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ARTICLES

CADRE POLICY, CADRE WORK AND SCREENING IN COMMUNIST CZECHOSLOVAKIA: SIMPLE IDEAS, COMPLICATED PRACTICE*

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Abstract

Even though cadre policy belonged among the fundamental themes of the communist regime, it has remained outside the main focus of investigation. Therefore, the text attempts to introduce this unknown area to the reader from several different angles. It was a political-ideological project of centralised work force management and it led to the formation of new societal bonds, in which the Communist Party's leading role was to be consistently implemented in practice. It included the checking and comprehensive screening of individual biographies (using a system of assessments and cadre materials) as well as education towards certain values and attitudes. However, contradictions accompanied the ambitious project from the very outset and this fact cannot be ignored. Also, cadre work formed part of common social bonds – where interests other than political were likewise manifested. Therefore, the practical consequences of the implementation of cadre policy for the lives of individuals cannot be depicted using only simple patterns.
Keywords: Czechoslovakia, communism, dictatorship, cadre policy, biography

> *"The Party ensures that according to his qualifications, abilities and political maturity, each socialistically minded and active citizen can be placed in the position where his benefit for the society is greatest."*
> From the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia On Cadre Work, Prague, 18 December 1964.[1]

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[1]   Usnesení ÚV KSČ o kádrové práci, Praha, 18. prosince 1964, Národní archiv ČR, ÚV KSČ, fond [fund – henceforth f.] 02/1, svazek [folder – henceforth sv.] 82, archivní jednotka [archival unit – henceforth a. j.] 93, s. [page – henceforth s.] 2a.

Introduction

The communist state aimed at a rational selection and at a centrally managed distribution of the work force. The criteria of appropriate selection included not only professional, but also political and ideological eligibility. People categorised as "hostile" to the socialist regime – due to class or individual attitudes – or simply "politically unsuitable" were to be denied access to certain jobs and positions. Correspondingly, politically conscious individuals were to be actively educated and distributed in a targeted way. As a result, a complex system of position classification and, above all, employee control, screening and education developed for this purpose.

Obviously, the phenomenon that I shall discuss in the following text relates to a lot of general issues common around the world, such as social control, selection, screening, evaluation, or self-presentation. These issues are of course not tied solely to communism-building societies. However, in an effort to create an entirely new society based on new relationships, communist ideologues and politicians adopted the concept of "cadre" to place it into a new context and to differentiate their work force management from other, especially capitalist, societies. Thus, cadre policy and cadre work (a very important branch of communist ideology and practice) came into existence. In order to preserve this intended specificity and out of fear of semantic reduction, I have decided to use the original term (i.e. cadre) rather than to translate it by a more common English term.

In general, cadre policy refers to societal classification based on professional and ideological criteria – qualifications, class origin, political attitudes, etc.; moreover, it refers to screening and placement of individuals in certain occupational positions and offices based on the above mentioned criteria; it also refers to preventing politically undesirable individuals from holding certain jobs or positions in public life; and last but not least, it likewise refers to education towards the preset ideals of appropriateness.

The introductory quote largely captures cadre policy objectives. Above all, it shows the familiar truth about the Communist party's leadership in society, strongly present in practical cadre work: from the highest level of drafting guidelines to the involvement of basic and local organisations in making decisions about individual people. It also hints at the political contingency of potential positive selection ("socialist mindedness"). In addition, one cannot leave out the idea of centralised work force distribution – that is "placing" individuals in certain positions. Further, the ideal criterion of appropriate placement was for the society's benefit. Finally, it rather implicitly suggested the necessity of previous individual screening.

Many principles related to screening were adopted from the practices of the Communist party (cadre questionnaires, assessments, CVs) and were used more or less across the entire Czechoslovak society after 1948.

Remarkably, cadre work has so far remained outside the main focus of historians and social scientists dealing with communism. If at all, attention – mainly among Western scholars – was paid to cadre work and screenings primarily in connection with the Communist party,[2] mostly in the Stalinist period,[3] as an extreme form of promoting the specific social practices the newly built society was supposed to be based on. The way post-war communist regimes got inspired by these communist and party customs, how they embodied them in regulations and cadre measures and how they were reflected in societal and individual lives remain, however, largely unnoticed. The only exception concerns phenomena that are more noticeable and significant from the historical point of view – such as various waves of purges and screenings that involved social exclusion or persecution of larger groups of people.[4] However, these are usually conceptualised disparately, as separate displays of the communist regime and tend not to be included in a broader context of cadre work, which – outside these exceptional moments – involved also long-term systemisation. In other words, purges and screenings can be seen as a certain extreme case of cadre work. Nevertheless, cadre work had also its less visible everyday form which concerned a large proportion of the population from various social strata. Therefore, its study can be considered as an important

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[2] For example Claude Pennetier and Bernard Pudal, *Autobiographie, autocritiques, aveux dans le monde communiste* (Paris: Belin, 2002); Florian Escudié, "Le fonctionnaire et la machine buraucratique. Contrôle biographique et la construction des carrières dans l'appareil régional du SED", *Genèse*, No. 53 (December 2003): 93–112.

[3] These include primarily works from the area of the Soviet Union's cultural and social history, focusing on identity and subject shaping in the period after the Bolshevik revolution and Stalinism: Brigitte Studer et al., *Parler de soi sous Staline* (Paris: Maison des sciences de l'homme, 2002); larger part of Oleg Kharkhordin's *The Collective and the Individual in Russia* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1999); Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution of My Mind. Writing a Diary under Stalin* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2006); Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Tear Off the Masks! Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia* (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005).

[4] Jiří Maňák, *Čistky v komunistické straně Československa 1969–1970* (Praha: ÚSD AV ČR, 1997); Vladimíra Hradecká, František Koudelka, *Kádrová politika a nomenklatura KSČ 1969–1974* (Praha: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 1998), 37–49; Alena Míšková, Hana Barvíková, Miroslav Šmidák, *Československá akademie věd 1969–1972. Restaurace komunistické moci ve vědě* (Praha: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny, 1998), 52–76; Petr Blažek, Michal Kubálek, "Politicky motivované vylučování studentů v zakladatelském období komunistického režimu. Černá kapitola z dějin zemědělského a lesnického školství v Praze", Provozně ekonomická fakulta České zemědělské univerzity v Praze http://wwwold.pef.czu.cz/kolektivizace/documents/vylucovani Studentu_cz.pdf.

contribution to the more general issues of governance and decision-making, communist regime functioning, and power distribution and its use.

This text does not aim to describe the historical development of the cadre system,[5] at evaluating criteria transformations or at precisely delineating the positions and competences of the individual participating actors. It rather intends to trace certain more universal traits relevant across time and to introduce the ambitious cadre policy project from several different angles. Even though the concept of cadre work also relates to the so-called employee care, I focus mainly on the selection, evaluation, screening or education – i.e. on the identification and shaping of a comprehensively (professionally, politically, and personally) reliable person. Primarily the ideological and political intent, including various party and cabinet statements, resolutions and opinions, must be taken into account in this respect. Sometimes, they may seem like mere ideological clichés; I nevertheless consider it important to mention them as they set the framework. The rules they promoted and wanted to bring into practice, however, were neither self-evident nor unproblematic. Throughout its implementation, cadre work was accompanied by ideological as well as practical contradictions: its operation was far from the operation of "a well-lubricated machine" in which individual components perform the activity strictly assigned to them and only them. My aim is to introduce the cadre work project in its incongruity and also to outline the way cadre policy was implemented at the individual level.

I assume that the landscape I am entering upon is relatively unfamiliar to the reader. Therefore, I consider it necessary to at least mention some fundamental facts – even though their precise definition would require much broader space than I have at my disposal in this paper.[6]

Actors of cadre work

Objects

The above description suggested what cadre policy was roughly about. The question that follows is whom it actually concerned – i.e. who was exposed to systematic control of professional and political eligibility and to the pressure to create

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[5]   About the beginnings of the cadre system establishment see Jaroslav Cuhra, "Kádrovník nikdy nemůže být se svou prací hotov. Kádrování a komunistické vládnutí", *Dějiny a současnost* 31, No. 11 (November 2009): 30–33.

[6]   I use the experience of former Czechoslovakia. So far, unfortunately, we have not had a chance to compare cadre practice with other countries from the former Eastern Bloc or with other political regimes.

socialistically appropriate personalities. Above all, one important fact that needs to be mentioned is that cadre policy in Czechoslovakia was being formed in a situation when the state was essentially the only employer. Knowing this is crucial as cadre work was always primarily related to employment, or, employment and the preparation for it were always at least at stake. As cadre policy can be understood as centrally managed state employment and work force management, any employee was potentially subject to it. However, this is the right place where a certain differentiation needs to be at least hinted at: the scope and intensity of cadre work and verification, of the required political engagement or "flawlessness" of biography of course differed according to the presumed societal importance of the profession or post held. Nonetheless, clear cut rules cannot be set. A consensus on the concept of cadre, i.e. who was to be the object of cadre policy or cadre work (or who deserved systematic attention), did not exist even in official party documents.[7]

Some authors connect cadre policy solely with the issue of creating communist "elites" – a relatively narrowly defined group of higher functionaries in political, social and economic life.[8] They focus on the so-called cadre orders – i.e. lists of functions where the appointment was subject to approval by a certain party body level, ranging from the party's central committee through various regional and district to company and local committees. However, this approach tends to neglect the lower cadre nomenclature levels,[9] even though company committees (at least in Czechoslovakia) had their own cadre orders including functions the importance of which did not exceed the framework of the given institution. True, all these nomenclature cadres were subject to a special selection, control and screening regime but it would be misleading to reduce the concept of cadre policy or cadre work solely to them. Even the purely formal delineation of functions went even lower

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[7] For instance a 1964 party document mentions "all leading workers". See Usnesení ÚV KSČ o kádrové práci, Prague, December 18, 1964, NAČR, ÚV KSČ, f. 02/1, sv. 82, a. j. 93, s. 2a. Another, from 1967, uses an even broader and vaguer definition of the concept of cadre: "They are people who lead the organisation, work scientifically or conceive its activities in a creative way, organise work, control its results, fulfil other independent and political and professional tasks..." See Úkoly a organizace dosavadních kádrových a personálních útvarů ve státní správě a v podnicích, Praha, 7. prosince 1967, NAČR, ÚV KSČ, f. 02/4, sv. 23, a. j. 34, s. 7. On this issue, see also Marek Pavka, *Kádry rozhodují vše! Kádrová politika KSČ z hlediska teorie elit* (Brno: Prius, 2003), 27–28.

