

FOREWORD

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The present collection of papers is the second in our series and the first in English. It presents academic endeavors of the members of the Department of American Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University and of some of its PhD students. Since its foundation in 1994, the Department has been building an interdisciplinary program in American Studies consisting of several main tiers: history, government studies, sociology, economy, law and, last but not least, American culture, both “high” and “low”.

The presented texts cover a broad range of topics, from modern history to problems of United States’ foreign relations. The contributions reflect, in the present author’s opinion, the progress the Department has made in recent years, largely due to improved library resources in Prague as well as easier access to foreign libraries and online archives.

The choice of topics shows a continuing attention given by most young scholars to foreign policy. There has also been a growing interest of graduate and post-graduate students in the relations of the United States to the nations of the Far East (China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea). An increasing amount of work has been done in the field of immigration studies. It has become obvious that the continuing high level of immigration is a key factor in the development of American Society. Since 2003, three scholars working at the American Studies Department have studied the U.S. immigration policy since 1965, the year in which the quota system was abolished, as well as the integration of newcomers. Above all, political and

historical factors have been studied. One of the presented contributions reflects this interest.

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Mgr. Vít Fojtek's paper deals with the response of Johnson's administration to the 1968 occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and her four Warsaw-Pact allies. His findings are based on meticulous research in American as well as German archives. He also made extensive use of the materials published in the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Fojtek gives a vivid picture of the tragic 1968 Prague Summer events as perceived by the outgoing American president, who had much more on his mind the Vietnam War, which had already thwarted his reelection hopes, as well as the mutual strategic arms reduction and the SALT 1 treaty.

The resulting "hands-off" policy led to the growing false sense of security on the part of the Soviets. However, the surprisingly swift night raid raised the specter of the Soviet capability of attacking other countries, too. There were worries concerning the repetition of such adventures vis a vis Romania and perhaps even Yugoslavia, but even some NATO member states felt increasingly insecure. All this resulted in the rethinking of NATO defense policies as well as to the rapprochement between formerly estranged partners, France and the United States.

In their move to launch propagandistic counteroffensive, the Soviets staged a new wave of attacks on the Federal Republic. As Fojtek proves on the basis of the documents of the time, some important politicians of the West reacted rather meekly, for instance the French Foreign Minister Michel Debré, who was ready to give support to the West Germans only insofar as it remained hidden from the Soviets (!). The reaction of Lyndon Johnson was only a little less dismal. In fact, it can be claimed that Fojtek is perhaps too polite when dealing with the reaction of the American foreign policy elites to the invasion, the reaction now easily accessible in the relevant volume of the Foreign Relations of the United States.

No less disappointing was the reaction of Charles de Gaulle, the French head of state, who at one point blamed the West Germans for the invasion (!). However, the NATO allies began to consider, for the first time in NATO history, to consider their interests in a broader geographic area. Above all, a Soviet move of the Soviet forces toward the Adriatic was

feared, i.e. invasion of Romania, Yugoslavia or even Austria. In addition, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia paved the way for the NATO membership of Spain even before the end of the Franco dictatorship. In the fall of 1968, NATO found a *modus vivendi* with Spain without necessarily implying any approval of the Spanish regime.

The Soviets were especially offended by the formation of the NATO Mediterranean Air Command, which was able to monitor all Soviet activities in the Mediterranean as well in the Black Sea. The U.S. Navy's Sixth fleet was strengthened.

Fojtek also pays attention to the reaction of the Third World countries. While the reaction of Asian non-aligned countries to the invasion was quite moderate, all the African nations responded in a hostile manner. Moscow's aggression was supported by the most faithful Arab countries only (Iraq, Syria, South Yemen).

The invasion also precipitated the first major wave of dissent among the communist parties in the West. The main consequence of the invasion was, as Fojtek rightly emphasizes, the strengthening of the solidarity of NATO countries in the early 1970s.

