicalism of professed views. An expression of this moderate strategy was the League's participation in the Berlusconi's governmental alliance in 2001.

The League persistently maintained that the political system of Italy is based on the exploitation of the North by the South. The rich and industrious North produces the decided majority of the GNP, which to a great extent is wasted by the poor and lazy South. Why is it so? The League's answer is simple: because the state is governed by Southerners connected to the mafia.

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[36] See Bruno Vespa, *La sfida* (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer Editori, 1998), 254.
[37] Quoted in Miłada Jędrysik, "Narodziny Padanii", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 16 September 1996.

Turning the attention to the strangeness between the entirely different Italian North and the Italian South, the League touched a real problem. Exposing it, it could count on being understood and, what follows, many supporting votes in the north of the country where – following the League's opinion – people began to be accustomed to the idea of dismemberment of Italy, and if it did occur, they considered that their standard of life would greatly improve nearly automatically.

A research recently conducted in Italy proved that if the South became a separate country, it would be the poorest EU state in terms of *per capita* GDP – unemployment in the region is the highest in the EU. On the other hand, the North would stand a realistic chance to obtain the title of the EU's richest state. It is a fact that there is an economic gap between the two halves of the country; this fact disgraces the Italian state, which for decades either did not want or was simply unable to bridge this gap.

Patricia Chiantera-Stutte, an Italian analyst, is right to notice that one of the key reasons for the success of the Northern League had its source in the fact that the Italian state has never solved the national question.[38] This was manifested in the lack of ability to unite really North and South, because the economic, social, cultural, and mental differences between these parts of the country are very drastic. In effect it may be considered amazing that they remain within the same state organism. Beyond doubt, the question considered here is the gravest disgrace of Italian statehood.

Summing up, the ideology and operation of the Northern League reflect the basic tragedies of Italy, whose roots reach back to the period of the country's fragmentation. For the League referred to the separatism, always present on the peninsula, which was hostile to the heritage of *Risorgimento*: the nineteenth century movement of restoration and unification of the country. That sort of separatism continues to exist and from time to time still makes itself known. In the 1990s a sufficient space opened for separatism in connection with a marked crisis in Italian national identity. For centuries Italy was divided, both politically and culturally. The unified Italian state originated fairly recently, only in the latter half of the nineteenth century. At the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first century, the powerful impact of integration processes in Europe, globalisation and supra-national

[38] Patricia Chiantera-Stutte, "Leadership, Ideology, and Anti-European Politics in the Italian Lega Nord", in *Challenges to Consensual Politics. Democracy, Identity, and Populist Protest in the Alpine Region*, ed. Daniele Caramani and Yves Mény (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 2005), 115–16.

economic and financial mechanisms, as well as the influence of mass culture and prevalence of consumer lifestyle strongly influenced the decaying of traditional myths and national values. This process was especially visible in Italy, where the state's founding myth proved rather weak.

The example of the League kindled the imagination of other Italian separatists, who wanted to follow the path it provided. Supporters of the restitution of the Republic of Venice turned up and hung their flags on the Doges' Palace. In Rome, the aficionados of the restitution of the Papal States, with the Pope being its king and sovereign, began to be active. The voices of enthusiasm for the Kingdom of Sicily and the Bourbon Dynasty were heard, while Sardinia disclosed ranks of advocates of the island's independence. None of these movements, however, became popular; they have never gone beyond the role of political curiosities, not even venturing into the margins of true politics. Yet politics, and especially that of the time of crises and turning points, provides numerous examples of curiosities suddenly turning into significant facts that influence the course of history.

Some time ago, Pietro Scoppola remarked that "there is a paradox in the history of the republic: normally, the sense of citizenship and the group identity related thereto are reinforced by a democratic system; the implementation of civil, political, and social rights consolidates the common sense and perception of belonging. Yet in our country, after fifty years of democracy, national identity enters a crisis".[39] Various drawbacks of Italian democracy, such as the weakness of state institutions and lack of efficiency, failure to bridge the division between the North and the South, partocracy, clientelism, and corruption turned out to be highly destructive for the national conscience, as they alienated the state from the society and strengthened the conviction that it is an alien structure. Democratic and republican post-war Italian state wasted its opportunity to play the role of the factor finally and irreversibly reinforcing national identity. Gian Enrico Rusconi went even further in his radical diagnosis, when he warned that the "nation may cease to exist".[40] These opinions were formed in the heyday years of the political crisis of the 1990s, the crisis that shook the foundations of the state. It was feared that many people might reject Italian national identity for a local or European identity. While the Northern League and other political initiatives of similar character promoted the first trend, the die-hard

[39] Scoppola, *La repubblica dei partiti*, 528.
[40] Gian Enrico Rusconi, *Se cessiamo di essere una nazione* (Bologna: il Mulino, 1993), 7.

Eurocentrists suggested the latter. The most pessimistic predictions did not come true. There has been no *finis Italiae*, which does not, on the other hand, mean that Italian national identity came victorious from the dire straits, coping both with the separatism and with the demise of the party system.

At present, Italians still must struggle with the question whether they indeed are a nation, and if so, whether they still should be one. Although the majority gives a positive answer to this question, this majority includes a large number of those who first define themselves in the categories of regional or local affiliation, and only later in the categories of national affiliation. The Italian regional variety is incomparably greater than in any other European country.[41] Ernesto Galli della Loggia noticed another factor here, "the weak Italian national awareness, i.e. the insufficient awareness of the fact that Italians are to be a nation and the rare situations when they do manifest their being a nation, is a central and highly significant fact for the contemporary Italian identity".[42] If it is so, then the task of building the Italian nation has indeed not yet been accomplished.

[41] Cf. Saverio Vertone, ed., *La cultura degli italiani* (Bologna: il Mulino, 1994), 93; Salvatore Sechi, ed., *Deconstructing Italy: Italy in the Nineties* (Berkeley: University of California, 1995), 3.
[42] Ernesto Galli della Loggia, *L'identità italiana* (Bologna: il Mulino, 1998), 157.

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STUDIA TERRITORIALIA IV

WARTIME TO PEACETIME: THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION DURING THE EARLY PHASE OF POST-WW2 RE-CONVERSION

MILOŠ CALDA

Abstract

The paper deals with the policies of the Truman Administration in the months following the end of World War Two. The main emphasis is placed on the analysis of several statements and addresses of President Truman, above all his *21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period* presented to the joint session of Congress on 6 September 1945. Various aspects of the United States' re-conversion are discussed, e.g. that of industrial plants, the closing down of wartime agencies, the lifting of wage and price controls, the restoration of collective bargaining, the management of liberated and occupied territories. Last but not least, the assistance to veterans is treated. In addition, the paper tries to place the early Truman presidency into a broader historical perspective reaching as far back as to George Washington's warning against entangling peacetime alliances. The analysis of Truman Administration's documents shows, the author argues, that the U.S. was ready to return to peacetime endeavours and hardly intended to get involved in the Cold War.

Keywords: United States, WWII, Hary S. Truman, Post-War Re-conversion

Introduction

The present paper will deal with the transition processes in the United States immediately after World War Two. In the post-war years, the Truman Administration took a historic step in departing from isolationism, which had prevailed in peacetime ever since George Washington's Farewell Address (1796). The first president admonished then the new American

nation "to steer clear of permanent Alliances, with any portion of the foreign world".[1]

The United States turned from an isolationist to a global as well as globalist power after the war. This transformation was by no means easy for the Democratic administration. The Republicans achieved a major victory in Congressional elections of 1946. Their campaign was based on the demands to reduce taxes, national debt, and foreign aid. The Republicans resorted to the Anglophobe rhetoric, threatening the "special relationship" between the U.S. and the U.K. To counter the isolationism of the Republicans, the Truman Administration invoked Franklin D. Roosevelt, who continued to enjoy, for many months and years after his death, a demigod status.[2]

The American Society experienced a significant transformation in the post-war decade. At the moment of victory over Germany and, a few months later, over Japan, most Americans believed that they would move from wartime economy, wartime society and wartime conditions to normality. They expected peaceful bliss. However, things did not prove to be that simple. In fact, the pre-war decade was far from normal, too unique to return to. The Americans were troubled by the Great Depression in 1930s, the most protracted economic slump of modern history. After the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt a few weeks before the end of war in Europe, it became the task of his vice-President, Harry S. Truman, to deal with the re-conversion to peaceful times. A leading academic biographer of Truman, Alonzo L. Hamby, states – too categorically – that "virtually nothing had been done to plan for re-conversion when Truman became president".[3]

Casualties Compared

The American nation survived World War Two relatively unscathed. Its losses were incomparably lower than those suffered by the nations whose territories became theatres of war. The total of approximately 400,000 Americans were killed in World War Two, virtually all of them military personnel.[4] In other

[1] President Washington's Farewell Address. The text was partially authored by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. Full text of the Address is available at *The Papers of George Washington*, http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents/farewell/transcript.html.

[2] See e.g. William E. Leuchtenburg, *In the Shadow of FDR* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[3] Alonzo L. Hamby, *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 375.

[4] The U.S. population amounted to about 132 million in 1940.

countries that participated in the war, the proportion of civilian population in the casualties total was very high. It is estimated that 55 million people were killed worldwide in World War Two, including approximately 30 million civilians. This figure includes close to 6 million Jews who died in the Holocaust. The USSR lost 20 to 30 million people, one in every eight citizens, almost half of whom were civilians. China lost approximately 15 million people, two thirds of them civilians, Germany 7 million, half of them civilians, Poland 5.5 million, all but 120,000 civilians, Japan lost approximately 2 million people, mostly military personnel.[5]

From Isolationism to Involvement

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the balance of power environment and the deep-rooted isolationism protected the United States from the ugly facts of world politics. The American public was mostly indifferent to international conflicts. The Americans were like spectators of other teams' ball game, occasionally indulging, for brief periods, in idealistic or interest-oriented interventionism, after which a swift withdrawal followed. This can be stated, above all, about the United States' behaviour after the end of World War One.

Active participation in foreign affairs has always involved serious risks. At least in two respects the risks of American foreign policy choices dramatically increased after World War Two. First, the United States was no longer shielded by the distance from potential adversaries, which had previously made it unnecessary to make explicit advance commitments. It could no longer wait to discover where its vital interests lay until they had been brought home by vivid demonstrations, as in the cases of World Wars One and Two. The United States assumed a dominant position in the non-Communist world, and her economic and military pre-eminence placed upon her a continuing burden of initiative. Secondly, the development of military technology during and after World War Two transformed war risks from limited to unlimited. It became very difficult to avoid the advance formulation of policies involving the assumption of a possibility of war.

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[5] For figures on American casualties in all wars until the early 1990s, see the pages of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Fact Sheet: America's Wars, http://www1.va.gov/opa/fact/amwars.asp.

The key American post-war foreign relations emphases – the policy toward the USSR, the membership in the United Nations, the recognition of the new State of Israel as well as the non-recognition of the People's Republic of China, the overall Cold War policies and the participation in the arms race – reflected the American public opinion. The attitudes and preferences of the American public in the 1940s were well documented by public opinion research organizations. In *The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918–1978*, Ralph B. Levering came to the conclusion that the American foreign policy copied to a surprising degree the sometimes dramatic changes of the public opinion, from interwar isolationism to pro-Soviet attitudes and support for wartime cooperation with the Soviets during World War Two to the Cold-War consensus reflecting the fear of what was perceived as a Soviet threat.[6]

Wartime and Post-War Economy

In contrast to the developments in Europe and Asia, where destruction and fragmentation prevailed, the American economy during and immediately following World War Two was characterized by rapid industrial renewal and growth. In the last months of 1941, the military spending reached the level of $2 billion a month; in the first six months of 1942, it skyrocketed to $100 billion. In 1939, the federal budget amounted to $9 billion; by 1945 it had grown to $166 billion. These massive increases in government spending had profound – and for the most part positive – effects on American society. Almost overnight the crippling unemployment of the Great Depression had been wiped out; in fact, the labour market significantly increased with the war, ultimately creating 17 million new jobs over four years. Women and minorities, especially African Americans, entered the industrial marketplace on an unprecedented scale. These population segments became integral parts of the American industrial economy during the war. The wave of thousands of African American workers who migrated from the agricultural South to the industrialized North helped to redistribute the fruit of the nation's economic activities. For the first time, the beneficiaries included large numbers of African Americans. In the two decades following 1940, the

[6] Ralph B. Levering, *The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918–1978* (New York: Morrow, 1978).

members of this minority almost doubled their average income, sharing, even if unequally, in the nation's renewed prosperity.

Re-conversion

In the summer of 1945, the United States began to face the challenges of post-war re-conversion. Already on 8 August, two days after the nuclear bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima, one day before the use of the second bomb against Nagasaki and two days before the Japanese government accepted the surrender terms of the Potsdam Declaration, President Truman wrote a letter to J. A. Krug, Chairman of the War Production Board who was soon to become the Secretary of the Interior, on the need to speed up re-conversion.[7] Truman ordered Krug to expand the production of materials for the upcoming civilian use, to limit the manufacturing of products that required scarce materials, to prevent hoarding, to remove bottlenecks which could hamper re-conversion, and to allocate scarce materials to the production of low-cost products.

In a statement made on 13 August to mark the tenth anniversary of the Social Security Act, Truman clearly indicated that he wished to remain faithful to the legacy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his New Deal. Truman claimed that "social security [had] become an essential part of the American way of life", pointing to the fact that the national system of old-age and survivors' insurance covered 40 million workers.[8] Unemployment protection was provided to approximately 36 million workers. The anniversary statement foreshadowed his Fair Deal program. Truman also announced a further extension of the coverage of the Social Security Act.

On 16 August, Truman proposed measures to provide for industrial peace during re-conversion, aiming at the prevention of strikes and lockouts. He put forward six points: (1) to hold a conference of organized labour and industry to achieve agreement on labour disputes; (2) the disputes

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[7] See Truman's Letter to the Chairman, War Production Board, on Measures To Speed Reconversion (8 August 1945), *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum,* http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=102&st=&st1.

[8] See Statement by the President on the 10th Anniversary of the Social Security Act (13 August 1945), *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum,* http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=106&st=&st1.

where no compromise would prove possible were to be handled by the War Labor Board; (3) wage and price controls should continue until the expiry of the Stabilization Act (30 June 1946); (4) unforeseeable wage-rate hardships during re-conversion were to be handled by the War Labor Board; (5) the existence of the War Labor Board should be put an end to as soon as the post-war wage stabilization had been achieved; and (6) the U.S. Conciliation Service should be built up to enable an effective system of disputes' conciliation and arbitration in a democratic manner.[9]

At the news conference held on 23 August, Truman announced that public holidays would be again observed as non-work days and that a 40-hour working week would be established wherever possible.[10]

On 27 August, Truman sent a letter to the Senate and House Committees on Military Affairs on Army Manpower Requirements. He drew the legislators' attention to the potential dangers of the immediate post-war period: while millions of veterans deserved demobilisation, the newly occupied territories, especially those of enemy nations in Europe and in the Pacific, needed continued policing. Therefore, occupation forces were to be maintained "at safe levels". Truman asked Congress not to suspend induction to the military service of those who had not done their part yet. An alternative would have been to ask those who had done their duty to make "further sacrifice" by serving extra time. He mentioned the need to "establish the broad national policies to govern full demobilization, occupation and world security".[11] This formulation indicates that Truman understood that the extent of U.S. power in the post-war period would be global. He proposed that young men aged from 18 to 25 should be called up for a period of maximum two years. On the other hand, war veterans who did not wish to remain in the service were to be discharged.

The estimated number of volunteers by July 1946 would not exceed 800,000, a figure far lower than that required by Eisenhower and MacArthur (1.2 million). The President also warned Congress against a premature legal termination of the "emergency" or "war".

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[9] See Statement by the President Proposing Measures To Insure Industrial Peace in the Reconversion Period (16 August 1945), *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum,* http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=111.

[10] See The President's News Conference (23 August 1945), *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum*, http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=114.

[11] See Truman's Letter to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Military Affairs on Army Manpower Requirements (27 August 1945), *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum*, http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=121.

On 30 August, Truman appointed George E. Allen his personal representative to study the problem of the liquidation of war agencies. One day later, on 31 August, Truman signed an Executive Order abolishing the Office of War Information (OWI).[12] This agency, established in 1942, was headed by Elmer Davis, journalist and radio news commentator for CBS and later for ABC radio. Davis was appointed in 1941 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The OWI had both domestic and foreign roles. It was considered both a psychological warfare instrument against the enemy as well as a tool of government propaganda on the home front, winning the American people for the support of wartime efforts and programs.[13] Truman understood the need for the continuation of "foreign information operations", which should be an "integral part" of the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. The foreign information functions of OWI would be transferred to the State Department. Truman considered "American private organizations and individuals in such fields as news, motion pictures and communications" to be the "primary means of informing foreign peoples about this country". The 31 August Executive Order terminated government information activities aimed at the American people, stating that the "domestic work of OWI, such as cooperation with the press, radio, motion pictures, and other informational media in explaining governmental programs", was no longer necessary.

Truman's 21-Point Program for the Re-conversion Period

Several days after the Japanese surrender, Truman was able to present to Congress a comprehensive re-conversion program in a message which turned out to be of fundamental importance.[14] The New York Times stated on Truman's message: "Some Democrats saw in it a great state document [...].

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[12] See Statement by the President Upon Signing Order Concerning Government Information Programs (31 August 1945), *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum,* http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=127&st=&st1.

[13] Library of Congress in Washington DC has a large collection of photographs produced by OWI and its immediate predecessor, Farm Security Administration. There are approximately 108,000 photographs in the collection. Many are available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/fsaallquery.html.

[14] See Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period (6 September 1945), *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum,* http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=136&st=&st1.

Republic [sic!] spokesmen found in it a continuation of the New Deal and a sign that the Truman administration had decided to go to the left."[15]

Truman stated at the beginning that the Congress reconvened "at a time of great emergency. It is an emergency about which, however, we need have no undue fear if we exercise the same energy, foresight, and wisdom as we did in carrying on the war and winning this victory." He added that "president Roosevelt, as early as the Fall of 1943, began to set up machinery which he foresaw would become necessary to meet the re-conversion period. The Congress in its wisdom has adopted some of that machinery by statute, and has improved and added to it. As a result, Government agencies, for some time, have been able to plan for the immediate and long-range steps which now have to be taken."[16]

Truman then formulated briefly the chief tasks which the United States faced immediately: (1) as the armed forces were no longer needed [!], the country should demobilise as soon as possible; (2) war contracts were to be cancelled and settled as quickly as possible; (3) war plants were to be cleared to permit peacetime production; (4) prices and rents were to be upheld until fair competition could operate to prevent inflation and consumers' hardship; (5) wages were to be subjected to control in order to prevent inflationary price rises; (6) most wartime government controls were to be abolished in order to speed up and encourage re-conversion and expansion; (7) only those controls were to be kept which were necessary to help re-conversion and expansion by preventing bottlenecks, shortages of material, and inflation; and finally (8) a rapid decrease of wage incomes or purchasing power was to be prevented.

In the second part of his message of 6 September, Truman presented his re-conversion program in a comprehensive, if not too cohesive program consisting of 21 points. Truman addressed many problems that he expected to affect immediate post-war developments and made several proposals for the transition time. It is obvious from the text that he was still "in the shadow of FDR".[17] His social policy was to be eventually called "Fair Deal for all Americans" in the January 1949 State of the Union Address.[18]

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[15] *The New York Times*, 7 September 1945.

[16] Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period.

[17] Truman's (and also subsequent presidents') struggle with the giant figure of the late Franklin Delano Roosevelt is analyzed in Leuchtenburg, *In the Shadow of FDR*.

[18] See Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (5 January 1949), *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum*, http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1013&st=&st1.

Fearing a large-scale unemployment during the transitional period, Truman began with unemployment compensation. There were more than 15,000,000 workers not protected under the existing unemployment insurance laws. Many of them did not manage to accumulate savings before the war due to the Great Depression. He also recommended a revision of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. This proposal by Truman foresaw the increase of a minimum wage – of 40 cents an hour then – in order to increase the living standard of low-income earners to a decent level. Truman argued that "healthy national economy cannot be secure so long as any large section of ou working people receive substandard wages. The existence of substandard wage levels sharply curtails the national purchasing power and narrows the market for the products of our farms and factories." Moreover, agricultural workers, who were not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, were to be guaranteed minimum wage. However, Truman remained unspecific as to the amount representing the minimum: "I therefore recommend that the Congress amend the Fair Labor Standards Act by substantially increasing the minimum wage specified therein to a level which will eliminate substandards of living, and assure the maintenance of the health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers." During World War Two, the U.S. economy was held stable by means of rationing and wage and price controls. What was the right moment to lift them? The demand for war commodities was decreasing. A further decrease could result from the cancellation of war-related contracts. Truman reminded Congress of economic difficulties in the aftermath of World War One when the short-lived price drops were followed by dramatic inflation and a stock market crash. He warned that a combination of pent-up demand and "speculative excesses" could lead to the lowering of incomes and an increase in unemployment. Therefore, the Office of Price Administration would eliminate rationing only gradually, as soon as individual commodities came into balance with demand. Since the Japanese surrender, Truman pointed out, rationing on gasoline, fuel oil, stoves, and processed foods had been ended. The post-war economic stabilization required that "rents and the prices of clothing, food, and other essentials remained in place". The Americans, Truman demanded, were "entitled to buy washing machines, vacuum cleaners, automobiles and other products at prices based on our traditional system of high output and low unit costs."[19] There was

[19] See Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period (6 September 1945), *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum*, http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=136&st=&st1=.

also a need to build one to one and a half million homes per year in the post-war decade.

For the industrial giant like the United States it was much easier to produce machines and gadgets than to increase quickly the raw material extraction and agricultural production. Truman warned that some food items like sugar, oil, and fat would continue to be in short supply well into 1946. The elimination of rationing should not proceed at the cost of American relief efforts to stabilize economically and aid the liberated areas in Europe and other war-ravaged territories. The president argued: "We have a moral obligation to the people of these liberated areas. More than that, our own enlightened self-interest tells us that hungry people are rarely advocates of democracy," adding, more pragmatically and perhaps more persuasively, that "the rehabilitation of these countries, and indeed the removal of American occupational troops, may be unnecessarily delayed if we fail to meet these responsibilities during the next few months."[20] Truman requested the Congress to extend the provisions of the Second War Powers Act of 1942, in order to achieve an orderly and stabilized re-conversion.

The wartime powers were to be terminated and the executive agencies created for the duration of the war liquidated. The wartime statutes had not automatically expired due to the unconditional surrender of enemies only. A formal state of peace needed to be restored. Truman admonished the Congress that the time was not yet ripe for the formal proclamation of the end of hostilities or even the termination of the state of war. This would, Truman emphasized, "cause great confusion and chaos in the Government", which did not seek "to exercise wartime powers beyond the point at which it is necessary to exercise them". The wartime agencies should be able to continue their work during re-conversion and their activities should be brought to an end possibly soon. The president suggested that proposals for legislative changes relevant to reorganization of executive agencies be submitted jointly by the Executive and the Legislature.

In 1945, the American nation still remembered vividly the hardships of the Great Depression, especially the high unemployment rates persisting in the 1930s. The wartime economy, in contrast, reached full employment. It even had to resort to new sources of workforce like middle-class white women and African Americans from the rural South. The continuation of full employment in immediate post-war time was perceived as vitally

[20] Ibid.

important. Truman reminded of the "economic bill of rights" put forward by the late Franklin Roosevelt in his message to Congress on the State of the Union, presented on 11 January 1944.[21] This address became one of Roosevelt's great speeches, perhaps the greatest of the last years of his life. The term "bill of rights" was of course a reference to the first 10 Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Roosevelt demanded equal rights for all, irrespective of social position, race or religious affiliation. These rights included, in the first place, the right to work and to decent earning. The farmers were to receive fair prices for their produce, businessmen had the right to trade free of unfair competition and domination by monopolies, families had the right to decent homes, individuals had the right to medical care, citizens had the right to receive protection from economic hardship in old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment, and the citizens had the right to good education.

Truman made it clear that he would seek to provide these economic rights, including social security, to all American citizens in the post-war period. However, he did not plan to rely on government-provided security in the first place. Rather, he wanted the government to inspire private sector with confidence. He phrased the need for full employment in traditional American rhetoric: "Full employment means full opportunity for all under the American economic system. [...] Full employment means opportunity to get a good peacetime job for every worker who is ready, able, and willing to take one. It does not mean made work, or making people work. [...] Full employment means opportunity to reduce the ratio of public spending to private investment without sacrificing essential services."[22]

One of the key post-war decades' issues, the need to overcome the discrimination against the minorities, was also addressed. Emphasizing the removal of remaining discrimination, which was in accordance with the "American ideal" and represented "one of the fundamentals of our political philosophy", foreshadowed Truman's often neglected or at least underestimated Executive Order 9981 signed on 26 July 1948, by which the United States Armed Forces were desegregated.[23] In the U.S. federal system,

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[21] See Address of the President Delivered by radio from the White House (11 January 1944), *Mid-Hudson Regional Information Center*, http://www.mhric.org/fdr/chat28.html.

[22] See Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period.

[23] See Executive Order 9981 (26 July 1948), *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum*, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/9981a.htm.

which gives great prerogatives to individual states, it was impossible for Truman to abolish discrimination beyond the federally controlled armed forces and agencies. However, Executive Order 9981 was an important step in the right direction. It should be noted here, however, that as early as in 1941 President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 banning racial discrimination in defence industries and the government.[24] Truman's decision to desegregate the military was an act of considerable political courage. It came just over four months before the 1948 presidential elections and the conventional wisdom would have advised him not to do anything to cause dissatisfaction among the Southern Democrats. It should be noted that three other Democratic presidents in the twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, were very cautious not to upset the Southern white electorate, which had traditionally supported the Democrats and without whose votes no Democratic presidential candidate was believed to stand a chance. Truman's political courage was statesmanlike; it contrasts sharply with the vacillations of Bill Clinton in early 1993 concerning the discrimination of gays in the military. In November 1948, Truman won, in spite of opinion polls that had predicted his defeat by Thomas Dewey, prompting the Chicago Tribune to print a story of Dewey's victory.[25]

Truman also proposed the setting up of the Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC), which would continue to work during the re-conversion period and was intended to become a permanent institution. The United States Employment Service (USES) was to continue until at least the end of June 1947 to assist the veterans in finding jobs. This task was found to be "fully as difficult as the mobilization of manpower for war".[26]

The re-conversion process was to affect the American farmers, too. Although the farm population had decreased by 5 million as against 1940, the per capita food production had grown by more than a third. Truman asked the Congress to aid farmers to return to peacetime production,

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[24] See Executive Order 8802, Reaffirming Policy of Full Participation in the Defense Programs by All Persons, Regardless of Race, Creed, Color, or National Origin, and Directing Certain Action in Furtherance of Said Policy (25 June 1941), *Our Documents*, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=72&page=transcript.

[25] For a facsimile of the *Chicago Tribune* front page of 3 November 1948, see *Library of Congress*, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/images/at0069_4s.jpg. The famous photograph of Harry Truman holding a copy of the erring newspaper is available at http://memory.loc.gov/master/pnp/cph/3c10000/3c15000/3c15000/3c15068u.tif.

[26] See Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period.

reminding them of the great hardship that befell American farmers after World War One, when the prices of farm produce dropped by more than 50 percent over a period of one year (1920–1921). In fact, the American farmers were one of the few social groups that remained depressed even during the generally prosperous 1920s. Truman pointed to one specific source of support for the farmers: 500 million dollars set aside by the Congress from lend-lease funds. The strengthening of the farm sector would lead to the stimulation of exports and to larger markets in the future. It was also necessary to improve crop insurance and agricultural research.

The post-war period would bring new international challenges. The United States would need a "long-range program for the national security". As a peace-loving victorious nation, Truman argued, the U.S. needed to continue "an armed occupation of the lands of our defeated enemies until it is assured that the principles for which we fought shall prevail in the reconstruction of those lands".[27] Therefore, the real presence of American land, sea, and air power was to be maintained. For this purpose, replacements had to be found for the veterans serving abroad. Truman warned Congress that there would not be enough volunteers and that recruitment procedures would have to remain in place. He also promised to keep the legislators informed on the national security developments, including the use and control of atomic energy.

During World War Two, the importance of science and technology became obvious. Truman stressed the need for cooperation between universities, industry and government; in all probability, he was unaware of the pitfalls of such cooperation which gradually became obvious during the post-war decades. It was only in January 1961 that the outgoing American president Dwight D. Eisenhower coined the term "military-industrial complex", pointing to the dangers which such cooperation represented for the freedom of academic endeavour.[28] Truman asked Congress to establish a centralized federal research agency which would support basic natural science research as well as scientific enquiry in social sciences, medicine and public health. The new agency was to offer scholarships to gifted young people, and above all coordinate scientific research supported until then by several departments and agencies of the Federal Government. He added,

[27] Ibid.

[28] Eisenhower's Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People (17 January 1961), *The Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum*, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/farewell.htm.

nevertheless, that "the Federal research agency here proposed should in no way impair scientists' freedom".[29]

The war expenditures in the 1946 fiscal year were expected to drop by 40 billion dollars as against the previous year, but they would still represent 50 billion dollars, out of the total expenditures of 66 billion dollars. The government expenditures would continue at high levels throughout the 1947 fiscal year. "Total war effort cannot be liquidated overnight", Truman stated.[30]

Much attention was given in the 6 September address to the veterans' issue. The legal framework was prepared in the 1944 Servicemen's Readjustment Act (also known as the GI Bill).[31] Of course, the veterans as well as the dependants of the fallen soldiers were provided for during the war already. The measures proposed by Truman included insurance coverage exceeding the total of 135 billion dollars, increased financial and health-care compensation for war-disabled persons and offered various services and benefits to veterans like vocational training, mortgage guarantees, right to re-employment, unemployment support, counselling, and the establishment of about 9,000 information centres for veterans nationwide. President Truman recommended Congress to expand veteran assistance programs, especially those under the *National Service Life Insurance Act,* and pointed to large-scale efforts to provide opportunities to returning veterans, like the Columbia River and the Missouri River Basin projects which were to provide farms to the veterans.

Truman reminded Congress that the war had interrupted the education of many young people and led to the depletion of natural resources, which had had to be used without consideration to their future availability. The water reservoir building as well as search for new ore deposits had to be suspended. Truman specifically referred to the Tennessee Valley Authority project as a model for future government New-Deal-style efforts. Similar projects of regional development were to be implemented elsewhere, especially in the areas mentioned in the previous paragraph and in the Central Valley in California. Such public projects, Truman pointed out, would be beneficial to provide employment.

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[29] See Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Servicemen's Readjustment Act (1944), also known as the GI Bill of Rights. *U.S. Statutes at Large* (78th Cong., 2nd Sess.): 284–301. Signed into law by President Roosevelt on 22 June 1944.

The U.S. Congress was therefore expected to make available additional funds for new public works, provide money for the construction of new federal buildings, and release funds for the highway program, which would require no less than 3 billion dollars over the next three years. The construction of the Inter-American Highway to reach the Panama Canal Zone was to be continued and as many as 3,000 new airports were to be built (to reach the total of 6,000 airports over the next 10 years). Appropriations were needed to build other elements of infrastructure such as streets, sewers, water-supply systems, hospitals, airports, schools, and other public facilities. Truman also demanded that in implementing public sphere improvements, discrimination based on race, creed, or colour should be prevented.