[8] E.g. Sandrine Kott, "Les Elites socialistes et le pouvoir. Le cas de la RDA," in *Le communisme et les élites en Europe Centrale. Destruction, mutation, conversion*, eds. François Bocholier, Nicholas Bocquet (Paris: PUF, 2006), 169–186; Ágnes Horváth and Árpád Szakolczai, *Dissolution of Communist Power: The Case of Hungary* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 223, note 1, understand cadre nomenclature as "the top level decision makers of the state and economy".

[9] Sandrine Kott mentions 312,169 persons in the GDR subject to cadre orders of the SED central, regional and district committees as of 1970, whereas the total population was 16 million. See Kott, "Les Elites socialiste et le pouvoir".

along the imaginary social structure – basic organisations (i.e. the most elementary party units present in virtually any working team), which by definition did not create cadre orders) were obliged to design a list of nomenclature functions "to which they g[a]ve opinions within their authority".[10] This significantly expands the whole concept of cadre – it was related to the performance of a function that was strategic from the viewpoint of the Communist Party and its use of power.

The officially drafted nomenclature lists at various communist body and organisation levels represented a very important lead in determining the objects of cadre policy or cadre work, but they were by far not the only ones. That is why documents sometimes mention "cadres in the narrower sense", meaning a certain leading "elite" of high functionaries, or in the "broader sense", meaning essentially any employee at all.

As my intent in this article is not to describe elite selection, education and control but cadre work at the most general level, I therefore use the broader understanding of "cadres". The so-called cadre materials, accompanying selected people basically throughout their whole professional life, were an important and tangible manifestation of systematic cadre work and screening from the individual's point of view (as well as a measure of interest the individual enjoyed from the cadre policy point of view).[11] It is very difficult to define the group cadre materials were kept for but they essentially did not pertain to manual workers and unskilled technical and administrative staff. We could de facto associate them with the (again problematic) category of the working intelligentsia. Communist party membership would be yet another criterion, as party members were screened separately along the party line. Thus we can see that the question of who was subject to systematic cadre work and control is rather complex and several viewpoints as well as cadre work lines intertwine at this point.

For these people, cadre practice involved regular professional and political evaluations, various *ad hoc* assessments accompanying any movement or change of status (e.g. change of job or position, new degree award, journey abroad, etc.), regular cadre questionnaire completion, and CV writing. Professional as well as personal eligibility the same as political reliability (or the lack thereof in case of negative assessments) of the person in question as well as his family was demonstrated in all the materials concerned. Cadre practice also included commitments for participation in various political events and voluntary jobs, engagement in

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[10] See for example: Návrh zásad pro zpracování kádrových pořádků, návrh projednávání kádrových návrhů ve stranických orgánech a návrh prozatímního kádrového pořádku ÚV KSČ, Praha, 6. února 1970, NA ČR, ÚV KSČ, f. 02/1, f. 02/1, sv. 118, a. j. 192, bod [point – henceforth b.] 1, s. 14.
[11] I will mention them later in more detail.

public life and the National Front organisations. Engagement was an important and demonstrable expression of reliability of the individual at stake.

Subjects

Subjects and objects of cadre work, i.e. those who performed the work and who were its targets, cannot be entirely separated because the assessors likewise needed to be assessed. As the above mentioned shows, the Communist Party, with its various levels from the central committee to basic organisations, was an important cadre work subject, practically implementing its continuously noted leading role in the society. The party systematically worked not only with nomenclature cadres and party members (by filling their cadre materials and regular evaluations) but it also occasionally assessed "ordinary" non-party members – e.g. in connection with their journeys abroad, changes in work positions, etc. Apart from the Communist Party, workplace management represented another important actor in the spirit of the slogan that "cadre work is part of any management work". The manager was responsible for the workers' comprehensive professional and political evaluation; it was up to him to produce various assessments, to watch over the employees' reliability and engagement or to actively lead them to implement this ideal. The fact that cadre work formed part of common work relations and hierarchies is of course significant for the way it was implemented in practice. I will return to this factor later in the text. The so-called cadre departments, gradually established at workplaces from the early 1950s, represented another institutionally embedded actor. Their functions and competences developed over time but despite the negative connotations linked to them to-date, their role in relation to cadre materials, it can be said, was largely administrative. Cadre materials were gathered and kept here; cadre department heads were responsible for their accuracy and completeness. They handled the related agenda, but apart from certain excerpts, they did not actively participate in creating them. Their agenda was much broader, however, including for example employee education – the organization and booking of various courses and training (professional as well as political) and also to look after employees at certain times (e.g. questions related to flats, health, vacation, etc.). These three main actors (different levels of the Communist party, the KSČ, organisations and bodies, management and cadre department) ensured cadre work at the workplace and bore responsibility for it. Occasionally, other actors could be and were involved in the process and provided complementary materials – various assessments and evaluations. These most often included superiors from previous jobs or former teachers, representatives of municipalities, the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (ROH), the Socialist

Youth Union (SSM) or various other organisations or associations one could be a member of. The practice common in the 1950s that virtually anyone acquainted with the person in question (his neighbour, fellow student, colleague, etc.) could be asked for an assessment was gradually abandoned later in the 1960s.

The network of potential assessors was fairly diverse and, importantly, individual components were aware of the relations and commitments they were part of. This undoubtedly influenced their evaluation.

Building the new society

As our knowledge of the so-called communist societies gradually deepens, it becomes more and more problematic to define a certain phenomenon as purely "communist". Closer examination shows that the seemingly essential differences fall apart and that the necessity to put them into various contexts arises. Therefore, the effort to study communism as the "other" becomes easily challenged. Otherness can also be viewed as a performance – not as something that *was* but what was performed and what was striven for. The communist state, at least in its numerous proclamations, wanted to be different, or new. It was to become new *inter alia* through the consistent implementation of cadre work and policy.

Cadre policy as work force management

The communist project of rational, centralised and planned societal management also included work force management. This involved the planning of jobs and occupational positions necessary for the society in the given period, the corresponding training and distribution of individuals, and also the classification of positions by their importance. This directly relates to (the above mentioned) cadre orders that determined which Communist party level was to decide about which positions. The example of cadre orders shows not only the Communist Party's declared exclusive position in workforce decision making at almost all levels but also the strategic importance the workforce management enjoyed. The canonised truths created by the communist system ideologues and founders actually postulated this importance; see for instance Stalin's "Cadres decide everything" or his statements about people representing the most valuable capital in the economy. Throughout socialism, the main contents of cadre work remained to correctly "choose, appreciate and position" people, regardless of how evaluation criteria changed through time.[12]

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[12] Human resources management has had its history under communism as well, of course. From the outset, it was strongly connected to the great project of class revolution in society, in which the task

The way the pieces were distributed on the chess board was not to be the result of an uncontrolled selection guided by the individuals' personal interests or the companies' sectional interests, but of a planned, rational and centralised consideration. Such endeavours were materialised for instance in occupational "placement orders" which were introduced in the early 1950s and used until mid-1960s. As criticised in a 1951 document on the situation at the universities for example, university graduates were leaving for different places in an "unrestrained way" and "without regard to the needs of our planned economy".[13] That was, not surprisingly, inadmissible. Societal rather than individual interests were to serve as the main measure of selection appropriateness. The individual's personal satisfaction with a position was not the goal in itself. It was but a prerequisite for the implementation of the interest of the entire society. According to general proclamations, such as the *Psychology of cadre work* handbook for instance, this was to distinguish socialist cadre work from the human resources management in the West: whereas in capitalist countries the question was "who was the most suitable for the job" in the sense "the best value for money", in socialist countries it was "who was best suited for what, how could they be of best use to the society".[14] The question "who was suited for what" did not thus stand just between the employer and the employee. It needed to be assessed from the outside, objectively, in relation to the interests of the entire society and other people.

The cadre policy and cadre work system were established to ensure this new regime of workforce selection and placement. It was to complete the transformation from "capitalist to socialist social relations".[15]

The comprehensiveness of cadre work

Special attention devoted to cadre work by the communist state was also caused by the significance it possessed in Marxist ideology. Theoretical sources of Marxism are referred to where work as such held an exclusive position in individual as well as societal life. According to these sources, work is fundamental in

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was to find and train capable workers for managerial positions and thus to create a new man not burdened with the old social order. As problems appeared in practice, this revolutionary ethos lost its momentum. Although class origin naturally continued to be a positively assessed criterion, the ambitious idea of trained workers gradually receded in favour of politically reliable experts.

[13] Návrh na ustavení kádrových pracovníků při rektorátech vysokých škol, Praha 25. dubna 1951, NAČR, ÚV KSČ, f. 02/4, sv. 36, a. j. 183, s. 3.

[14] Jan Kučera, *Psychologie v kádrové práci* (Praha: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství, 1954), 10.

[15] Úkoly a organizace dosavadních kádrových a personálních útvarů ve státní správě a v podnicích, Praha, 7. prosince 1967, NAČR, ÚV KSČ, f. 02/4, sv. 23, a. j. 34, s. 7.

shaping human consciousness and psychological life. In itself, it is not separable from other components of the human personality, and, therefore, the worker needs to receive comprehensive attention:

"The worker is not related to the organisation only in his working time, the occupational position influences his entire life. An organisation's interest in workers therefore needs to pertain also to their non-working time, environment, culture, leisure and personal life."[16]

For this reason, cadre work monitored not only the expertise and qualifications that were directly linked to the occupational performance but also the employee's political and public life and opinions as well as his character traits, private and social background and his health condition.