In his analysis of the U.S. policy towards the People's Republic of China in the aftermath of Tiananmen, Mgr. Jakub Lepš employs the method developed by the scholars in the field of the theory of games. He tries to find out how the U.S. administration was able, after initial shock and despite public pressure, to restore the level of relations with Communist China to pre-Tiananmen level within mere eighteen months. In order to expound the complex interaction of domestic politics and diplomacy, Lepš employs two levels, a level of international agreement and the level of domestic ratification. In a section devoted to the evolution of the U.S. policy in the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre, the author shows how, in fact, Bush had to overcome the resistance of the more hawkish Congress, reestablish, against the odds, communication with the Chinese communist leadership which, Lepš claims, was more hawkish than the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. Both leaders, American and Chinese, were "dovish" at that time, facing hawkish ratification assemblies in their respective countries (the U.S. Congress under more direct pressure from the embittered American public opinion, the Chinese communist leadership trying to preserve the regime in its moment of the deepest crisis), and were able to make a deal, as the author argues convincingly, to

“collude”. In conclusion, Lepš lists three reasons why Bush proceeded as he did: (1) he was a cautious politician, (2) he had a more cohesive team, (3) the three people with greatest influence over American China policy were all influenced by Henry Kissinger, whose basic message was to save the relationship despite the unattractive behavior of the Chinese leadership.

The return of the U.S. China policy to pre-Tiananmen level also required George Bush to restore China’s most-favored-nation status. Lepš also expounds the link between the U.S. relations to China and the aggression of Iraq in Kuwait in 1990.

Francis D. Raška, PhD. presents in his contribution based on his study of archives (in the Public Record Office, London, the National Archives of Canada, Ottawa, the Central State Archive, Prague, and the Imperial War Museum, London) a narrative of the exodus of the Sudeten (ie Czech German) exiles to Canada. He takes a close look at the little-known population transfer of the German-speaking democrats, who were forced to flee after the Munich Agreement, just like virtually all the Czechs, from the territories taken by the Nazi Germany. The total number of these post-Munich refugees is estimated at more than 150,000 people. The rump Czechoslovakia was unable to harbor all of them. The two leaders of the German Social Democratic refugees, Wenzel Jaksch and Siegfried Taub, tried to seek help in Great Britain, one of the key Munich powers, which was able to find a new domicile for the anti-Nazi Germans in the dominions, above all in Canada. During the spring and summer months of 1939, the first batch of German refugees, placed after Munich in Czechoslovak refugee camps, was able to find a new home in Canada. Interestingly, Raška shows that Jaksch, campaigning in the British press for the speedy granting of visas to the German-speaking refugees, exaggerated the alleged miserable conditions in the camps. The Canadian authorities placed on the British Government increasing demands for financial assistance to the resettlement program.

When the Nazi Germany occupied the rest of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, many Sudeten German Social Democrats were already in England.

The refugees sailed to Canada between April 8th and July 28th, 1939, heading for two Canadian provinces, British Columbia and Saskatchewan. The total of 302 families and 72 single persons were transported.

The conditions in Canada were quite basic and by no means comfortable, especially for people used to life in Central Europe. However, the refugees

were able to achieve prosperity and most of them stayed in Canada after the war.

Dr. Štěpánka Korytová-Magstadt takes a comprehensive look at the 20th-century American history books devoted to migration. Her contribution is not a mere description; she shows a clear structural understanding of the development of immigration history, which developed, after pseudoscientific concepts and the pattern of “push or pull” to more sophisticated methods, including modern statistics.