Some European beneficiaries of lend-lease programs had incurred large debts. Truman's administration admitted that most of the dollars owed by foreign states would not be repaid but it refused to cancel all lend-lease obligations, proposing to settle the debts by agreements with individual governments in order to achieve a sound world-wide economy by means of carrying out the "Bretton Woods proposals for an international monetary fund and an International Bank" and by extending the operations of the Export-Import Bank. Truman repeated his earlier pledge that the Unites States would do everything "reasonably possible to help war-torn countries to get back on their feet".[32] The *United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration* (UNRRA) was to be appropriated the remaining 550 million lend-lease dollars committed by the U.S. earlier. The total United States share in the UNRRA program in Europe and Asia would amount to 1.35 billion dollars, Truman stated.[33] In fact, the total U.S. grants to the UNRRA were to reach approximately 3.25 billion dollars. The surplus military and lend-lease goods were to be used for the program as well.

Congress was also asked to learn from America's poor preparedness for the war and her dependence on foreign sources of raw materials. The United States was to maintain stockpiles of strategic materials for any

[32] See Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period.

[33] See the Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (9 November 1943), http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/unrra001.htm. The Congress accepted the United States' participation in a Joint Resolution To Enable the United States To Participate in the Work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Organization. The text of the resolution is available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/unrra002.htm.

emergency. Truman also promised to recommend a program which has not been implemented to this day: "a national health program to provide adequate medical care for all Americans and to protect them from financial loss and hardships resulting from illness and accident".[34] In the spirit of the New Deal, the American social security system was to be expanded and education facilities improved.

Aid to Europe and the Implementation of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act

In the statement made on 17 September 1945, Truman dealt with the aid to Europe. The provision of American aid was no longer a logistical problem, nor was it limited, in most commodities, by scarcity. Aid to Europe depended, above all, on financial resources. Truman repeated what he had said after his return from Potsdam: "If we let Europe go cold and hungry, we may lose some of the foundations of order on which the hoped for world-wide peace must rest. We must help to the limits of our strength. And we will."[35] It was above all coal, transportation and food that the "liberated people" of Europe needed most. The United States was shipping to Europe approximately 1.4 million tons of coal a month. The volume of this relief was to reach 8 million tons a month by January 1946.

By the spring of 1946, seven million servicemen as well as large numbers of servicewomen had returned home, determined to pick up where they had left off. To cushion the return to civilian life – and also to cushion the effect on the national economy – numerous laws were enacted that provided, among other things, for job recruitment, unemployment pay, insurance, home loans, and educational opportunities. The last category alone gave 12 million veterans access to technical and university education. By 1947, more than 4 million Americans were taking advantage of the *Servicemen's Readjustment Act* of 1944 to receive a government-subsidised tertiary education. This piece of legislature was passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by President Roosevelt in June 1944. It provided, among other things, federal aid to veterans so that

[34] See Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period.

[35] Statement by the President on the European Relief and Rehabilitation Program (17 September 1945), *Harry S. Truman Library & Museum*, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=143&st=&st1=.

they could adjust to civilian life, be properly treated in hospitals, buy homes and businesses. Above all, it enabled them to obtain education. The GI Bill provided them with means to cover the costs of tuition, subsistence, books and supplies, and equipment needed to go back to school or college. The GI Bill increased substantially the enrolment of American institutions of higher learning. The university education was no longer confined to the middle or upper-middle class. The graduates extended the ranks of engineers and economists, above all. In addition, the university facilities were expanded. For example, the University of Michigan had fewer than 10,000 students prior to the war. By 1948, their numbers had far exceeded 30,000.

The 1946 Employment Act required the chief executive to submit an annual economic report. It established a council of economic advisers and declared the intention of the federal government to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power. Though it did not specifically endorse the economics of John Maynard Keynes, the act clearly foreshadowed policies of deficit spending and unbalanced budgets. In other areas, a number of wartime agencies was abolished by executive order.

Conclusion

The Truman Administration was faced with post-war re-conversion problems even before World War Two had ended. In America's transition from wartime to peacetime society we can distinguish several distinct activities. They included the winding-up of wartime agencies, transition to peacetime economy and the conversion of wartime plants and hardware to peaceful uses, various provisions for veterans and their families, the lifting of wage and price controls as well as the restoration of collective bargaining. In addition, the United States had to manage and police the territories of the defeated enemy nations as well as the liberated areas. From the several messages and statements quoted here it follows that President Truman intended in the early post-war period to continue the legacy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal.

It can also be seen from the documentary evidence that in the early post-war period Truman planned to carry out a thorough demobilization of the United States armed forces, regardless of what the future adversaries were doing. This finding might be relevant for the endless discussions on the origin of the Cold War. In the immediate post-war period the former enemy nations became allies, while the former allies became potential adversaries.

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STUDIA TERRITORIALIA IV

FUTURE PROSPECTS OF SCOTLAND

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Abstract

The issues of Scottish devolution and independence have been discussed in the UK for decades. Coming to power in 2007, the Scottish National Party intensified the debate on the constitutional future of Scotland promoting Scottish independence. It is argued that further devolution and independence attracted most attention within political parties as well as within the Scottish public, while the status quo or federalism did not. Independence itself then is analysed on the basis of secession theories with particular attention paid to economy, territory, negotiations between the British and Scottish governments, and referendum issues, and their embodiment into the discussion. The National Conversation debate is examined through the lenses of reports produced by the Scottish Government as well as Liberal Democrats and by the independent Commission on Scottish Devolution established by Scottish Labour, Scottish Conservatives, and Liberal Democrats. The emphasis is also put on the involvement of the public into the debate as well as on opinion polls.

Keywords: devolution, secession, independence, Scottish Parliament, Scottish Government, Scottish National Party, Calman Commission, Steel Commission, National Conversation

Almost ten years after the September 1997 referendum when people in Scotland were asked to decide whether they wanted the establishment of autonomous Scottish institutions, the Scottish National Party (SNP) won the elections to the Scottish Parliament with the promise to hold a referendum on the independence of Scotland, and thus change its constitutional status. However, the SNP did not intend to withdraw Scotland from the United Kingdom without the majority consent of the Scottish people. For that reason it initiated the National Conversation debate on the constitutional future of Scotland and sought to involve political parties and Scottish public into it.

The article focuses on the debate on Scottish future which took place between the years 2007 and 2009. Its main purpose is to demonstrate what topics were emphasized, and how political parties and the public were involved in it. The underlying thesis is that two constitutional options, further devolution of powers and independence, were at the centre of the discussion, while federalism and the status quo attracted only little attention, and if they did, it was the public in particular who discussed them. The independence option is examined through the theories of secession as they set several conditions on which the right to secede can be justifiable. Applying them to the Scottish case, four issues – economy, territory, negotiations between the British and Scottish governments, and a majority vote in a referendum – prove to be crucial. Therefore, the purpose of the article is also to analyse to what extent these four issues were accentuated in the discussion. It is argued that the economic issues as well as the referendum were discussed in a great detail, while the territory and negotiations only occasionally.

The article views the debate on the future prospects of Scotland mainly through the lenses of several reports that were produced by the political parties themselves or by the independent Commission on Scottish Devolution Commission, also known as the Calman Commission. The debate was opened by the Scottish Government's White Paper *Choosing Scotland's Future: A National Conversation. Independence and Responsibility in the modern world* published in August 2007. The unionist opposition parties – Scottish Labour, Scottish Conservatives and Liberal Democrats – responded to the SNP's proposals by setting up the Calman Commission. The peculiar role was played by Liberal Democrats. They participated in the establishment of the Calman Commission and agreed that its sole remit would be devolution, even though they have been promoting federalisation of the UK for a long time. Moreover, in 2006 they published a report (within the Commission chaired by Lord Steel) on the prospective federalisation of the UK and its implications for Scotland dealing with some key issues discussed in the National Conversation debate. Therefore, the report of the Steel Commission is included in our analysis. The discussion formally ended in November 2009 when the SNP published another white paper based on the findings of the consultation process and analysing several options for further constitutional development of Scotland.

As for the public, the government was successful in involving people, not only those living in Scotland, but also outside, into the debate on

the Scottish constitutional future. Because two constitutional options were discussed the most, the article also includes public opinion polls on devolution and independence issues, in particular focusing on the potential of getting a majority support for independence.

The article is thus divided into three main parts. The first deals with the explanation of the devolution concept generally and its implementation specifically in Scotland, and with independence as a secession issue. The other part is devoted to the debate itself analysing the approaches of individual political parties and the public. This part is concluded by the Scottish Government's response to the whole National Conversation debate. The last section then focuses on public opinion on the extension of devolution, independence as such, and on the possibility of holding an independence referendum.

Devolution, independence, and theories of secession

Devolution is about of transferring certain powers from central institutions to regional ones, while the superiority of the centre is maintained. It can also be understood as territorial decentralisation of power connected to the establishment of a more democratic and representative government.[1] Gordon Smith recognises two types of devolution – deconcentration and decentralisation. While deconcentration is about plain delegation of authority from a higher administrative level to a lower one being spatially distant from the centre, decentralisation is characterised by a certain degree of autonomy, and thus it is possible to recognize several levels of decentralisation ranging from weak (elected assembly) to strong decentralisation. We can talk about strong decentralisation only if five conditions are fulfilled: i.e. direct election of representatives to a regional or provincial assembly, control over the subordinate local government organs in the area, a provincial executive authority responsible to the assembly, an area administration under the control of the executive, and powers to finance activities in the region.[2] Applying these conditions to the Scottish devolution process, we can see we are not able to talk about strong decentralisation, because Scottish institutions

[1] Howard Elcock and Michael Keating, eds., *Remaking the Union. Devolution and British Politics in the 1990s* (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 1998), 8.

[2] Gordon Smith, *Politics in Western Europe* (Aldershot: Gower, 1989, 5th edition), 254–55.

do not possess the power to decide autonomously on fiscal issues as well as on civil service. It is thus necessary to specify in what way devolution was designed for Scotland; which powers were devolved to Edinburgh and which remained in London. It is important to do that to be acquainted with the status quo of Scottish devolution that served as a basis for the discussion on the constitutional future of Scotland.

In Scotland, devolution became a reality on 1 June 1999, when the Scottish Parliament was officially opened, and specific powers were rendered to Edinburgh concurrently. From that date the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government[3] are responsible for areas such as education, transport, fisheries, agriculture, rural communities, planning, economic development, local government, or health care. Furthermore, Scotland possesses the right to legislate on local taxes, business rates, and to change the basic rate of the income tax up to ± 3 per cent. However, the economic impact of tax-varying power is almost none, and besides there has been a general agreement between political parties that this power will not be used. The Scottish Government was also given a borrowing power. However, this power is strictly limited to the ability to borrow only from the UK Treasury and solely for the immediate improvement of cash-flow. Therefore, Scotland does not have any significant fiscal powers and continues to be financed mainly from the UK budget through a block grant which is based on the allocation to Scotland from the previous year and adjusted by the Barnett formula.[4]

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[3] In September 2007 the Scottish Executive was officially renamed to the Scottish Government. SNP argued that the new term better "express[ed] the corporate identity" of Scottish Ministers, and "help[ed] the public more clearly understand the role and functions of the devolved Government in Scotland". The latter argument was supported by a public survey on the Scottish Executive perception. However, the Scottish Executive is a legal term, and as such continues to be applied in legal documents. The British government resisted using the new name originally, but with the government reshuffles it started to apply new name in October 2008. The Scottish Government – it's official, Scottish Government Press Release, 3 September 2007, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2007/09/31160110; Alan Trench, "Intergovernmental Relations", in *Scotland Devolution Monitoring Report January 2009*, ed. Paul Cairney (University of Aberdeen: The Constitution Unit, 2009), 70, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/files/research/devolution/dmr/Scotland_Jan09.pdf.

[4] Barnett formula is a population based mechanism according to which is the block grant adjusted when changes are made in expenditure for England. David Bell and Alex Christie, "Finance – The Barnett Formula: Nobody's Child?", in *The State of the Nations 2001. The Second Year of Devolution in the United Kingdom*, ed. Alan Trench (Thorverton: Imprint Academic, 2001), 136; John Altridge, "Financing Devolution. 2008 and Beyond", in *The State of the Nations 2008*, ed. Alan Trench (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008), 147, 151.

Scottish autonomous institutions cannot thus exercise any powers in the following areas: the constitution; foreign affairs, including relations with the European Union (EU); defence; civil service, treason, registration and financing of political parties; financial and economic matters; home affairs (e.g. elections, immigration, nationality, national security); trade and industry (e.g. telecommunications, postal services, intellectual property); energy; transport (e.g. regulation and security); social security; regulation of the professions, employment, health and medicine (e.g. regulation of the main health profession, misuse of drugs, medicines, embryology, surrogacy, genetics, abortion); media and culture; as well as judicial remuneration, equal opportunities, control of weapons, ordnance survey, time and outer space. However, there are some exceptions concerning for example the European Union. Even if the European Union issues are not among the devolved powers, the Scottish Parliament is responsible for the implementation of European law in areas in which it can pass legislation (e.g. fishery).[5]

Unlike devolution, independence is about changing powers and responsibilities beyond the existing state. It concerns the secession of a sub-political unit from the state. In our case, Scotland, governed by the Scottish National Party at the moment, aims to secede from the United Kingdom. Some members of the Scottish National Party, such Neil MacCormick for instance, do not view the process leading to independent Scotland as secession from the United Kingdom but rather as dissolution. They argue that the Union between Scotland and England established in 1707 was set up by mutual agreement of both countries and as such, therefore, can be dissolved if there is a congruence to do so. The major differences between the two above mentioned notions can be best seen in light of the continuity of the EU membership. While from the dissolution point of view both independent Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom should continue in being members of the European Union, from the secession point of view, however, only the rest of the United Kingdom would have its membership guaranteed, while independent Scotland would have to apply for it if it wanted to be a member of the EU.[6] Nevertheless, the more important thing

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[5] *Scotland Act 1998. Chapter 46*, Schedule 5; Peter Lynch, *Scottish Government and Politics. An Introduction* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 161–62; Jean McFadden and Mark Lazarowicz, *The Scottish Parliament. An Introduction* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2nd edition, 2000), 11.

[6] Neil MacCormick, "Is There a Constitutional Path to Scottish Independence?", *Parliamentary Affairs* 53, No. 4 (October 2000): 735.

is the position and views of other EU member states, because it is mainly up to them to accept a seceding region as a sovereign state or not. European law does not address the issue of secession or dissolution. Therefore, international law applies in the case. Nonetheless, the previously mentioned acceptance by other states is equally relevant.

Secession can be understood as a "withdrawal from a central political authority by a member unit or units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status".[7] There are several theoretical approaches to secession explaining why some groups seek to secede, what kind of groups have the right to secede and under what conditions. A comprehensive definition of theories of secession is offered by Allen Buchanan who defines two main types of theories of secession – remedial-right-only theories and primary-right theories. The former acknowledges the right to secede only to a group that is subject to some injustices perpetrated by the state and for which secession is "the appropriate remedy of last resort", while the latter grants the right to secede to a group that does not suffer any injustices from the state.[8] The primary-right theories can be further divided into two main categories. Ascriptive group theories embrace those secessionist movements that see their right to secede on the basis of being a nation. Associative group theories grant the right of secession to those who want to create their own sovereign state, i.e. they voluntarily decide to "associate together in an independent political unit of their own". This theory includes a plebiscitary right of secession or plebiscite theory of the right to secede referring to the fact that any group is entitled to secede if it is able to form a majority for secession within a certain territory of the state. However, the plebiscitary right is mostly moderated by a formulation of certain conditions, such as for example the size of the secessionist group, under which the secessionists are not allowed to secede from the state.[9] One of the main representatives of this approach is Harry Beran. Beran offers a liberal normative theory of secession. He argues that "secession [should] be permitted if it is effectively desired by a territorially concentrated group within a state and is morally and practically possible".[10] Beran analyses the permissibility of secession on the

[7] John R. Wood, "Secession: A Comparative Analytical Framework", *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 14, No. 1 (March 1981): 110.
[8] Allen Buchanan, "Theories of Secession", *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 26, No. 1 (Winter 1997): 34–35.
[9] Ibid., 37–39.
[10] Harry Beran, "A Liberal Theory of Secession", *Political Studies* 32 (1984): 23.

basis of freedom, sovereignty and majority rule as liberal and democratic values. According to him, people are free to leave the country where they live or to change their nationality, because the relation between the state and the individual is only voluntary. Hence, the consent of the individual to live in a certain state is necessary. Similarly, such consent is required in exercising political sovereignty, because only individuals have the moral right to determine their political relationships. By a majority principle Beran understands the respect for political rights of all individuals. If the majority does not respect these rights, a minority group living in a certain territory is entitled to secede. Such a group can also do so if it either does not want to be subordinated to the majority, or is profoundly devoted to secession, and uses adequate political action to achieve it. Nevertheless, he fails to elaborate on what he means by adequate political action. Beran also acknowledges the right of secessionists to hold a referendum, but on the condition that the territory in which the referendum is supposed to take place is specifically defined, it also must be clearly stated who is entitled to vote, and there has to be a general agreement among the people that the majority vote would be accepted in the referendum results. He concludes that secessionists would most likely give the right to vote only to those who live within the territory where they can secure the majority for secession.[11]

Despite of such a liberal approach to the right for secession and wholly in accordance with Buchanan's postulation, Beran indicates that in some circumstances the secession may not be permitted. However, he distinguishes between several levels of barriers to secession. The right to secede should never be granted if the size of the group who wants to secede is too small, if it rejects the right for secession to other sub-groups within the group or desires to keep down sub-groups within itself. On the contrary, in situations in which the seceding group would set up an enclave, or occupies a territory that is indispensable from the existing state either economically, culturally or militarily, the secession can be allowed only on the basis of negotiations between the seceding group and the state.[12]

Another liberal theorist Anthony H. Birch criticizes Beran's theory as one with "liberal premises and conservative conclusions". Although Birch

[11] Ibid., 25–28.
[12] Ibid., 30–31.

refuses Beran's insistence on the majority rule as a sufficient condition for secession based on what he called a "moral imperative", he himself stresses that the majority of people living in the region that seeks to secede has to give their approval for the secession. However, this majority approval is only required when at least one out of four conditions is fulfilled. These are, according to Birch, as follows. (1) The region was included in the state by force and its people have displayed a continuing refusal to give a full consent to the union. (2) The national government has failed in a serious way to protect the basic rights and security of the citizen of the region. (3) The democratic system has failed to safeguard the legitimate political and economic interests of the region, either because the representative process is biased against the region or because the executive authorities contrive to ignore the results of that process. (4) The national government has ignored or rejected an explicit or implicit bargain between sections that was entered into as a way of preserving the essential interests of a section that might find itself outvoted by a national majority.[13]

Furthermore, Birch, unlike Beran, does not recognize the condition of territoriality as essential for the right to secede. In other words, he does not share the opinion that any territorially concentrated secessionist group is entitled to be given the right to secede. Birch also emphasises that the right to secede should not be precluded by the hesitation on the prospective workability of the new state as well as by the impact on the interests, either economic or strategic, of the existing state.[14]

By stipulating four injustices of the existing state towards the political sub-units that can justify the right for secession Birch's approach to the right to secede complies with the remedial-right-only theories. Similarly to Birch, Allen Buchanan advocates the right to secede on the basis of the remedial-right-only theories. According to him, a group is entitled to secede only if such a group is subjected to violation of human rights, annexation of the group's territory, and discriminatory redistribution of financial resources between the central authority of the existing state and seceding group.[15] Although Buchanan considers the remedial right the only one that can vindicate the right of secession, he also acknowledges the right to secede to a group that has not suffered any injustices in the past if the secession

[13] Anthony A. Birch, "Another Liberal Theory of Secession", *Political Studies* 32 (1984): 598–601.
[14] Ibid., 598, 601–2.
[15] Buchanan, "Theories of Secession", 37; Allen Buchanan, "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede", *Journal of International Affairs* 45 (1992): 353–56.

is an outcome of a negotiated agreement between the state and a seceding group.[16]

Theorists of secession differ in their views on what basis the secession can be granted to a seceding group or region. Some of them, Beran for example, put an emphasis on the territory question, respect for political rights of individuals, and a majority approval for secession in a referendum, while others, such as Birch or Buchanan, stress violation of human rights, discrimination in the distribution of financial resources or annexation as necessary conditions for allowing secession. However, all of the above mentioned theorists admit that the right to secede can be influenced by circumstances that would be in contradiction to their postulates. For instance, Beran argues the secession cannot be accepted if the secessionist group is not big enough to create its own state or does not recognize the rights of its sub-groups. On the other hand, Buchanan is willing to grant secession if it results from negotiations between secessionists and representatives of the existing state.

Given this theoretical framework the article from now on focuses on the debate concerning the constitutional future of Scotland; whether Scotland should be given more powers under devolution, or whether it should become an independent state. As for independence, attention is paid to issues which theories of secession define as crucial for justifying such a step. Therefore economic matters, referendum and territory issues, and the question of negotiations between the British and Scottish governments are examined from the perspective of their embodiment into the debate. The violation of human rights is omitted in this analysis because in the case of Scotland we cannot talk about any persecution of the Scottish people from side of the British state or any violation of human rights generally.

The National Conversation – the starting point of the debate

Coming to power in May 2007, the Scottish National Party was firmly committed to fulfil its election promises. One of them, and at the same time the most delicate, was a pledge to hold a referendum on the independence of Scotland. A wide-ranging public debate on this issue was

[16] David Gauthier, "Breaking Up: An Essay on Secession", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 24, No. 3 (September 1994): 358; Michael Seymour, "Secession as a Remedial Right", University of Montreal, 3, http://www.philo.umontreal.ca/documents/cahiers/SecessionasaRemedialRight.pdf.

supposed to precede the referendum itself. Therefore, shortly after the new government was set up, the SNP leader and also the Scottish First Minister, Alex Salmond, launched the "National Conversation" by publishing a White Paper on Scotland's future in August 2007.[17] Despite the fact that the Scottish National Party has favoured independence, it offered two options to the Scottish people for discussion. The first option referred to the extension of the Scottish devolution. Because Scotland lacks important fiscal powers, the SNP paid a great deal of attention to the devolution of such competences and proposed to grant Scotland fiscal autonomy, including responsibility for financial services, oil and gas reserves. The aim was to decrease Scottish dependency in the area of economic issues on the UK government; moreover, the SNP argued that if Scotland was given theright to decide independently about its economic and fiscal policies, this would enable Scottish autonomous institutions to match these policies with specific Scottish conditions.[18] In addition to fiscal autonomy, other areas such as anti-terrorism legislation, employment and trade union law, all aspects of energy policy, Scottish Parliament elections or civil service, etc., were emphasised to be ceded to Scotland.

The White Paper also focused on intergovernmental relations requiring these relations to be put on a more formal basis and to use adequately the tools of cooperation between the Scottish and British governments that were set within the framework of two institutions – the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) and the British-Irish Council (BIC). Both of them have served as a platform for the exchange of ideas, best practices, and for the sharing of topical information. They have also offered an opportunity to discuss the central government's proposals for reforms that would have effect on the devolved administrations. The problem of cooperation within JMC and BIC, at the time when the government document was published, was that members of British Government who convene the meetings avoided doing that, because they got used to cooperate with their Scottish counterparts informally. This was possible mainly due to the fact that the same party was in power both in London and in Edinburgh.[19]

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[17] For the text of the White Paper, see Scottish Executive, *Choosing Scotland's Future: A National Conversation. Independence and Responsibility in the modern world* (Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2007), http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/194791/0052321.pdf.

[18] Scottish Executive, *Choosing Scotland's Future*, 10.

[19] The Joint Ministerial Committee involves representatives of the British, Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Ireland governments. It is a consultative body on devolved and reserved

The other option proposed by the SNP for public discussion was granting independence to Scotland. The SNP emphasised that Scotland had always been a nation "with its own legal system and borders". It also underlined that the territory of Scotland was clearly set and as such had not been questioned – except for the maritime boundaries and share of the continental shelf that had to be straightened out. However, according to the SNP, the negotiations on the latter with the British Government should not cause any problems as "there are well-established legal principles" that have to be followed.[20] The delineation of the continental shelf is closely related to the North Sea oil question. Because at present, in Regional Accounts, the UK Continental Shelf represents a special separate region, so called the extra-regio territory, and is thus geographically excluded to belong to any UK region, as a result, the North Sea revenues are allocated to the UK government and not to Scotland.[21]

The SNP also outlined how the negotiations on independence with the British government should proceed, and specified the role of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive as well as the impact of independence on defence matters and foreign affairs. As for the deliberations, the SNP stressed that the Scottish and British governments should negotiate about economic issues such as apportionment of the national debt, UK official

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powers; dealing with disputes between the governments is within its remit too. Decisions of the JMC are adopted by consensus, and are not binding. The committee operates at two levels – plenary and functional. Plenary meetings should have been held annually, but in the period between 2002 and June 2008 there was none. Functional meetings, on the contrary, in which specific areas of interest such as EU affairs, poverty or health are discussed, have taken place more frequently. The British-Irish Council includes not only central, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland governments, but also the Irish government, and representatives of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. The BIC focuses on issues that are topical and of great importance to individual members, such as drugs, environment, health, social inclusion, minority languages, tourism, or financial crisis. Its meetings have been held on regular basis, at least once a year. See "Agreement on the Joint Ministerial Committee", in *Devolution: Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements Between the United Kingdom Government, Scottish Ministers, the Cabinet of the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee*, SE/2002/54, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library2/memorandum; Trench, "Intergovernmental Relations", in *Scotland Devolution Monitoring Report January 2009*, 71–72; Alan Trench, "The More Things Change, The More They Stay the Same. Intergovernmental Relations Four Years On", in *Has Devolution Made a Difference? The State of Nations 2004*, ed. Alan Trench (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004), 180.

[20] Scottish Executive, *Choosing Scotland's Future*, 20.

[21] Scottish Government, *Government Expenditure & Revenue Scotland 2007–2008* (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, June 2009), 38, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/276248/0082927.pdf.

reserves, future liabilities on public sector pensions, and social security benefits, as well as on defence matters such as for example the division of the defence estate, and on foreign affairs. Moreover, special negotiations between both British and Scottish governments and the representatives of international institutions should take place on the position of Scotland in the European and the international arena. The SNP argued in favour of continuing membership of Scotland in the European Union, United Nations, Commonwealth, NATO, OECD, WTO, and World Health Organisation.[22]

Because the SNP promised to hold a referendum on Scottish independence, the White Paper included also a draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill asking the Scottish people whether they agree or not with that "the Scottish Government should negotiate a settlement with the Government of the United Kingdom so that Scotland becomes an independent state". The reason for such wording of the question is to avoid potential interference with the 1998 Scotland Act which forbids the Scottish Parliament to adopt legislation on constitutional matters including the 1707 Union between England and Scotland. Therefore, special measures have been embodied in the 1998 Scotland Act in order to prevent the autonomous Parliament from passing laws in areas in which it is not allowed to do so. And as independence means abolition of the above mentioned Union, the Scottish legislative body cannot approve any bill referring directly to the independence of Scotland.[23] On the other hand, a question arises whether such wording is sufficient to be regarded as non-violating the Scotland Act 1998.

Moreover, the SNP defined who can participate in the referendum. It gave the right to vote to those who were entitled to vote in Scottish

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[22] Scottish Executive, *Choosing Scotland's Future*, 20–23.

[23] In order to prevent the Scottish Parliament from adopting legislation outside its remit, the following measures were approved. Before the Bill is debated in the Parliament, member of the Scottish Government has to make a statement that the proposed Bill does not overstep Parliament's legislative powers. The Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament has to review any Bill to make sure it is within the powers devolved to the Parliament. After the Parliament approval, a four-week period starts within which Advocate General for Scotland, Lord Advocate, Attorney General for Scotland can submit the whole Bill or any provision of it to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to decide whether it is within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. Also Secretary of Scotland can intervene if the Bill is not compatible to reserved matters or international obligation of the United Kingdom. If there are no objections, the Bill is submitted for Royal Assent, otherwise is sent back to the Scottish Parliament. See *Scotland Act 1998. Chapter 46*, Sections 31–35. For areas in which the Scottish Parliament cannot adopt any legislation – reserved powers – see *Scotland Act 1998. Chapter 46*, Schedule 5.

local elections.[24] This means that only people who have their residence in Scotland can vote in a Scottish referendum whatever their nationality is while Scots living abroad cannot. The precise definition of electors is entirely in accordance with Harry Beran's assumption that those who want to secede on the basis of an independence referendum would limit the franchise to people living in the prospective seceding territory.

The Calman Commission

The reaction of the three main opposition parties – Scottish Labour, Conservatives, and Liberal Democrats – to the Scottish Government's White Paper was immediate. All of them refused the SNP's proposal and initiated the establishment of the Scottish Constitutional Commission (it was Wendy Alexander, the then leader of the Scottish Labour Party, who publicly announced this initiative) which should have a mandate from Holyrood instead.[25] The Scottish Parliament gave green light to the initiative and approved the establishment of the Commission on Scottish Devolution in November 2007.[26]

The Commission started to work under the chairman, Sir Kenneth Calman, in April 2008, and, as had been promised, it consisted of politicians, business, media, and academia representatives. Unlike the Government's White Paper its aim was only to review the existing devolution arrangements and examine possibilities for further devolution of powers to Scotland.[27] The issue of the Scottish independence was entirely excluded from the Commission's remit which made the debate on the future of Scotland a bit peculiar. It is supposable that members of the Commission would reject independence of Scotland as an adequate option but it would be interesting to compare their arguments to those embraced by the SNP.

After months of gathering evidence and thorough analysis, the Commission published its final report in June 2009 emphasising that the Scottish

[24] Draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill, in Scottish Executive, *Choosing Scotland's Future,* 44.

[25] Holyrood means the Scottish Parliament, because the Parliament sits at the foot of Royal Mile in front of the Holyrood Park and Salisbury Craigs.

[26] Peter Jones, "Scotland. The Nationalist Phoenix", in *The State of the Nations 2008*, ed. Alan Trench, 52–53.