More precisely, it was this comprehensive approach that distinguished cadre work from western human resources management. It was the basic axis that should never be diverted from. Whenever the Communist Party leadership got the impression that any of the components were neglected, criticism followed. It was particularly strong for example in the early 1970s. Although the comprehensive approach principles were not fundamentally challenged even during the "liberal" end of the 1960s,[17] the new leadership felt the need to point out the pillars of cadre work again and to distance itself from the previous period based on their alleged violation:

[between 1968 and 1969] "The requirements of political and ideological firmness and character features corresponding to the communist morality principles were neglected and challenged, and the solely professional prerequisites of occupational performance were emphasised, often reduced to school education."[18]

"Professionalism" was a sin countlessly pointed out in various circumstances. Comprehensiveness applied not only to the different evaluation components and to the interest in the individual, but also to the care that was to be given to the employee. Apart from selection and evaluation, it was supposed to involve active personality shaping as well. "The cadre worker needed to be aware that his task is not only to describe and assess the individual's personality, but also to create

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16 Ibid., 10.
17 Bureaucracy, unsuitable questionnaires, duplicity of materials, simply excessive paperwork were criticised in the 1960s but cadre work and screening as such remain unquestioned. It just needed to be freed of formalism. The political aspect was never really removed .
18 Kádrová a personální práce ve stranických orgánech, státní a hospodářské správě, Praha, 17. září 1970, NAČR, ÚV KSČ, f. 02/4, sv. 54, a. j. 97, b. 1, s. 8.

and recreate it."[19] This again refers to the ideological premise of human nature's malleability and conditionality. Cadre policy was to make labour relations comprehensive and through them, all personality components were to be exposed to assessment as well as active shaping.

Exclusion

So far, social exclusion – an important aspect of cadre work – has not been mentioned. Building a new society and new social relations also entailed the ideological struggle against its enemies or "politically unreliable" individuals. This element was always part of cadre work, making it an ultimately political theme. One of the first cadre work manifestations could be found in the society's "purification" from "reactionary elements" during the communist takeover and the immediately following spontaneous activities of the National Front's action committees,[20] as well as the somewhat later, already centrally organised, purges at universities, central authorities and in the Communist Party. How to remove certain people from their positions was a practical political problem, somewhat distant from the humanist-socialist slogans about the "nobility of cadre work".

An early 1950s party document delineating cadre department responsibilities mentions this repressive function of cadre work as well: "Cadre departments are to help remove hostile elements from the state and economic apparatus, mass organisations, etc."[21]

In this sentence, the content of cadre work is limited more or less to the evaluation of political reliability-unreliability, to the removal or non-admittance of the unreliable. The emphasis on mass "cleansing" was manifested primarily at the turning points of the regime, such as the onset of the communist system or the years following the violent termination of the Prague Spring in 1968. Even though the definition of "unreliability" and the image of the enemy differed in different purge waves, the belief that the society needed to be "cleansed" always prevailed.

Individual exclusion or screening was also an inherent aspect of every day cadre work. The threat of being labelled "politically unreliable" or "insufficiently engaged" was ever-present, even though in "more stable" periods it acquired

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[19] Kučera, *Psychologie v kádrové práci*, 73.
[20] The activities of action committees were only legalised retrospectively by Act No. 213 "On the regulation of certain circumstances to protect public interests" in July 1948. It mentions "purification" and "protection of the people's democratic regime".
[21] Pokyny pro prověřování pracovníků ve státním aparátě, hospodářských podnicích a jiných institucích, Praha, 14. listopadu 1950, NAČR, f. 02/4, sv. 25, a. j. 157, b. 2, s. 6.

somewhat different, let's say more individualised, dynamics and did not lead to such significant societal changes. In addition, we should not forget cadre work's ambition to shape certain relations and personalities and it is possible to say it was not a mere ideological slogan. In reality, screenings and control manifested in countless questionnaires, interviews, assessments and evaluations, in which reliability (class, social, political) had to be proven. The "educational" emphasis had its specific manifestations as well. Membership in various organisations, attendance at party courses and training, public activism, participation in various political-ideological events, volunteer jobs or party press subscriptions, which people were constantly asked to take up, all that was to contribute to the formation of socialist personalities and socialist social relations. Let us leave aside the impact of this kind of "education", as translated into a range of more or less enforced or at least required activities, on the personality and consciousness of the participants. From the communist state's point of view, cadre policy faced the great task of harmonising both goals – i.e. separating the reliable from the unreliable and preventing the unreliable from accessing important positions on the one hand; and educating the reliable ones and distributing them appropriately on the other.

The premises it was based on kept failing in practice but that could not challenge their proclaimed validity and durability during socialism because the entire ideology of cadre work would have collapsed without them.

The premises of good cadre work

Let us now look at two important premises cadre work was based on. Correct selection, evaluation and the targeting of education was of course primarily based on knowledge, on information. Decisions made about people were based on many aspects – the assessment of class origin, past activities, family suitability, political opinions and engagement – therefore, relevant information had to be found about all the above mentioned. The whole system of questionnaire completion, CV writing, interviews and assessment gathering was actually built to get to know people, as this was to become the alpha and omega of cadre work. "Cadre work has to lean on scientifically precise knowledge of people, therefore, it needs to be alive."[22] It was necessary to "get to know the workers consistently, to evaluate their activities in a demanding way."[23] Cadre work was not just any work; it was proclaimed to

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[22] Stalin as quoted in Kučera, *Psychologie kádrové práce*, 50.
[23] Úkoly a organizace dosavadních kádrových a personálních útvarů ve státní správě a v podnicích, Praha, 7. prosince, NAČR, ÚV KSČ, f. 02/4, sv. 23, a. j. 34, s. 8.

be a highly demanding political and technical job in which phenomena such as "subjectivism" or "spontaneity" could not be allowed.

Cadre work was primarily based on the belief that objective knowledge of the personality as a whole – including his or her inner life (opinions, beliefs, values, etc.) – was possible to achieve. People could of course obscure, hide or distort a lot of things, but that was to be overcome by constant improvement of cadre work methodology. This was to be achieved solely by cleansing the knowledge of the given person from any particular intentions and interests on the side of the evaluators and knowledge gatherers. The entire cadre work history was accompanied by warnings against "familiarism", collegial or neighbourly "solidarity" and all manifestations of "subjectivism".

People involved in cadre work as assessors were expected to leave aside ties and commitments that could bond them to the person assessed, to set aside potential personal, group or occupational interests in favour of the centrally defined state interest.

The proposed amendment to the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences Cadre Work Guidelines from 1964 explicitly listed who could not be employed at the Academy. A warning followed: "It is inadmissible to yield in these principles and to influence them by friendly and personal relations."[24]

The only officially approved loyalty was that to the state. In this sense, the cadre work project was very ambitious as it attacked the very bases of sociability. At the very same time, this brought it closer to other modernist rationalisation and bureaucratisation projects aimed at eliminating traditional family and group ties from decision making in the public sphere.

Apart from objectivity, state cadre policy also required deep knowledge of people based on the evaluators' personal acquaintance and their personal approach. Apart from subjectivism, cadre work's formalism and insufficient knowledge of the assessed was also constantly criticised. Informality was required – stripped of everything that usually accompanies an informal relationship: complicity, trust, mutual commitment. In the party ideologues' minds, the goal of an informal personal relationship – the relationship itself – was to be a mere prerequisite for impartial and objective knowledge. In a personal relationship prescribed in this way, the person was to be committed to the policy of the state, not to the person concerned.

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[24] Směrnice presidia ČSAV o zásadách obecné kádrové politiky v Československé akademii věd, Praha, 25. listopadu 1964, Archiv Akademie věd ČR, f. PČSAV, sv. XIX, zasedání P 25. 11 .64, s. 2.

While ideology was capable of dialectically uniting deep knowledge based on a personal relationship with relentless loyalty to objectivised political interests, these two were much more difficult to unite in practice. The declaratory rules hit the velocity of various interests and collegialities, which were never uprooted from the society despite all the appeals. For instance, when in the 1950s the head of the Cadre department at the Academy of Sciences helped to pull research workers out from industrial enterprises, he acted in the interest of "his" institution and against the centrally declared state interest.

Another prerequisite of cadre work is the existence of objective criteria – the idea that people can be grouped into clear cut, pure and stable categories according to their social origin, opinions, activities, etc. Moreover, it is not possible to omit one more prerequisite, i.e. that rules to determine reliability can be stipulated and that individual components of the mechanism (that is how the society was conceived, as a "mechanism") will implement the rules in practice in a unified and harmonised way.

These ideas also hit reality and, of course, kept failing again and again. Not even the conceptual delineation of "class origin" – a category of fundamental importance for cadre work – was agreed upon. Take the attributes of working class origin for instance – a category that bore certain bonuses, e.g. in admission procedures to a number of educational levels. Did both parents have to be workers or was only one sufficient? Did they have to be workers at the given time? Was it enough to have a worker's experience for one to become a worker? Quite understandingly, the criteria kept changing in practice. In the early 1970s for example, the number of students admitted to universities from workers' and farmers' families could significantly increase *inter alia* because the way the origin was defined changed compared to the previous years. While before it had covered only children of parents working as workers or farmers at the time, later, in 1971, it also extended to parents with only past worker or farmer experience.[25]

Cadre materials

Let us now look at how cadre work manifested itself in the lives of specific individuals. As I have already mentioned above, cadre materials represented an option of approaching the problem at this level. We can see them, therefore, as a certain tangible manifestation of cadre work.

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[25] Jakub Jareš, "Přijímací řízení na vysoké školy v období normalizace. Příklad Filozofické fakulty UK", in *Prověřená fakulta. KSČ na Filozofické fakultě UK v letech 1969–1989*, ed. Katka Volná, Jakub Jareš, Matěj Spurný and Klára Pinerová (Praha: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, v. v. i., 2009), 37–84.