The scholarly historiography was established at a relatively recent date, Korytová argues. The turning point came in 1960, when Frank Thistlethwaite challenged historians to improve their methodology and get rid of “pseudohistorical writing”, which only served as a defense against anti-immigration backlash during the first of the 20th century and was colored with partisanship favoring the particular historian’s own ethnic background. Most historians centered on immigration to the United States only, failing to realize that immigration was and is a much broader phenomenon. Dr. Korytová then takes a closer look at some major American publications on immigration, like Theodore C. Blegen’s *Norwegian Migration to America, 1825–1860* (1931), Walter Forster’s *Zion on the Mississippi* (1953), the first microscopic emigration study devoted to the Saxon Lutheran immigrants in the first half of the 19th century. She convincingly shows that the process of modern migration is so complex that it requires an interdisciplinary approach, employing statistics and the building of models, which came to be employed with success by the Uppsala Project (1962–76), a number of small-scale studies on topics like the spread of information on the New World in individual European countries, emigration at levels down from country to parish, taking into account re-immigration as well. Studying one village in Sweden over a period of a quarter of a century, the Swedish researches came to an important conclusion: migration was not a movement of those who were predominantly destitute.

Dr. Korytová then takes a closer look on immigration historians dealing with other countries, like Denmark, the Netherlands (where a weaker pull of America was perceived than in Scandinavia), and Germany, one of the most important countries providing immigrants to the United States. As Mack Walker in his *Germany and the Emigration, 1816–1885* shows, many Germans in America tried to preserve their traditional way of life and habits, which they perceived threatened by the king.

Fleming and Bailyn answered the question “Why did people leave their homeland?” by arguing that very many European migrants tried to flee from industrial revolution, from modernity, and that their wish was to retain their heritage in the New World. Italian immigration patterns were studied by John W. Briggs in *An Italian Passage. Immigrants to Three American Cities, 1890–1930* and by Dino Cinel in *From Italy to San Francisco. The Immigrants Experience*, the latter work monitoring the life of Italian Americans over three generations. Both authors pointed out to a high ratio of those who, just like many present-day Mexicans, went to the United States to make money and return.

Many researchers like Josef J. Barton in *Peasants and Strangers. Italians, Rumanians, and Slovaks in an American City, 1890–1950*, concluded that emigration can be viewed as an alternative to restricted opportunities in traditional agrarian societies. Excellent study was made by Jon Gjerde (*From Peasants to Farmers. The Migration from Balestrand, Norway, to the Upper Middle West*), who rejected as too simplistic to consider overpopulation the driving force behind 19th century migration. He even found evidence of improving economic conditions in Norway.

In a section devoted to the Czech migration studies, Dr. Korytová states that the scholarship falls short of what migration studies devoted immigration from other countries had achieved. Works like Rose Rosicky’s *Dejiny Cechu v Nebrasce* (*The History of Czechs in Nebraska*) or Capek’s *The Cechs* (*Bohemians*) in America. A Study of Their National, Cultural, Political, Social, Economic, and Religious Life are mere biographical narratives and lack any analytical aspect. The author mentions writings devoted to Czechs in individual states, like Nebraska and Oklahoma; she could equally well have taken a look at another publication of this sort, Kostel’s *History of the Czechs in South Dakota*. Dr. Korytová mentions some valuable contributions by Czech historians and demographers, who studied motivation of those who decided to emigrate to North America in the 19th century and made comparisons between emigrations to other areas, like Russia or the Balkans. She also mentions works by 20th-century Czech historians like Josef Polišenský.

Mgr. Jana Sehnálková takes a close look at the early 1980s, an important phase in the development of the U.S. policy towards China. Ronald Reagan, an elderly conservative politician with an ideological baggage from the time

when the West perceived communism as a monolithic and mortal threat, expressed support for Taiwan during his election campaign, the campaign that was to bring him landslide victory. Reagan's public statements criticizing the Sino-American normalization and promising the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) made the Republican foreign policy makers very uneasy; Reagan's running mate George Bush, the former chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking and later the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, made a special trip to Beijing to mend fences.