[27] Commission on Devolution, *Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st Century*, Final Report, 15 June 2009, 3, http://www.commissiononscottishdevolution.org.uk/uploads/2009-06-12-csd-final-report-2009fbookmarked.pdf.

devolution had been successful so far. It defined areas that could be transferred from London to Edinburgh as well as a number of areas in which the reform was needed to improve the present system. It also proposed to give Scotland a certain degree of fiscal autonomy, and thus to increase the financial accountability of the Scottish autonomous institutions. The Commission recommended replacing the existing tax varying power of the Scottish Parliament by a reduced UK basic rate and higher rates of income taxes in Scotland by 10 pence in the pound including a corresponding reduction in the block grant. Furthermore, it specified the following economic powers – the Stamp Duty Land Tax, Aggregates Levy, Landfill Tax, and Air Passenger Duty – as subject to devolution; again the Scotland's grant should be reduced accordingly. On the other hand, the Commission rejected to devolve the corporation tax and North Sea oil and gas taxes. Its main argument to keep the North Sea revenues at the centre was high volatility of these revenues. They themselves are dependent on oil prices which are determined by the global market, not by the UK or Scotland. The Calman Commission also recommended the continuation of using the Barnett formula to set the amount of financial resources to be spent in Scotland. In addition, the Commission proposed an extension of borrowing powers of Scottish Ministers. However, only in order to increase capital investments, the amount of financial resources would be limited by their capacity to repay debts.[28]

Apart from certain fiscal powers, the Commission also suggested the devolution of responsibilities in areas concerning the administration of the Scottish Parliament elections (while legislation for these elections should remain reserved), airgun regulation, drink driving limits, determination of the national speed limit, the appointment of the Scottish member of the BBC Trust, animal health funding, marine nature conversation, or the Deprived Areas fund. The Calman Commission went even further and emphasised the necessity to improve the existing procedures of cooperation in reserved areas that have effect on Scotland. This provision mainly relates to issues such as local variations in immigration law implementation or the operation of the Crown Estate.[29]

The Commission, as the "National Conversation", paid attention to relations between the British and Scottish Parliaments and governments. It recommended improving relations between the Parliaments by strengthening

[28] Ibid., 69–112.
[29] Ibid., 157–214.

communication mechanisms, better usage of the Sewel convention,[30] and by establishing ad hoc joint committees. As for intergovernmental relations, it strongly criticised the current arrangements of the Joint Ministerial Committee and outlined how the JMC should work. Generally, it stressed that the formality of these relations had to be restored. The Commission also proposed better involvement of Scottish Ministers in negotiations on EU matters related to the devolved areas.[31]

Some of the Calman Commission's recommendations for further devolution and for the improvement of relations between the centre and the devolved bodies coincide with the SNP views. Despite the SNP had not participated in the Commission's work and had been rather critical of it, it called for fast implementation of some of its recommendations, especially those concerning the devolution of powers. The Scottish Government officials even drafted orders relating to the administration of Scottish parliamentary elections, regulation of airguns, licensing and control of substances used in the treatment of addiction, drink driving limits in Scotland, and national speed limits. These draft orders were published in the Scottish Parliament Information Centre in June 2009. Moreover, the Scottish Government committed itself to enforce the proposed changes in areas such as the development of UK policy towards the EU, Scottish Ministers' involvement in the EU business, agreement on local variations of immigration policy, consultation on welfare of working programmes, appointments to the BBC Trust and to the Crown Estate. The SNP also welcomed proposals to devolve taxes and to give the Scottish Government borrowing powers but it rejected restrictions on the use of these powers. In general, the Scottish Government was very critical of the recommendations on finance and economic issues stressing the lack of efficiency, accountability and transparency of the proposed measures.[32]

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[30] Sewel Convention refers to the adoption of legislation on devolved issues in Westminster. Because the British Parliament did not lose its sovereignty with the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, it has retained the power of passing laws even in areas devolved to Scotland, but with the consent of the Scottish Parliament. It was assumed that the British Parliament would legislate under Sewel Convention rarely; however, the opposite has proven to be true. The Sewel Convention is used quite regularly. The name of this agreement is derived from Lord Sewel – The Minister of the Scottish Office – who first proposed it. See Paul Bowers, *The Sewel Convention* (London: Parliament and Constitution Centre, 25 November 2005).

[31] Commission on Devolution, *Serving Scotland Better*, 141–56.

[32] Scottish Government, *The Scottish Government Response to the Recommendations of the Commission on Scottish Devolution* (Edinburgh: The Scottish Government, November 2009), 2–6, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/291162/0089439.pdf.

Unlike the SNP Government, the unionists' parties have neither specified their positions on the recommendations yet, nor how the findings of the Commission would be reflected in their politics. Instead, a working group, consisting of members of the Scottish Labour Party, Liberal Democrats and Conservatives, was set up to address the recommendations.[33]

The Steel Commission

Political parties directed the debate on the constitutional future of Scotland to two options only – to devolve more powers to Scottish autonomous institutions or to have an independent Scotland. This is understandable in case of the SNP who argue in favour of independence, as well as Labour and Conservatives who prefer the devolution option, but not so much in case of Liberal Democrats. LibDems have been advocating federalisation of the UK for a long time, however, with no success in stimulating a sound public discussion about it. It is interesting to note that they did not use the opportunity of the debate on future prospects of Scotland to promote their views on the question. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the LibDems would give up specifying their proposals. Those were outlined in the Final Report of the Commission chaired by Lord Steel and published in March 2006, over a year before the National Conversation debate was launched. In spite of the fact that the report of the Steel Commission did not directly result from that debate, it is important to examine its findings as it addressed some of the key issues that were being discussed, such as fiscal powers of Scotland, albeit within a federal framework of the UK.

In general, Liberal Democrats advocated the establishment of a Constitutional Convention as the main body where to discuss the Scottish future between all political parties and representatives of the civic society. LibDem thus referred to the Scottish Constitutional Convention that was set up in 1989 to enforce the establishment of the Scottish Parliament. The Steel Commission recommended the transfer of more powers to Scotland from the central government. These responsibilities included the electoral system to the Scottish Parliament, the operation of the Scottish

[33] Cairney, "The Scottish Constitutional Debate", 10–11; Scottish Government, *A National Conversation – Your Scotland, Your Choice* (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, November 2009), 13.

Parliament, transport, medical contracts, energy policy, and civil service. Moreover, the Commission listed some other areas, such as for example betting and gaming, marine policy, regulatory powers, employment law, and broadcasting, which should be devolved to Scotland in result of the debate within the Constitutional Convention.[34]

The Commission also devoted itself to the very much discussed topic of the potential impact of the North Sea oil revenues on Scottish economy if Scotland was entitled to use them. It came to the conclusion that if Scotland was responsible for the allocation of the North Sea oil revenues it would reduce the deficit of Scottish public finances, but not "eradicate" it.[35] The findings of the Steel Commission support the argument of the SNP that the North Sea oil revenues would help to improve the economic situation of Scotland.

As for fiscal powers, the Commission argued against full fiscal autonomy or fiscal freedom regarding it as "no more and no less than a Trojan horse for independence".[36] Instead, LibDem promoted so called fiscal federalism, a system that was to be created to the benefit of all the constituent parts of the United Kingdom, while it focused more on Scotland. The Steel Commission avoided stipulating specific fiscal powers to be transferred to Scotland as a subject of further discussion; instead, it outlined general issues which should be devolved to Scottish autonomous institutions. According to the Commission, the Scottish Government should possess borrowing and increased tax-raising powers which most influence the development of the Scottish economy. However, all of these powers would have to be accommodated to the UK system. The Commission therefore proposed a new formula on which the redistribution of financial resources between individual parts of the United Kingdom should be based on, and which should replace the currently used Barnett formula. This needs-based equalisation formula should allow for some indicators, such as for example geography, rurality, state of infrastructure, distance from markets, poverty, housing, and employment, to be used for allocating funds from the London government.[37]

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[34] Scottish Liberal Democrats, *The Steel Commission: Moving to Federalism – A New Settlement for Scotland* (Edinburgh: Scottish Liberal Democrats, 2006), 66–73, http://www.scotlibdems.org.uk/files/steelcommission.pdf.

[35] Ibid., 81–84.

[36] Ibid., 91.

[37] Ibid., 90–105.

The problem with the proposed measures and provisions is that they are projected for a federal state. However, some of the proposals can be and already are used by some parties, especially by the SNP, to outline their position to the further devolution of powers. On the other hand, if we assess the LibDem report from the perspective of federalism, it lacks clear specification for the other parts of the United Kingdom than Scotland. The explanation that most issues would be resolved within the Constitutional Convention cannot be regarded as sufficient. The whole issue of the prospective federalisation of the UK leads to questions on the position of England and as such cannot be discussed without a comprehensive concept that would include all parts of the United Kingdom. However, it should not prevent Scottish political parties or public from discussing this option as one of the possible alternatives for the future development of Scotland.

Public involvement into the debate

The National Conversation on the two options lasted over two years. People from Scotland and the UK as a whole as well as from abroad had a chance to participate in the debate. It was possible mainly due to the fact that the Scottish Government created a special website where the public could express their opinions on governmental proposals and constitutional preferences.

Over 10,000 people took part in the National Conversation, contributing to the discussions either online or during almost 200 events all over Scotland. However, not only individuals participated in the debate on Scottish future; it was also the civil society – representatives of culture institutions (e.g. Aberdeen Performing Arts, Whitehall Theatre), local governments (e.g. Argyl & Bute Council, Girvan Community Council, Stirling Council), churches (e.g. Scottish Episcopal Church, Church of Scotland, Free Church of Scotland, Christ Church or Trinity Church), universities (e.g. Stirling University, University of Dundee, University of Strathclyde), business organisations (e.g. Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, Highlands and Islands Enterprise), trade unions, police, and many others.[38]

[38] Scottish Government, *A National Conversation – Your Scotland, Your Choice*, 5–6, 140–51.

Devolution vs. independence

Public discussion on extending devolution and independence offered a wide range of opinions and views. The discussion on the preferred constitutional option was often accompanied by economic arguments supporting either devolution or independence. A considerable number of people who had participated in the debate gave their preference to devolve more powers to Scottish autonomous institutions including full fiscal autonomy. There were also voices that required more detailed specification of powers that would be transferred to Scotland. Only a minority of people did not make any difference between further devolution and independence and claimed that they would support both options. The opposing views regarded devolution as a whole as a failure and insisted that only independence was "the right answer to the Scottish question".[39]

Interestingly, not only Scots supported independence for Scotland but also some English expressed their support for it, arguing that they were tired of being blamed for everything wrong. Those who were in favour of independence emphasised the economic potential of Scotland as an independent country while opponents highlighted that Scotland has economically benefited from being part of the UK and argued that North Sea oil and gas supplies have been running low – that is not an irrelevant argument.

People also paid particular notice to the economic crisis and its consequences for Scotland. Advocates of independence articulated a clear opinion that only independent Scotland could deal with the crisis sufficiently while opponents stressed that only within the UK Scotland could get over the unfavourable economic situation. Economic arguments played a role in the discussion on continuing membership of independent Scotland in the EU. Many proponents of independence argued that by being member of the EU, the situation in Scotland would be even worse than under the UK while those supporting the Scottish EU membership argued that Scotland could not prosper without the EU.[40] Although the majority of contributions

[39] "Extending devolution", Official Site of the Scottish Government. Scotland's Future: A National Conversation, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/a-national-conversation/Tell-us/commentIssue/extending-devolution.

[40] "Economics and Constitutional Change", Official Site of the Scottish Government. Scotland's Future: A National Conversation, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/a-national-conversation/Tell-us/commentIssue/economics; "An Independent Scotland", Official Site of

were about extending devolution or independence, a few people argued in favour of a federalised Britain in which each constituent part would have its own parliament in order to avert the breaking up the United Kingdom, or supported the status quo.[41]

Referendum

The debate on the referendum was not less interesting and recorded the same or even bigger diversity of views on this issue than the case of devolution or independence. Attention was paid to the issue who is entitled to vote, where and when the independence referendum should take place, whether there should be only one ballot or more, and how many questions should the referendum include.

The Scottish Government proposed that only residents in Scotland should be allowed to vote in the independence referendum. Scots, especially those who live in Scotland, agreed with the governmental proposal while those who live abroad did not. According to them the right to vote should be given to all Scots, not only to those who have residence in Scotland. There was also an opinion that the referendum should take place not only in Scotland but also in England so that the English could express their view on the future of the United Kingdom.

Opinions differed also in the question when the referendum should be held. Some proposed that it should be connected with the next Scottish Parliament elections which will take place in 2011 while others claimed to hold the referendum as soon as possible. As for the number of referenda, the discussants suggested that the first ballot should ask the people of Scotland whether they wanted a referendum or not. The other option was that the first eferendum should give the SNP Government the right to negotiate the conditions of Scottish independence with the British Government, and then there should be another referendum on the settled conditions because only then the Scottish people would know what to expect from independence.

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the Scottish Government. Scotland's Future: A National Conversation, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/a-national-conversation/Tell-us/commentIssue/independence.

[41] "An Independent Scotland", Official Site of the Scottish Government. Scotland's Future: A National Conversation, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/a-national-conversation/Tell-us/commentIssue/independence; "Extending devolution", Official Site of the Scottish Government. Scotland's Future: A National Conversation, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/a-national-conversation/Tell-us/commentIssue/extending-devolution.

Regarding the question to be asked in the referendum, there was no agreement at all. The views differed from the support of a single-question referendum as proposed by the SNP in the National Conversation White Paper, or a two-question referendum involving independence and further devolution to a multi-option referendum with three questions – the status quo, independence and extending devolution of powers that were to be specifically formulated. Not surprisingly, there were also views refusing holding a referendum all together. One contributor also suggested that the independence referendum should be watched by the UN observers to ensure its results would be respected by political parties.[42] The issue of whether the referendum results should be binding was also discussed. However, in the British political system the referendum results are not mandatory for the government, nevertheless, politicians respect them and act accordingly.

Public discussion on Scottish constitutional future proved the existence of a big diversity of views on what option Scotland should choose. The most supported options were further devolution and independence while preserving the status quo or federalisation of the UK attracted only little attention. The debate also indicated that people were not quite certain what powers were to be further devolved to Scotland, and thus demanded more detailed specification. To a certain extent, the same was required in the case of independence. In relation to constitutional options the economic issues as well as the question of holding a referendum were discussed in depth. On the other hand, the question of negotiations between the Scottish and British governments seemed to be marginal for those who participated in the discussions because they were mentioned only rarely. The same is true for the territory issue which was discussed solely within the context of franchise in the referendum.

The Scottish Government's response

The SNP Government tried to accommodate most of the suggestions that were put forward within the public debate as well as to react to the proposals made by the Calman Commission and it specified its proposals in several statements and documents.

[42] "Referendum and Voting Rights", Official Site of the Scottish Government. Scotland's Future: A National Conversation, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/a-national-conversation/Tell-us/commentIssue/A-Referendum.

At the beginning of September 2009 the Scottish Government confirmed that the referendum on independence should take place on 30 November 2010 and announced that the Referendum Bill would be introduced in the Scottish Parliament in 2010. However, unlike its previous statements, the SNP admitted the "possibility of multi-option referendums", and that it "[was] open to the possibility of the fiscal proposals in Calman being on the referendum ballot".[43]

The issue of how many options would a prospective referendum include was indicated by the SNP in the White Paper *Your Scotland, Your Voice* that was published in November 2009 as an official conclusion of the National Conversation debate. The Scottish Government stipulated four options for the future of Scotland: the status quo, the implementation of the Calman Commission's recommendations, full devolution, and independence for Scotland. However, the SNP stressed that not all of these options should be included in the referendum. It was especially against the embodiment of the recommendations of the Calman Commission as such, because the sponsors of the Commission were against it and the political parties that initiated the establishment of the Commission did not explicitly support its recommendations. The SNP also argued that it already made an effort to implement some of the recommendations and it would thus be rather confusing for the Scottish electorate what has been put into practice and what has not. Therefore, the Scottish Government proposed that the most relevant option could be full devolution – an alternative offering the extension of powers of Scottish autonomous institutions. However, in spite of the fact that SNP expressed its willingness to deal with a multi-option referendum, it clearly stated that the proposal for a multi-option referendum had to be raised by other political parties in the Scottish Parliament during negotiations on the Government's Referendum Bill and declared that its preferred choice was to have a single option referendum.[44] To a certain extent, the Government reflected the National Conversation public debate in which some people expressed their preference to have more than just a single question in the ballot. But it let other political parties to promote it. The SNP avoided providing details on its proposed Referendum Bill, but at the same time it indicated that the referendum would be organised

[43] Scottish Government, "Referendum Bill", *Scottish Government News Release*, 3 September 2009, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/programme-for-government/2009-10/summary-of-bills/referendum-bill.

[44] Scottish Government, *A National Conversation – Your Scotland, Your Choice*, 136–38.

in a similar way as the 1997 referendum in which only those who were residents in Scotland possessed the right vote.[45]

Therefore, the question remains whether there will be only one option in the ballot, perhaps the one formulated in the 2007 Draft Referendum Bill, or whether there will be a multi-option referendum including three questions – the status quo, full devolution and independence. Moreover, the important issue is how the opposition parties in the Scottish Parliament would deal with the Referendum Bill. Two scenarios are possible. First, they will refuse to debate about it in the chamber and vote it down, or second, they will use the opportunity the SNP offered and will promote a multi-option referendum in order to demonstrate that majority of the Scottish people do not wish to have an independent Scotland. However, the reactions of leaders of unionist parties[46] suggest the first scenario is more likely to happen. On the other hand, public statements could differ from those being made in the Parliament. As Paul Cairney puts it: "While the main opposition parties were quick to announce that they would not support the bill, whispers continue about various members of various parties being keen to see it go ahead."[47]

It was mentioned above that the Scottish Government in its White Paper concluding the National Conversation debate analysed four options for the possible future development of Scotland. The options of the status quo and the implementation of the Calman Commission's recommendations were already discussed in the paper as well as independence. The only option left to be analysed is full devolution which goes much further than the Calman Commission. However, the independence option cannot be omitted either, because the SNP, unlike in the previous White Paper in 2007, specified in more details what independence would mean for Scotland, and even modified some of its proposals. It is also important to show what difference is, according to the SNP, between full devolution and independence because in some areas, such as transport for example, the distinction between these two options is none.

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[45] Ibid., 139.

[46] See for example "SNP sets out Scottish independence white paper", *BBC*, 30 November 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/8385425.stm.

[47] Cairney, "The Scottish Constitutional Debate", 11.

Full Devolution

Full devolution means that the maximum range of powers would be ceded to Scotland from the central government. In the economic area, the SNP stressed the necessity to devolve such powers that would ensure the responsibility of Scottish autonomous institutions for levying all taxes in Scotland such as for example the inheritance and corporation taxes, North Sea tax regime, Fossil Fuel Levy fund, and for spending. Furthermore, Scotland would pay a certain amount of money to the UK Government for public services provided and financed by the centre; this concerns mainly defence matters or foreign affairs. However, the whole issue of remittance would be specified during the negotiations between the Scottish and UK Governments. Under full devolution, Scotland should be given the right to decide on employment and competition law, regulation of companies, health and safety issues. The SNP also acknowledged the limitation of the proposed measures because the main instruments of macroeconomic policy would remain in hands of central government.[48] These proposals indicate that the Barnett formula as well as the block grant would not be used under the full devolution. However, the proposed scheme would need precise specification of working mechanisms in order to avoid negative consequences, either on the UK as a whole, or on Scotland itself.

As for specific policies to be transferred to Scotland, the SNP argued that regulation and the security of roads, rail, marine and air transport, and responsibility for Scottish broadcasting should be wholly devolved to Scotland. It also suggested that new broadcasting services should be set up, such as Scottish digital network, and called for negotiations to be held on funding Scottish public service broadcasting with the UK Government. Scotland should be responsible for all the procedures related to the autonomous institutions, such as for example the electoral system to the Scottish Parliament, and should have its own civil service. The SNP also proposed devolution in the area of national security and defence. Although it recognised the importance of this area for the UK as a sovereign state, it insisted that emergency powers could be ceded to Scotland while stressing the need of mutual co-operation between the governments.[49]

The SNP also reflected the changes that occurred on the UK level, in particular those in judiciary and courts. In October 2009 the new Supreme

[48] Scottish Government, *A National Conversation – Your Scotland, Your Choice*, 16–18, 29, 42–43, 88
[49] Ibid., 54, 82–84, 86–88, 117, 129, 131–32.

Court of the UK started to work addressing also appeals from civil cases in Scotland as well as criminal cases, however, only when human rights are a matter of dispute. The SNP expressed concern whether the Supreme Court would sufficiently protect the distinctiveness of the Scottish legal system. Therefore, within full devolution the Supreme Court should have a special Scottish Chamber where the majority of judges would be experts in Scottish law and practice, and such a Chamber should become an integrated part of the Scottish legal system. Furthermore, a Scottish tribunal service should be established as a part of the court system of Scotland.[50]

Independence

The SNP argued that with independence the Scottish Government could adopt such an approach and tools that would best comply with the needs of Scotland. The Government would be thus able to react better to economic problems and promote long-term competitiveness of the country. Nevertheless, the SNP admitted that independent Scotland would have to follow international as well as EU rules concerning for example competition or tax harmonisation. It also stressed that independent Scotland would simplify its tax system and reduce corporation taxes in order to make the country an attractive place for business. To attract private capital, the SNP proposed the establishment of a Scottish Stock Exchange. Likewise, the creation of a sovereign wealth fund was advocated. The fund would administer North Sea oil and gas reserves and "provide an effective mechanism to insulate the economy in times of economic instability and invest for long-term sustainability".[51] The SNP has argued for a long time that revenues from the North Sea oil would help to ensure Scotland's economic prosperity. The argument is not as strong today as it was in the 1970s because the reserves of oil have been slowly running out. However, if the revenues of the North Sea oil were allocated to Scotland, they would help decrease the deficit of the Scottish budget, the argument was also put forward by Liberal Democrats. But to what extent will the North Sea revenues really influence the budget depends on the method of calculation. If we take a per capita share of North Sea revenue, the reduction of Scottish deficit is lesser than if we use a geographical share of North Sea revenue.[52]

[50] Ibid., 102–03.
[51] Ibid., 33.
[52] Scottish Government, *Government Expenditure & Revenue Scotland 2007–2008* (Edinburgh: Scottish Government, June 2009), http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/276248/0082927.pdf.

However, the Government acknowledged that Scotland's average annual GDP growth rate of 2 per cent between the years 1977–2007 was lower than the of the UK economy as a whole reaching 2.4 per cent. It also rightly pointed out that the economic situation of an independent Scotland would depend on the policies adopted by the government of the day and influenced by the European and global economic situation.[53]

The SNP specified that the relations with the rest of the UK would be based on a "strong partnership on areas of mutual interests" and that effective mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation should be formed in order to achieve it. The Government also addresses the issue of citizenship. It argued that Scottish citizenship "will be based upon an inclusive model", while those who have any ties with other parts of the UK could get shared or dual citizenship. As for the court system, the SNP stipulated that it would be subject to further consideration whether there should be a Scottish Supreme Court established according to the UK model, or whether the existing Scottish judicial system was to be kept. Concerning the membership of independent Scotland in international alliances such as NATO, the Government altered its position without any explanation. It did not insist on being a member of NATO, but rather it favoured co-operation with it through its Partnership for Peace programme. In general, independent Scotland should be a sovereign country with the Queen as Head of State and a member of the EU. Moreover, the SNP already indicated that once independent, the Scottish Parliament or people, in a referendum, would decide whether they wanted a codified and written constitution or to remove the religious condition of succession to the throne as it was incorporated in the Act of Union 1707.[54]

Public opinion – majority for independence?

Liberal theorists of secession concede the right of secessionists to organise a referendum to let people express their support for secession. However, only if the majority of the people agree with it, the results could justify the withdrawal of the territory from the existing state, they claim. In the case of Scotland, people living in the country are likely to vote in the

[53] Scottish Government, *A National Conversation – Your Scotland, Your Choice*, 23, 34.
[54] Ibid., 103–4, 112, 114, 120.

independence referendum that should take place in autumn 2010. Because it is still not clear whether there would be a single-option or a multi-option referendum, or a referendum at all, it is worth examining the attitude of the Scottish electorate both to independence and to devolution to see if there is a majority in favour of the independence of Scotland or not. Although people could participate in the debate on the Scottish future within the National Conversation, the opinion polls represent another approach to determine the views of the public and probably with more precise result.

Table 1 shows that the Scottish Parliament with strong powers has been the best option since 1997. It also indicates that the support for independence in the European Union has been steady at 18 per cent with the exception of the 1997 referendum when 28 per cent of the people endorsed independence in the EU. This increase of support for this option can be explained by the fact that the Scottish people were, we can say, in euphoria to be given the right to decide over the Scottish future and they did not differ much in the options of the Scottish Parliament with some taxation powers and of independence.

Table 1 Support for Various Constitutional Options, 1979–2002

	1979	1992	1997 Election	1997 Referendum	1999	2002
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Independence outwith EU	7	6	8	9	10	11
Independence in EU		17	18	28	18	18
Strong domestic parliament	26	50	42	32	50	44
Weak domestic parliament	28		9	9	9	8
No elected body	26	24	17	17	10	13
Sample Size	729	957	882	676	1482	1665

No distinction was made between the two types of independence in 1979.
Strong domestic parliament was referred to in 1979 as "Scottish Assembly which would handle most Scottish affairs", and from 1997 onwards as "Scottish Parliament within the UK with some taxation powers". Weak domestic parliament was referred to in 1979 as "Scottish Assembly which would handle some Scottish affairs and would be responsible to Parliament at Westminster", and from 1997 onwards as "Scottish Parliament within the UK with no taxation powers". No distinction was made in 1992.

Don't know and not answered included in the base.
Sources: Scottish Election Surveys of 1979, 1992 and 1997; Scottish Referendum Survey of 1997; Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys of 1999 and 2002. In Lindsay Paterson, *Attitudes to Scottish Independence and to the SNP* (Dunblane: Seminar for MSPs, MPs and MEPs from the Scottish National Party, August 2003), http://www.institute-of-governance.org/publications/working_papers/attitudes_to_scottish_independence_and_to_the_snp.

The support for further devolution of powers as the most favourable option confirmed a MORI Scotland social survey that was carried out in early 2006. In this survey 48 per cent of respondents gave their preference to more powers being devolved to the Scottish Parliament;[55] three years later, June 2009 ICM/BBC survey also registered 47 per cent of answers being in favour of further devolution in the area of tax powers.[56]

The endorsement for independence did not overcome a 50 per cent threshold until November 2006 when 52 per cent of respondents in ICM Research expressed their approval for Scotland becoming an independent country.[57] It was at the time when the Scottish National Party was on a roll with its campaign leading to the Scottish Parliament elections held in May 2007 and focusing on independence for Scotland and North Sea oil revenues. However, since then the support for independence has been declining. This was confirmed by the survey carried out by ICM for BBC in June 2009 that showed only 28 per cent endorsement for independence option.[58]

When people were surveyed on the question of a referendum as proposed by the Scottish National Party in the 2007 White Paper and had to show the preference whether they agree or disagree that the Scottish Government should start negotiations in the question of the independence of Scotland, they would, as Table 2 implies, refuse the proposal. On the other hand, the proportion of those who would agree is not insignificant. However, this changed a several months later. In November 2009, just a few

[55] Stephen Herbert, *Attitudes to the Scottish Parliament and Devolution*, SPICe briefing 06/23 (Edinburgh: The Scottish Parliament, April 2006), 19, http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/briefings-06/SB06-23.pdf.
[56] John Curtice, "Public Attitudes and Elections", in *Scotland Devolution Monitoring Report September 2009*, 18.
[57] Sunday Telegraph Independence Poll Scottish Data, ICM Reserch, fieldwork November 2006, total number of respondents was 1003, http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/pdfs/2006_november_sunday_telegraph_independence_poll_scottish_data.pdf.
[58] Curtice, "Public Attitudes and Elections", 18.

days before the publication of the Scottish Government's White Paper, the Daily Telegraph released a new survey on the voting intention of the Scottish people in a prospective referendum using the wording of the question as formulated in the draft Referendum Bill 2007. Majority of respondents, 57 per cent, said that they would vote no in an independence referendum while 29 per cent expressed their willingness to support independence. On the other hand, 45 per cent responded that such a referendum should take place within two or three years.[59]

Table 2 Referendum on Scottish Independence Opinion Poll

		I agree that the Scottish Government should negotiate a settlement with the government of the United Kingdom so that Scotland becomes an independent state	I do not agree that the Scottish Government should negotiate a settlement with the government of the United Kingdom so that Scotland becomes an independent state
August 2007	%	35	50
Nov./Dec. 2007	%	40	44
Mar./Apr. 2008	%	41	40
June/July 2008	%	39	41
October 2008	%	35	43
Jan./Feb. 2009	%	38	40
May/June 2009	%	36	39

Question asked: The SNP have recently announced their plans for a possible referendum on Scottish independence in future. If such a referendum were to be held tomorrow, how would you vote? Respondents had to choose between two options.

[59] YouGov asked 1,141 Scottish people between November 18 and November 20, 2009, survey carried out for Daily Telegraph. Simon Johnson, "Independence and SNP support down, Telegraph poll shows", *Daily Telegraph*, 24 November 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/scotland/6637020/Independence-and-SNP-support-down-Telegraph-poll-shows.html.

Source: TNS-BMRB System Three/The Herald, base 1000; 27. 5. – 2. 6. 09 in John Curtice, "Public Attitudes and Elections" in *Scotland Devolution Monitoring Report September 2009*, ed. Paul Cairney, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/files/research/devolution/dmr/Scotland_Sept_2009.pdf.

The result of such a referendum will very much depend on the precise wording of the question or questions in case of multi-option referendum, and also on the political and economic situation not only in Scotland, but in the UK as a whole. These opinion polls also confirm the findings of researchers focusing on the dynamic of referendums that "there is a tendency for referendum voters to behave in a conservative way".[60] Such a conservative approach to voting can be further strengthened by an unfavourable economic situation. The latest November survey showed it very clearly. 63 per cent of those polled said that the primary task of the Scottish Government should be to reduce unemployment that had increased due to the economic crisis.[61] Therefore, in the current economic situation it would be very difficult for the Scottish National Party to get a majority of votes in the independence referendum, if any referendum will be held at all.

Conclusion

The National Conversation debate on the future prospects of Scotland confirmed the diversity of opinions and views on what constitutional option should be chosen to ensure a sustainable development of the country. The Scottish Government managed to involve several thousand people living in Scotland, and a remarkable number of those from other parts of the UK or abroad as well as representatives of Scottish civil society into the discussion. It was less successful in involving directly the opposition parties but, on the other hand, the SNP contrived to get a response from them within the Calman Commission.

The discussion started with two options, further devolution and independence of Scotland, but ended up by four specifically formulated options – the status quo, limited extension of powers as proposed by the Calman Commission, full devolution, and independence. The Scottish

[60] Quoted in Stephane Dion, "Why is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons from Quebec", *British Journal of Political Science* 26, No. 2 (April 1996): 272.

[61] Simon Johnson, "Independence and SNP support down, Telegraph poll shows", *Daily Telegraph*, 24 November 2009.

Government included the status quo to emphasise the current state of devolution in Scotland as well as to reflect some of the public views. The option of further devolution was split into two because the Scottish National Party did not consider the scope of responsibilities that were to be transferred to Scotland on the basis of the Calman Commission's recommendations sufficient and wanted to put forward its alternative vision of extending devolution of powers. However, the SNP omitted the federal option. It was likely due to the fact that this option did attract only little public attention; even Liberal Democrats who had been promoting federalisation of the UK for a long time did not advance it actively in the debate.

One of the most discussed issues were economic matters that were analysed both by supporters of devolution and advocates of independence. Because Scotland was not granted any significant fiscal powers, the scope for further devolution of competences in this area was wide and political parties seized the day. Their proposals coincided in what areas the change could be made but differed in the extent of specific powers to be ceded to Scotland. The biggest changes were proposed by the Scottish National Party within full devolution and independence options. As a defender of independence, the SNP argued that Scotland would be able to adopt economic tools that would be the most convenient to Scottish needs. On the other hand, the party acknowledged that its economic growth was lower that of the UK in the last thirty years. However, it insisted that the North Sea oil revenues would help independent Scotland to improve its economic situation, however, not to the extent as it could have in the 1970s. Under full devolution, the SNP proposed full fiscal autonomy of Scotland that would mean a complete change of the existing way of financing Scotland with no room left for the block grant as well as the Barnett formula. As a result, Scottish Parliament and Government would be responsible for raising all taxes and spending in Scotland and for the payment to the UK Government for public services such provided at the UK level.