Cadre materials were a personal file that followed people like a shadow throughout their entire working life.[26] They consisted of all sorts of information the communist state considered relevant – political, social, moral and occupational qualifications: political attitudes, activities or actions, class origin and family background, engagement in various organisations and public offices, participation in political education, training and various events, professional qualifications, and naturally they also consisted of personal characteristics or health status information. This was done in the format of required and regularly updated cadre questionnaires and CVs that were filled in and written by the individual at stake, as well as various assessments given by other people, regular "comprehensive evaluations", personal characteristics, screening conclusions, etc. All the materials, whether written by the concerned person himself or by somebody else, were always to contain information and evaluation of all the above mentioned components – i.e. occupational the same as political, social and personal issues. The omnipresent evaluations and screenings[27] not only practically confirmed the importance of the assessed facts, but they also regularly questioned the assessee's position. The question of reliability was opened again and again and could be challenged by new assessments anytime.

This naturally had an impact on the actions and activities of individuals in a very real way. For example, at least formal involvement in various social or political organisations represented a very common response to the incessant question of political engagement. It must be likewise borne in mind one was never screened alone in the materials that were being kept: information on all other family members – children, parents, siblings, spouses, the spouse's siblings and parents – was also included. People were commonly screened by using their family's cadre materials and assessments. In addition, cadre materials were classified, and they were accessible only to a strictly defined narrow circle of people holding certain offices. People could never be sure what their cadre materials contained (except for their own personal CVs, cadre questionnaires and comprehensive evaluations). Since cadre materials or their parts represented the individual's indispensable represen-

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[26] Marie Černá, "Od školy až do důchodu. V síti kádrových materiálů", *Dějiny a současnost* 31, No. 11 (November 2009): 37–39.

[27] These were primarily the regular comprehensive evaluations which were introduced in the early 1970s as a result of the previous general screenings. They were repeated every two, later every five years. Regular reviews of comprehensive evaluation conclusions implementation need to be included here as well, which could occur also outside the evaluations as such. Moreover, there were *ad hoc* assessments which had to accompany automatically any social or physical movement – changes of jobs, offices, positions, new degrees, journeys abroad, etc. All that required an approval process accompanied by various assessments.

tation, a certain *alter ego*, sent for assessment to various instances, the possibility of controlling one's self-presentation was at the least impaired.

Let us take for example the scientific candidature approval process (a title comparable to today's Ph.D.) undergone by Ms V. in 1960. The degree award had to be approved by the KSČ district committee – it was there where background materials were gathered for this purpose, consisting of various assessments and recommendations, as well as a cadre questionnaire, CV, dissertation outline, and a list of publications.

The candidate's evaluation worked out by the workplace manager was there also, the same as three professional dissertation assessments, a basic ROH organisation's assessment and basic KSČ organisation's opinions and recommendations on the problem.

Based on these materials, someone at the relevant KSČ district committee (i.e. the committee for propaganda, agitation, education, science, arts and public education), who probably did not know the person in concern at all, drafted a Proposal to establish a candidate – a certain meta-assessment, a de facto approval or disapproval of the assessments submitted. This proposal was then submitted to the district committee bureau for approval. Moreover, the workplace cadre department requested cadre assessments for their own use from three other people – two co-workers and one former fellow student – in relation to the candidature.

These are the traces preserved in the cadre materials from which we can reconstruct the process. Possibly, the agenda around the candidature approval could have been even more extensive – e.g. assessments that party bodies requested from the party organisation were not filed in common cadre materials. Similar procedures were usually also accompanied by assessments of the assessors. What is important in the whole matter, however, is the fact that a lot of the steps took place without the candidate even knowing it. Apart from professional assessments related to the thesis itself, she was not to get acquainted with any other evaluation and thus could not have any idea which materials were supposed to represent her.

From this point of view, the large-scale return of cadre materials to their original "owners" after November 1989 could be interpreted as a new chance to retell one's biography in one's own terms.

Practice

So far, I have looked at various procedural questions rather than the content of cadre materials itself – i.e. what specifically was the object of interest, what was

evaluated, what was desirable or, on the contrary, undesirable. Unlike the officially declared slogans, the real content and its meanings defied simple descriptions. This was so, firstly, because the evaluation criteria and the meaning of certain facts, or the image of the enemy, changed over time. For instance the original emphasis on social origin lost power with time and other aspects came to the fore – from 1970, for example, one of the main questions was about activities and declared attitudes to the year 1968. Second, and mainly, it is very problematic to stipulate any general rules at all.

For the image of reliability or unreliability – the purpose of cadre materials – did not derive purely from objective facts where clear criteria could be applied to measure the "pluses" and "minuses". Of course, there were generally declared ideas and rules enforced in all kinds of ways about what was or was not desirable in the image of reliability, translated also into cadre questionnaire questions, assessment and evaluation guidelines, etc. However, cadre work was not a mere echo and implementation of these rules, but something that co-created them in practice. Thus, the image of the individual was a result of much subtler processes where various actors stood alongside but also against each other, defining what was and what was not a manifestation of reliability or unreliability in different ways. The very "fact" of reliability as well as the meaning of various realities was socially negotiated. Cadre practice left relatively little space to hide certain facts or to completely make up others because the multiple checks and assessments via family made the risk of disclosure very high. However, there was space to interpret certain facts, to bring them into a certain context to add or reduce their significance. The assessee as well as the assessor could use this space. Let us take an example of another Academy of Sciences employee. Mr V. was an openly practising Catholic throughout his long professional life (from the early 1950s until the late 1980s). As an academic employee (moreover often travelling abroad), he used to be evaluated regularly. Few dared to disregard the religious aspect for a certain period of time; however, some assessments trivialised, excused, or strictly separated it from the performance of the scientific profession, while others (isolated but influential) enhanced and emphasised it. The point at stake is not whether the person concerned was a believer or not, there is no contention there, but whether religiosity was or was not in conflict with the performance of the scientific profession, the scientist's position or promotion in his career. It is interesting to observe the way and the opportunity when a street Communist Party organisation's assessment suddenly (if only temporarily) disrupted the carefully constructed image of a religious, yet respectable and reliable scientist, who had been approved by various assessors at the workplace (including members and representatives of the facility Communist Party organisa-

tion) for years. Such a sudden turn had real consequences – in this concrete case, it was the interruption of the higher degree award process. What is important here, religiosity as such did not represent a discriminatory handicap in this specific case, but was made into one only through certain actions acknowledged by others (none of the participants stood up against the street organisation's version, even though they undoubtedly could have). Simultaneously, all participants confirmed religiosity as a category worth assessing.

Analogically, the individual assessed components, i.e. what was political, personal or occupational, could not be clearly and objectively delineated either. A quote from cadre materials of a secondary school teacher shows, for example, that the scope of politically relevant activities was fairly broad. In a letter to the headmaster, the Sports Union district committee presidium praised the teacher at stake – its member. It addressed the main evaluator as follows:

"Therefore, we ask you to take this evaluation into account and consideration also in your own evaluation of his activities. Work in a sports movement is societally important, equal to political engagement."[28]

Cadre materials included a lot of similar examples demonstrating the endeavour to satisfy the political engagement imperatives in all kinds of ways, or to justify its absence in a politically correct way. If the relations at the workplace were more or less unproblematic, without any fundamental conflicts, the individual and his assessors – mainly his superiors and the basic KSČ or ROH organisation – worked together to negotiate and fine-tune the figure of an orderly and trustworthy worker. In such cases, the tasks and commitments were often tailored with regard to various possibilities and limitations (e.g. women with small children or men building a house were commonly excused from stronger political involvement.) Sheila Fitzpatrick argues that individuals did indeed possess the possibility even under the communist regime to "manipulate their own files". Additionally, she insists that this individual practice of "self-fashioning" must be "part of the discussion on Soviet identity".[29] This might, of course, be extended also to other communism-building societies but I would emphasize that this practice was not only *individual* but especially *social.* The evaluation and creation of a reliable (or unreliable) figure was embedded in relations and communication, following certain rules just as any other communication, such as decency.

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28 Dossiers on a secondary school teacher. Author's personal holdings.
29 Fitzpatrick, *Tear off the masks!*, 16–18.

Social life's common and expectable motives were likewise manifested in cadre work – routinisation, collegiality, various sectional interests, their conflicts or harmony. Practical implementation of certain rules and measures was far from clear cut because participation in decision making was dispersed among various institutions and actors and woven into common occupational and personal ties and hierarchies.

Conclusion

From the communist state's point of view, cadre work or policy were not to impact on the individual only. The goals of cadre policy were much more ambitious: not only to discipline and educate the individual, but also to discipline and shape the entire society. It envisioned a certain type of individual, the cultivation of certain characteristics, and also the cultivation or suppression of certain social bonds.

As I have suggested above, however, cadre work was accompanied by a range of internal conflicts throughout the duration of communism. They were caused not only by practical imperfections and omissions – as constantly pointed out by numerous party and government documents calling for "improvement". Ambiguity dominated also the concepts and principles of cadre work itself.

Cadre work required many highly formalised and routinised processes – filling out questionnaires and evaluations, but it was to be informal at the same time. It was meant to be deeply personal and emphatic, yet simultaneously impartial. It was supposed to explore and shape inner beliefs, values and attitudes, while emphasising formal expressions of loyalty at the same time. Cadre work presupposed clear evaluation criteria, but there was no agreement on even the most basic categories. The way to balance the motives of exclusion or collective guilt (e.g. in the case of people who had been proclaimed class enemies) and of education and self-development was not clearly determined either. This relates to the more general issue of the fatality of certain categories versus the possibility to change certain givens by one's own effort, or, the extent to which an individual was an object or a subject of cadre work. Both principles coexisted alongside each other and could be used for argumentation. Further, the cadre process itself was to be controllable; therefore, powers were spread among several instances with a different degree and nature of involvement. Simultaneously, their unity and harmony were emphasised but this was very hard to achieve precisely due to their enormous diversity.