In her contribution, a modified version of two chapters from her successful M.A. thesis, Jana Sehnálková also focuses on the role the State Secretary Alexander Haig played in the development of Sino-American relations during the early phase of the first Reagan administration. Haig was one of the two candidates for the Secretary of State, the other being George Shultz. Shultz had a much stronger Congressional support, while Haig seemed to be tainted with the Watergate scandal by his association with Richard Nixon. To demonstrate his sovereignty, Reagan appointed Haig. It is clear from Jana Sehnálková's writing that Haig underestimated Reagan's resolve, that he expected a role more independent of the President and that he differed from the President about the future course of policy towards Taiwan and China. While Reagan realized the benefits of the earlier opening to China for the U.S. diplomatic strength vis a vis the Soviet Union, he believed that the United States was strong enough not to have to rely on the support of the Chinese communists. Haig, perhaps more cynically, was ready to make broader concessions to China to be able to continue to play the "Chinese card" against the Soviets, and dump Taiwan accordingly. The President and his Secretary of State found themselves in a competition for the foreign-policy primacy.

The tensions between Reagan and Haig came to a climax over the proposed sales of advanced Northrop FX jet fighters to Taiwan. The jets, although inferior to the F16s, would have improved the Taiwanese defense capability substantially. As China was strongly against the sale, the issue quickly turned into the question whether the Chinese had the right to veto American arms sales to Taiwan. While Reagan favored the sale, Haig wanted to balance the arms sales, ie to sell weapons both to the People's Republic and Taiwan. Haig traveled to China in June 1981, where he clearly ignored the President's instructions and made the American readiness to sell arms to the Chinese communists public.

The U.S. began informal military cooperation in 1980 with Defense Secretary Harold Brown's visit to China. The military cooperation was based mostly on exchanges of information (intelligence cooperation) and army representatives' visits. From 1980, the U.S. permitted minor transfers on non-lethal military equipment. China continued to make clear that it wanted a fundamental change of U.S. policy towards Taiwan. In August 1981, it increased its pressure on the United States – it suspended all the existing military cooperation with the U.S. until it achieved U.S. concessions on the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

In these circumstances, Haig finally gave up his concept of trading arms sales to China for arms sales to Taiwan as he finally understood that it was not the solution to the Chinese demands. At the same time, the Chinese communists insisted that any sales of arms to Taiwan would constitute an obstacle to the peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland China. Any arms sales, from their point of view, would constitute interference in China's internal affairs. While Haig was ready to offer concessions to the Chinese, Reagan remained adamant. It follows from Sehnálková's argumentation that Haig, making unauthorized promises to terminate arms sales to Taiwan, simply tried too hard to please China; in this way, the United States would have become a power dependent on the good will of China and lose initiative in the concert of great powers. This implied America's weakness on the world stage, a position of a beggar unacceptable to Reagan, who was catapulted to the White House, among other things, by American patriotism, the wish of the voters to end the period of their country's humiliation on international stage. In fact, Haig tried to take charge of the U.S. foreign policy, finding allies in his efforts to appease communist China in Defense Secretary Weinberger and CIA director Casey. Haig's pressure finally made Reagan give up the sale of advanced FX fighters to Taiwan. The President then came under pressure from some conservative Republicans like Barry Goldwater, the leading supporter of Taiwan. The tensions between Haig and Reagan gradually intensified and in June 1982 Haig resigned.

Sehnálková's contribution represents an insightful analysis of the inner workings in the early phases of the Reagan administration, which suffered from fragmentation of authority, personal tensions and a lack of uniform thrust. There was an air of inevitability in the process of Haig's departure from administration: his vision of America's power and diplomatic possibilities was much more modest than that of his superior, who was

much less ready to make a compromise with China over Taiwan and who perceived his role to become a leader of America's efforts to restore her global position.

Mgr. Kryštof Kozák set out to explore a very interesting and, for countries like the Czech Republic, very topical problem: asymmetric integration. Kozák exemplifies asymmetric integration of the USA, Canada, and Mexico in the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), where the former two countries are highly developed economies, while Mexico is much less industrialized and economically advanced. The Czech Republic, together with several other formerly communist countries, has recently joined the European Union, which includes some of the leading industrial countries. The European Union, too, had to cope with asymmetric integration problems when three countries of Southern Europe joined (Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986). Indeed, the author devoted a particularly interesting section to a lesson from experiences of Mexico with asymmetric integration.

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It is to be hoped that the present collection of contributions will enrich the readers and give them new insights.