Liberal Democrats and the Calman Commission refused to support full fiscal autonomy arguing that it was almost the same as granting independence to Scotland. On the other hand, LibDems agreed to remove the Barnett formula and to replace it by needs-based equalisation formula referring to all parts of the UK, while the Calman Commission insisted on keeping it. Both LibDems and the Calman Commission supported granting borrowing as well as increased tax-raising powers to Scotland, but to a lesser extent than the SNP.

Unlike the economic matters, the territory and the question of negotiations between the British and Scottish governments were not much discussed because there were not considered important. As for the former, the territory of Scotland is geographically clearly defined. Only the SNP pointed out that the maritime boundaries and the share of the UK continental shelf would have to be solved once Scotland becomes independent. The issue was also mentioned indirectly when the franchise in the prospective referendum had been debated by the public.

The referendum itself drew a lot of attention because it is closely related to many sensitive questions. For the SNP for instance it is the only way how to justify Scottish secession if the majority of people living in Scotland would support it. However, the opinion polls have showed prevailing support for further devolution of powers to Scotland than for independence. Moreover, according to the newest polls, the majority of Scots even refused to give the Scottish Government green light to start negotiations with the UK Government on independence as was the SNP's proposed wording of the question embodied in a draft Referendum Bill 2007. Being aware of this situation, the SNP made concession in expressing their readiness to accept a multi-option referendum including three options – the status quo, full devolution and independence. But it indicated that it would not initiate such a proposal, because of favouring a single-issue referendum, and left the whole initiative to other parties in the Scottish Parliament. Therefore, the question of the independence referendum is still open, and it is really difficult to anticipate when and under what conditions, if ever, the referendum will take place, and with what results.

In general, the National Conversation debate did not make the situation easier for the Scottish Government. The SNP has failed to secure a majority vote for independence in the public, and if it wants to enforce an independence referendum, it has to overcome its minority position in the Scottish Parliament as well as legal obstacles preventing the Members of the Parliament to legislate outside its remit.

It is thus possible to agree with John R. Wood that "predicting secession is like predicting the moves of gamblers; even if one is familiar with their predispositions, understands their rules, and knows the cards they hold, one still cannot foretell the outcome of their game".[62]

[62] Wood, "Secession", 133.

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STUDIA TERRITORIALIA IV

BETWEEN TRADITION AND MODERNITY: GREEK-GERMAN RELATIONS IN RETROSPECT

KATEŘINA KRÁLOVÁ

Abstract

The relations between Greece and Germany have evolved from age-long cultural ties between the people of both countries. As early as in the early modern period, Germans turned to the traditions of ancient Greece and its language. The presence of Greek scholars in German schools and universities led to a rise in interest in the ancient culture. With the Industrial Revolution, German lands became an important trade partner for Greece and their privileged position was hardly hit by military conflicts of the twentieth century. The study attempts to summarize the evolution of relations between the two countries from the birth of the Greek national movement at the beginning of the eighteenth century until their stabilization after the Second World War. The arrangement of the chapters follows the chronological sequence of events, which underscores the transition from the traditional cultural contacts to political and economic cooperation in the modern era.

Keywords: Greece, Germany, external relations, tradition, modernity

Introduction

The relations between Greece and Germany evolve from age-long cultural bonds between the people of both countries. As early as in the Middle Ages, Germans turned to the traditions of ancient Greece and its language. The presence of Greek scholars in German schools and universities contributed to deepening the German interest in the ancient culture. Germans also recognized the Byzantium as the bearer of Eastern Christian tradition.

German lands played an important role during the founding of modern Greek national state via military support of numerous Philhellenes, as well as via the first modern Greek sovereign, who came from Bavarian Wittelsbach Dynasty.

With the Industrial Revolution, German lands became an important trade partner of Greece and their privileged position was hardly hit by military conflicts of the twentieth century. In spite of Nazi terror and damages caused by the Second World War, Greece proved able to come to terms with this past and soon became one of the first partners of the Federal Republic of Germany not only in terms of trade, but also in the political arena.

In the historical reflection on the development of modern Greece, the German role is often neglected despite the fact that the Germans had participated to a considerable extent in the formation of cultural, political, legal, and economic institutions of modern Greece.

The following study attempts to summarize the development of relations between the two countries from the birth of the Greek national movement at the beginning of the eighteenth century until their stabilization after the Second World War. Individual chapters address main areas of German influence on the evolution of the first national state in the Balkans. The arrangement of the chapters reflects the chronological sequence of events, which underscores the transition from the traditional cultural contacts to political and economic cooperation in the modern era.

Philhellenism: Struggle for the Birth of Modern Greece

The end of the eighteenth century witnessed the French Revolution and the transition of the Enlightenment into Romanticism. Under such influence, Europe began to look for new paradigms. Many thinkers, particularly intellectuals from Western Europe who identified themselves with neo-classicist ideals, turned to the intellectual legacy of ancient Greece. Western Philhellenes, keen on Greek antiquity, promoted liberal thinking in the spirit of national revival.[1] Western interest in Greece was inspired by German archaeologist Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–1768), who perceived ancient Greek architecture as one of the foundations of European culture. Winckelmann's theory motivated other German humanists and romanticists, including Lessing, Schiller, Goethe, and Hölderlin, whose

[1] Pavel Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka* (Praha: Lidové noviny, 1998), 269.

works then generated an increased public interest in the restoration of the Greek state, through which they sought to revive the cultural roots of European civilization.[2]

Rebellions in the territories under the Ottoman rule concurrently gave rise to national liberation movements that aspired to break up the Ottoman Empire and to create national states. Greece soon established itself as the leader of the liberation movement in the Balkans. At the initial stage of this struggle, Germans, already deeply influenced by Philhellenism, conveyed their sympathies to modern Greeks who in their eyes represented the personification of ancient Greek heroes.[3] Germans were among the first volunteers who had set out from the French port of Marseilles to support the Greek battle against "dark Turkish dominance."[4] On the Greek soil, however, the volunteers were confronted with a reality that was completely different from their romantic ideals.

As Hans Eideneier describes:

"The Philhellenes set out to find their Greeks in places like Sparta, Athens, Olympia, Delphi, or Thermopylae. There, if they actually managed to locate these places, they found a population who did not remember those sites at all, who did not speak the language studied at Central European grammar schools, and who referred to themselves as to the Romaios."[5]

The activities of the Philhellenes were instrumental in the creation of modern Greek statehood, as they contributed to the revival of ancient thought. At the same time, the Philhellenes gathered financial resources to support Greek liberation movement – in this context, we must not forget the contributions by the Bavarian King Ludwig I, himself an enthusiastic Philhellene – and some even directly participated on the Greek side in armed conflicts.[6] Although the inexperienced Central Europeans

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[2] See Paulos Tzermias, *Die Identitätssuche des neuen Griechentums: eine Studie zur Nationalfrage mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Makedonienproblems* (Freiburg: Univ.-Verl., 1994), 14.

[3] See A. Vakalopoulos, "Der Philhelenismus der Deutschen während der Griechischen Revolution von 1821," *Balkan Studies* 207 (1986): 47.

[4] See Johannes Irmscher, "Griechisch-deutsche Beziehungen vom 13. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart. Eine erste Übersicht," *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes* IV/3–4 (1966): 357.

[5] See Hans Eideneier, "Hellenen und Philhellenen", in *Griechen und Deutsche: Bilder vom Anderen*, ed. Kirsten Fast and Jan Peter Thorbecke (Stuttgart: Württembergisches Landesmuseum, 1982), 64. For Romaios, see also Heinz Richter, "Zwischen Tradition und Moderne: Die politische Kultur Griechenlands," in *Politische Kultur in Westeuropa,* ed. Peter Reichel (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1984), 155–57.

[6] See Olga Lazaridou, "Von der Krise zur Normalität: Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen

did not always understand the military strategy, they nonetheless helped considerably strengthen the Greek rebels.[7] Yet the European participation in the liberation movement had not been officially appreciated by the Greek side until 1843 when the Greek veterans of the liberation struggle appealed to the Bavarian King Otto von Wittelsbach to adopt a constitution and to expel the remaining foreigners, including the Bavarians, from the country, with the exception granted to the Philhellenes who had fought on the Greek side.[8]

Nonetheless, the historical experience of the Philhellenes during the period of national upheaval that reflected the age-long marginalization of the historical development in the Balkans discredited the image of modern Greece in the eyes of German public. As German historian Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer (1790–1861) wrote:

"In Europe, the race of the Hellenes was wiped out, not a drop of pure, unmixed Hellenic blood runs through the veins of the Christian citizenry of today's Greece. The modern Greeks are, if they are not Albanian, actually Slavs."[9]

Paradoxically, Fallmerayer's words in fact prompted the Greeks to create their own modern identity by effectively combining their ancient past with Byzantine-Christian traditions, Athens with Constantinople, and an ancient Hellene with a medieval Romaios. The legacy of nearly four centuries of Ottoman rule was also, in essence, suppressed. The newly established Greek state that comprised territory only slightly larger than the Peloponnese and Attica decided that incorporation of all ancient territories populated by Greek diasporas was the main objective.

From the beginning, the geopolitical ambition of the modern Greece was degenerating into a utopian plan to reconstruct the Byzantine Empire of five seas and two continents. This "Great Idea" (*Megali Idea*) became the new doctrine and, for the next one hundred years, it often overshadowed domestic problems of political, social, or economic character. With a language reform, new, so-called pure, Greek language (*kathareuousa*) was created, combining ancient Greek elements with Greek that was commonly

(1949–1958)" (Ph.D. dissertation, Universität Bonn 1992), 80–81.

7 See Misha Glenny, *Balkán 1804–1999* (Praha: BB Art, 2003), 47.

8 See Hagen Fleischer, *In Kreuzschatten der Mächte – Griechenland 1941–44: Okkupation – Resistance – Kolaboration* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter-Lang Verlag, 1986), 39.

9 See Jakob Phillip Fallmerayer, *Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea während des Mittelalters* (Stuttgart/Tübingen: Cotta, 1830–1836), 9.

used by the people at that time. However, since only the intellectual elite had a command of *kathareuousa*, the new language in fact caused an irreconcilable social gap.[10]

One may object that an analysis of modern Greek nation building is not essential to the study of relations between Greece and Germany. However, our Central European perception of history often prevents us from understanding the complex issue of national revival of a society with strong traditions of Greek antiquity and Byzantium. The fact that the Greeks were repeatedly attempting to build their own state on the foundations of Athenian democracy, while at the same referring to the Byzantine-Orthodox tradition, cannot be ignored. The evolution of Greek state is thus closely linked to the events of the remote and often rather mythical past.

The Modern Greek State and the "Foreign Factor"

The Greek resistance movement of 1821 envisioned that the victory over the Ottoman Empire would be followed by creating of an independent republic with its own constitution. However, the Great Powers were dismayed by the "Great Idea" concept and decided rather to intervene and establish a monarchy that would be in fact under their control. The influence of the Great Powers thus fundamentally determined the future form and the development of political system of modern Greece. External intervention went considerably beyond common European practices and became the central element of its political life. Greek society coined its own term for this phenomenon: "foreign factor" (*xenos paragontas*).[11]

The external interference in Greece remained constant and high for decades. From the establishment of modern Greek state in 1830 till the early 1860s, England, France, and Russia exerted influence over Greek politics. In 1832, Otto von Wittelsbach, the son of Bavarian King Ludwig I, was installed to the Greek throne as the first Greek monarch, thus establishing the first significant link between the Greek and the German peoples. Otto was an acceptable candidate for both sides. At the same time, the Great Powers agreed that governmental affairs would temporarily come under the

[10] See e.g. Richter, *Zwischen Tradition und Moderne*, 145–66.
[11] See Paulos Tzermias, *Politik im neuen Hellas: Strukturen, Theorien und Parteien im Wandel* (Tübingen: Francke, 1997), 13; Richter, *Zwischen Tradition und Moderne*, 148.

authority of Council of Regents, comprising of three Bavarian Germans who were to represent Otto before he would reach maturity.[12]

Count Joseph Ludwig Armansperg became the president of the council. Munich professor Georg Ludwig Maurer covered legislative, religious, and education-related affairs. Major General Karl Wilhelm Heideck was put in charge of military and security matters. However, personal relations between the regents were tense. Eventually, Armansperg emerged victorious from the power struggle and succeeded in persuading Otto to dismiss the other two regents. In this way, Armansperg secured his own position as the Greek "Arch-Chancellor." In the end, his excessive rise in power became the reason for him being recalled to Bavaria. The governmental affairs were then passed on to Ignazio Rudhardt, but in the meantime the title of "Arch-Chancellor" had been abolished with Armannsperg's departure. In December 1837, the government finally came under the direct rule of Otto I, who finally came of age.

In an effort to stabilize the new system, a series of changes of political, legislative, and administrative character were carried out in Greece during the 1830s. King Otto I dissolved irregular military and paramilitary divisions that posed threat to his rule and replaced them with a regular army. Several Bavarian divisions, later supplemented by a number of mercenaries, became its core element. The presence of Bavarian armed forces in Greece was provided for by a Bavarian-Greek treaty of friendship and alliance from November 1832, as well as by an agreement between the Great Powers and Bavaria from May 7, 1832.[13]

The Council of Regents paid special attention to legislative issues under the guidance of Georg von Maurer, a specialist in French law and German civil rights. Despite the fact that Maurer stayed on the Council for no more than just seventeen months, he managed to frame the foundations of modern Greek legal system. Under his leadership, four legal codes were drafted, passed, and eventually put into effect: the penal code, the code of judicial proceedings, the penal order, and the civil judicial order.

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[12] For more on Otto's era, see Paulos Tzermias, *Neugriechische Geschichte. Eine Einführung* (Tübingen: Francke, 1986); Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Modern Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka*; Christopher M. Woodhouse, *Modern Greece. A Short History* (London: Faber & Faber, 1986); and Wolf Seidl, *Bayern in Griechenland. Die Geschichte eines Abenteueurs* (München: Süddeutscher Verlag, 1970), among others.

[13] The number of Bavarian soldiers exceeded five thousand. See Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka*, 301–2.

With regards to terminological inadequacies of modern Greek language, the laws were drafted in German and published together with their Greek translations. For a long time, the above-mentioned codes continued to influence the development of Greek legislation and many of them remained valid until the recent past.[14]

The era of Otto's rule was not an easy period for the Greek population. The originally weak and uncertain young king quickly transformed into a resolute and energetic ruler with absolutist inclinations. In September 1843, a bloodless revolt of Athenian garrisons together with the demands of Greek oligarchy compelled the ruler to adopt a constitution and to establish a constitutional monarchy. Nevertheless, Otto often disrespected the new constitution. He curbed the freedom of the press and interfered with the election and legislation process in order to resume his absolute power. Persecution of officials and magistrates as well as of civilian population who opposed the monarchy became a characteristic trait of Greek politics during the following decades.[15]

In February 1862, a military coup of dissenting officers in Nafplion brought about the end of Bavarian Dynasty's rule in Greece. Otto was superseded by Wilhelm Christian Ferdinand Adolf of the Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glückburg family, who accepted the name of Georgios I. Neither France, weakened by the Revolution, nor Russia, exhausted by the Crimean war, could prevent England from installing her own candidate to the Greek throne and from becoming de facto sole protector of Greece. Britain held her protective hand over Greece till 1947 when it was replaced by the United States. Greece did not achieve true sovereignty until the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974.[16]

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[14] For more on the legal system see Vassilios Skouris, "Beziehungen der griechischen und der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft in der Nachkriegszeit," in *Proceedings of the Symposium Organized by the Institute of Balkan Studies in Thessaloniki and Ouranoupolis, 1989 "Griechenland und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Rahmen Nachkriegseuropas"* (Thessaloniki: Institute of Balkan Studies, 1989), 71–80.

[15] See Tzermias, *Die Identitätssuche des neuen Griechentums*, 69. See also Monika Yfantis, "Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen 1949–1955" (Ph.D. dissertation, Universität Düsseldorf 1999), 16–18; Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka*, 307–8.

[16] See Tzermias, *Die Identitätssuche des neuen Griechentums*, 42–44; Richter, *Zwischen Tradition und Moderne*, 149–50; Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka*, 325–26.

Culture and Education

The cultural background of Greek national revival during the Ottoman era was shaped by scholars of Greek origin who resided in European centers of education and were inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Classicism under the influence of the French Revolution. Eugenios Voulgaris (1716–1806) was among the most prominent Greek philosophers of the Enlightenment. His opinions and modern approach to teaching philosophy made him a frequent target of attacks from the Greek Orthodox Church, which accused him of atheism. After teaching in numerous schools of philosophy, Voulgaris finally departed to Leipzig. There he became acquainted with the works of Voltaire and published *Logika*, a book on both ancient and modern philosophy.

European events at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the Greek struggle for liberation stimulated a wave of Philhellenism in Western Europe. Western inspiration manifested itself in particular by using ancient as well as modern Greek themes in numerous romantic works of leading European artists. Modern Greece was born during the era of Romanticism. Lord George Gordon Noel Byron (1788–1824), English writer who laid down his life in the fight for the establishment of modern Greece, became its guiding spirit.[17] Fallmerayer's racial theory about the origins of Greeks paradoxically helped to define modern Greek state *vis-à-vis* the rest of the Balkans.

Classicist ideas, however, often clashed with romantic philosophy. Disputes were sparked primarily by Johann Gottfried Herder's (1744–1803) work, which emphasized the value and significance of folk art as the original national culture. Thus, a contradiction in the national identification between Greek antiquity and Byzantium emerged, which on one hand opened up far-reaching disagreements between the Orthodox Church and liberal intellectuals and on the other hand stimulated a boom of Greek literature and philosophy.[18]

Otto I deserves credit for unprecedented development of Greek culture, which, in the long run, was significant also in that it allowed for strengthening of Greece's relations with the German lands. Together with the monarch, Greece received a large group of German scholars, architects,

[17] See Glenny, *Balkán 1804–1999*, 47.
[18] See Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka*, 339–47.

and artists who had a substantial influence on the formation of modern Greek society. The first Greek university was established in Athens in 1837, only three years after Otto had declared it the capital city. In its organizational structure and architectural layout, the Athens University resembled the university in Göttingen. Seven German professors were included in the first professorial board. In addition to this, the foundations of the Athens Technical College (*Polytechnion*) were laid.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the architecture of Athens underwent substantial changes. Stamatis Kleanthis and German architect Gustav Eduard Schaubert, with whom Kleanthis became acquainted during his studies in Berlin, designed the city's new urban plan. Together with German architect Leopold von Klenze, archaeologist Ludwig Ross, and Danish architect Theophile Hansen, Schaubert later took part in the reconstruction of ancient Acropolis.[19] The Old Royal Palace (currently the seat of the parliament) was designed by Friedrich Gärtner in 1836.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, Athens' architecture was perhaps most noticeably influenced by grandiose neo-classicist constructions by German architect Ernst Ziller. Originally an assistant to Theophile Hansen, Ziller became the designer of the New Royal Palace (the Maximou Palace, currently the official residence of the prime minister) built as the seat of King Constantine I, as well as of the Athens City Theatre and Stathatos Palace (currently the Cycladic Art Museum). From 1872 to 1882, Ziller was professor at the National Technical University in Athens; in 1884, he became the director of the Institute of Public Edifices. During his life, he gave rise to over six hundred public and private buildings in Greece. Ziller's name is also inherently linked to the activities of German archaeologists working in Greece. Ziller designed the building of the German Archaeological Institute (*Deutsches archäologisches Institut*) in Athens, opened in 1874, which till nowadays houses the most extensive part of archaeological research in Greece. His work also includes the Troy Palace (*Iliu melathron*), the seat of the prominent German archaeologist and discoverer of Troy and of Mycenaean treasure, Heinrich Schliemann (currently the Numismatic Museum).[20]

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[19] Schaubert's plan prevented implementation of a design to alter the Acropolis into a royal palace by another German architect, Karl Friedrich Schinkel. See Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka*, 361.

[20] For Ernst Ziller, see Friedbert Ficker, Gert Morzinek and Barbara Mazurek, *Ernst Ziller – Ein sächsischer Architekt und Bauforscher in Griechenland; Die Familie Ziller* (Lindenberg i. Allgäu: Kunstverlag Josef Fink, 2003).

Archaeological discoveries of ancient Greek monuments generally bolstered the classicist architecture. These excavations were essential to the understanding and mastering the elements and construction techniques of Greek antiquity. The main representatives of German archaeology included not only the aforementioned Heinrich Schliemann, but also Wilhelm Dörpfeld and Adolf Furtwängler. Dörpfeld took part in the excavations in Olympia, where he designed the local museum, while Furtwängler worked in Mycenae, Olympia, and Aigina.

With the departure of the Wittelsbachs, Greek-German cultural relations came to a standstill. However, Berlin, Munich, Leipzig, and Vienna continued to be the target destinations for Greek students and scholars. In the late nineteenth century, linguist Manolis Triandafyllidis, pedagogue Alexandros Delmuzos, and philosopher Dimitris Glinos completed their studies in Germany. On their return to Greece in 1910, these scholars founded the Society for Education (*Ekpeaideoutikos Omilos*), which aimed at carrying out a reform of the education system. During the era of Viennese modernity, Konstantinos Christomanos, teacher of modern Greek language who resided at the Emperor's court in Vienna, recorded his reflections on his lessons and journeys with the Emperor in *To vivlio tis autokrateiras Elisavet* ("The Book of Empress Elisabeth"). Nikolaos Gyzis, who became a professor at the Munich Academy, ranks among the founders of modern Greek painting. The foundations of modern Greek sculpture were laid by Ioannis Vitsaris, who, after completing his five-year study program in Munich in 1870, evolved from expressing classicist ideals to forms of Romanticism and Realism.[21]

With Constantine I rising to the Greek throne in 1913, the relations between Greece and Germany experienced a breakthrough. The new ruler was not only fond of Germany because he studied at the Potsdam Military Academy, but also because of his marriage to Princess Sophie, sister of the German Emperor.[22] Family ties and German education enabled the two countries to forge a close relation. General Ioannis Metaxas, the authoritarian leader of Greece from 1936 until his death in 1941, also studied in Germany, at the German Military Academy of the Prussian general staff in Berlin.

[21] For modern Greek culture, see A. Antoniadis, *Synchroni Elliniki Architektoniki* (Athens: Ejdoseis Karagkouni – Anthropos + Chronos, 1979); Ch. A. Christou, *I Elliniki Zografiki 1832–1922* (Athens: Ethniki Trapeza tis Elladas, 1981); L. Politis, *Istoria tis Neoellinikis Logotechnias* (Athens: Morfotiko Idryma Ethnikis Trapezas, 1980).

[22] See Fleischer, *Im Kreuzschattenchatten der Mächte*, 44.

Metaxas's policies were heavily influenced by his sympathies to fascist Italy and later Nazi Germany.[23]

The German School in Athens (*Deutsche Schule Athen*), founded by Wilhelm Dörpfeld in 1896, experienced a considerable expansion during the first half of the twentieth century. Its growth was especially noticeable during the Metaxas dictatorship, when attendance of German classes greatly increased due to night classes for adults. In 1939, Department of German Philology and Literature was founded at the Athens University under the direction of German linguist Rudolf Fahrner. Not surprisingly, in order to study Roman languages and English, Greek students had to wait some more years.[24]

Generally speaking, the interest in German language courses was increasing. After its establishment in 1934, the German Academy in Athens (*Deutsche Akademie*), the predecessor of today's Goethe-Institut, started out with only eighteen students. At the outbreak of the Second World War, there were already eleven branches of the Academy established throughout the entire Greece. In some provinces, the courses of German enjoyed greater popularity than courses offered by English and French institutes, which had been founded earlier. For instance, during Nazi occupation, over three thousand university students attended the German courses at the Academy's branch in Thessaloniki.[25]

Despite the heavy burden of Nazi occupation and the long civil war, Greece was the first country from the territory occupied by Nazis to resume relations with Germany. The positive development was induced particularly by accession of Paul I and his energetic wife Friederika, granddaughter of German Emperor Wilhelm II, to the Greek throne in 1947. Therefore, as early as in 1951, the German Archaeological Institute in Athens reopened. The resumption of the Institute's activities was rather unique, as it preceded reopening of other important regional branches, such as the one in formerly allied Rome, or the one in neutral Istanbul. During the following year, archaeological excavations in Olympia opened again. In 1955, Greece officially put the Institute under German patronage.[26]

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[23] See Lazaridou, *Von der Krise zur Normalität*, 84.

[24] See Hagen Fleischer, "Der Neubeginn in den deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und die Bewältigung der jüngsten Vergangenheit," in *Proceedings of the Symposium Organized by the Institute of Balkan Studies in Thessaloniki and Ouranoupolis, 1989 "Griechenland und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Rahmen Nachkriegseuropas"* (Thessaloniki: Institute of Balkan Studies, 1989), 81–84.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid., 92.

Similarly, religious and educational institutions in Greece soon resumed relations with Germany. In 1952, the very first branch of the Goethe-Institut opened in Athens and bilateral student exchanges began to flourish. Owing to a considerable assistance of Queen Friederika, the restoration of German evangelical parishes followed. In 1953, Greece received the first post-war German pastor. Not long afterwards, in 1956, the Athens German School reopened. In the same year, after concluding a cultural agreement between Greece and the Federal Republic of Germany, construction of new representative Goethe-Institut building in Athens commenced. The Goethe-Institut was not only to provide German language courses but also to take care of the (from Germany's perspective) much-needed cultural enlightenment.[27]

Political Evolution in the Shadow of Wars

After the establishment of modern Greek state, Germany was not involved in Greek politics as one of the patron Powers – it was involved only indirectly through Otto von Wittelsbach of Bavaria, the first Greek king. After his abdication, the political relations between the two countries were quelled.

At the end of the nineteenth century, meetings of the European Great Powers, so-called Berlin congresses, convened to address the critical situation in the Balkans. The first congress, which took place in 1869, debated the issue of Greek and Turkish minorities in Crete. The results of the second congress, which was assembled after the Russo-Turkish war of June 1878, included a revision of the peace treaty of San Stefano and a proposal for readjustment of borders between Greece and the Ottoman Empire to the benefit of the former. Later on, as bilateral Greek-Turkish talks nearly flared up into another military conflict, the Great Powers met again in Berlin in 1881. Under their pressure, the Ottoman Empire was forced to cede the territories of Thessalia and the Artha district in Southern Epirus.[28]

The ties with Germany forged by King Constantine I held firm over the course of the First World War. Under the influence of Constantine's German wife and with the support of part of the Royal Army, the king was not willing, even under pressure of the Great Powers, to abandon his friendly

[27] Ibid., 93–99.
[28] See Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka*, 322–25; Fleischer, *Im Kreuzschattenchatten der Mächte*, 43.

neutrality towards Germany. Part of the liberal political scene, led by the Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos abandoned king's policy and moved to Thessaloniki, declaring support for the Entente Powers. In October 1915, Venizelos gave approval to the British and French units to land in Greece. King Constantine responded by granting a permission to land to the Central Powers, thus creating a situation of national schism. Great Britain, however, was not to tolerate Constantine's pro-German politics any longer. Together with Venizelos, the allied army forced Constantine to abdicate and to leave the country. Constantine's son Alexander was then appointed his successor. In early July 1917, Greece declared war on Germany.[29]

Close ties with Germany were re-established after Ioannis Metaxas, a right-wing extremist, was appointed Greek prime minister in April 1936. Metaxas, influenced by ideas of German National Socialism, did not hide his Germanophile inclinations. Only a month after assuming control over the government in Athens, the Reich's minister of propaganda Joseph Goebbels accepted invitation for an official visit to Greece.[30] At the beginning of the Second World War, Metaxas, in fear of Mussolini's expansive intentions, turned to both London and Berlin with a request for intervention. Metaxas's hopes of eliciting help from Germany counted on his reputation of a long-time advocate of pro-German orientation and on his personal credit of fostering cultural and economic relations with the Reich. Hitler, however, was not willing to act against the interests of allied Italy.[31]

In April 1941, German *wehrmacht* invaded Greece (operation Marita) and occu-pied the northern part of the country – the regions of Macedonia and Thessaloniki. The southern provinces of Greece became part of the Italian occupation zone while the eastern Macedonia and Thrace were occupied by Bulgaria. Following the capitulation of fascist Italy in September 1943, all of Greece came under the control of German armed forces.[32]

Initially, Germany promoted – relatively successfully – a "soft" occupation policy, not least because of Hitler's admiration for ancient Greece. Germany's power in Greece was thus designed to contrast with the harsh approach of

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[29] See e.g. Tzermias, *Neugriechische Geschichte*, 123.

[30] See Hagen Fleischer, "Die 'Viehmenschen' und das 'Sauvolk'. Feindbilder einer dreifachen Okkupation: der Fall Griechenland," in *Kultur –Propaganda – Öffentlichkeit: Intentionen deutscher Besatzungspolitik und Reaktionen auf die Okkupation*, ed. Wolfgang Benz, Gerhard Otto and Anabella Weismann (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 1998), 135.

[31] See Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka*, 421.

[32] 508 AR 9381/88 Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg (ZLS), 130 JS 4/88 (Z) Zentralstelle Köln.

the Italians.[33] However, the situation quickly changed after German landing in Crete (operation Merkur) in late May 1941. Germans clearly sensed that initial apparent Greek sympathies were only pretended out of necessity. For the first time, the activities of the armed Greek resistance movement and of the guerrilla groups became widespread. The National Liberation Front (*Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo*) soon turned into the key element of the left wing and liberal opposition during the occupation.[34]

The Nazi swiftly adapted their occupation policy by shifting from "mere" propaganda to terror aimed against the highland guerrillas. Such policy inflicted great suffering upon the civilian population. In winter 1941–1942, Greece had to cope with a widespread famine that caused death of several hundred thousands. Starting from mid-December 1943, Greek Jews were being arrested in order to carry out the "final solution to the Jewish question." The last transport of Jews from the Greek territory to Auschwitz took place in June 1944. In total, sixty thousand Greek Jews fell victim to the Holocaust, which comprised about 80 percent of the Jewish population in Greece.[35]

At the end of summer 1944, Soviet Red Army entered Bulgaria. Therefore, on August 28, 1944, Hitler issued an order for immediate withdrawal of German troops from Greece. The balance sheet of the German occupation was appalling: nearly 1,600 villages were burned down and one million Greeks were left without shelter. Only a quarter of the national railway network remained operable. Most of the infrastructure, including stations, ports and even the Corinthian Channel, were destroyed. Moreover, over 120 thousand Greeks died as victims of so-called retributive measures (*Sühnemassnahmen*). Among the Greeks, the total loss of lives amounted to 520 thousand people, which represented 7.2% of the pre-war population.[36]

Paradoxically, Greece was one of the first formerly occupied countries to promote post-war reconciliation with Germany. Greek civil war of 1946–

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[33] After the Greek victory of "Ochi" over Italy on October 28, 1940, the Greeks resisted the occupation of their country by the defeated Power. Besides the initially non-violent German occupation policy, which, as a result, contributed to the growth of the resistance movement in Greece, there was also the fact that after the defeat of the Greek army, the victorious Wehrmacht only disarmed the captive men and non-commissioned officers and sent them home – unlike in the case with, for instance, the defeated Polish or French armies. See N. Svoronos, ed., *I Ellada 1936–1944. Diktatoria – Katochi – Antistasi* (Athens: Morfotiko Institouto ATE, 1989), 360.