All this and certainly much more turned the transparent ideological assignment explainable even in only a few simple slogans (see the introductory quote for instance) into a complex and basically unattainable project. If cadre policy spoke

of a "new" socialist human being and "new" social relations, then this system, in place for such a long time, largely failed. The entire cadre process turned out to be much more complex and conflictual than its ideologues were ready to admit in their general statements. All the "unclean" ties and commitments – personal, collegial, occupational – that cadre work was to be free of, could not in fact be circumvented. This was so because screening and education were largely dependent on them as cadre work was based on the immediate knowledge of the given person. Even though the practice of personal assessments was abandoned with time, the main responsibility was transferred to the superiors at work or teachers at school. The representatives of the basic KSČ or ROH organisations participating in the assessment often knew the individual in concern personally as well. Only the next assessment instance was taken to a more anonymous level of higher (party) functionaries and bodies, who worked with the submitted documents – assessments and cadre materials. Basic materials were created by people personally and professionally involved with the assessee and this was, of course, reflected in the evaluation.

The fact that cadre work did not function entirely according to ideological proclamations, or that the proclamations themselves often contradicted each other, does not diminish its importance and impact on people's lives in any way. The related agenda was enormous. The fact that cadre work did persist throughout the communist regime probably represents its most important aspect. During the whole period in question, questionnaires were filled in, and CV, assessments and evaluations were written. People adjusted their lives rhetorically as well as practically to demonstrate their comprehensive "reliability" – even though this reliability was contextually grounded and much less clear cut than it would seem at first glance and than the ideologues of the communist state would admit.

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF C. WRIGHT MILLS:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

FRANCIS D. RAŠKA

Abstract

This article analyzes the interesting, though brief, scholarly career of the radical American sociologist, C. Wright Mills. Despite the fact that he wrote a number of pioneering works in a short period of time, Mills remains largely ignored in twenty-first century sociological literature. Mills challenged conventional wisdom by arguing that sociology should be approached from a less academic standpoint involving the linkage of private problems with public issues. According to Mills, the contemporary approach to sociology did little to address the true problems of society and needed to be replaced with greater activism on the part of scholars.

Keywords: Mills, Gerth, sociology, power elite, white collar, sociological imagination

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to introduce the controversial American sociologist of the last century, C. Wright Mills (1916–1962), within the context of his intellectual mission. The epilogue by sociology professor, Todd Gitlin, to the 2000 edition of Mills' *Power Elite* characterizes Mills as follows:

"C. Wright Mills was the most inspiring sociologist of the second half of the twentieth century, his achievement all the more remarkable for the fact that he produced his major work in a span of little more than a decade. For the political generation trying to find bearings in the early Sixties, Mills was a guiding light of radicalism. Yet he was a bundle of paradoxes, and this was part of his appeal whether his readers were consciously attuned to the paradoxes or not. He was a radical disabused of radical traditions, a sociologist disgruntled with the course of

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sociology, an intellectual frequently skeptical of intellectuals, a defender of public action as well as a craftsman, a despairing optimist, a vigorous pessimist, and all in all, one of the few contemporaries whose intelligence, verve, passion, scope – and contradictions – seemed alive to most of the main moral and political traps of his time. A philosophically-trained and best-selling sociologist who decided to write pamphlets, a populist who scrambled to find what was salvageable within the Marxist tradition, a loner committed to politics, a man of substance acutely cognizant of style, he was not only a guide but an exemplar, prefiguring in his paradoxes some of the tensions of a student movement that was reared on privilege, amid exhausted ideologies, yet hell-bent on finding, or forging, the leverage with which to transform America root and branch."[1]

Equally enthusiastic is a comprehensive biography by Irving Horowitz entitled *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian.*[2] Horowitz's work is complemented by a compilation (produced by Mills' two daughters) of Mills' correspondence with family, friends, colleagues, and publishers: *C. Wright Mills: Letters and Autobiographical Writings.*[3]

Not all reviews of Mills have been so positive. His correspondence reveals his feelings concerning professional reviews of his publications and his reactions to them. Of note is the recent book *Collaboration, Reputation, and Ethics in American Academic Life: Hans A. Gerth and C. Wright Mills.*[4] This well-documented analysis of the long collaboration among both social scientists over two decades helps illustrate Mills' complex personality and may raise some questions about his character and integrity. Czech readers were introduced to Mills' biography and publications in a succinct and well-written afterword to the Czech translation of *The Sociological Imagination* by Lubomír Sochor entitled *C. Wright Mills and the Sociology of Sociology.*[5]

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[1]   Todd Gitlin, Afterword to *The Sociological Imagination*, by C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 229.
[2]   Irving L. Horowitz, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian* (New York: Free Press, 1983).
[3]   Kathryn Mills and Pamela Mills, eds., *C. Wright Mills: Letters and Autobiographical Writings* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
[4]   Guy Oakes and Arthur J. Vidich, *Collaboration, Reputation, and Ethics in American Academic Life: Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999).
[5]   Lubomír Sochor, "C. Wright Mills a sociologie sociologie", Afterword to *Sociologická imaginace*, by C. Wright Mills (Praha: Mladá fronta, 1968), 193–199.

Brief Biography

Mills was born on August 28, 1916, in Waco, Texas to a middle-class Catholic family of Irish-English background. His early education would suggest a future career in engineering. Mills attended Dallas Technical High School where he took no social studies courses. After graduating, he entered Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College. One year later, Mills transferred to the University of Texas where he graduated in 1939 with both Bachelor's and Master's degrees. According to Horowitz, the University of Texas was an exciting time to be during the 1935–1939 period: "A school in turmoil and transition in sheer size, as well as in political orientation. The university which emerged during this period reflected the larger-scale impact of the New Deal on Texas politics."[6] It was in Texas that Mills received his first exposure to Marxism. Horowitz concludes that it was there where Mills learned that Marx's method represented a "signal and lasting contribution to the best sociological ways of reflection and inquiry available."[7]

Mills wished to pursue further graduate study, but the University of Texas at this time offered no doctoral programs in sociology. Therefore, Mills decided to start his Ph.D. work at the University of Wisconsin. A faculty member at the University of Texas helped gain Mills' acceptance at Wisconsin.[8]

Department of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison was rated among the best in the country. This was Mills' first departmental affiliation. In Wisconsin, he began his controversial friendship and collaboration with Hans Gerth, a German non-Jewish refugee and junior faculty member. It resulted in a volume of translated essays entitled *From Max Weber*[9] and later in a book on social psychology, character, and social structure.[10] Horowitz concludes that "The two years at Wisconsin could be summarized as a mixed blessing. Mills' personal relationships had turned sour."[11] At Wisconsin, Mills continued a pattern of learning he began in Texas, which emphasized broad interdisciplinary tasks, rather than narrow disciplinary boundaries.[12] Mills' association with Selig Perlman proved important. Perlman's courses on socialism and capitalism influenced Mills. It was in Madison

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6 Horowitz, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian*, 15–19.
7 Ibid., 34.
8 Horowitz, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian*, 24–26.
9 Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Galaxy Books, 1946).
10 C. Wright Mills and Hans H. Gerth, *Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1953).
11 Horowitz, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian*, 53.
12 Ibid., 45.

that Mills formulated his first attack on academic sociology.[13] With the exception of Gerth, Mills' interactions with the faculty at the Department were adversarial and confrontational, including the chairman, John Gillin and Professor Howard Becker.[14]

In 1942, Mills moved to the University of Maryland, College Park. He participated little in university affairs and viewed Maryland as a place to get away from. Instead, he related his professional affairs directly to the Washington, D.C. area. In a letter to Robert Merton at Columbia, Mills wrote that "University of Maryland is a sinking ship" and asked for help finding another position.[15] Mills had not been required to serve in the military during the war because of a heart ailment. His name had achieved recognition in some circles thanks to some articles he had produced for the leftist periodicals, *The New Republic* and *The New Leader*. During this time, Mills developed a relationship with the editor of *The New Leader*, Daniel Bell, who introduced him to literary notables. In 1944, Mills received a part-time position at the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University under the leadership of Paul F. Lazarsfeld. Mills' task was to evaluate target projects in mass communications and public opinion.[16] In 1947, he was given an appointment at Columbia College. The reasons appeared to be complex. He failed to complete the results on contracts at the Bureau and was thus transferred to the College. It turned out that his teaching performance there was also disappointing, leading to the postponement of his promotion to Associate Professor. In 1948, Mills completed a contracted project on Puerto Rican immigrants in New York, which resulted in a book, *The Puerto Rican Journey*, which appeared in 1950.[17] In 1948, the first of Mills' books in trilogy on stratification *The New Men of Power: America's Labor Leaders* was published,[18] followed by *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* in 1951,[19] and by *The Power Elite* in 1956.[20]

In 1953, the book, *Character and Social Structure*, co-authored by Gerth, was released. A detailed description of this book, the history of Mills' collaboration with Gerth, which may raise questions about Mills' character, can be found in a

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13 Ibid., 55.
14 Ibid., 51–53.
15 Ibid., 60.
16 Ibid., 77–78.
17 Ibid., 80–82.
18 C. Wright Mills, *The New Men of Power: America's Labor Leaders* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1948).
19 C. Wright Mills, *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951).
20 C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

work by Oakes and Vidich entitled *Collaboration, Reputation, and Ethics in American Academic Life*.[21] Mills' most important publication, a handbook of sociological practice entitled *The Sociological Imagination*, was published in 1959. In 1956, at the age of 40, Mills was promoted to the rank of Professor at Columbia. Also in 1956, Mills traveled to Europe and lectured at the University of Copenhagen. At this time, he began writing his autobiographical letters to an imaginary Soviet friend, "Tovarich" (comrade), in which he tried to formulate his opinions on important political and social issues. Soon after his return to New York, Mills wrote his first mass-market publication, *The Causes of World War Three*, which appeared in 1958.[22] In the summer months of 1960, Mills visited Cuba where he met Castro and other leaders of the "new Cuba." Several months later, his defense of the Cuban revolution, *Listen Yankee: The Revolution in Cuba* was published.[23] In December 1960, Mills was scheduled to debate Adolf Berle, Jr. on national television on the topic of United States policy towards Cuba. Overstressed and overworked, Mills suffered a major heart attack one day before the debate. In 1961, he traveled to the Soviet Union where he considered special treatment of his heart condition, but decided against it. In March 1962, Mills died at his home in West Nyack, New York. A few days after his death, Mills' last mass-market publication, *The Marxists*, was published.

Collaboration with Hans Gerth

Hans Gerth was a junior faculty member at the University of Wisconsin when Mills began his doctoral studies there. Mills did not register for any of Gerth's courses, but did attend a number of Gerth's lectures. Although Gerth's lectures were neither popular, nor easily understandable, Mills was very impressed. In his usual brashness, Mills commented: "Gerth is the only man worth listening to in this department."[24]

In 1940, their thirteen-year collaboration began. Their first joint publication was a review of James Burnham's book *The Managerial Revolution: What is happening in the World*. The critique, entitled *A Marx for Managers*, appeared in the small journal *Ethics*. Mills took the opportunity to send the essay to all important sociologists of that time.[25]

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[21] Oakes and Vidich, *Collaboration, Reputation, and Ethics in American Academic Life*, 57–90.

[22] C. Wright Mills, *The Causes of World War Three* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958).

[23] C. Wright Mills, *Listen Yankee! The Revolution in Cuba* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1960).

[24] Oakes and Vidich, *Collaboration, Reputation, and Ethics in American Academic Life*, 2.

[25] Ibid., 15.

Gerth was an expert on German sociologist, Max Weber, whose works had not been known in North America prior to the publication in 1937 of Talcott Parsons' *The Structure of Social Action*.[26] In 1943, Mills planned to publish an excerpt from Weber's *Economy and Society* as *Class, Status, Party*, which had been prepared and translated by Gerth. Mills took it upon himself to make all necessary arrangements with the publishers, and also claimed equal credit for this product.[27] Afterwards, Mills proposed the publication of a translation of selected works by Weber and succeeded in negotiating a contract with Oxford University Press.[28] Gerth was to translate the material into "rough English" and Mills would be responsible for editing the English as well as negotiating with publishers. The book's prospects became complicated when Edward Shils, a prominent sociologist from the University of Chicago, planned to publish his own selection of Weber translations. Shils had helped Gerth to secure his first university appointment in the United States and the two men were friends. Moreover, Shils was unhappy with the published *Class, Status, Party* and hinted that, as Gerth and Mills had Shils' original translation, their product might well be plagiarized. Mills orchestrated all dealings with Shils and the publication of *From Max Weber* was assured.[29]

For two years (1944–1946) a dispute over the credit for *From Max Weber* continued[30] since in an advertisement as well as in some reviews, Mills was listed as the first author. The arguments do not enhance the prestige of either of the two men. It was not only a disagreement over the allocation of proper credit for the book, but also a matter of collegiality and academic collaboration. Both Mills and Gerth sought witnesses and advocates in support of their respective positions and each engaged in vicious verbal attacks decrying the moral integrity of the other. While Gerth's contribution to the actual translations did deserve more credit, his claims that Mills' German was inadequate to deal with Weber's originals did not win Gerth many friends. Throughout the dispute, Mills was in control at all times.

The history of collaboration on the second book, *Character and Social Structure*, is even more twisted.[31] Mills had proposed the textbook on social psychology to Howard Becker, his doctoral supervisor, as a first-year graduate student already in 1941 as a collaborative project with Gerth. Becker secured them a contract with the publisher D.C. Heath, where Becker served as an editor. As initially project-

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26 Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York: Free Press, 1937).
27 Kathryn Mills and Pamela Mills, *C. Wright Mills: Letters and Autobiographical Writings*, 55–56.
28 Oakes and Vidich, *Collaboration, Reputation, and Ethics in American Academic Life*, 17–37.
29 Kathryn Mills and Pamela Mills, *C. Wright Mills: Letters and Autobiographical Writings*, 72–77.
30 Oakes and Vidich, *Collaboration, Reputation, and Ethics in American Academic Life*, 38–56.
31 Ibid., 57–90.

ed, the book was to contain 34 chapters. For years, nothing happened. In 1946, Mills drafted the so-called "Cleveland Protocol," which defined their respective responsibilities for the book. Gerth refused to accept the offered arrangements and, despite haggling, no work was done on the book for the next two years. In early 1949, Mills attempted to revive the project by securing a contract with Harcourt Brace Publishers, although they were still bound by the original contract with Heath. After prolonged disputes on the order of the authors' names and other details of collaboration on the project, Gerth consented in the spring of 1949 and signed despite their still-binding contract with Heath. Mills immediately began to work on gaining a release from the original contract, which they obtained at the end of February 1950. The book itself was published in 1953. Although the text was based upon Weberian principles, Gerth could not have written it alone. Gerth's encyclopedic knowledge required an editor and not just an English-language editor. Mills organized Gerth's notes into understandable texts. He also provided the discipline needed to meet the deadlines.

"Comparison of Gerth's notes and drafts for *Character and Social Structure* with the published text demonstrates that this book was Mills's major achievement as the editor and expositor of Gerth's thought. The book develops historical models of character structure and a theory of the institutional formation and selection of types of actors. Employing Weber's conception of institutional orders, Gerth and Mills examine political, military, economic, kinship, and religious institutions in a variety of historical periods and with reference to the themes of social control, stratification, power, and status. They construct models for investigating the unity of social structures and modes of institutional integration. Finally, they address large questions of social change, collective behavior, and the sociology of leadership by tracing the course and fate of the "master trends" of modernity: bureaucratization, the decline of liberalism, and the coordination of political, economic, and military institutions. The book ends with a breathtaking global tour of the prospects for communism and capitalism in the late twentieth century."[32]

Aronowitz characterizes *Character and Social Structure* as Mills' unjustly neglected premier work, which provided the "scaffolding" upon which to hang his future major works.[33]

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[32] Ibid., 131.
[33] Stanley Aronowitz, "A Mills Revival?", *Logos Online* (2003): 13, www.logosjournal.com/aronowitz .htm.

Stratification Trilogy

"Whatever place one ultimately gives Mills in the sociological cosmos, one fact remains indisputable: he was a master analyst of stratification. His trilogy *The New Men of Power*, *White Collar*, and *The Power Elite* provides a fundamental analysis of the American division of labor between 1946 and 1956. These three books helped define the critical literature concerning American class composition and indelibly stamped Mills as a scholar of first rank."[34]

Mills always tried to speak out to a wider public even when he was formulating new theories, let alone engaging in public criticism than did most other academics. Mills' intention was to be critical of the then prevailing notion that intellectuals should remain neutral observers of social, economic, and political life.

According to Aronowitz, "Mills held that intellectuals and their ideas were embedded in the social antagonisms and struggles of their own time; they bring to their analysis a definite standpoint, whether or not they are prepared to acknowledge it."[35]

Mills was critical of the right, conservatives, liberals, and the left. He always maintained a clear separation from the Communist movement.

Mills wrote: "It is very difficult to locate the Communist Party as a specific unit on any United States political scale. Its outlook and activities are those of a foreign national bloc within the lineup of United States politics."[36]

Mills used the tools of conventional social research: interviews, surveys, and data analysis. Though staying within the framework of his data, Mills advocated social change that was often radical in nature.

The first book in the trilogy *The New Men of Power: America's Labor Leaders* was based on a research project Mills directed at the Labor Research Division of the Bureau of Applied Social Research. It was completed after major strikes in 1946, which were followed by Taft-Hartley changes in labor relations. This was not a study about the working classes, but rather their top leaders. Mills concluded that, for the first time in history, the labor movement had an opportunity to become a major actor not only in shaping the political economy, but also in American politics as well. Mills pointed out that:

[34] Horowitz, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian*, 209.
[35] Aronowitz, "A Mills Revival?", 3.
[36] C. Wright Mills, *The New Men of Power* (New York: A. M. Kelley, 1971), 22.

"Labor leaders occupied contradictory space, whether as army general and a contractor of labor, machine politician and the head of a social movement. The union is a human institution, established to accumulate power. Its leaders are members of the power elite. They do not simply represent workers, but are new participants in a world of powerful contending elites."[37]

Mills recognized the existence of a powerful conservative force that was assembled against labor, which had no intention of yielding more ground without an all-out political confrontation. Mills thought that labor leaders were poorly prepared for such a struggle.

"They are the only ones who can do it; that is why they are now the strategic elite in American society. Never has so much depended on men who are so ill-prepared and so little inclined to assume the power."[38]

Mills pointed out the major gap between the major unions, namely the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations.[39] Mills introduced a number of new phrases into the technical vocabulary, such as "the main drift," "the great trend," or "the great shift." The precise meanings of these terms are sometimes difficult to grasp. His "main drift" is away from the cooperation between business and labor made necessary and viable by the war. He suggested "that labor leaders of 'great stature' must come to the fore before. Now there is no war, but there is a powerful war machine and conservative reaction against labor's power at the bargaining table." He warned that corporations translate economic growth into effective and united political power. The power of the federal state has increased. The state is now so big in the economy and the power of business is so great in the state that unions can no longer seriously expect even short uneconomic gains.

Mills proposed that "labor leaders become the basis of a 'new power bloc'. Rather than making deals on the top, they will need to accumulate power from the bottom. If the democratic power of members is to be used against the concentrated power of money, it must in some way create its own political force. The left would create an independent labor party base in labor's formidable economic strength."[40]

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[37] Horowitz, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian*, 216.
[38] C. Wright Mills, *The New Men of Power*, 291.
[39] Ibid., 68–83.
[40] Aronowitz, "A Mills Revival?", 6–7.

As we know, Mills' prophecy was not fulfilled. Labor unions never formed a labor party, but the two main labor organizations did merge forming the united AFL-CIO. New gaps appeared, however, between the AFL-CIO and the Teamsters. Indeed, organized labor forged a new social compact with large employers for its members. Labor unions succeeded in negotiating striking advances in their members' standard of living and a high degree of job security.[41] In summary, unions did deliver to a substantial portion of the American working class.