[34] Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka*, 436.

[35] Mark Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 41.

[36] Wolfgang Schumann, ed., *Europa unterm Hakenkreuz. Die Okkupationspolitik des deutschen Faschismus (1938–1945)*. Band 6 (Berlin: Hüthig, 1992), 76.

1949 and the escalating conflict between the East and the West provided stimuli for normalization of relations. Greece's pro-Western government took a radically anti-communist stance primarily for domestic reasons. With regards to anticipated economic benefits of rapprochement with Germany, the blame for the devastation of Greece thus could have been propagandistically transferred from the Nazi occupants to the communist opposition.

Post-war stabilization of Greek-German relations started with reopening of Greece's general consulate in Bonn and Germany's consulate in Athens in March and December 1950 respectively. Both consulates were upgraded to Embassies in the spring of 1951. Greece then officially terminated the state of war with Germany. Speculations surrounding the alleged role of Werner von Grundherr, the first German Ambassador to Greece, accused of involvement in the *Endlösung* during his wartime activities in Denmark, could not cause damage to the re-established ties between the two countries.[37]

The consensus on the Cold War anti-communist stance that governed policy of both countries in the 1950s was solidified by official visits of German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to Greece and of Greek Prime Minister Alexandros Papagos to Germany in 1954. Although Papagos had spent the war years in the Dachau concentration camp, as prime minister he demonstrated his admiration for the German "working spirit and discipline, and especially for the military attributes of the German people." According to Papagos, alliance with the Federal Republic would represent a definite contribution to the West's security.[38] Bonn later showed appreciation of Papagos's effort in the reestablishment of relations by providing funds for publishing Papagos's wartime memoirs in Germany.[39]

Two years later, Greek royal couple received the German President Theodor Heuss. This high-level visit represented the first official reception of Germany's head of state abroad since the end of the Second World War. In 1956, both states concluded an agreement on cultural cooperation.[40]

While dealing with the issue of punishing war criminals, Greece was

[37] On Grundherr, see Yfantis, "Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen," 111–16.
[38] See Fleischer, *Der Neubeginn*, 99–103.
[39] Alexandros Papagos, *Griechenland im Kriege 1940–1941* (Bonn: Schimmelbusch, 1954).
[40] See e.g. Yfantis, "Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen," 255; Siegrid Skarpelis-Sperk, "Last – Verantwortung – Versöhnung. Politische Perspektiven für das zukünftige Verhältnis Deutschlands zu Griechenland," in *Versöhnung ohne Wahrheit? Deutsche Kriegsverbrechen in Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, ed. Karl von Giebeler, Heinz A. Richter and Reinhard Stupperich (Mannheim: Peleus, 2001), 91.

aware of the potential profit from future cooperation with the Federal Republic. Therefore, Athens opted for unofficial "compensation" and handed over all relevant prosecution documents to Bonn, thus transferring the responsibility of legal prosecution of war criminals to Germany. In the end, however, all the proceedings in Germany had been discontinued as the actions became time-barred.[41]

In between 1952 and 1955, both Greece and Germany were admitted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Only a few years later, in 1958, Greece concluded an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community. In the following decade, the Federal Republic became the main target for Greek labor migration. Then, in 1967–1974, when military junta took over the power in Greece, Germany also became the refuge for Greek political exile.[42] Later on, Germany supported the admission of democratic Hellenic Republic into the European Community. Greece finally joined the EC on January 1, 1981.

Economic Relations

The establishment of modern Greek state at the beginning of the nineteenth century paved the way to modernization of local conditions. During the Bavarian rule, postal services and new Greek currency (drachma) were introduced. Emphasis was placed on renewing the country-side. The first soil-improving methods were implemented to the rural areas. Road, sewage system, and public building construction became the most important long-term contributions to the development of the Greek countryside. Several German businesses set up operations in Greece; however, their share of Greek foreign trade remained marginal until the end of the nineteenth century.[43]

The rectification of the dismal political and economic conditions was declared priority for Charilaos Trikoupis's government. During the period of 1875 to 1895, Trikoupis served seven times as prime minister of Greece while

[41] See Willi Dressen, "Deutsche Sühnemassnahmen und Vergeltungsaktionen in Griechenland im Spiegel der deutschen Strafverfolgung," Ibid., 31–41.

[42] Statistics shows that every tenth Greek spent a longer part of his life in exile. See Pantelis M. Pantelouris, *Die deutsch-griechischen Nachkriegsbeziehungen*, http://www.hellasproducts.com/news/dg/pantelouris.htm.

[43] Lazaridou, "Von der Krise zur Normalität," 293; Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka*, 304.

holding other offices in the meanwhile, too. The increase of his popularity was related to the recovery of Greek economy and living standards. Trade, banking, and shipping experienced rapid growth. Local agricultural products, such as olives, olive oil, and raisins, were among popular exports. However, industrial production was developing slowly and was limited to shipyards, weaving mills and spinning factories, mining, and food production. In addition, there was an improvement of infrastructure, as new roads and railways were built. The Greek government assigned majority of contracts to foreign companies.[44]

Due to the boom of German industry, Germany strengthened her position on Greek market. However, despite the rapid growth of German exports in 1880–1913, Greece continued to remain the least important trading partner of Germany in the Balkans. Greece experienced a trade deficit with Germany until the First World War, which caused, for a certain period of time, total disruption of relations. Having overcome hyperinflation in the first half of the 1920s, financially stabilized Germany soon evolved into Greece's main trade partner.[45]

The second half of the 1920s provided a further push to the expansion of trade between the two countries. Greek export to Germany soon exceeded the import from Germany. Furthermore, on August 31, 1928, Greek-German Trade Agreement was negotiated. The implementation of a clearing mechanism in the mid-1930s was instrumental in boosting mutual trade exchanges and thus bringing the two national markets even closer. Major German companies, such as *AEG*, *Siemens*, and *IG Farben*, set up their plants and branch offices in Greece.[46]

Trade relations between Germany and Greece experienced further expansion under the Metaxas regime in the mid- and late 1930s. Only in between 1935 and 1936, Greek export to Germany increased by 27 percent. Germany imported mainly tobacco, which later became a key "political factor," as well as minerals (ores, marble) and raisins. Greece, for its part, was primarily interested in importing German black coal, iron, and industrial goods. In 1938, exports to Germany represented over 40 percent of the total

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[44] Tzermias, *Die Identitätssuche des neuen Griechentums*, 372–80; Hradečný, *Dějiny Řecka*, 317–20.

[45] R. Schönfeld, "Wirtschaftliche Kooperation unter Kriesenbedingungen – Deutsch-griechische Handelsbeziehungen in der Zwischenkriegszeit," in *Die Entwicklung Griechenlands und die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Bernhard Hänsel (München: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1990), 124.

[46] Lazaridou, "Von der Krise zur Normalität," 293.

volume of Greek exports. Awarding strategically important contracts to German companies and hiring German consultants for the construction of naval fortifications confirmed Greece's interest not only in mutual trade, but also in military-strategic cooperation.[47]

In the following year, however, the virtual peak in Greek-German relations was overcome. Metaxas was subjected to an increased pressure from England to restrain his contacts with the Nazis. At the same time, German government began to curb its activities in Greece. An export agreement with *Rheinmetall*, German arms producer, worth 50 million Reichmarks, was being revoked. German deliveries of coal and iron to Greece were also swiftly reduced. Despite strong pressure from Germany, Greek exporters continued to supply chrome to London, claiming the lucrativeness of the British offer. Just as before, most Greek trade flotillas sailed under the flag of the British Isles. Moreover, Greek tankers imported fuel from Romania to supply the Allied navy. British ships, anchored in Greek ports, were supplied with German coal. Greek weapon factories, such as the *Poudererie et Cartoucherie Hellénique*, built almost entirely under the supervision of German specialists using German machinery and materials, operated for the British customers as well. Arms and ammunitions produced for fictitious Turkish enterprises were loaded at night on French ships coming from Beirut.[48] After the war broke out, economic relations were completely terminated.

The Nazi occupation from 1941 to 1944 caused serious damage to the Greek economy. Inflation reached astronomical heights. A "forced loan" (*Zwangsanleihe*) from the National Bank of Greece to Germany exhausted national gold reserves worth several millions of Reichsmarks. This "loan" was never paid back. Virtually all Greek agricultural production ended in the Reich. Several Greek regions were severely afflicted by famine.[49] In Greek consciousness, the experience of Nazi occupation gave rise to certain contempt for Germany.[50]

During the initial post-war years, Greek-German economic relations were practically null. While Greece was being troubled by civil war, the Allies divided Germany into occupation zones. The economies of both Germany

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47 Schönfeld, "Wirtschaftliche Kooperation," 131–34.

48 Ibid., 136.

49 See Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece*; Fleischer, *Im Kreuzschatten der Mächte*.

50 See Kirsten Fast and Jan Peter Thorbecke, eds., *Griechen und Deutsche: Bilder vom Anderen* (Stuttgart, Darmstadt: Württembergisches Landesmuseum Stuttgart und Hessisches Landesmuseum Darmstadt, 1982).

and Greece lay in ruins. Situation only normalized at the beginning of the 1950s while the two countries began to restore their mutual relations motivated by open efforts to reconcile with the past.[51]

With the end of the civil war, Greece's demand for foreign goods increased. Thus, imports from Germany were resumed. However, their quantity hardly matched the pre-war levels. In 1949, German exports were merely 50 percent of what they were in 1929, and 21 percent of the amount in 1938.[52] The resumption of the export of Greek tobacco became the most contested commercial issue. The so-called Tobacco Agreement (*Tabakabkommen*) of October 26, 1950 proved decisive for restoring bilateral trade.[53]

The post-war export of tobacco was threatened by the imposition of a special tax on tobacco in Germany. This issue initiated not only trade, but also political negotiations. In exchange for lifting the tobacco tax and for regular purchase of raw tobacco, Greece showed willingness to make concessions in reparations and to support Germany's bid for membership in international organizations. After lengthy bargaining and escalating of demands, post-war Germany succeeded in gaining its first ally. On November 11, 1953, Greek-German agreement on economic cooperation was signed where Germany pledged to provide 200 million Deutschmarks for restoration of Greek economy, with participation of German companies such as *Krupp*, *Hydrocarbon*, *Stahlunion Export*. The agreement was to serve primarily to the execution of major investments or construction projects, such as the power station in Ptolemais, brown coal mines, oil refineries, etc.[54]

Metallurgy and construction machinery, electric devices, metals, metal products, and automobiles became the main articles imported from Germany, together with chemical fertilizers, medicine, and other pharmaceutical products and, initially, coal. In addition to tobacco, Germany, for its part, imported agricultural products such as wine, cider, dry fruits, tropical fruits, olives, and nuts from Greece. Germany was also eager to import leather and furs as well as raw materials, such as nonferrous metals and bauxites. Bilateral trade enabled to fill in the gaps in local industries and agriculture.

In spring of 1957, the bilateral relations grew tense due to the arrest of Maximillian Merten in Athens. From 1942 to 1944, Merten held a position

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[51] See Dimitrios Delivanis, "Die deutsch-griechischen Handelsbeziehungen," *Südosteuropa-Jahrbuch*, Band 2 (München: Südeuropa-Gesellschaft, 1958), 152.
[52] Ibid., 146.
[53] For Tabakabkommen, see Yfantis, "Die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen," 65–99.
[54] Ibid., 154–69. See also Lazaridou, "Von der Krise zur Normalität," 130–59.

of advisor to the military administration in Thessaloniki where he was in charge of economy and administration of the city. After the war, Merten was accused of committing war crimes in Greece. West Germany protested against his arrest. After all, he spent nearly two years in custody. His trial took place from February 11 to March 5, 1959. Merten was charged with murder, violation of habeas corpus, violence against Greek and Jewish populations, and confiscation of Jewish property. Greek court sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison.[55]

In November 1957, during the preliminary hearing of the Merten case, the Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis visited Bonn in order to conduct talks on future investments and on Germany's political support for Greece's position in the Cyprus conflict. On November 27, 1958, another agreement on economic cooperation was signed. Under this arrangement, the Federal Republic pledged to provide Greece with a loan of 200 million Deutschmarks, additional funding of long-term investment projects totaling 100 million Deutschmarks, and technical assistance. Two months later, Greek Parliament approved so-called abolition act, according to which Greece ceased prosecution of war criminals – with the exception of Merten.[56]

Max Merten had to wait until November 1959 amnesty of war criminals allowed him to be transported to Germany. In March 1960, an agreement on reparations in the amount of 115 million Deutschmarks was signed. Germany also agreed to provide Greece with economic aid in the form of a special loan. Upon his return to Germany, Merten was arrested; however, he was once again released a few days later. His case was dismissed because of lack of evidence. Later, Merten actually received financial compensation (*Heimkehrerentschädigung*) from the German state for the time he spent in Greek prison.[57]

The Merten case concluded a period of mutual talks, during which Greeks sought maximum financial compensation instead of demanding direct reparations. Germany welcomed the opportunity to avoid direct reparations as well as the public debate about its Nazi past. Since the 1960s, the Greek-German economic relations had stabilized. New factors emerged

[55] See Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece*; Fleischer, *Im Kreuzschatten der Mächte*.

[56] See Susanne-Sophia Spiliotis, "An Affair of Politics, Not Justice: The Merten Trial (1957–1959) and Greek-German Relations," in *After the War was Over. Reconstructing the Family, Nation and State in Greece, 1943–1960*, ed. Mark Mazower (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 293–302.

[57] See Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece*; Fleischer, *Im Kreuzschatten der Mächte*.

to have a positive impact on financial flow from the Federal Republic of Germany to Greece: an influx of resources from the Greek emigrants living in Germany and from the tourist industry. To this day, Germany remains Greece's main trading partner.

Conclusion

Over the past two centuries, Greek-German relations have been experiencing ups and downs. Germans indisputably established themselves in the Greek society not only through the accession of Bavarian Wittelsbach Dynasty, but also through cultural and social influence supported by traditional German Philhellenism that arose mainly from the fascination with the ancient past. In the twentieth century, Germany's interest shifted to political and economic spheres. Germany not only resumed the traditional cultural relations, but also began to look for political support and trade benefits in Greece. Germany was aware of the significance of support to an allied state. At the same time, it profited from Greece's growing dependence on German economy.

The Second World War can be regarded as a climactic event. The German aggression of 1941 crippled the mutual ties to such a degree that their normalization after the Second World War seemed almost impossible. Essentially, however, the Second World War removed traditional ties and thus created space for new political developments that were soured by Greek resentments over Nazi occupation, but prospered through economic cooperation. Owing to political talks at the highest level, Greek-German trade began to flourish and cultural contacts were restored. Germany represented a supporter of Greece's participation in world arena.

Greek society regarded the Federal Republic as a stabilizing factor in its democratic transition. For decades, Greek citizens have immigrated to Germany in hopes of improving their economic situation. At the same time, Germany served as a refuge for Greeks who feared political repression during periods of political crises. The era of political-economic regeneration of the 1950s to the 1970s helped both countries to open a new chapter in the mutual relations. The new level of Greek-German cooperation brought Greece into the European Community and enabled both countries to forge standard political relations based on partnership and cooperation. Thus, to a considerable degree, Germany's influence in the Balkans supported Greece's transformation into the present-day democratic state.

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STUDIA TERRITORIALIA IV

BETWEEN TRADITION AND MODERNITY? BRITAIN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1960s

JAN VÁŠKA

Abstract

This paper analyses the transformation of the British foreign policy during the first government of the Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson (1964–70). It focuses on the genesis, wider political and economic context and impact of two landmark decisions which in effect profoundly changed Britain's international position: the second British application for membership in the European Community, and the decision to withdraw all British Armed Forces from the area east of the Suez Canal. The most important factors which influenced the reassessment of both British foreign and defence policy are identified in the long-term economic problems Britain was facing at the time and in the decolonisation process and the subsequent decline of both the economic and political importance for Britain of the Commonwealth. The contribution argues that this transformation can be interpreted as a shift from a *traditional* to a *post-traditional* era of British foreign policy.

Keywords: Britain, European Community, Suez Canal, foreign policy, 1960s

Tradition and Modernity in British Foreign Policy

Britain's international position has undergone a profound change since 1945. Its present status of a medium-ranking, largely European power bears rather little similarity to that of a global – albeit weakened – economic, political and military power which it had enjoyed at the outset of the post-war era. British foreign policy in this period certainly cannot be conceptualised as a simple, linear and basically non-problematic transition

from *tradition* to *modernity*,[1] i.e. between two types of foreign policy based on two different, or even contrasting, conceptions of Britain as an international actor. However, at least on the level of ideal types it does seem possible, in relation to the period spanning from 1945 until the present, to define a *traditional*, or initial, pole and a *modern*, or more precisely *post-traditional*, pole that opposes the initial pole in some fundamental attributes and towards which the development of British foreign (and defence, due to their intimate interconnection) policy seems to have been heading since the end of Second World War. When analysing a particular foreign policy decision, it is usually possible to recognise ideas and concepts associated with each of the two poles. Additionally, both are penetrated by a similar conviction about Britain's unique position and exceptional role in the world. Yet in spite of this, as I shall argue, it does seem possible to determine a particular point, or more precisely a several years span, when a notional shift in balance from *tradition* to *modernity* in British foreign policy took place, owing to a simultaneous impact of several long-term trends. This period is the second half of the 1960s.

Modern, or Post-Traditional?

The *traditional* concept of Britain's position in the post-war international system and its mostly reactive model of foreign policy (stemming from the fact that Britain was a *status quo* defender in decline) can be identified more or less unambiguously. In the early post-war years, Britain saw itself as a great power with global outreach, admittedly weakened economically, but definitely not undermined, possessing special responsibility for the shape and stability of the emerging post-war international order, for the development of the Empire's dependent territories, for the security and prosperity of the Commonwealth, and, after a very short respite, for a world-wide struggle against communism. The often-quoted concept of "three circles", formulated by the Leader of His Majesty's Opposition, Winston Churchill in 1948, best describes this sense of exceptionality: Britain's international position is unique due to the fact that it is situated in the intersection of

[1] The adjective *modern* is employed here in the sense of "relating to recent times or to the present", rather in its social scientific meaning as sketched e.g. in Zygmunt Bauman's contribution to the *Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*. Cf. Joel Kriegel, ed., *Oxfordský slovník světové politiky* (Praha: Ottovo nakladatelství, 2002), 513–17.

three circles, inside of each of which it plays an influential role: the Empire and Commonwealth (considered to be the source of its structural power at the time), the political, military and cultural links with the United States, and finally continental Europe, which Britain was predestined to mentor and lead (this "circle", however, was regarded as the least important).

The *modern* pole is much more difficult to define – especially as even the foreign policy of Labour Party under Tony Blair (rebranded as New Labour) was in many ways based on traditional Churchillian tenets.[2] Yet it was the New Labour that, after coming to power in 1997, formulated what was probably the most self-contained alternative vision of Britain's position in the world and a new model of foreign policy, often referred to in a much simplified way as an "ethical foreign policy" (in fact, Robin Cook, the newly appointed Foreign Secretary, talked only of an "ethical *dimension* of foreign policy" in his *Mission Statement* on 12 May 1997).[3] Post-Imperial Britain is, in New Labour's eyes, a "pivotal power" which forms a bridge between the United States and Europe, plays a leading role in the European Union (in terms of providing strategic leadership, not deepening of political integration) and assumes responsibility for global problem-solving. This vision has however been contested. It is not neither fully shared by the opposition Conservative Party (which advocates somewhat different approach to European integration) nor by the Labour Party's left-wing (which objected to the close links Blair maintained with the American administration of George W. Bush and opposed British involvement in the Iraq war). At the same, Britain has retained until present several attributes of its former great power status: a permanent chair in the United Nations Security Council, a nuclear deterrent, significant military capacity, and the Commonwealth of Nations as a reminder of its imperial past.

New Labour's concept of the "ethical dimension of foreign policy" under Tony Blair (and especially during Blair's first term in 1997–2001 when Robin Cook was his secretary for foreign affairs) consisted according to Wheeler and Dunne of two main obligations. Firstly, "Britain has to play an active role in the international community, follow its rules, and

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[2] Cf. Anne Deighton, "The Foreign Policy of British Prime Minister Tony Blair: radical or retrograde?" (lecture to Centre of Euroepan Studies, Humboldt University Berlin, 11 July 2005, http://www.gcsp.ch/e/publications/Issues_Institutions/Europe/Academic_Papers/Deighton-CBS-07.05.pdf).

[3] Cf. Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, *Moral Britannia? Evaluating the Ethical Dimension in Labour's Foreign Policy* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), 5.

co-operate with its institutions." Secondly, "It should use its influence to protect and support liberal and social-democratic values, such as human rights, democracy, poverty reduction, and good governance."[4] It is to be noted that these two obligations are in potential conflict with one another. The first one presupposes, among others, restraint in the threat and use of force, while the second one leads to activism in foreign policy. When combined with sufficient military and material resources, as in the case of Blair's Britain, it can easily lead to an interventionist foreign policy (propped up by e.g. the doctrine of humanitarian intervention). Tony Blair's *Doctrine of the International Community*, an address given in Chicago during the war in Kosovo in April 1999 (and followed by an article in the *Newsweek*), is a programmatic document of this approach; it is considered to be the most direct expression of Blair's idealistic and interventionist views as concerns foreign policy:

"We need to enter a new millennium where dictators know that they cannot get away with ethnic cleansing or repress their people with impunity. We are fighting not for territory, but for values [...] for a new internationalism where the brutal repression of ethnic groups will not be tolerated [...] for a world where those responsible for such crimes have nowhere to hide."[5]

As a rule, pre-1997 British foreign policy – both before and after the changes of the mid-1960s – can be interpreted as an attempt to maintain (and later to return to) its great power status and imperial role through increasingly limited means. With its idealistic "ethical foreign policy" concept, Tony Blair's first government has thus been – not just rhetorically but (to a lesser extent) also materially – the biggest, if partial, deviation from the *traditional* model of a rather pragmatic and reactive British foreign policy so far. Of course there was still a notable degree of continuity: for example neither a relatively pro-European Blair government,

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[4] Ibid, 7.

[5] Lawrence Freedman, "Defence", in *The Blair Effect. The Blair Government 1997–2001*, ed. Anthony Seldon (London: Little, Brown, 2001), 299. Full text of the speech can be accessed at "Prime Minister's speech: Doctrine of the International community" (Economic Club, Chicago, 24 April 1999), http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1297.asp. On the contrary, Blair's first address, as a prime minister, on the theme of foreign policy from November 1997 is influenced by a traditional, Churchill conception of Atlantic foreign policy and Britain's function as a bridge between Europe and America. Cf. Wheeler and Dunne, M*oral Britannia?* 13; "Speech by Prime Minister Tony Blair at Lord Mayor's banquet" (London, 10 November 1997), http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1070.asp.

nor any of its predecessors have ever seriously entertained the idea of endorsing a supranational format of European political integration without reservations, or adopt any policy that would permanently "separate" Britain from the United States due to a closer political orientation towards the European Union. After all, the government's (and Blair's in particular) policy during the Iraq crisis of 2002–03 has reconfirmed Britain's undiminished proximity with the United States.[6] With regard to this continuity, it thus seems more appropriate to refer to a *post-traditional* British foreign policy rather than to a *modern* one.

Sources of Change

This gradual transformation of British foreign policy from a *traditional* to *post-traditional* model can be regarded as the result of several concurrent long-term trends, some of which had already begun to influence Britain's position in the world during the interwar period. Two of them appear as the most important. The first one was the relative economic decline of Britain as compared to other developed Western countries. Particularly in the course of the first three decades after the end of the Second World War, the British economy experienced a significantly lower growth rate than countries in continental Europe. Since the end of the war, Britain has also been losing its positions in world markets: whereas in 1950 its share in global trade equalled 25 per cent, by 2000 it fell to a mere 5 per cent.[7] The second defining trend was the decolonisation of the British Empire. This process took place after 1945 in two main waves, at the end of the 1940s (India) and during the 1960s (Africa). Britain's global role was thus symbolically brought to an end by its entry into the European Community in 1973 – the remaining overseas territories notwithstanding.[8] The pattern of British foreign trade changed as well. At the beginning of the 1960s, the European Economic Community (EEC) definitively replaced the Commonwealth as Britain's

[6] For an overview of Blair's policy during the Iraq crisis see Christopher Hill, "Putting the world to right: Tony Blair's foreign policy mission", in *The Blair Effect 2001–5*, ed. Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 395–407.

[7] Caroline Schenk, "Britain in World Economy", in *A Companion to Contemporary Britain 1939–2000*, ed. Paul Addison and Harriet Jones (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 463–64.

[8] For a recent introduction into the problematic of British decolonisation era see Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire. The Road to Decolonisation 1918–1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

main trade partner. After a series of unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a free trade zone between the EEC and other members of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), London began to regard its entry into the Common Market as an economic necessity and the only way how to secure favourable conditions for British export. Britain's first attempt to join the EEC took place in 1961.

However these long-term trends are but a part of the picture. They constitute an objective material structure in which specific foreign policy decisions are adopted. A collective reflection of these trends then forms, together with other ideas and meanings shared by the actors involved, part of an inter-subjective ideational structure that has enabling and limiting influence on foreign policy decision-making. Every specific foreign policy decision then needs to be analysed as a unique case study in which structural factors interplay with interests and preferences of separate institutional and individual actors involved in the decision-making process. Some of these actors, such as strategically situated political entrepreneurs with a radical foreign policy agenda, can act as catalysts to changes, while others, such as bureaucratic structures (including the very system of formulation and implementation of British foreign policy) and existing ties, conversely tend to support the *status quo*. A decision that seems contradictory to the logic of the long-term trends on the *macro* level of the analysis can thus be entirely understandable after descent on the *micro* level of individual actors and institutional interests. This study seeks to take into account both levels of analysis.

The Background: Political and Economic Context and the Macmillan Legacy

As I have suggested in the introduction, the end of *traditional* British foreign policy as expressed in the "three circles" concept can be traced back to the governments of Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson in the second half of the 1960s. Three events that took place in 1967 rounded off three different but tightly interconnected processes that kept changing Britain's position in the world since the early post-war years.

Firstly, the cabinet's decision to apply for membership of the European Economic Community in April 1967 signalled a domestic agreement (albeit temporary, as it later turned out) on the expedience of a qualitatively higher

degree of economic and political integration into continental Europe, which had been in the post-war era playing for Britain a dual role of its close ally and a potentially more successful competitor.[9]

Secondly, an amendment to defence policy reform in July 1967 called for a complete withdrawal of British military forces from the area east of the Suez Canal by mid-1970s. The end of Britain's global military role meant a final resignation to the aspiration of maintaining a status comparable to both superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. 19 January 1968, the day Wilson officially announced the planned withdrawal, is thus said to mark the end of the British Empire.[10]

Last, a devaluation of the sterling in November 1967, a measure taken by the cabinet to face up to a chronic deficit in the balance of payments, meant a *de facto* immediate end of the global role of the British currency (its "number two" status as a world reserve currency), and it was followed by the collapse of the monetary system of the former Empire, the Sterling Area. Britain would have to give up its second part – that is what remained of the imperial preferential tariff – after agreeing to EEC's common external tariff.

The following brief chapter outlines Britain's domestic and economic development in the second half of the 1960s as the context of the transformation of its foreign policy.

Political and Economic Context

The general elections of 15 October 1964 concluded a 13-year period of Conservative rule. However, the incoming Labour government of Harold Wilson could only rely on a very narrow parliamentary majority of 317 out of 630 seats in the House of Commons. Wilson therefore decided to call an early election on 31 March 1966. The vote brought the government a convincing victory as expected: the Labour Party beat the Conservatives by

[9] A valuable overview of the academic "landscape" and main lines of interpretation in relation to the second British EC membership bid is provided in Daddow's "Introduction: The Historiography of Wilson's Attempt to take Britain into the EEC", in *Harold Wilson and European Integration. Britain's Second Application to Join the EEC*, ed. Oliver Daddow (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 1–36.

[10] Cf. Denis Judd, *Impérium. Britská imperiální zkušenost od roku 1763 do současnosti* (Praha: BB Art, 1996), 389.

more than 1.5 million votes and won 363 seats in the House of Commons.[11] Wilson thus gained a comfortable parliamentary majority for the full electoral term, which enabled him to push through some policies that were not supported by the whole party. Despite the size of government majority, intra-party opposition was still able to block in 1969 a key reform of trade unions, proposed in the White Paper *In Place of Strife*.

Throughout his entire first government (Wilson served as Prime Minister again in 1974–76), Harold Wilson had to face the country's worsening economic situation. The fundamental problem was neither inflation nor the unemployment (as they came to be in the 1970s and 1980s). Compared to other developed countries, British economy recorded slower economic growth: in the 1960s, the economy grew on average by meagre 2.5 per cent annually. This was due to a combination of low competitiveness of British industry that stemmed from its capital underinvestment, and of Keynesian economic policies which manifested themselves by manipulation of demand and by political commitment to full employment. At the same the economy suffered from stop-go cycle and from a chronic balance of payments deficit which undermined the stability of the sterling.[12]

Immediately after the 1964 election Wilson and his economic ministers James Callaghan (finance) and George Brown (economic affairs) decided not to devaluate the sterling. This turned out to be a strategic decision of paramount importance. Over the course of the following years it required several budget cuts which significantly limited governmental policies and in effect also precipitated the dismantling of Britain's military presence in the Middle and Far East.[13] Instead, the government asked for a stabilisation loan from International Monetary Fund, and in 1964–65 it borrowed almost £850 million.[14] At the same time it introduced a temporary import surcharge.

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[11] Bryn Morgan and Joseph Connelly, *UK Election Statistics 1945–2001. House of Commons Library Research Paper 01/37* (London: House of Commons Library, 2001), 8.

[12] The mechanism of the stop-and-go cycle is explained in Ian Budge et al., *The New British Politics* (London: Longman 2004), 63; the cycle was broken in the 1980s owing to income from North Sea oil. For sources and impacts of the deficit of the balance of payments see Schenk, "Britain in World Economy", 470–75.

[13] Wilson, Callaghan and Brown accepted the decision not to devaluate without the consultation with other ministers over the course of several hours after the electoral results were announced. Cf. Peter Hennessy, *The Prime Minister. The Office and Its Holders Since 1945* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 289.

[14] It involved a considerable amount that corresponded to approximately one fifth of the reserve fund of the International Monetary Fund. Cf. Schenk, "Britain in World Economy", 470.

The most ambitious project of Wilson government, a radical programme for economic and social modernisation of the country, was thus in sharp contrast to economic realities. The programme included re-nationalisation of the steel industry, regulation of rents, increase in pensions, stronger guarantees for trade unions and abolition of fees on medical prescriptions. Its central point was the National Plan, launched in September 1965, which called for a 25 per cent growth in GDP over the following five years. The implementation of the National Plan, which required fiscal expansion, however soon turned out to be incompatible with the effort being made to maintain the parity of the currency. The deepening budget deficit led in July 1966 to an attack on the sterling. The cabinet reacted by vast budgetary cuts and wage and price freeze that was to last for six months. These anti-inflation measures program *de facto* meant the collapse of the National Plan, i.e. the central pillar of the government's economic policy.[15]

The government managed to maintain the parity of the sterling even during the following Sterling Crisis in July 1967, yet on 18 November 1967 it finally gave in and adjusted the sterling parity from $2.80 to $2.40 for £1. Not even this devaluation however managed to entirely solve the balance of payments deficit problem and in 1968 Britain was forced to resort to another loan from the IMF.

As in West European countries, the second half of the 1960s was also a period of social polarisation in Britain. Apart from the left-wing student and environmental movements, national movements started up in Scotland and Wales and regional parties, Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru won their first mandates in Westminster. Big industrial centres faced growing problems related to the coexistence of the white majority and ethnic minorities of Caribbean and Asian descent and the problem of racial discrimination and concerns about the racial riots going on in the United States were brought to the fore. In the event the British government gradually introduced quotas to limit immigration from the Commonwealth's newly independent countries. The situation in Northern Ireland posed a peculiar problem. The non-violent movement for civil rights of the Catholic community escalated the so-called Troubles in 1969 after Protestant paramilitary units attacked Catholic districts in Londonderry and Belfast and British military troops entered the territory. Harold Wilson

[15] See David Gowland and Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans. Britain and European Integration 1945–1998* (London: Pearson Education, 1999), 155–59.

remained the Prime Minister until the Labour defeat in the general election on 18 June 1970. Having received almost a million votes more than the Labour Party, the Tories gained 330 seats out of 630 and Wilson was replaced by the Conservative leader Edward Heath.[16]

"Three Circles" at the Beginning of the Wilson Government

The limits to the leeway the Labour government had for its foreign policy were initially set by external factors, most importantly by the legacy of the previous Conservative government of Harold Macmillan (1957–63). The other given fact on which Britain had rather little influence was the state of relations between both superpowers. The Caribbean Crisis in 1962 marked the end of the turbulence at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s and open into the *détente*, a relatively long and stable ease in relations between the East and the West, which was to last until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. For West European countries, *détente* meant an opportunity for a more independent foreign policy both towards the Soviet bloc (e.g. German *Ostpolitik*) and the United States (foreign policy of Gaullist France, attempts to find a common European approach within NATO, and the establishment of European Political Cooperation should be mentioned in this context). This space for increased autonomy in foreign policy was equally open for London. What was then the state of the "three circles" of British foreign policy at the outset of the Wilson era?

Harold Macmillan's oft-quoted *Winds of Change* speech,[17] delivered on 3 February 1960 in Cape Town, is interpreted as an official sign that London was ready to negotiate the transfer of power into the hands of the native majorities in its African colonies (the first British colony in Sub-Saharan Africa to gain independence had been Ghana in 1957). While up to that point the decolonisation process mainly concerned British colonies in Southeast Asia, by 1964 almost half of Britain's African and the first of Caribbean possessions had gained independence. The British Empire was *de facto* replaced by the Commonwealth, in which Britain was only "the first among equals". Both pillars of the imperial economic system survived until the turn of the 1960s and the 1970s: the preferential customs ("imperial" or

[16] Morgan and Connelly, *UK Election Statistics 1945–2001*, 8.

[17] "Wind of Change Speech", speech by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (South Africa Parliament, 3 February 1960; extracts), http://africanhistory.about.com/od/eraindependence/p/wind_of_change2.htm.

"Commonwealth") tariff and the Sterling Area, a monetary system in which the British pound was the reserve currency. It can be however argued that at the beginning of the Wilson government, the Commonwealth was more psychological and symbolic than political and economic asset; as of the early 1960s, the Commonwealth's share in Britain's foreign trade permanently fell behind that of the EEC's member states.

A primary importance was attached, as in the times when the concept of "three circles" was formulated, to Britain's "special relationship" with the United States. Not even Macmillan's personal friendship with President John F. Kennedy could however conceal the fact that this relationship was completely unbalanced. While generations of British statesmen were keen on a privileged bilateral partnership, Washington for most of the time valued Britain as a supportive and culturally proximate European power with a leading role in a unifying Europe, which was however not supposed to enjoy special treatment.[18] Seen from London, the "special relationship" was to fulfil several basic functions. First of all, the alliance between the USA and Britain was the axis of NATO, which in turn was the linchpin of the security of Western countries in the course of the Cold War. The British also believed that through the "special relationship", they would be able to influence American policy and especially restrain its hawkish tendencies. Finally, since the Suez Crisis in 1956 the governments in London had been clearly aware of the fact that in the end, Britain's international position was dependent on American goodwill, and often directly on its active support. As a 1959 government paper stated: "In many cases, the United States will be the only Power capable of supporting our interests in the world outside Europe. We shall become increasingly dependent on their support [...] and our status in the world will largely depend upon their readiness to treat us as their closest ally."[19] Some American administrations appreciated Britain's role as a competent military ally with a global outlook, yet a part of American political representation took a rather critical or condescending attitude towards it. London was especially outraged by a speech by the former Secretary of State Dean Acheson at West Point in December 1962. According to Acheson, Britain "lost an empire and not yet found a [new] role", and its old role was "about played out".[20]

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[18] Petr Luňák, *Západ. Spojené státy a Západní Evropa ve studené válce* (Praha: Libri, 1997), 177.
[19] For The Future Policy Study, 1960–1970, see David Gowland and Arthur Turner, eds., *Britain and European Integration 1945–1998: a Documentary History* (London: Routledge, 2000), 53.
[20] Quoted in Hugo Young, *This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 171.

During the Macmillan era, British co-operation with, and dependence on, the United States deepened in the field of military technologies, especially as concerned nuclear weapon carriers. After the signing of a bilateral Mutual Defence Agreement in July 1958, American McMahon Act of 1946 prohibiting the administration from sharing information about nuclear technologies with other countries ceased to apply to Britain. London thus gained privileged access to classified American information concerning nuclear technologies. An imminent trust crisis caused by the termination of the American *Skybolt* missile programme (which was foreseen as the main British nuclear weapons carrier) was quickly averted during a bilateral Macmillan–Kennedy meeting in Nassau in December 1962. On the basis of the agreements concluded in Nassau the United States would provide Britain with *Polaris* submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The outcome of the Nassau meeting in turn served as pretext for the French President Charles de Gaulle to veto in January 1963 the British application for EEC membership.

The Macmillan government was quick to realise that the European Free Trade Association (EFTA, or the "Seven"), the establishment of which it had instigated, had no potential to become the intended counterweight to an emerging ECSC-EEC continental political and trade bloc. The government was also afraid that Britain's ongoing absence from the main flow of the European integration process could threaten it with economic and political marginalisation, and therefore it decided in July 1961 to apply for EEC membership. However, as it turned out in the course of the accession negotiations, Britain was not ready for membership, above all psychologically. London was at the time not yet willing to accept obligations following from the EEC's common trade and agricultural policy and to give up its preferential trade relations with Commonwealth countries. According to the French president, who was the most vigorous opponent of British membership, London was too closely linked to the United States in the spheres of foreign and defence policy. From de Gaulle's point of view, the Nassau Agreement *de facto* negated earlier considerations about possible bilateral Franco-British co-operation in the development of nuclear weapons, and it also confirmed British voluntary dependence on the United States. It seems that de Gaulle had planned to veto the British application in the EEC even before Nassau; the contents of the agreement offered to him a convenient pretext.

The first British attempt to join the EEC does not, nowever, constitute a real turning point in its post-war foreign policy. There are two main

reasons for this. First, there was a remarkable lack of identification with the integration project, and even Macmillan's address in the Commons on 31 July 1961, in which he announced the application, lacked any signs of enthusiasm.[21] As for the accession negotiations, it was apparent that the government was not willing to sacrifice anything essential from the complex of traditional bonds that tied Britain to the Commonwealth and the United States. Secondly, the prospective membership of the EEC was not a matter of domestic political consensus. Throughout 1962, the opposition Labour Party, led by Hugh Gaitskell, kept – also because of its internal divisions – an evasive attitude towards the EEC issue. Gaitskell only took a clear position at the annual party conference in October. In his address he entirely sided with the opponents of membership. He accused the government of betraying the independence of Britain and the Commonwealth and of shifting "thousands of years" of national history into reverse, and he posed five unrealistic conditions for his support of entry into the EEC: guarantees for the interests of British agriculture; guarantees for the interests of the Commonwealth; guarantees for the interests of the EFTA countries; assurance of British right to pursue an independent foreign policy; and assurance of British right to pursue national economic planning.[22] These five conditions were the official Labour Party position when Harold Wilson became the party leader after Gaitskell's sudden death in January 1963.

"Tradition": 1964–1966

Wilson became the Labour Party leader – and Prime Minister in October 1964 – with the reputation of being a "Commonwealth man" with a sceptical attitude towards Britain's possible membership in the EEC. During his tenure as Shadow Foreign Secretary he supported Gaitskell's line and, conversely, he was convinced of the prospects of political and trade co-operation with the former Empire, with which he was also connected through his former academic interests. He is recorded to having said that "the UK's frontiers are the Himalayas".[23] Despite a freeze on military

[21] Cf. Gowland and Turner, *Documentary History*, 85; Young, *This Blessed Plot*, 128–29.
[22] Gowland and Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, 132.
[23] Intervention of David Greenwood at "The Decision to Withdraw from East of Suez" (Seminar held on 16 November 1990 at the Institute for Contemporary British History, transcript published in 2002), http://www.icbh.ac.uk/witness/esuez, 17.

expenses, Wilson's first cabinet was positively committed to the global presence of the British Armed Forces. "I want to make it quite clear that [...] we can not afford to relinquish our world role," he was quoted as saying.[24] As a matter of fact the situation in the House of Commons in 1964–66 where the government had a wafer-thin majority of three seats and the Parliamentary Labour Party was not united in practically any fundamental issue of the foreign and defence policy, starting with the attitude towards the EEC and finishing with an independent British nuclear deterrent, in principle excluded any radical initiative.

The then-prevailing Labour Party's orientation towards the Commonwealth rather than towards European co-operation was reflected in the 1964 election manifesto: "Though we shall seek to achieve closer links with our European neighbours, the Labour Party is convinced that the first responsibility of a British Government is still to the Commonwealth."[25] The manifesto entirely disregarded the question of the future British relationship with the EEC; on the contrary, it paid considerable attention to proposals concerning the enhancement of institutional ties and trade exchanges with Commonwealth countries. It also denounced the Conservative Party for defeatism and for the fact that over the course of its 13-year administration it had allowed a sharp drop in the Commonwealth's share in British foreign trade.[26]

Yet the development of political and business relations with the Commonwealth was for Wilson a distinct disappointment. The share of former colonies in British foreign trade could not be reversed and the government soon realised that the vision of the post-war Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin – restoration of Britain's great power status based on the resources of the transformed Empire – was at odds with economic and political realities.[27] Two events of 1965 are cited as the main reasons for

[24] See Gowland and Turner, *Documentary History*, 115.

[25] See "The New Britain. 1964 Labour Party Election Manifesto", http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1964/1964-labour-manifesto.shtml.

[26] Ibidem. Between 1951 and 1964, the Commonwealth share dropped from 44 to 30 per cent. From a long-term perspective, however, its percentage in early post-war years was rather exceptional and it can be ascribed to a lack of dollar reserves and the activity of the Sterling Area.

[27] These developments were already conceded in the *Future Policy Study*: "The Commonwealth is likely to become less of an economic unit [...]. Britain cannot expect to increase her proportion of the trade of other Commonwealth countries." Wyn Rees, "Britain's Contribution to Global Order", in *Britain and Defence. A Policy Re-evaluation*, ed. Stuart Croft et al. (London: Longman, 2001), 39.

disillusion related to the Commonwealth's political development. The first one involved the fact that India and Pakistan, succession states of the former "jewel in the British Crown", chose the Soviet Union instead of Britain as their mediator in the conflict over Kashmir. The second was the unilateral declaration of independence of South Rhodesia in November.[28] This act was the only one of its kind in the whole process of the post-war British decolonisation and it was all the more degrading for Britain in that it provocatively copied the 1776 Declaration of Independence of thirteen North American colonies. London decided to enforce obedience of Ian Smith's rebellious regime by imposing a trade embargo. The chosen tactic however failed and the white minority regime survived, with help from South Africa, until the late 1970s. On the contrary, the Wilson government became subject to sharp criticism from both African countries and the Labour left, which considered its policy an exercise in alibism. With the entry of newly independent Third World countries and the decreasing share of "white" members, the Commonwealth was inadvertently becoming less and less a *British* Commonwealth. Even the setting-up of a permanent secretariat in London in 1965 did little to reverse the decline of both Commonwealth's political importance for Britain and the international standing of Britain itself.

Europe

Even though the Wilson government officially changed its policy towards the European Communities (or the "Common Market" as was a standard reference to the EEC in the British discourse at the time) only in the first year of its second electoral term, first clear signs of a new approach already appeared before the March 1966 elections. While the attention of the cabinet was focused primarily on overseas events in 1965, several key ministers were keen supporters of British participation in the European integration project. This group included the Deputy Leader of the party George Brown and the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, both of whom had ranked among the minority that had disagreed with the negative position that Hugh Gaitskell took to the Macmillan government's application in 1962. In 1965, a group of high officials at the Foreign Office, whose

[28] Gowland and Turner, *Documentary History*, 110. For South Rhodesia see Judd, *Impérium*, 384–97.

pro-European views were shaped during the first accession negotiations with the EEC in 1961–63, discretely started to work (through material presented to the cabinet) towards the revision of the existing Labour orthodoxy of "five conditions".[29] The Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, also supported a reassessment of the policy towards the EEC and in December 1965 he advised Wilson to apply again immediately.[30]

An equally significant factor was the developments taking place within the EEC (since 1965, the European Community, EC) itself. In July 1965, the Community went through a deep internal crisis when France under President de Gaulle opted for an obstructive "empty chair" policy in order to thwart an attempt to strengthen the authority of the supranational institutions, the Commission and the Parliament (the Hallstein Plan). The crisis lasted until the Luxembourg Compromise was reached in January 1966, which enabled the member states to retain the right to veto in matters that affected their "vital interests".[31] The Luxembourg Compromise undoubtedly facilitated the later decision of the Wilson government to apply for EC membership in that it weakened the British concerns about the Community's hasty progress towards the establishment of a European federation and a full assertion of a supranational form of integration.

There is circumstantial evidence that Wilson "converted" to support the EC membership some time in early 1966. Among these are e.g. the diaries of Cecil King, Chairman of the pro-Labour tabloid *Daily Mirror* Board.[32] King's testimony may have been influenced by his pro-European orientation; it is nevertheless confirmed by a February 1966 diary entry of Richard Crossmann, a prominent left wing minister and Labour Party ideologist who was opposed to EC membership: "As he [Wilson] sees it, the difficulties of staying outside Europe and surviving as an independent power are very great compared with entering on the right conditions."[33] In any case, in January 1966 Wilson and the Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, established a secret committee under the chairmanship of Sir Eric Roll, Permanent

[29] Young, *This Blessed Plot*, 184–85.
[30] Gowland and Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, 156.
[31] Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1999), 46–49.
[32] After his lunch with Brown on 20 January 1966, King noted: "Wilson has decided to enter the Common Market!" Shortly after the election, on 19 April 1966, King met Wilson. According to King, Wilson said that he thought that Britain "should be in [the EC] in two or three years." See Young, *This Blessed Plot*, 186–89.
[33] Gowland and Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, 153.

Secretary at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and former key member of Harold Macmillan's negotiation team, consisting of high-ranking officials from the Foreign Office, Treasury, Board of Trade and others ministries. Its objective was to work out an analysis of the overall economic impact of potential EC membership and the Common Agricultural Policy on Britain. Other resort ministers were to be informed about the existence and results of the Roll committee only after its deliberation has ended.[34]

Unlike two years before, in the 1966 election the Labour Party could no longer afford to ignore the European community issue. In the election campaign, the Conservatives under their new leader, Edward Heath, who had been Macmillan's chief negotiator with the EEC and was known as a politician with strong pro-European leanings, promised once in government, the party would renew Britain's application for EC membership. The Labour Party thus also had to clarify its position, and its manifesto reflected a circumspect yet not necessarily disapproving attitude: "Labour believes that Britain, in consultation with her E.F.T.A. partners, should be ready to enter the European Economic Community, provided essential British and Commonwealth interests are safeguarded."[35] In one of his key speeches in the campaign, Wilson paraphrased this passage as "We are ready to join if [...]". At the same time he distanced himself from the political dimension of European integration: "We believe that, given the right conditions, it would be possible to and right to join the EEC as an economic community. But we reject any idea of supranational control over Britain's foreign and defence policies. We are in Europe, but our power and influence are not, and must never be, confined to Europe."[36]

Defence Policy

As a *status quo* global power, post-war Britain was a typical example of a country with a reversed relationship between its foreign and defence policy. Whereas most governments deploy military assets to support basic objectives and interests set by their foreign policy concept, British foreign policy often found itself in an entirely pragmatic service of existing

[34] Young, *This Blessed Plot*, 186.
[35] See "Time for Decision. 1966 Labour Party Election Manifesto", http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1966/1966-labour-manifesto.shtml.
[36] Harold Wilson, speech in Bristol, 18 March 1966. See also Gowland and Turner, *Documentary History*, 112–13.

military obligations. These obligations were all perceived as vital as their abandonment would, according to British policy-makers, lessen Britain's power status. Given the financial straits, the Wilson government started in October 1964 to prepare a defence policy reform (Defence Review) in order to adjust it to the financial means that were at its disposal for military expenses, yet these savings were supposed not to entail any considerable reductions of existing military obligations. In November 1964, the government adopted two decisions that were to influence fundamentally the shape of British defence policy in the following years.

The first one was the reduction, in the upcoming years, of the defence expenditure from £2.4 to £2.0 billion (in 1964 prices). This decision was however not followed by a corresponding reduction of military obligations and, as mentioned above, only a month later, on 16 December, Wilson stated in his House of Commons speech that "[W]e cannot afford to relinquish our world role." According to critics, this elementary contradiction doomed the forthcoming defence policy in advance.[37] This cut was logical from the point of view of the requirements of domestic politics (the government's difficult financial situation, the National Plan, the expensive socio-economic modernisation program) but in a medium-term perspective, it precipitated and emphasised the financial indefensibility of continuing British military presence in the Far as well as the Middle East. Its impact was further aggravated by the growing weapons system costs. In the second key decision, a committee consisting of Wilson and his defence and foreign ministers (Denis Healey and Patrick Gordon-Walker) agreed to continue the construction of submarines designed to carry the *Polaris* missiles. The government thus dispelled earlier uncertainties caused by the promise to renegotiate the Nassau Agreements, which the Labour party made in the 1964 election campaign with regard to the anti-nuclear orientation of its left wing.[38]

The review of British defence policy was concluded in February 1966 by the publication of two documents, the Defence Review White Paper and the Statement On The Defence Estimates 1966 (Cmnd 2901). The Ministry of Defence was convinced that it was possible to meet, in the coming years, the existing obligations by rationalisation of expenditures. Several major armament programmes, including the development of a universal

[37] Intervention of Lord Mayhew at "The Decision to Withdraw from East of Suez", 23.
[38] Hennessy, *The Prime Minister*, 290–91.

TSR-2 supersonic aircraft (subsequently replaced by American F-111) were terminated. For the years 1966–69, the defence budget was to stay at the level of £2.0 billion (in 1964 prices) and thus drop from more than 7 to 6 per cent of GDP by the end of the decade.[39] The White Paper however stated that in the long term, a partial reduction of global military obligations would be inevitable:

"[In the 1970s, Britain will still have military commitments in many places overseas.] Nevertheless, to maintain all our current military tasks and capabilities outside Europe would impose an unacceptable strain on our overstretched forces, and bear too heavily both on our domestic economy and on our reserves of foreign exchange. For all these reasons we have decided that, while Britain should retain a major capability outside Europe, she should in future be subject to certain general limitations."[40]

The White Paper also set restrictive principles for future military engagements overseas: no large-scale operations without allies, no unofficial military assistance, and no operations out of the flying range of aircraft based on the mainland.[41] Beside financial restrictions, another problem emerged in the course of the 1960s in the form of a critical lack of military personnel: the 1957 Sandys Defence Review ended the National Service and the strength of the British Armed Forces gradually decreased from 690,000 to 375,000. As there was no corresponding back-scaling in commitments, the Armed Forces became threatened by overstretch. After the publication of the White Paper, the Navy Minister, Christopher Mayhew, resigned in protest as in his view the 1966 reform deeply undermined the credibility of British defence policy.

As Hyam points out, however, the lengthy process of reassessment of the East of Suez role had actually begun even before the Wilson government took office. Whereas on the political level the Defence Review was initiated by Labour ministers in autumn 1964, on the expert level officials already started their reappraisal of the international role of the British Armed Forces towards the end of the Conservative era.[42]

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[39] Andrew Dorman, "Crises and Reviews in British Defence Policy", in *Britain and Defence. A Policy Re-evaluation*, ed. Stuart Croft et al. (London: Longman, 2001), 16.

[40] Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966, paragraph 19 as quoted in Gowland and Turner, *Documentary History*, 116.

[41] Intervention of David Greenwood at "The Decision to Withdraw from East of Suez", 13–14.

[42] Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire*, 388.

"Modernity": 1966–1970

One of the characteristic traits of the post-war British foreign policy was the endeavour to play an active role on the "top floor" of world politics despite the conditions of the bipolar world. This aspiration was based on reminiscences of the "Big Three" era, and following Stalin's death in 1953 and the subsequent partial warming of the relations between both blocs ("Geneva spirit"), it translated into an interest in highest-level contacts in quadrilateral format (United States, Soviet Union, Britain and France). Like his predecessor Harold Macmillan (excluding the short tenure of Lord Home), Wilson attempted to capitalise, in the *détente* conditions, on his good personal relations with Soviet leaders, especially with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin whom he got to know during his tenure as President of the Board of Trade in the post-war Attlee government. In the 1960s, Wilson visited Moscow four times (in 1964 as an opposition leader at the head of a party delegation, three times as Prime Minister – in February and July 1966 and in January 1968). Like Macmillan's in 1959, Wilson's visits to Moscow led to the signature of a series of agreements aiming at intensification of scientific and technical co-operation and cultural contacts (most of which were already in progress). The reality of the Cold War, Soviet espionage and its subversive activities in the Third World however stood in the way of a more tangible improvement of relations in the political sphere. During his visit to London in February 1967, Kosygin offered Britain a Treaty of friendship. The Wilson government took a reserved attitude towards the Soviet proposal, and the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact armies, which Wilson, who otherwise fully realised how powerless Britain was in this matter, denounced in the Commons as a "flagrant aggression", led to a (temporary) downgrade which put an end to all deliberation about the treaty.[43]

The main objective of the Wilson-Kosygin talks was the Vietnam War. As Keeble put it, "Wilson sought to use the British relationship with the Soviet Union as a means of bringing about a ceasefire between the United States and North Vietnam."[44] The Vietnam War placed Wilson in a tricky situation: on one side the Labour Party's strong left wing required the government to dissociate

[43] Curtis Keeble, "The Historical Perspective", in *Soviet-British relations since the 1970s*, ed. Alex Pravda and Peter Duncan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press/RIIA, 1990), 38–39.
[44] Curtis Keeble, *Britain and the Soviet Union, 1917–1989* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), 274.

itself from the American policy. On the other hand, the U.S. administration expected Britain to carry out its traditional role of American "closest ally". In the event Wilson managed to resist American pressure to involve British troops directly in the war, he did however not dare refuse to support his main ally politically. In fact the Soviets supported British efforts to mediate a diplomatic solution to the Vietnam War only so long as it was advantageous for North Vietnamese troops but they were not willing to let the British arrange an agreement that would be acceptable for the United States. Therefore, Britain had no real possibility to help end the Vietnam War through its relationship with the Soviet Union.

During Wilson's two visits of President Johnson in Washington in December 1964 and December 1965, an informal agreement on the principles of co-operation between both countries was reached: the United States would help Britain maintain the parity of the sterling and the trade embargo on South Rhodesia while the British would assist the United States to combat communism on a global scale and keep their military troops in Malaysia and the Royal Navy in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.[45] From this perspective, the subsequent decision of the Wilson government to withdraw British troops from East of Suez was very disappointing both for the US and other British allies in the area.

One of the main British diplomatic successes at the time was thus in 1968 the signing of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The NPT Treaty would in the future sanction Britain's status as one of the world's five countries that can legitimately stock nuclear weapons, symbol of a great power status in the second half of the twentieth century.

In the previous chapter, I tried to show that both key decisions that in my opinion moved the British foreign policy into the *post-traditional* era, that is the second application for European Community membership and the withdrawal of troops from the area East of Suez, emerged from trends that had already become manifest during first electoral term of the Wilson government in 1964 – 66. Foremost among them appear to have been a worsening economic situation, including persistent deficits in budget and in balance of payments, and an unsatisfactory development of political and trade relations with the Commonwealth. The following chapter looks at the genesis of both decisions after the March 1966 elections and at their immediate consequences in greater detail.

[45] Gowland and Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, 155.

Europe

As shown above, the Labour Party fought the spring 1966 general election with a position which could be paraphrased as "joining the European Community in principle yes, as long as it will be possible to negotiate favourable conditions for Britain and its trade partners from outside the EC". By that time, Harold Wilson had probably already personally decided in favour of a second application, or at least he was very close to this decision. Evidence to this shift was the appointment as Foreign Secretary of George Brown, Deputy Leader of the party and the cabinet's most prominent supporter of Britain's European orientation. During 1966, and especially after the July monetary crisis, it became generally accepted that an entry into the European Community would entail a devaluation of the sterling.[46]

The first time the cabinet discussed the policy toward the European community was on 22 October 1966 at an all-day meeting that took place at Chequers, the country residence of British Prime Ministers. As it turned out during the debate, the cabinet was, as concerned the question of joining the EC, practically divided in half: nine ministers declared to be in favour, eight were against.[47] The Prime Minister did eventually not take a side. Instead, he put through a proposal that he and the Foreign Secretary would embark on a tour around capitals of all six EC member countries to discover what opinions prevailed on the continent with regards to potential British application and to convince their counterparts of the seriousness of the British intentions. This "Probe" was scheduled to take place between January and March of the following year. The key negotiation with French President Charles de Gaulle was to take place on 24 and 25 January 1967 in Paris.[48] On 10 November 1966 Wilson informed the House of Commons that his government intended to join the EC if it was possible to negotiate guarantees for the fundamental interests of Britain and the Commonwealth.[49]

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[46] Gowland and Turner, *Documentary History*, 110.

[47] Cf. Gowland and Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, 163. Douglas Jay, an atypical member of the party's right wing and the President of the Board of Trade, was the most emphatic objector to EC membership in Wilson's cabinet.

[48] Wilson and Brown's task in Paris was rendered even more difficult by a disastrous outcome of a July 1966 visit to London by French Prime Minister Pompidou and Minister of Foreign Affairs Couve de Murville. See Anthony Adamthwaite, "John Bull v. Marianne, Round Two: Anglo-French Relations and Britain's Second EEC Membership Bid", in *Harold Wilson and European Integration. Britain's Second Application to Join the EEC*, ed. Oliver Daddow (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 160–63.

[49] Ibid., 164.

The Wilson-Brown tour of Europe was a public manifestation of the Labour government´s commitment to British entry into the Common Market. Its immediate results were however at best mixed, and the suspicion proved to be true that so short after overcoming the inner crisis of the Community, the "friendly Five" states, and in particular Germany, would not be willing to push France very hard in the case de Gaulle decided to block the British application again.[50] During the Paris discussions, Wilson courted the French president's support by emphasising the perspectives for bilateral technological co-operation and by stressing the asset for the Community, in the *détente* conditions, of the good relationship between the British government and the Soviet leadership. The General however remained unimpressed.[51] He did not entirely refuse British membership of the EC but he pointed out many difficulties that in his opinion complicated the situation: London's ties with the United States, changes that would be needed to accommodate the accession of Britain into Common Agricultural Policy, and the weakness of the sterling as a global reserve currency.[52]

The outcome of the "Probe" was then not very encouraging: de Gaulle apparently did not wish the EC enlargement, and the other countries of the Six would not stand up for Britain. Not even Wilson's memorable speech on 21 January 1967 before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, in which he referred to thousands of years of common history and the proximity of the British civilisation and those of continental nations, was able to make a difference.[53]

As of spring 1967, a larger part of the political mainstream, most mass media, industrial circles, the City (then the world's biggest financial centre), and, last but not least, the public opinion, were all leaning towards the view that Britain's entry into the European Community had become more or less a necessity.[54] It was also for this reason that in spite of the caution

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[50] Gowland and Turner, *Documentary History*, 110–11, 117–18.

[51] Gowland and Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, 164 – 65.

[52] The weakness of the currency was the main innovation in de Gaulle's arguments in comparison with the early 1960s. Cf. Gowland and Turner, *Documentary History*, 111, 118 –120.

[53] See Young, *This Blessed Plot*, 193–94. The full version of the address is available at the European Navigator at http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm.

[54] Cf. Young, *This Blessed Plot*, 195–99. Public opinion remained strongly in favour of the application until early 1967 when public support began to erode; following de Gaulle's "velvet veto" negative view prevailed. See Anne Deighton, "The Labour Party, Public Opinion and the 'Second Try' in 1967", in *Harold Wilson and European Integration. Britain's Second Application to Join the EEC*, ed. Oliver Daddow (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 49–51.

dictated by the outcome of the "Probe", Wilson – convinced that the time was on his side regardless of de Gaulle's ongoing scepticism – decided to continue steering towards the renewed application for EC membership. Whereas Macmillan had avoided discussion about the negative impacts that EC membership was expected to have on Britain, especially as concerned its impact on the erosion of the constitutional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,[55] Wilson was ready to discuss the likely disadvantages resulting from membership, including a delicate question of the expected increase in food prices and an overall increase in the cost of living.[56]

As the cabinet remained divided on the EC issue, Wilson called a formal vote on 30 April 1967 and in the event, the cabinet agreed to submit the application by thirteen against eight votes. Interestingly, none of the ministers who were opposed to EC membership threatened to resign in protest. As a matter of fact they did not even attempt to reverse the decision as they expected that the Prime Minister's effort to bring Britain in the European Community would once again be wrecked by de Gaulle's veto.[57] On 2 May 1967, Wilson officially informed the Parliament about the cabinet's decision to apply for EC membership. Thanks to the support of both opposition parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals,[58] the House of Commons approved the decision by a clear majority of 488 to 62 votes despite the fact that 35 Labour members voted against their own government and another 51 abstained from voting.[59]

Within the Parliamentary Labour Party, the main opposition to Wilson's pro-European course came from left-wing members. A total of 74 of them signed a public statement published in a Marxist weekly *The Tribune* on 5 May 1967. Their argument is an illustrative example of the radical left wing approach to the EC from the 1960s through to the 1980s: the Community rules were incompatible with socialist planning and they would prevent

[55] The legal opinion of Lord Kilmuir (David Maxwell Fyfe), Lord Chancellor in Macmillan's government, was that Britain would give up a substantial part of its sovereignty if it signed the EEC Agreement. Kilmuir strongly advised Macmillan and Heath not to try to trivialize the fact; this was however exactly what happened. See Gowland and Turner, *Documentary History*, 84–85, 96–98.

[56] Young, *This Blessed Plot*, 195.

[57] Gowland and Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, 166.