Although Mills' dire prognosis for the unions did not materialize for the next quarter century after he published *The New Men of Power*, labor is paying a steep price now for its failure to heed Mills' admonition to forge its own power bloc.[42]

"Buffeted by economic globalization, corporate mergers, and the de-industrialization of vast areas of the Northeast and Midwest and by the growth of the largely non-union South as the investment of choice, many unions have despaired of making new gains and are hanging on to their declining membership for dear life. Labor is, perhaps irreversibly, on the defensive. In this period, union density – the proportion of union members to the work force – has been cut in half. Collective bargaining still occurs regularly in unionized industries and occupations and employers still sign contracts. But the last two decades are marked by labor's steady retreat from hard-won gains. In many instances, collective bargaining has yielded to collective begging."[43]

In the early 1950s, Mills lost confidence that the labor movement would be able to resist the complete corporate capitalist domination of economic, political, and cultural life, as is reflected in the next two books of the stratification trilogy.

The second book in the trilogy, *White Collar*, is an analysis of the American middle class. The characterization of the new middle class is introduced by the statement "The white collar people slipped quietly into modern society." "White collar" is the term which encompasses the various layers of the "new" middle class – the rapidly growing layer of salaried technical, professional, and administrative employees, primarily urban dwellers working mostly for large corporations. They perform non-manual labor at better-than-average salaries, and, in their social behavior and political attitudes, they always aspire to a middle course. Mills presents a description of the "old" middle class, farmers, small merchants and manufacturers. The transformation of property in the second half of the nine-

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41 Ibid., 7–8.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 5–6.

teenth century from this class to large concentrations of capital severely limited the economic and political influence of the "old" middle class to middle levels of power in mostly local communities. The function of administration, distribution, and sales grew faster than production and the bureaucracies of the various levels of white collar employees markedly expanded. Mills regretted the disappearance of independent individualism as a lifestyle and as a social value. The "captain of industry," the free speculator in land, the free small entrepreneur of rural America – these gave way to the dependent and anonymous "little man" of the new urban culture and one whose "white collar" marks the shift of the middle class from older entrepreneurial groups to the mass of today's office dwellers.[44]

In the twentieth century, the large corporations of heavy industry, large light manufacturing, banking and insurance as well as wholesalers and large retailers employed large numbers of clerks and salespersons as well as technicians, engineers, and managers. Mills pointed out that small business of all types was becoming unstable.

"Nationally, the small businessman is overpowered, politically and economically, by big business: he therefore tries to ride with and benefit from the success of big business on the national front, even as he fights the economic effects of big business on the local and state front."[45]

Mills assigned a unique place to managers.

"The 'managerial demiurge' signifies a new form of power, and not only at the workplace. Their numbers are growing and, to the degree they run corporate and government bureaucracies, the managerial type of man becomes more important in the total social structure."[46]

With the decline of the small entrepreneur, the shared fate of economic dependence, and the great increase in the number of employees, the middle classes have increasingly adopted union-style methods of struggle. A significant portion of organized unionism was extending to transportation, communication, education, and even state and federal government. White collar people, according to Mills, have come to unionism too late and are thus sharing unionization in the period of its incorporation as an economic interest group into the "liberal state."

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[44] Horowitz, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian*, 227.
[45] Aronowitz, "A Mills Revival?", 7.
[46] Ibid., 8.

"Mills saw little hope for their unionization as long as mass culture – their indigenous culture – was "the main drift" of mass society. On the one hand, reared in images of American exceptionalism, they were the embodiments of the cultural aspiration for individual social mobility; on the other, their growth was accompanied by the proletarianization of professional and technical strata: proletarian because they neither owned their own productive property nor controlled their labor. Some may earn higher salaries than industrialized workers, but, in contrast to unionized workers who have the protection of a collective bargaining agreement limiting management's rights, they were subordinated to arbitrary managerial authority in the performance of their tasks. Yet their eyes were fixed on the stars. Lacking a secure class identity which is intrinsic to those engaged in the production and appropriation of things, as producers of "symbols" they were likely to remain an atomized mass. […] As for the clerical and administrative employees they were cogs in the vast machinery of the "enormous file"; they were keepers of information and of the proliferating records accumulated by the growing significance of sales."[47]

In *White Collar*, Mills coined the term "lumpen-bourgeois" to complement the concept of "lumpen-proletariat" in the Communist Manifesto. This marginal middle class stratum was barely earning its way in the city or country and existed from day to day, anxious and dependent. Mills attributed this to the high rate of small-business failure and the growing mentality of dependence. It was located at the "bottom of the entrepreneurial world." Mills had been advised by Gerth during the preparation of the manuscript that he misunderstood the German word "Lumpen," which is not a synonym for victims of economic deprivation, but rather a pejorative term meaning "riff-raff" or scum. The lumpen-proletariat was composed of pimps, prostitutes, petty criminals, and confidence men. Economically, they were parasites who performed no productive functions. Mills coined the term anyway and was clearly mistaken. The lumpen-bourgeoisie were disenfranchised and impoverished business owners. The lumpen-proletarians of Marxist theory were recruited from all strata and included "socially heterogeneous materials."[48]

The response to the book was overwhelming. There were assaults from commercial quarters and serious reviews by fellow sociologists. Not all of them were positive.[49] Mills responded to published reviews either to authors directly or through his various friends. Here is his reaction to a review by his former friend, Dwight MacDonald:

47 Ibid., 8.
48 Oakes and Vidich, *Collaboration, Reputation, and Ethics in American Academic Life*, 118–119.
49 Horowitz, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian*, 244–254.

"Yesterday I read Dwight MacDonald's review in *Partisan Review*. As you probably have seen, it is a complete thumbs down. Of course, I know Dwight is an irresponsible reviewer, but I can't conceal that it hurts, for if he is half right, the best thing for me to do is to close up shop."[50]

The last book of the stratification trilogy is *The Power Elite*. *The Power Elite* was published in 1956, a time, as Mills himself put it, "when Americans were living through a material boom, a nationalist celebration, a political vacuum."

"Into this milieu exploded *The Power Elite*. C. Wright Mills was one of the first intellectuals in America to write that the complacency of the Eisenhower years was not enough. His indictment was uncompromising. On the one hand, he claimed, vast concentrations of power had coagulated in America, making a mockery of American democracy. On the other, he charged that his fellow intellectuals had sold out to the conservative mood in America, leaving their audience-the American people themselves- in a state of ignorance and apathy bearing shocking resemblance to the totalitarian regimes that America had defeated or was currently fighting."[51]

Mills' social thought centered around power, particularly the mechanisms by which it could be achieved and retained by elites in the economy and social institutions. His thinking was influenced by the theories of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca.

"Society is (and always will be) divided into two categories of people: those who rule (elites) and those who are ruled (masses). The so-called political ideology is only a mixture of truths, half-truths, and lies. Its function is to manipulate the masses, make them believe that everything is in order, and that the system they live in is the best there is. Social theory is thus reduced to a theory of elites. The movement of society is a political movement, which is based on the movement of elites."[52]

Mills derived his conception of power, in contrast to Marxists, neither from the forces of labor, nor from the market. He was a state theorist: according to Mills,

50 Kathryn Mills and Pamela Mills, *C. Wright Mills: Letters and Autobiographical Writings*, 163.
51 Alan Wolfe, Afterword to *The Power Elite*, by C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 363–364.
52 Miroslav Jodl, "Sociolog humanista," Foreword to *Mocenská elita*, by C. Wright Mills (Praha: Orbis, 1966), 15.

elites are always institutionally constituted. He recognized the relative autonomy of corporations, but he argued that the state had become the fundamental location of the exercise of both economic and political power.[53]

One of the goals of *The Power Elite* was to show how much the organization of power in America had changed. The "local elites" of the beginning of the century became obsolete and power in America had become nationalized. Mills called attention to the three institutionalized legs it was based upon: the corporate, the political, and the military. Business had shifted its forms from primarily regional in scope to ones that produced products in national markets. What once had been a propertied class, tied to ownership of real assets was replaced by a managerial class, rewarded for its ability to organize giant corporate enterprises for ever expanding profits. The managerial class exercises national influence not only through companies, but through roles it may be called upon to play in "the national interest."[54]

Mills characterized the political leadership of the country as the "political directorate" and introduced it as follows:

"A small group of men are now in charge of the executive decisions made in the name of the United States of America. These fifty-odd men of the executive branch of government include the President, the Vice-President, and the members of the Cabinet; the head men of the major departments and bureaus, agencies and commissions."[55]

Mills pointed out that only about one fourth of the members of the directorate have by virtue of their career been professionals of government or party politics. The remaining three quarters are political outsiders, most of whom had been linked either financially or professionally or both with the corporate world.

A change took place in the military sector of American society, whom Mills calls "warlords." After the Second World War, Mills detected the autonomous power of the military as increasingly the driving force of society. Warlords had once been "only uneasy, poor relations within the American elite; now they are first cousins; soon they may become elder brothers." With its generous financial support and fantastic technological and scientific achievements, the military was becoming increasingly autonomous. Of the three legs of the power elite, this "military ascendancy" had the most dangerous implications.

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53   Aronowitz, "A Mills Revival?", 9.
54   Wolfe, Afterword to *The Power Elite*, 364–365.
55   C. Wright Mills, *Power Elite*, 231.

"American militarism in fully developed form would mean the triumph in all areas of life of the military metaphysic and hence the subordination to it of all other ways of life."[56]

The military retained its central position in the power elite. The two super-powers were engaged in the Cold War. Under these circumstances, the military allied itself with those industries engaged in defense production. Mills refers to such big corporations as "big money" and "big money" is the backbone of the entire system. Mills thus formulated the concept of the military-industrial complex long before President Eisenhower.

Mills also discussed politicians' reliance on mass media and celebrities. As the premier ornaments of mass society, celebrities are recruited to lend prestige to high officials of the three principal institutions of power.

Mills described the power elite as the only "independent variable" in American society and revised his earlier high hopes for the labor movement. He lost hope that working people and their unions would enter the historical stage as autonomous actors, unless a powerful new left of intellectuals emerged to push them.