[58] For the attitude of the Conservative opposition towards Wilson's European policy and its internal divisions see e.g. Philip Lynch, "The Conservatives and the Wilson Application", in *Harold Wilson and European Integration. Britain's Second Application to Join the EEC*, ed. Oliver Daddow (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 56–74.

[59] Gowland and Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, 166.

"movement towards a socialist society". The Rome Treaties were in many aspects an economic analogy to NATO, and because none of the communist countries of East Europe would accept them, they petrified the division of Europe. The terms for trade between the EC and Third World countries were unfavourable for the developing economies and had a "flavour of economic colonialism". Finally, the left wing argued that by joining the EC, Britain would relinquish a considerable amount of sovereignty and the right of legislative initiative to the hands of an undemocratic and unaccountable bureaucracy in Brussels.[60] On the right of the Conservative party, a small group of MPs, led by the Shadow Defence Secretary Enoch Powell, also voted against the official party line. Their argumentation against the EC membership revolved around the loss of national sovereignty.

The sceptics' assumptions were soon confirmed. On 16 May 1967, President de Gaulle exerted his "Velvet Veto" (dubbed as such due its sophisticated, insultingly smooth language) and made it clear that he still was not going to allow the British accession in the European Community. In his view, Britain was not ready to join the EC until it underwent deep political and economic transformations, reappraised its interests outside Europe (especially its aspiration for a privileged relationship with the United States and, according to the French president, its consequent subordination to American interests) and resolved the issues of the international status and the chronic weakness of the sterling.[61] De Gaulle's statement did however not imply a direct veto as the British application had not been formally submitted. On 21 June 1967 Wilson therefore travelled to Versailles, where he once again unsuccessfully tried to convince the French president by offering a close, co-operative approach towards international issues. De Gaulle, referring to the "special relationship" between Britain and the United States, did however not consider Wilson's proposal to be credible. To the contrary, he expressed concern that if Britain joined the EC and the smaller member countries followed its leadership, the Community would be transformed into an Atlantic organisation subordinate to America.[62] Wilson thus had to acknowledge that the prospects for an early accession into the EC were not too bright. Nevertheless, he maintained a certain amount of

[60] Cf. Gowland and Turner, *Documentary History*, 122–23. In the 1970s, another case of the Labour left against the EC membership would be the negative impact on British farmers and consumers of the Common Agricultural Policy.
[61] Ibid., 123.
[62] Gowland and Turner, *Documentary History*, 124.

optimism: "If we keep beating firmly at the door and do not falter in our purpose or our resolve I am not sure he [de Gaulle] has the strength finally to keep us out."[63]

The second British application for membership in the European Community was officially submitted in July 1967 during a meeting of the West European Union. De Gaulle formally vetoed it on 27 November 1967, soon after the British government, faced with another sterling crisis, decided for the ever-postponed devaluation of the pound. Along with Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway also stopped their preparations for EC membership. At first, Wilson contemplated drastic retaliatory measures including a cancellation of all Franco-British projects, refusal to renew the Washington Treaty (signed originally for a period of 20 years) and a withdrawal of all troops from Germany.[64] However, in the end he adopted a much more pragmatic line. He refused to withdraw the application and decided to wait for the anticipated end of the ageing General's political career. Wilson's waiting paid off in spring 1969 when de Gaulle resigned from his office and Georges Pompidou's succession in the Élysée Palace opened a new era in relations between Britain and the European Community. In December 1969, a Community summit in The Hague gave a new impulse to the European integration process after years of stagnation and launched the first round of EC enlargement. The accession negotiations between Britain and the EC however only opened in June 1970 when Harold Wilson had already been replaced by the Conservative leader, Edward Heath.

Defence Policy

The February 1966 Defence Review White Paper and Statement on the Defence Estimates were not sufficient to consolidate the situation. In the following two years, Britain's continuing economic difficulties (especially an exacerbation of the balance of payments deficit in summer 1966) forced the government to implement further partial expenditure cuts, operational savings and to rearrange units deployed overseas. Wilson personally preferred that the brunt of these cuts be borne by the troops units stationed in Europe (comprising at the time around 55,000 soldiers). In May 1965, he told the American State Secretary Dean Rusk that he would rather

[63] Wilson's telegram to Brown, ibid., 125.
[64] Young, *This Blessed Plot*, 197.

"pull half our troops out of Germany, than move any from the Far East".[65] The relatively massive British military presence on the Continent followed however from the obligations Britain had assumed in the framework of NATO, and in the event the cuts affected the most the troops deployed in the East of Suez area (Singapore, Malaysia, Persian Gulf).[66] In fact the British could only begin to seriously consider withdrawal from the Indian Ocean territory in 1966 after a coup of General Suharto in Indonesia put an end to the military conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia in North Borneo, in which British troops were involved on the side of the Malaysian Federation.[67] In the same year, the Wilson government rented the island of Diego García (the largest of the Chagos Islands, strategically located in the central part of the Indian Ocean) to the United States as a naval base. In 1967, the British speeded up (amid a chaotic civil war in Yemen) the schedule of their withdrawal from Aden and adjacent protectorates. The hasty abandonment of the former Empire's key strategic point which guarded the sea route to India was regarded as "one of the most humiliating and unsuccessful retreats from [Britain's] colonial relationships".[68]

Although Wilson officially announced the complete withdrawal of the British Armed Forces from East of Suez only in January 1968 (the so-called "withdrawal announcement"), it is July 1967, when the government published the Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy (Cmnd 3357, one of the partial revisions of defence policy), that is generally considered to be the main (albeit "quiet") turn in the global dimension of the British defence policy. According to this document, the number of troops deployed in Singapore and Malaysia were to be reduced by half in the course of the following three years and the withdrawal of all British troops from the Asian mainland with the exception of Hong Kong was foreseen to be completed by the mid-1970s. The government declared that Britain would nevertheless keep sufficient naval and marine forces to enable it to intervene

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[65] Wyn Rees, "Preserving the Security of Europe", in *Britain and Defence. A Policy Re-evaluation*, ed. Stuart Croft (London: Longman, 2001), 58.

[66] In the mid-1960s, approximately 25 per cent of all military expenses fell on units deployed East of Suez. Cf. Rees, "Britain's Contribution to Global Order", 39.

[67] Cf. Vladimír Nálevka, *Čas soumraku. Rozpad koloniálních impérií po druhé světové válce* (Praha: Triton, 2004), 70–75.

[68] Intervention of Lord Thomson, Minister for Commonwealth in 1967–68 at "The Decision to Withdraw from East of Suez", 41. The decolonisation of British colonies on the Arabic peninsula was completed in 1971, when Bahrain, Oman and the United Arabic Emirates gained their independence.

in the area even after the evacuation of the Far East mainland bases.[69] The contradiction between the fundamental, *de facto* historic character of the changes that Cmnd 3357 apprised, and the illusion of a total continuity of the defence policy that the government tried to preserve is interesting.[70]

However, the state of the British economy imposed additional budget cuts during the autumn of 1967 and in the end, despite the devaluation of 18 November 1967, it led not only to the acceleration of the withdrawal schedule, but also to the resignation of the intention to keep at least limited military capacities in the region. The new revision was published on 19 January 1968 in the form of the Prime Minister's Statement on Public Expenditure 1968–69 and 1969–70 (Cmnd 3515),[71] and was further elaborated in a programmatic document on the defence policy for 1968 (Statement on Defence Estimates 1968, Cmnd 3540). The Statement announced a complete withdrawal of the British Armed Forces from Singapore, Malaysia and the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971 and stated: "We do not thereafter plan to maintain a special military capability for use in that area."[72] These documents then *de facto* completed the reorientation of the British defence policy towards Europe and NATO. Even though the government subsequently confirmed its obligations within the scope of the regional alliances of SEATO and CENTO, 19 January 1968 is rightly considered, as Denis Judd does, the day that the British Empire ceased to exist.[73] The swift (and not exactly conceptual and diplomatically adequately prepared) withdrawal of almost all British troops from the area East of Suez caused significant tension not only in the relationship between London and Washington due to the American expectation of British support in facing communism in Asia, but it also permanently weakened the ties between Britain and its former colonies and dominions in the area. Australia, New Zealand and especially Malaysia and Singapore, which had hitherto regarded Britain as their main

[69] Intervention of David Greenwood, ibid., 14.
[70] Ibid., *passim*.
[71] The publication of the Statement was preceded by heated discussions in the Cabinet, with several key figures arguing for delay. Interestingly (and unlike in 1966), Wilson finally managed to have this landmark decision his way without any resignations. Cf. Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire*, 393–94.
[72] Intervention of David Greenwood, "The Decision to Withdraw from East of Suez", 15.
[73] Judd, *Impérium*, 389. The decolonisation of the British colonies in Africa was completed by this date with minor exceptions (Mauritius, Swaziland); Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Guyana, the largest British colonies in the Caribbean, had also gained independence before 1968.

ally and the guarantor of their security, were sharply critical towards the Wilson government's decision, and in the following years they were forced to reorient their defence policies towards the United States.

The opposition Conservative Party did not support the government's defence policy, and it was critical of both the cancellation of some armament programmes (TSR-2), and especially of the decision to completely withdraw British Armed Forces from the Middle and Far East. The Conservatives had traditionally been the "Empire party" with close ties to colonial administration and the Armed Forces, and after their return to power in 1970 they slowed down the withdrawal schedule by several years. However with regard to the country's financial situation and to their topmost foreign policy priority, the accession in the European Community, they did not question the final goal, which was the complete withdrawal of the British Armed Forces from the area East of Suez.[74]

When analysing the withdrawal of the British Armed Forces from the area East of Suez and the subsequent end of Britain's global military role, it is interesting to look at the politics of defence policy review that is at the formulation of the government policy in terms of the power struggle among individual institutional actors and key politicians. The situation was reminiscent of the first post-war reappraisal of British international obligations in 1947; again the mid-1960s, it was again the Treasury (under James Callaghan and from November 1967 under Roy Jenkins) to exert probably the strongest pressure on the reassessment of Britain's global military role. On the contrary, the Prime Minister himself and at least a part of the Foreign Office were interested in maintaining this role to the largest possible extent.[75] It follows from testimonies of the actors at the time that a key role was played by the Defence Secretary, Denis Healey.[76] Although Healey ranked among the opponents of the orientation of British foreign policy towards the European Community, in the defence policy realm he inclined towards NATO and European co-operation (Eurogroup). It also follows from testimonies that Healey, who was responsible for the 1964–66 defence policy reform and its subsequent revision, accepted the necessity to significantly redefine Britain's military role, including the complete withdrawal from the East of Suez. In comparison with his predecessors in

[74] Andres Dorman, "The Politics of Defence", in *Britain and Defence. A Policy Re-evaluation*, ed. Stuart Croft (London: Longman, 2001), p. 104.
[75] Intervention of David Greenwood, "The Decision to Withdraw from East of Suez", 17.
[76] Ibid., *passim*.

the resort of defence his role was easier because the economic situation was imperative and the decolonisation process was almost completed. Moreover in 1964, the integrated Ministry of Defence was established, in which the separate ministries of the three Services of the British Armed Forces – previously a significant institutional obstacle of defence policy reforms – were subsumed.

Conclusion

When the Conservative party regained power in the June 1970 general election, Britain's international position and the orientation of its foreign policy were in many aspects very different from the situation six years earlier, when the Conservatives had passed power onto Harold Wilson's Labour government. The decolonisation of British colonies in Africa had been finished and the process of the complete withdrawal of the Armed Forces from the area East of the Suez Canal was in progress. Although Britain was still waiting in front of the gates of the European Community, the biggest – and insurmountable, as it had been proven twice in the 1960s – adversary to the British membership, French President Charles de Gaulle, had now departed and the process of the EC enlargement, which had gained a new impulse at the Hague summit in December 1969, had been launched. British foreign policy had crossed the threshold of the *post-traditional* era. Its further development was, however, to a large extent dependent on the policy of the new Conservative government of Prime Minister Edward Heath. The Conservatives had an opportunity, at least a theoretical one, to try to return to the *tradition*, that is to the fundamentals of their post-war foreign policy as represented by Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, back before the year 1967 – at least, they could have taken back the British application for the EC membership and halted the withdrawal of the British Armed Forces from the Middle and Far East. The fact that this did not happen shows that the British political elite had in the course of the second half of the 1960s come in the context of changing material and ideational structures to a general – although, as the 1970s and 1980s development were to show, fragile and conditional – agreement on the new principles of a *post-traditional* foreign policy.

REVIEWS

Burak Tangör, ***Avrupa güvenlik yönetişimi: Bosna, Kosova ve Makedonya krizleri.*** Ankara: Seçkin, 2008, 231 pp. ISBN 975-02-0732-7.

The latest book by Burak Tangör, a specialist on international relations and the European Union at the Gazi Üniverzitesi in Ankara, analyses the reactions of the EU on the threats stemming from the Bosnian, Kosovo and Macedonian crises in 1992–2001. In essence, Tangör provides a handbook that sums up crucial facts about the European foreign policies towards the region and the legal framework of the European intervention and its crisis management.

European security management: the Bosnian, Kosovo and Macedonian crises, as the Turkish title could be translated, was intended primarily for students of law and international relations and can be thus taken for a textbook. The author cites numerous documents which have been in this way published in their entirety (or partially) for the first time in Turkish (which can be very beneficial in view of the poor language skills of the Turkish academia).

The theoretical framework, especially in respect to its pedagogical function, is mostly grounded on a broad understanding of security politics, as it is still more often perceived by experts on security, and policy makers. Apart from the diplomatic negotiations and military missions, the account includes also economic policies and politics of subsidies of the EU towards the respective countries as well as the stabilization impact of the integration process. It is mainly these stabilization measures preventing future military threats that characterize the new approach towards security and security politics that has been asserting itself approximately since the end of the Cold War. The book can thus be read as a case study that illustrates the practical operation of security politics in this conception.

Tangör's book is meant for Turkish audience as it deals with a topic that has been numerously researched in the European context. It thus does not bring any new views on the issue. Within the Turkish environment, though, the publication can be perceived as in many aspects very useful and unique. Yet in the broad European or even global context, it is a rather uninspiring study. After all, as its translation is not envisioned, and the author probably does not even set such ambitions for this book.

Kamil Pikal

Slavomír Horák, ***Rusko a Střední Asie po rozpadu SSSR.*** Praha: Karolinum, 2008, 228 pp. ISBN 978-80-246-1472-4.

Literature on developments in post-Soviet Eurasia is still rather rare, not only in the Czech academia. It is therefore a double pleasure to come across such a notable piece of work as recently published by the Prague Charles University Press. In 2008, the publishing house "Karolinum" featured an original monograph entitled *Rusko a Střední Asie po rozpadu SSSR* [Russia and Central Asia after the Soviet Union demise], written in Czech by a prominent scholar of the field Slavomír Horák. The monograph is a revised and slightly expanded book version of his doctoral dissertation defended at the Charles University's Institute for International Studies; with this book, Horák draws upon his earlier publications, namely his *Střední Asie mezi Východem a Západem* [Central Asia between the East and West] from 2005 that centered on Central Asia primarily *from within*. This latest reviewed study by Horák of Central Asia's *external* relations thus in a sense complements his previous efforts to map the region's post-Soviet developments.

Following a brief introduction elaborating the author's aims and objectives, a note on the methodology as well as an evaluation of sources, the book opens with an outline of the geopolitics of Central Asia after 1991. The fall of Communism, Horák says, has ultimately shaken Russia's long leading position in post-Soviet Eurasia. Hand in hand with Moscow's inevitably losing its grip over its once "fraternal" republics it is thus only natural that also these newly independent states on Russia's periphery found themselves increasingly caught up in the middle of competing powers and interests. In this context, Horák investigates one by one the role of the main outside powers in Central Asia, starting from the Muslim world; these Islamic countries, in the first place Iran, seek for influence over the nations in Central Asia, in order to promote the Islamic values in a region shaped for the several last decades by Communist secularism. Since the late 1990s, China, driven by a rapid economic expansion, has become increasingly involved in the renewed "Great Game" around Central Asia as well, mainly in search for the region's vast energy resources. The West is as of today the region's yet another major player which probably would not take a closer look at Central Asia, be it not for the tragic events of 9/11 and the related War on Terror in Afghanistan that effectively led to the U.S. and its Allies' firmly establishing themselves militarily in this volatile region.

The following chapter offers a look back into the history of Russia's relations with Central Asia. Horák begins his narration with recounting the key events that marked the Russian conquest of Central Asia, a process that was essentially completed by the last third of the nineteenth century. In the next parts of the book, he moves on portraying the Bolsheviks coming to power after 1917, the basmachi uprisings against the newly established Soviet rule, and the delimitation of the region into "national republics" under Stalin in the 1920 and 1930s, whereby also

the foundations of the Central Asian nations' modern statehood were laid down. Horák convincingly demonstrates that the Central Asian republics maintained an extremely subaltern status within the Soviet Union, referring to their generally low stage of development. Regrettably, the following years of Central Asia's existence under the Soviets are given rather sketchily in the course of further narration. This is particularly pity because it was precisely in this period that the local elites completed their forming as prospective independent political actors, a process which proved decisive for the non-democratic regimes in Central Asia to establish after 1991, and with it also for the specific paths of development they would eventually embark.

Leaving this historical excursus behind, Horák then brings the reader back again to the novel international environment that arose in Central Asia following the Soviet collapse in 1991. He claims that for keeping its influence in the region, Moscow still relies on bilateral ties of subordination and dependence, but at the same time, and to this end, it also uses a wide range of multilateral mechanisms as a leverage. Hence, the next chapter provides an overview of the key integration and cooperation organizations and projects in Central Asia. In this chapter, Horák describes and further explicates the principles, aims, and actions of the individual regional groupings in Central Asia (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Eurasian Economic Community, among others), categorized according to their functions, scope as well as external orientation. Based on this, he further points to the desperately poor, if viewed from Moscow, performance of all these groupings, a problem that is likely to have much to do with the very unreformed nature of all the parties involved. He concludes by arguing that the ever-growing number of these regional groupings notwithstanding, it is still rather disintegration than integration of this once common space that prevails, reflecting also the slowly emerging plurality of the external powers in Central Asia.

What follows is a thematic block of chapters dealing with the bilateral dimension of Russia's relations with Central Asia. This very core of Horák's book is formed by four distinct case studies analyzing the mutual relations of Russia and each of the Central Asian republics, e.g. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, respectively, Kazakhstan being excluded mainly for conceptual reasons. A chronology of the foreign policy of the individual republic introduces each of these four case studies. After this opening section, the key areas of the Russia-Central Asia relations are explored, namely politics, security, trade and business, as well as social aspects including the national minorities. Importantly, each study has a same basic structure, which is clearly advantageous for it allows for an easy comparison among the respective cases. Yet at the same time, this structure is flexible enough so that to highlight the specific features in the relations between Russia and the respective Central Asian republic as well. For instance, when dealing with Tajikistan, Horák puts the main emphasis on the continuing military presence of Russia in this perhaps most fragile republic of Central Asia. In Turkmenistan, in

contrast, he focuses primarily on Ashkhabad's troubled interaction with Moscow in the oil and gas industry. Combating extremism, for its part, is in the center of his attention in the Uzbekistan chapter, while the social dimension including labor migrants dominates the chapter on Russia-Kyrgyzstan relations.

Finally, the whole picture is complemented by a concluding chapter summarizing the book's main findings, and with it also framing the post-Soviet developments in the relations between Russia and Central Asia into a global context.

The book is thoroughly referenced, and for the sake of clarity, moreover, a number of tables, figures, and schemes throughout accompany the text. Besides, there is at the end a concise bibliography of select bibliographic titles divided into statistics, documents, and literature featuring the most important monographs and articles published in relevant academic journals of the field. Technically the publishers did a good job in editing the manuscript and preparing it for print, which is commendable. Less so, however, is that they fell short of providing this very readable text also with a basic subject index, a glossary of terms, and a map annex. This would have helped make the book also a valuable reference tool and thus make it accessible to an even broader audience of readers who would otherwise hardly dare to look for information after such a specialized and narrow monograph on this little-researched topic.

As mentioned in the beginning of this review, Horák's book is to be noted for several reasons. First, the book is based on an evaluation of a truly tremendous amount of sources available in the main world's as well as in the region's local languages. Hence the author's deep knowledge of the local peculiarities that firmly draws upon his decade-long personal experience with Russia and Central Asia including frequent research trips to the region. He utilizes this kind of expertise particularly in those parts of the book that familiarize the reader with some lesser known aspects of the social life in Central Asia which would be hard, and sometimes even impossible, to obtain otherwise, given the difficult access to information for outsiders in the closed and semi-closed societies like Central Asia. Furthermore, Horák's book deserves credit also as an outstanding empirical study in terms of methodology. The book provides a sound analytical framework that helps explain the foreign policy behavior of the surveyed newly independent states in the context of the geopolitics of post-Soviet Central Asia and as such could be applied in other area studies and regional analyses as well.

Slavomír Horák's *Russia and Central Asia after the Soviet Union demise* presents a unique attempt at a systematic elaboration of the relations between Russia and Central Asia after 1991. For this reason, the reviewer very hopes that the author finds enough time to come up soon with an up-date English version of the text which he could then offer for a critical evaluation and assessment also to a wider international audience.

Jan Šír

İlhan Uzgel, Bülent Duru (eds.), ***AKP Kitabı – Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu.*** Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2009, 802 pp., ISBN 9786055738075.

The voluminous anthology edited by İlhan Uzgel (Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Studies at the Ankara University) and Bülent Duru (expert on environmental and urban politics at the same institution) doubtlessly belongs among the most significant works in Social Sciences published in Turkey this year. The collective volume of thirteen papers reflects the development of domestic and foreign politics of Turkey since autumn 2002 when the Party for Justice and Progress, better know under its Turkish acronym AKP, formed the government and took over power in the country.

AKP Kitabı – Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu (*Book on AKP: the balance of change*) is divided into ten chapters that cover the individual aspects of ideology and political practice of AKP. The first chapter focuses on the ideological profile of the party and its place in the Turkish party system. The second chapter offers an analysis of the background of the AKP electorate, Turkish countryside and urban peripheries. Other chapters deal with the issue of human rights and the questions of foreign, economic, educational, environmental and social policies. A separate chapter is devoted to the manner in which AKP addresses social issues (it includes a section on "AKP and Women", pp. 614 – 632). To complete the list, let us mention a chapter on "Religion and Politics" (pp. 281–354) that examines probably the most problematic theme discussed in relation to AKP.

Authors of the papers are mostly renowned scholars from Ankara research institutions, especially the Faculty of Political Studies and Law Faculty at the Ankara University and the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Başkent University. When choosing contributors to this volume, entirely in accord with their political orientation and own professional views (also greatly influenced by their political beliefs), the editors approached extremely secularist academics whether it be Kemalists or proponents of various movements of the Turkish left. Their choice markedly affected the conception of the entire volume: for example, the chapter on "Religion and Politics" comprises of papers by three political scientists and political philosophers but not a single Islamic scholar nor a religion expert that could outline the perception of the relationship between religion and politics in religious circles.

A slight exception among the array of texts deprecating AKP politics (especially both contributions by İlhan Uzgel) or moderately criticising it (most of the other authors), is a study by Nuri Yeşilyurt and Atay Akdevelioğu on the Middle Eastern policies of AKP (pp. 381– 409). The authors discuss a significant improvement in the relations between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours during the AKP government and also quite positively assess the more active role Turkey is now playing in the region after decades of non-intervention. Within this book, such a moderate praise is in sharp contrast with Professor Uzgel's disapproval of the Turkish attempts to become prominent in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa

as he regards them senseless and ineffective (pp. 36–37). On the other hand, it must be noted that the authors adjusted their diction to the concept of the whole volume as their texts and private discussions suggest that their positive evaluation of AKP's Middle Eastern politics is usually less restrained.

Reading the pages of Uzgel and Duru's voluminous anthology one must ask a question what had made thirty six elite scholars in Social Sciences compile a libel book of 800 pages and why is their undertaking considered both by scholars and the general public as a significant contribution to the academic as well as broad public political discourse in the country. The reasons for that can be found in the disposition of the current political scene in Turkey, and implicitly of the entire society. Moreover, also some wholly prosaic motives must be specified.

AKP and its leaders, that means especially the current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President Abdüllah Gül but also the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and the long-time author of AKP's foreign policies, Ahmet Davutoğlu, have brought many changes to the stale Turkish politics. Until the establishment of the Party for Justice and Progress, Islam-oriented parties such as Refah or Fazilet represented quite marginalized formations (the fact that the leader of the Refah Party Erbakan briefly held the post of Prime Minister was more of a proof of a crisis in the Turkish right than anything else). These parties (were they not banned) attracted only a relatively small proportion of voters – mainly because not even religious Turks living predominantly in the countryside were drawn to their programme in the context of tolerant and religiously relaxed Turkey. AKP's odd practices for gaining votes (e.g. relief distribution in neglected urban peripheries and slums, whereby the recipients of AKP's assistance had to swear on Koran to vote for the party) and its radical rhetoric on the verge of law alarmed some secular Turkish circles despite its marginal importance in the same way as marginal extreme right arouses apprehension and precaution inWestern Europe. Subsequently, when the inner leadership circle of the newly-banned Islamist party Fazilet, including Erdoğan, decided to found a catch-all-party that would abandon the ills of its very radical predecessors, concerns of secularists were surely apropos.

Why though is this nearly fanatical hatred towards AKP manifested even today, after six and half years of its rule, especially when AKP's politicians did not try to introduce Islamic law nor tuned Turkey into a satellite of Iran? A partial explanation offers the fact that although in a different sense, changes brought by AKP into Turkish public life are truly radical. Throughout its entire period in power, AKP has been systematically and step by step weakening the traditionally influential role of the army, it has relaxed Turkish minority policies, and reduced state interventionism in the economy but also the education. These reforms could at first sight seem very pro-Western and liberal and are thus correspondingly quite positively evaluated by Western observers. However, apart from a moderate economic growth they have yet another effect: they enfeeble the traditional secularist elites that see the reforms as a direct assault on Atatürk's state achievements.

There is another hint that AKP's politics might be designing: the protracted law suit Energekon against an allegedly extremely Kemalist terrorist group that supposedly planned attacks on the current government. The fact that most of the indicted "terrorists" are scholars, journalists but also high state officials – many of them in their retirement age – indicates that the trial might have some political motives. Special concerns about best Turkish universities, until recently never contested elite institutions that have for decades been producing highest state representatives, can point to AKP's emphasis on private universities, often financed by Islamic circles. More and more state employees graduated at one of these universities and the traditional state universities thus have a good reason to worry about their exclusive positions. These fears, although not admitted in the volume (but confirmed in a private conversation with one of the editors) are also one of the reasons why *AKP Kitabı* was published.

However disputed the objectivity of this volume might be, it is still worth reading. It brings a very substantial and well-formulated manifestation of that part of the Turkish elite and middle class that feels harmed by the current political development in the country. This book offers answers to readers of Economist and other prestigious news weeks that publish eulogies on Erdoğan's "liberal" politics, who could wonder who are these people that do not (contrary to most Western commentators) praise the current, according to many objectively set standards, successful government. The fact to be born in mind is that the proportion of people fundamentally objecting to AKP's politics is around thirty to forty per cent in the deeply fragmented Turkish society. Every scholar pursuing any sort of research on the current Turkish politics should thus pay due attention to their voice and should not be blinded by the loud chanting of "*Allāhu akbar!*", a slogan of AKP's campaigns.

Kamil Pikal

Melanie Ilic (ed.), ***Stalin's Terror Revisited.*** Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 256 pp. ISBN 978-1-4039-4705-5.

More than seventy years have passed since Stalin's Great Terror erupted, but this topic has never ceased to attract extraordinary interest of historians. Foundations to the research of the Great Terror as one of the most salient phenomena of Soviet history lay British historian Robert Conquest, who also coined the term. However, his conception is in many respects outdated: during the last forty years of research some crucial moments have moved the study of this topic forward. The most important of these was the Archival Revolution in the Soviet Union towards the close of 1991. The declassification of a number of key documents of the probably

most inaccessible ministry in the world resulted in some fundamental findings that solve the long-time scholarly disputes among historians (primarily on the number of victims of the purges). However, some new questions and the main point at dispute why the purges culminated in 1937–1938 still have not been sufficiently explained. At the same time, the nature of scholarly work has changed. The opening of local archives has enabled a study of individual "cells" and this way reconstruct the picture of the entire "body" of the Stalinist system during the critical period. This trend has affected the majority of contemporary works on Stalinism. An important contribution to the topic that should not escape notice to anyone interested in this issue is a collection of papers written by prominent world scholars edited by Melanie Ilic (University of Birmingham), *Stalin's Terror Revisited*.

Next to case studies on the impact of the purges in selected regions, institutions and industrial branches of the USSR, the volume focuses on the profile of the victims in terms of their position within the party hierarchy and on the impact the terror had on Soviet economy. These problems are dealt with in the two introductory chapters.

Robert W. Davies, a prominent Sovietologist from the "Cold Warriors" had the first word. The author of major works from the 1980s on the economy and collectivization under Stalinism seeks to answer the question of what immediate impact the economic situation in the country had on the eruption of purges. He rejects the argument of Roberta T. Manning (in her and John A. Getty's work *Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives* from 1993, both of them counted among "revisionists") that the origins of the purges can be found in the economic recession of 1936 that partly preceded the trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev. Davies argues that the Soviet leadership had only a few worries about the economic situation at that time. He proves the contrary by saying that purges played an important role in the economic problems of the country that had been on the increase since 1937.

The next chapter was written by Oleg Khlevnyuk, the former director of "RGASPI" archive (that among others administers the archive of the Comintern) and the current director of the State Archive of the Russian Federation. He is considered the "best informed" Sovietologist of today. In his study he systematically examines the consequences of the terror on the functioning of Soviet People's Commissariats. He describes the double liquidation of ministerial cadres – the original and the newly appointed ones. He argues that after the end of the terror, ministries as well as the entire Soviet economy found themselves in an odd situation when the leadership comprised of two different generations of cadres, a phenomenon whose practical effects he further investigates.

Junbae Jo from the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, in his paper reveals the essence of the repressions in Soviet trade unions. Among other things, the author compares the situation to the purges in trade unions in 1928–1930. The fourth study by Christopher Joyce from Durham University looks at the impact of the Great Terror on the Soviet prison system. He

convincingly shows that the NKVD was unprepared for such massive repressions as well as was the system of gulags and penitentiaries. He describes the problems of both institutions and especially of its personnel. The fifth chapter by Melanie Ilic concentrates on the gender aspect of the purges. The author presents a thorough study of the initiation, circumstances and repercussions of the NKVD operational order No. 00486 from August 15, 1937, marking a beginning of mass repressions of wives of the enemies of the people and "traitors of Motherland".

Regional studies form the bulk of the remaining sections. Valerii Vasiliev from Ukrainian Academy of Sciences focuses on the impact of the extremely brutal terror on Ukraine. Based on his archival research on the documents of NKVD from Vinnytsia and Poltava, the author confirms the assumption that confidential police lists of *kulaki* and other "anti-Soviet elements" and criminals were used during the mass repressions. Vasiliev also had a very close look at the consequences of the purges on mining and agriculture in the republic.

Melanie Ilic in her second study in this volume makes use of the lists of victims, the martyrologies from Mordovia in order to visually depict the chronology of the repressions in this region. Her socio-demographic analysis of the victims of the purges also includes a detailed account of life stories of the affected women. The last study by Christopher Joyce uses the same methodological approach. The author presents a social profile of thousands of people that suffered from the repressions in the Komi territory. Apart from that, Joyce examines the social interaction between groups of free workers and gulag prisoners in the region as the boundaries between these two worlds were hardly recognizable.

There is no salient link between the studies in the anthology *Stalin's Terror Revisited*. The authors come from different generations of scholars, institutions and countries (and united their forces – not physically – at the premises of the University of Birmingham). The chapters have very similar date of origin and some of them are case studies. The apparent heterogeneity of this volume serves as a good example of the state of current research on Stalinism: there is no ideology left, schools and groups have also disappeared and the entire research field is very diverse.

Mikuláš Černý

Jarosz Darius, Pasztor Maria, ***Stosunki polsko-francuskie 1944–1980.*** Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2008, 480 pp. ISBN 978-83-89607-42-3.

Stosunki polsko-francuskie 1944–1980, a monograph written by Polish historians Darius Jarosz and Maria Pazstor, is the outcome of a many years long research on French-Polish relations in the twentieth century. Maria Pasztor has been especially renown for the numerous works she has published on the topic so far, some even in French.

In this book on the French-Polish relations in 1944–1980, the authors present a chronological account of the topic divided into four chapters, whereby the introduction also includes a brief description of the development in 1918–1943 and the conclusion summarises the post-1980 period until the fall of communism in Poland. The first chapter analyses French-Polish relations in 1944–1947, the period of the re-establishment of Poland within new borders, and the time of cultivation of scholarly and cultural cooperation between Paris and Warsaw on the one hand but worsening of economic ties due to nationalisation policies in Poland on the other. The following chapter on the period of 1948 to 1953 focuses on the deterioration in cultural and economic bonds that had been caused by the growing tensions between the two countries and a series of repression (roundups and expulsions). The third part deals with the period of 1953 to 1970, i.e. the time of *détente*. The general political relaxation at the international level facilitated a resumption of the political dialogue between Paris and Warsaw and cultural, scholarly and even economic ties once again intensified. In the mid-1960s, mutual cooperation even deepened due to Charles de Gaulle's policies of rapprochement with the Eastern bloc. The study is concluded by an analysis of French-Polish relations in 1970–1980, the period of abundant diplomatic activities such as mutual official state visits of Poland under Edward Gierek and France under Presidents Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing. At this time, mutual trade relations strengthened, whereby Paris became one of the main creditors of Poland.

The authors worked on the assumption that under the conditions of a bipolar division of the world, the role of politics at the international level was very limited. Therefore, priority is given to economic, cultural, educational and scholarly relations between the two countries. Likewise, chapters on the mutual relationships between their two communist parties are included. However, the international aspect of the subject had not been left out: French-Polish relations are also depicted in the broader context of European and world politics (especially regarding the German question) and in respect to relations with other countries (mostly addressing the role of Moscow and Bonn).

The book relies mainly on French and Polish archives and contemporary media, less so on secondary sources. The authors also used parts of their previous publications that are incorporated into their new monograph. Bibliography and index are also included.

Statistical data and the usage of tables (chiefly of economic data or even of statistics of literary translations) create a substantial part of the book. Very frequent are also various enumerations and listings of e.g. French soloists performing in Poland. In fact, the book is a dense composition of many previous studies and a long-term research that occasionally gives away the key problem the authors faced: the limits on the length of the book. As a way of overcoming this problem, the authors included an abundance of bibliographical references in the footnotes. However, the

quantity and concentration of the information offered in some passages negatively affected readability.

At any rate, the salience of the book lies in the plenitude of information acquired mainly from the primary (archival) resources. The profoundness of this study on French-Polish relations in 1944–1980 offered in this monograph thus cannot be disputed.

Michaela Kůželová

Jeff Johnson, ***The New Theatre of the Baltics, From Soviet to Western Influence in Estonia, Lativa and Lithuania.*** Jefferson, North Carolina, and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2007, 222 pp. ISBN 978-0-7864-2992-9.

Theatre in the Baltic state seems very remote not only for Central Europeans but for many others. Jeff Johnson's book is an attempt to introduce this quite unknown realm of European cultural heritage to a broad spectrum of readers. The author himself in the preface admits that he does not speak any of the Baltic languages and that he is not an expert on this area. He grew interested to this topic through an experience with Lithuanian dramatic art that later led him into the study of drama in the other two republics.

First chapter, "Crisis of Relevance", does justice to the pivotal theme of all three national theatres: after the acquisition of independence, actors, directors and playwrights have been searching for their place in the post-Soviet society. The three Baltic republics suffer from the same problems as theatres of the other countries with a similar historical experience such as insufficient financial resources, decrease in spectators and commercialization. The author outlines possible solutions that the individual theatres and theatre companies implemented. First and foremost, it is a contemplation over the function of theatre in current times where theatre does not serve as a disguised critic of the regime and that does not serve as the only means of entertainment anymore. The contemporary world has brought a wider scale of opportunities and theatres need to deal with them as best as they can. Just like small nations search for their place in the new Europe, theatres confront the issue of how to establish themselves as small and in terms of language inaccessible theatres in the globalized world.

Next three chapters are devoted to the individual national theatres. As Jeff Johnson recognized in the introduction, his journey started with Lithuanian drama, which is also the first one he deals with, followed by the Estonian and Latvian dramatic production. Each chapter starts with an introductory historical overview that enables the reader to understand the used terms and the background of

the respective dramatic art. One of the major sources the author relied on were numerous interviews with actors and directors that also take up a substantial proportion of the book. Through the interviews Johnson introduces the reader with individual theatrical ensembles and their plays. He also adds views of critics, actors and directors on each of the themes of the plays. This way, his account has gained an insider perspective. Naturally, the author drew many comparisons between the republics in order to provide a better understanding of the differences in dramatic styles.

This publication also contains a great number of black and white pictures of actors and plays. There is a description of the play and its significance under each picture. At the end of book is a list of footnotes, bibliographical sources and an index. Most of the used sources are in English but Johnson also relied on Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian sources that he had translated. The index includes a list of plays, playwrights and key drama terminology.

The New Theatre of the Baltics is a very useful reference book for any reader who wishes to find his way through the dramatic work in the Baltic republics. It not only offers a summary of the most important playwrights, actors and plays but also attempts to make the author ponder over the function of theatre in post-communist societies. Johnson offers a great insight into a hardly accessible topic to anyone who is not familiar with the local languages, but a topic that is no less interesting than any other European theatre.

Olga Brabcová

Polly Jones (ed.), ***The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization. Negotiating cultural and social change in the Khrushchev era.*** London: Routledge, 2006, 279 pp. ISBN 978-0-415-54588-4.

This collection of papers focuses on the period after Stalin's death that was characteristic of manoeuvring between reforms, for so long needed to maintain the Soviet system. Popular topics such as the importance of N. S. Khrushchev, his struggle for power and political reforms are left aside for the sake of an often underestimated aspect of the post-Stalinist period: social and cultural reforms, their impact on the population and people's reactions to the reform. The authors of the anthology strive after emphasising the dynamics of the reform movement and creating a new framework for cultural and social changes of the Khrushchev era.

The volume comprises of three parts, whereby the first one is devoted to public opinion and the reaction of society to the reforms. The first study by Miriam Dobson from the University of Sheffield examines a poorly researched area of Destalinization –

amnesties and the fate of released prisoners. Dobson shows how problematic the consequences of the amnesties had proven to be. Released prisoners (*zeks*) could not, and often did not want to, re-integrate into society. Also the reaction of society to the return of prisoners was quite negative. Criminality rates rapidly rose. Miriam Dobson uses the examples of concrete soldiers in order to demonstrate the unreadiness for the consequences of amnesties not only of the freed prisoners but also of Soviet society. It is thus clear from this study that Destalinization had not always been enthusiastically welcomed. Not even official authorities and media knew how to react, especially after the wave of criminality broke out. Who were the *zeks*? Victims of Stalinist purges, or bandits? The new Soviet leadership refused to fill Gulags once again and thus appealed to the public for help to re-educate the released prisoners. On the example of amnesties Dobson demonstrates that Destalinization was more than a well-planned process; it also was not unchallengeable and was by no means only welcomed.

The editor of the anthology, Polly Jones, analyses in her study the official Destalinization rhetoric of the Soviet state as compared to the reaction to the process from below. The author clearly shows that the Soviet leadership was far from expecting the popular reaction to Destalinization that followed Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Congress. The party welcomed verbal expressions of Destalinization, rejection of the cult of personality etc., but disapproved of all other practical actions towards this direction. The period from 1956 to 1961 was thus quite uncertain as for the practical repercussions of Destalinization. The party leadership had learnt from this development and when the second wave of Destalinization was launched at the 22nd Congress, a very clearly defined line of criticism of Stalin was set; any attempt to divert from it was punished. The author thus proves that Destalinization was conceived in such a manner that it would be kept within the party's power and so that the party could overcome "the mistakes of the past" and continue the same course. Public discourse about Stalinist past was thus ended as swiftly as it started.

Susanne Schattenberg goes along the same line in her paper on the impact of Khrushchev's "secret" speech at the 20th Congress on the everyday life of ordinary people. Similar to the findings of the preceding study, the author comes to the conclusion that the party was not ready for the reaction of the public. Schattenberg examines the course of Destalinization in workplaces. Immediately after the start of the process, the party tried to regulate it and the call for democratization was soon replaced by effectiveness of work and fulfilment of the plan. Also the workplaces thus witnessed a suppression of liberalization at the very start, whereby steps towards radical reforms that Destalinization could have meant were foredoomed to fail. The first part of the anthology ends with Denis Kozlov's article on the work of the writer Vladimir Dudintsev that had stirred up the already troubled waters of the post-Stalinist USSR. Through a bold mosaic of recollections and memories of ordinary Soviet people on Dudintsev's novel, Kozlov creates an image of the period immediately after the

20th Congress. He shows that for Soviet society the novel "Not by Bread Alone" embodied a mirror set against the Stalinist state order that provoked anti-bureaucratic reactions rather than pure anti-Stalinist sentiments. Kozlov depicts that Dudincev's readers identified with the characters and transferred even negative characters of the novel into the real life. In the course of time, the mirror created by the novel naturally lost its clarity and relevance and was put into the shade of, for example, Solzhenitsyn's "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich".

The second part of this volume deals with the question of identity and what had happened of Stalinist identity after Destalinization. Christina Varga-Harris turns the readers' attention towards the housing problem in Leningrad in the 1950s and 1960s. Although life conditions of many people noticeably improved after the war when a massive construction of houses was launched, this was done at the expense of quality. In any case the state was still unable to meet the demand. Petitions for better housing became a new type of civil activity: clerks duly dealt with these complaints and acknowledged their rightfulness but could only rarely handle it in the claimants' favour. Varga-Harris's article also demonstrates how these petitions came to be the new way of interaction between the state and the people.

The contributions of Ann Livschiz and Juliane Fürst deal with the question of children and youth related policies in the Soviet Union. Livschiz shows the impact of Stalin's death on the state policies on children and youth education. The state had to face the problem of hooliganism and youth criminality. Moreover, as Livschiz argued, there was a fear that Stalin's personality cult had stigmatized the youth, which was supposedly manifested in the absence of basic human emotions. The article further describes the zeal of reformers to reverse this development by, for example, the use of books praising exactly these qualities. As in most of the previous studies, it is concluded that the post-Stalinist period had not led to any significant change as against the preceding years. As for hooliganism and youth criminality, the situation even deteriorated after Stalin's death. Liberalization, if any, was achieved only verbally, not factually. The approach of the state towards hooliganism and delicts is also the topic of Juliane Fürst's paper that looks at the reaction of Khrushchev to the rapid growth in such cases. As proven by the author, political reforms in this area as well as in other spheres had more or less failed. Even here the dilemma between liberalization attempts and the need to keep control played an important role. Fürst asserts that Khrushchev went even further than Stalin in crushing "non-conformism" of the youth. Donald Fitzer returns to the question of workers and their position after Stalin's death in his contribution.

The last part comprises of studies on the "search after a new style". Roger Marwick in the first of these studies analyses Soviet historiography in order to demonstrate similar findings as his colleagues have come to in the previous sections, i.e. that the initial Destalinization and liberalization from soon turned into a threat

for the new leadership that interfered. Historiography experienced attempts to offer a new perspective on history whereas literature, as shown by Emily Lygo, focused on lyrical poetry that was soon forced out of the Soviet literary life. After a brief renaissance of lyrical poetry, the Union of Soviet Writers intervened against J. Brodski and thereby put an end to the poetical euphoria. On the other hand, as stressed by Lygo, the Union supported a younger generation of poets; however, only those that had some experience from the literary groupings (LITO) and that thus more or less had control over them. Renaissance of poetry is also discussed in the last article of the volume by Katherine Hodgson. Contrary to Emily Lygo, she does not focus on poets of the older generation but her conclusion is very similar: there was no major liberalization and many authors of this period were banned from publishing. However, one could still talk about an emergence of a sort of cultural Destalinization movement when these poets who experienced the war tried to reconcile with their own past.

Susan E. Reid describes the changes that ensued the 20th Congress in the realm of art. She presents a discussion that erupted between Soviet artists on the so-called modern style *(sovremennyi stil')*. She comes to the conclusion that despite disagreements over the need for a new modern style, all artists agreed – just like in any other sector – that no revolutionary changes had come about.

Tereza Vorlová

Tim Judah, ***Kosovo: What everyone needs to know.*** Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 208 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-537673-0.

Tim Judah is a correspondent of the British news weekly *The Economist* in the Balkans. His new book *Kosovo: What everyone needs to know* indirectly extends his previous work on the circumstances of the Kosovo conflict in 1999 (*Kosovo: War and Revenge*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). The main aim of his newest publication is to provide any reader with a general and basic overview of the historical, political and cultural development of Kosovo in its broader international context and to offer possible alternatives of the future evolution of the region. As the author pointed out in the introduction, the aspirations of this book do not go any further than what the title suggests. It is meant only for the general public interested in the topic that wants to acquire some understanding of the problem, and certainly not for scholars, knowledgeable of the issues.

Judah brings forward two important reasons why Kosovo should be of interest to the general public. Firstly, due to its geographical position, Kosovo geopolitically gained on importance with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to NATO and the

EU in 2004 a 2007 respectively. Together with other states of the Western Balkans, the region has become encircled by Euro-Atlantic structures. Profaned appellations of the Balkans as the European backyard have come to nought. A mere glimpse over the map of Europe suffices to see that the region has become rather a sort of a European courtyard. The author sees the second reason for a close study of Kosovo in the manner in which it gained independence in February 2008. Judah does not embark on a detailed description of the issue, nor does he impose his views on the reader. He only states that the establishment of Kosovo as an independent country could have severe implications for the rest of the Western Balkans as well as for other unresolved territorial issues such as the status of the region of Basque or Kurdistan.

Judah divided his latest publication into thirteen chapters. The first two provide a brief demographic overview of contemporary Kosovo and surrounding areas. Third chapter introduces a historical analysis of the region and deals with popular myths and Kosovo's medieval past. Chronologically ordered seven chapter that follow focus on the crucial historical developments until the presentation of the Ahtisaari plan in 2007. Chapter eleven goes beyond the borders of Kosovo and briefly assesses the current perspectives of a potential establishment of the so-called "Greater Albania". The penultimate chapter puts the question of Kosovo into the context of frozen conflicts of the post-Soviet realm. The last part of the book describes the situation of the independence proclamation, formation of an independent administrative system, and the deployment of EULEX mission.

Judah's historical analysis that comprises the largest part of the book is based on the widely accepted (although in some respects controversial) work of Noel Malcolme *Kosovo: a short history* and a book of a leading French Balkanist Jean-Arnault Dérens *Le Piège du Kosovo* (Paris: Editions Non lieu, 2008). Another frequently quoted source is Miranda Vickers's *Between Serb and Albanian: A history of Kosovo* (London: Hurst, 1998). Passages dealing with the contemporary political development are an outcome of Judah's long-time experience as a journalist and his incessant stay in the region. Sources used in the last chapters mostly comprise of personal interviews of the author with prominent political figures, important local business people or even the clergy. The book includes useful maps, brief bibliography and links to recommended Internet resources.

Jakub Andrle

Marlène Laruelle, ***Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire.*** Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008. 276 pp. ISBN 978-0-8018-9073-4.

The roots and ideological core of inter-war Eurasianism, the development of Eurasianist ideas among post-war Soviet dissent and the upswing of Eurasianism in the period of post-Soviet transformation. Such would be a brief summary of the thematic content of the volume *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire* written by Marlène Laruelle, a prominent French specialist on nationalism and political philosophy of contemporary Russia and Central Asia. This work is a revised translated edition of the French original *L'idéologie eurasiste russe ou comment penser l'empire* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999).

Political and social transformation in Russia throughout less than the last decade, marking also the publishing of the first French and the second English edition of the book, prompted the author to strongly emphasize that there was no connection whatsoever between the translated study and the ideological background of the officially supported Russian patriotism. Laruelle also prefaced that the aim of her work was to analyze Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism on solely intellectual grounds. The author rules out and plays down any impact of Eurasianist ideas on either the internal or foreign policy of the Kremlin as well as on programs of Russia's nationalist parties and groupings. These issues are thus nearly entirely left out.

The first part of the book focuses on the various original theories of Eurasianism among inter-war Russian *émigrés*. The subject of interest of the second part is the work of Lev Gumilev, dubbed as the "last of the Eurasianists". Based on a very detailed analysis of Gumilev's (pseudo-)scientific work and correspondence, Laruelle convincingly argues that his association with the "Founding Father" of Eurasianism is to a large degree fallacious. The author asserts that it was rather Alexander Panarin and Alexander Dugin, representatives of the incoherent movement known as Neo-Eurasianism, who held ideas similar to the ideological grounds of Eurasianism. While Panarin was well-known mainly for his elaboration on the Eurasianist philosophy of history, the importance of Dugin's work on geopolitical theories lay mainly in his connections with prominent research institutions and political circles. However, Laruelle opines that Neo-Eurasianism intellectually lags behind Eurasianism in every respect. Neo-Eurasianist works are less elaborative, often contradictory with each other and apart from a few exceptional cases lack any literary qualities.

The two final chapters in this volume examine the development of Eurasianist ideas in ethnically non-Russian regions – first in Russia as such and then in Kazakhstan and Turkey. The author holds Eurasianism in Tatarstan and Yakutia-Sakha for "less theoretical and more pragmatic Eurasianism, centered on the search for a political, economic and symbolic balance between center and the periphery" (p. 170). (Neo-) Euroasianism plays a similar role in Central Asia and especially in Kazakhstan. The

relationship between the center and the periphery in this case shifts outside of the borders of current Russia into the post-Soviet region. As for the Turkish intellectual movement of the analyzed concept, the author primarily explores the clashes between Turkism, Pan-Turkism, Turanism and Kemalism. The essential conclusion of this volume is the insistence on a strict differentiation between all existing branches of Neo-Eurasianism and the intellectual heritage of inter-war Eurasianism. Also, the assumption that Neo-Eurasianism is a comprehensive intellectual concept is severely challenged.

Jakub Andrle

Molik Witold, Żaliński Henryk (eds.), ***„O nas bez nas": historia Polski v historiografiach obcojęzycznych.*** Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2007, 258 pp. ISBN 978-83-7177-552-9.

The anthology "O nas bez nas" [About Us Without Us] consists of updated proceedings presented at the XVII General Assembly of Polish Historians in Cracow in September 2004 that among other things dealt with non-Polish historiographical approaches to Polish history. The aim of the volume is to grasp the image of Polish history given by foreign history books (including textbooks); the emphasis is placed especially on the choice of historical topics, usage of myths and stereotypes and the general perception of Polish history abroad. Apart from that, the volume attempts to expound the salience of Polish historiography, its future course, subjects of interest, methods and findings in foreign countries.

The conceptions of Polish history are analyzed in two geographical realms: in the so-called big countries (USA, France, Germany and Russia) and neighbouring countries (or historically neighbouring countries) of Poland (Czech Republic, Lithuania, Ukraine and Hungary). John J. Kulczycki brings an interesting analysis of the historical research on Poland in the USA. He primarily examines American textbooks and comes to the conclusion that Poland is mostly mentioned with relation to Western Europe. Likewise, turning points of Polish history are often misinterpreted or sketchily explained. The only realm that American historiography pays more attention to is the Jewish question. Daniel Beauvois contributed with a study on French historiography. He gives an overview of all prominent historians that have dealt with the topic but also refers to the role of non-historians that for example translated Polish fiction. Małgorzata Willaume in her paper even looked into Daniel Beauvois's work.

Poland has a much more important place in German historiography. This is shown by Michael G. Müller on the examples of German historical research on

Poland in the past two decades. The dominant topic is the German-Polish problem; however, some new research themes emerge as well (especially on Lithuania and Ukraine). Swetłana Falkowicz examined the Russian perspective and chronologically analyzed the place of Polish history in Russian historiography since the mid-19th century until today. She focused mostly on Russian authors, research topics and educational institutions dealing with Polish history. Lithuanian historiographical view and the image of Poles and Poland in Lithuanian historical memory are presented by Alvydas Nikžentaitis. He concluded that given the phenomena such as Polonization of Lithuania and periods of anarchy, Poland has been by and large given negative connotations. Recently, though, some new and more positive topics have come up such as the civilizing role of Poland and its cultural heritage. In the following paper on Belorussian historiography, Olga Gorbaczewa asserts that Polish history is a recurring topic in Belorussian history textbooks due to the common past but is also evaluated mainly negatively. Unlike in the Lithuanian case, there is no tendency towards a study of topics that would bring a more positive account of Poland's historical role. Leonid Zaszkilniak noted that Ukrainian historiography depicts Poland in very similar colours. This can be ascribed to the prism of Polish-Ukrainian relations, the influence of Russian historical research as well as the dominant stereotypes and *Ukrainocentrism*. István Kovács added to the discussion with his study on Polish-Hungarian relations and the consequent interest for Poland in the Hungarian realm. The last paper of the volume written by Jiří Vykoukal offers an insight into the Czech historiography on modern and contemporary Polish history and its evolutionary trends, primary topics and research institutes. The impact of Czech/Czechoslovak environment is particularly noticeable in this case.

Any reader of the volume can gain a very clear image of Poland in the studied foreign historiographies. Moreover, the editors admonish Polish historians to publish more works on Poland abroad.

Michaela Kůželová

Jana Nosková, ***Reemigrace a usídlování volyňských Čechů v interpretacích aktérů a odborné literatury.*** Brno: Ústav evropské etnologie Filosofické fakulty Masarykovy univerzity, 2007, 226 pp. ISBN 978-80-2540095-1.

The doctoral thesis of Jana Nosková, a researcher in ethnology, was published in the scope of the programme "Building on the Past: European Doctorate in Social History of Europe and the Mediterranean" and was defended at the Institute of European Ethnology of the Faculty of Art at the Masaryk University in Brno in 2006. Nosková pursued a historical-ethnological research whose main aim was to

establish the process of memory formation of some historical events by their actors and determine how personal memories differ from scholarly work on the topic and how these two perspectives influence each other. All of the studied processes relate to re-emigration and ensuing settlement of Volhynian Czechs in Czechoslovakia after the Second World War.

The volume comprises of eight large sections and also includes an extensive number of appendices, list of bibliography and a summary in German. Each chapter is supported by comprehensive footnotes. The time frame of the study is clearly determined in the beginning: the author examines events after the Second World Word up until the beginning of the 1950s but also relies on relevant literature from recent years. The study thus indirectly covers the entire post-war period until the 21st century. Territorial scope of the study primarily includes Czech territories and implicitly also the area of Volhynia within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

As this work is based on a broad research, methodology and theoretical foundations make up a large part of the first section that is by its extent comparable to the description of the actual findings. Therefore, first section could be called the theoretical part. Nosková decided to combine the bibliographical method, oral history and document analysis that should, in her view, help to achieve a better understanding of collective memory formation of a concrete group of people. This section further includes a detailed analysis of bibliography used in the thesis, evaluation of general theoretical concepts and terminology applied in this research. Terms such as life story, small and big history, everyday life reality formation and collective memory are among those mentioned in this section. Last but not least, the methods used during fieldwork are described as well as the process of information acquisition by the means of interviews and subsequent data evaluation. The author interviewed and recorded seventeen people in total and subsequently produced transcriptions of every interview. Personal experience of each individual interviewee was thus of major importance.

The author called the second principal part of the thesis material and interpretational. It is again subdivided into two sections according to the two historical processes: the first one is the process of re-emigration of Volhynian Czechs and the second their settlement on the Czech territory. Two different perspectives are used in both of the sections: scholarly work on the topic of historians and ethnologists (usually associated with the general context of domestic and international politics) represents the first one whereas the second one is projected on a much more individual and emotional level as it assembles the memories of the individual actors. Excerpts from interviews, often quite long, serve as an illustration and as a documentation of the presented arguments. A separate chapter is devoted to literature stemming from the environment of Volhynian Czechs that the author sees as a valuable additional source. Each sub-chapter is supported by a commentary by the author and an interpretation of the findings.

The crucial finding of the thesis is presented in the conclusion: in terms of factual history, the two perspectives – that of the actors and that of the historians – do not differ in any substantial manner. Nosková also offers an explanation of her findings: the studied community is largely very interested in its own history and thus possesses a substantial knowledge of the scholarly literature. She thus confirmed her hypothesis included in the introduction that interpretation of historical events in the work of historians, ethnologists and other scientists has an impact on the collective memory formation of the community that is a subject to the respective study. However, it is impossible to quantify or precisely determine their impact.

Appendix to this work is also quite extensive. Biographies of the interviewees, tables and maps showing the settlement of Volhynian Czechs, demographic migrations and contemporary political or press documents form the bulk of the materials.

This publication is undoubtedly a very valuable historical analysis based on a thorough historical research. The main stress is placed on the work with historical documents, hence it is not their form by their creator that matters the most. Apart from new finding, that the author acquired by her research, this work is valuable also as an overview of scholarly and popular literature on the topic of re-emigration and settlement of Volhynian Czechs in the lands of their forefathers.

Eva Pelíšková

Carolina Vendil Pallin, ***Russian Military Reform. A failed exercise in defence decision making.*** London: Routledge, 2008, 248 pp. ISBN 978-0-203-89239-8.

Carolina Pallin as many other authors in the past looks into the question of what happened with the Soviet army after the break-up of the USSR. The transformation of a gigantic military complex into a viable post-bipolar world army is certainly not a neglected topic. The author has decided to bring some sacks to the literature mill on Russian military reforms by the use of institutional framework analysis and the impact of decision-making process on state defence. Pallin believes that the Russian military reform was a very specific example of the process that each and every European country had to go through after the end of the Cold War. Its analysis can thus provide a stepping stone for studies of military reform in other countries. As has already been mentioned, the author focuses primarily on the decision-making process and how its changes influenced the course of the reform. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia's new political leadership had also to take charge of the military command and subjugate the colossal Soviet military apparatus; however, at first new and appropriate institutions had to be created.

In the beginning of her study, the author summarizes the bulk of the explanations for the dragged-on military reform implementation. Arguments on the "Soviet legacy", "economic problems", "Cold War stereotypes of decision-making", or "insufficient political leadership" are all on offer. It is the absence of pro-active political leadership that is perceived as one of the most plausible explanations. The decision-making body is in the limelight of the next section, i.e. the structure of who and how decides on security questions is depicted as well as its later evolution and ideal design for the future. Graphical illustrations accompany all theoretical conclusions. Furthermore, the author defines what a "military reform" in fact means in the Russian case. She further elucidates its understanding on the Russian side and how it differs from the Western one. Pallin also categorizes the reasons for a military reform: firstly, internal, i.e. new weapons and new ways of conduct of war; secondly, external, i.e. new threats; and thirdly, the transformation of the entire society. Chapters that follow closely look at the period of Yeltsin's presidency and the progress of the military reform, or better to say its stagnation. A breakthrough came with the defeat in the first Chechnya war, but even then radical measures had not been fully taken. It comes without saying that the next section deals with the period of Vladimir Putin's presidency, which is generally considered to have brought the most progress in the issue of military reform. However, the author is of a different view: although Putin has created a sort of a "power vertical" and the system had undergone a number of changes, Pallin asserts that the Russian army as such has not really changed in any revolutionary way.

In her book Pallin also shows to what extent the course of military reform depended on motivation and the level of action-taking of the actual political leadership. The periods of intensified activity and reform zeal turned out to be short lived and followed by long stagnation, when the reform got "lost" somewhere in the bureaucratic apparatus. The lack of political will is claimed to be the main reason for the endlessness of the Russian military reform during Yeltsin's as well as Putin's presidency. Although the term of the latter had brought substantial changes, especially regarding centralization that vested more power in the hands of the president, some elementary problems of the Russian army such as opaqueness of financing, or clashes between individual army units have not been solved. Quite to the contrary, by the centralization and monopolization of power into Putin's hands, the apparatus of Kreml has been locked into a self-nourishing vicious circle that offers no way-out.

Tereza Vorlová

Ivan Pop, ***Podkarpatská Rus: Osobnosti její historie, vědy a kultury.*** Praha: Libri, 2008, 311 pp. ISBN 978-80-7277-370-1.

Ivan Pop, a historian, a Bohemist and Ruthenist, published a – in his field – unique study on the region of Subcarpathian Rus. The aim of this encyclopaedical publication is to give a systematic and well-arranged overview of all prominent figures that were somehow linked to this area: statesmen, politicians, clergymen, cultural representatives and artists as well as pedagogues, scientists, military officers and many others.

The publication consists of a preface by the author and the publisher, explanatory notes on the entries, editor's note, A to Z encyclopaedia of personalities, list of abbreviations, index, glossary, bibliography and information about the author. In the index the author also mentions those personalities not given a separate entry in the encyclopaedia as they were not attached such importance as others – for the sake of entirety, only their names, date of birth and profession are listed.

The time frame for this book cannot be determined as not even the author has set one. Included are not only ancient and medieval rulers but also important figures of the nineteenth and twentieth century that in fact form the bulk of the entries. The density of the last two centuries is naturally caused by the emergence of Ruthenian national movement and the gradual growth of political mobilization. In terms of territorial scope, the author primarily focused on personalities directly coming from the area of Subcarpathian Rus; however, some other prominent figures of other origins are listed as well. The only set requirement for inclusion is relevance of the respective individual to the history of Subcarpathian Rus or the influence on the development of this historical region.

Date of birth and death (if known) is put next to every person and crucial information from his or her life together with a description of activities related to Subcarpathian Rus follow. Entries to concrete personalities are ordered chronologically. Information that the author considers to be of major importance is highlighted in bold. There is also an image next to each figure. The extent of entry of each personality depends on the accessibility of information and author's personal judgment on the relevance of the data. Again, personalities from the modern times are given priority over those from the more distant past. Personal profiles are not conceived as biographies but the author solely limits the content of the entries in information relevant to the history of Subcarpathian Rus. Readers thus cannot expect exhaustive biographical accounts that would provide life stories of each of the personalities. However, this approach offers a new perspective on activities of numerous important statesmen and stateswomen such as Maria Theresa or Edvard Beneš.

It is certainly necessary to understand this publication from the prism of the author's origins, which can cast some doubt on its objectivity. Information included is clearly very selective, as the data had to be given in a condensed manner. Nevertheless, given its uniqueness this volume is surely a valuable handbook for scholars and anyone else interested in the history of Subcarpathian Rus.

Eva Pelíšková

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