"The top of modern American society is increasingly unified, and often seems willfully coordinated: at the top there has emerged an elite of power. The middle levels are a drifting set of stalemated, balancing forces: the middle does not link the bottom with the top. The bottom of this society is politically fragmented, and even as a passive fact, increasingly powerless: at the bottom there is emerging a mass society."[57]

The Power Elite generated considerable controversy and most reviews were critical. We should mention those by Daniel Bell, Robert Lynd, and Talcott Parsons.[58]

Mills' view was at variance with the opinion prevailing at the time that pluralism was a more accurate description of American political power. Empirical studies were conducted to address Mills' leading ideas as expressed in *The Power Elite*. The best known of these is *Who governs?* by Robert A. Dahl.[59] Dahl studied the power structure of the City of New Haven (Connecticut), construed power in

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[56]   Ibid., 223.
[57]   Ibid., 324.
[58]   Horowitz, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian*, 272–277.
[59]   Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

the graphic form of forces, none of which dominated political decision-making. Business, labor, consumer groups, taxpayers, and other organizations constituted power relationships through the mechanisms of consensus and compromise. Although not denying the strong tendencies exhibited by big business and the *political directorate*, Dahl vehemently rejected that there were clearly articulated ruling groups that were the only genuine independent force, thus rejecting Mills' power elite theory.

The Sociological Imagination

In 1959, Mills published his best-known book, *The Sociological Imagination*. He introduced the book by stating:

"The sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography and the relation between the two within society. That is its task and its premise."[60]

The most fruitful distinction with which the sociological imagination works is between the "personal troubles of milieu" and the "public issues of social structure." Troubles occur within the character of the individual and within the range of his immediate relations with others. Issues have to do with matters that transcend local environments of the individual and the range of his inner life.[61]

In order to illustrate his point, Mills discusses unemployment, war, marriage, and urban issues. He points out that the problem of unemployment cannot be resolved by individuals. Likewise, individuals are powerless to solve the problems connected to war, the problem of a satisfactory marriage remains incapable of a purely private solution, and the issues of urban living will not be solved by personal ingenuity and private wealth.[62]

Mills claims that: "My conception stands opposed to social science as a set of bureaucratic techniques which inhibit social inquiry by methodological pretensions." He then continues to attack the accepted principles of sociological work of his time, which he claims are "subject to distortion, to being run into the ground." The theory of history, the systematic theory of "the nature of man and society" (grand theory), and empirical studies of contemporary social facts and problems also came under attack. As representatives of a theory of history, Mills names Arnold Toynbee and Oswald Spengler. Talcott Parsons is presented as a "grand

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[60] C. Wright Mills, *Sociological Imagination*, 6.
[61] Ibid., 8.
[62] Ibid., 9–10.

theorist," and George Lundberg, Samuel Stouffer, Stuart Dodd, and Paul Lazarsfeld are described by Mills as "abstract empiricists."[63] Parsons stated that people often share standards and expect one another to stick to them. Insofar as they do, their society may be orderly. Parsons' grand theory was, in short, rejected by Mills. "One could translate the 555 pages of *The Social System* into about 150 pages of straight-forward English. The result would not be very impressive."[64] Mills addresses the meaning of "power." He points out that the last resort in "corrective" mechanisms is coercion, but power has other forms as well. Authority is the power justified by the beliefs of the voluntarily obedient. Manipulation is another form, which is wielded unbeknownst to the powerless. In fact, these three types of power have to be considered when we think about the role of power. What Parsons and other grand theorists call "value orientations" and "normative structure" has mainly to do with master symbols of legitimation.[65] The ideological meaning of grand theory tends strongly to legitimate stable forms of domination […] The value of the theory as presented in *The Social Structure* is as follows:

"It is only about 50 percent verbiage; 40 percent is well-known textbook sociology. The other 10 percent, as Parsons might say, I am willing to leave open for your own empirical investigations. My own investigations suggest that the remaining 10 percent is of possible – although rather vague – ideological use."[66]

Abstracted empiricism did not fare much better. Like grand theory, abstracted empiricism seizes upon one junction in the process of work and allows it to dominate the mind. As a more sophisticated spokesman of this school, he used Paul Lazarsfeld, who defined sociology as a methodological specialty. The sociologist thus becomes the methodologist of all the social sciences. Mills criticizes Lazarsfeld's opinion of the sociologist, well housed in research institutes, as science-maker, tool-maker, and keeper of the interpretations, as well as the whole style of work. Mills points out that "The economics of truth-the cost of research-seems to conflict with the politics of truth-the use of research to clarify significant issues and to bring political controversy closer to reality." He continues: " [B]ecause of the expansiveness of the method, its practitioners have become involved in the commercial and bureaucratic uses of their work."[67]

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63 Ibid., 22–24.
64 Ibid., 31.
65 Ibid., 37.
66 Ibid., 49.
67 Ibid., 64–65.

Later in the book, Mills distinguishes between the responsibilities of the writer who tries to persuade others about his own opinions and those of the teacher whose responsibilities are greater.

"The teacher has a captive audience, to whom he has to reveal as fully as he can just how a supposedly self-disciplined mind works. The art of teaching is in considerable part the art of thinking out loud, but intelligibly."[68]

He addresses one of the problems of the academic profession in America.

"The academic profession has often failed to make ambitious men contented with merely academic careers. The prestige in the profession has not been proportionate to the economic sacrifice; the pay and hence the style of life have often been miserable and the discontent of many scholars is heightened by the awareness that often they are far brighter than men who have attained power and prestige available in other fields."[69]

In a separate chapter, Mills addresses the "bureaucratic ethos" in social science and points out that abstracted empiricism in particular represents a "bureaucratic development." He returns to questions of academic reputation and prestige and presents a detailed analysis of the status of the social sciences at American institutions of higher learning. While this analysis may be factually correct, one feels Mills' sense of bitterness, his recognition that he himself was only "marginal" at Morningside Heights.[70]

"However, by his prestige, the new academic statesman has acquired means of competence-but which must be distinguished from his personal competence. […] A permanent professional secretary, a clerk to run the library, an electric typewriter, dictating equipment, and a mimeographing machine, and perhaps a small budget for purchasing books and periodicals –even such minor office equipment and staff enormously increases any scholar's appearance of competence. Any business executive will laugh at the pettiness of such means; college professors will not-few professors, even productive ones, have such facilities on a secure basis. […] This is one kind of situation which helps to explain how men may acquire considerable reputation without having in all truth produced very much. About

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68   Ibid., 79.
69   Ibid., 98.
70   Horowitz, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian*, 76–113.

one such man, a colleague remarked: As long as he lives, he'll be the most eminent man in his field; two weeks after he dies, no one will remember him!"[71]

Mills then continues by discussing "the cliques" in the academic world. It is an expose which is not limited to American academia and is even more prevalent in smaller scenes. The cliques compete to control the field of study. The career chances of younger scholars depend on whether "they belong or not." Reputations do not always depend on the value of work accomplished, but may be due to one's position in the clique. When relations between the cliques are considered, there are "statesmen," brokers dealing in allocation of prestige between the cliques and pretending to be spokesmen for the field as a whole. He then points out that academia does not only consist of cliques, but there are also unattached individuals of many varieties, some of whom "play the game," whereas others do not. Mills also addresses the question of "mutual admiration," which in America is called "I scratch you and you scratch me." He addresses the idea of scientific peer review.

"Everyone who has not only reviewed, but also written books knows that one of the easiest of all intellectual tasks is to "debunk" a book – any book – in a two- or three-column review, and that it is virtually impossible to answer such a review in the same space."[72]

This is perhaps Mills' response to critiques of his previously published books, which had previously gone unanswered. It is a valid point, however, which has become even more important with respect to "peer review" of manuscripts for publication in journals, which are often of very dubious quality. Mills concludes his criticism by returning to both the grand theory and abstracted empiricism as follows:

"Theory serves, in a variety of ways, as ideological justification of authority. Research for bureaucratic ends serves to make authority more effective and more efficient by providing information of use to authoritative planners. […] Should these two styles of work come to enjoy an intellectual "dropoff", they would constitute a grievous threat to the intellectual promise of social science and as well the political promise of the role of reason in human affairs-as that role has been classically conceived in the civilization of Western societies."[73]

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[71] C. Wright Mills, *Sociological Imagination*, 168–169.
[72] Ibid., 112.
[73] Ibid., 117–118.

The book provoked multiple responses. The important ones are summarized by Horowitz.[74] Most of the reactions were negative. Opinions could be found also in the Czech literature. In their textbook, *Soudobá sociologie* (Contemporary Sociology), Jaroslav Klofáč and Vojtěch Tlustý adopted a critical stance. They pointed out that, contrary to nihilist views of sociology, Mills had proposed emotional general concepts and demands. These lacked accuracy and clarity, were not sufficiently broad or systematized, and thus did not conform to scientific requirements.[75] A more positive review was presented by Lubomír Sochor.[76] The most vicious review was presented by Edward Shils in *Encounter:*

"Imagine a burly cowpuncher on the long, slow ride from the Panhandle of Texas to Columbia University, carrying in his saddle-bag some books which he reads with absorption while his horse trots along. Imagine that among the books are some novels of Kafka, Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution*, and the essays of Max Weber. Imagine the style and imagery that would result from the interaction of the cowboy student and his studies. Imagine also that en route he passes through Madison, Wisconsin, that seat of a decaying populism, and that on arriving at his destination in New York, he encounters Madison Avenue, that street full of reeking phantasies of the manipulation of the human will and of what is painful to America's well-wishers and enjoyable to its detractors. Imagine the first Madison disclosing to the learned cowpuncher his subsequent political mode, the second an object of his hatred. The end result of such an imaginary grand tour would be a work like *The Sociological Imagination*."[77]

This review requires no comment.

C. Wright Mills as Activist

In 1958, Mills wrote a book entitled *The Causes of World War Three*. This treatise reflected Mills' frustration with the Cold War and he hoped that he could contribute to world peace. It depicted global politics in terms of rivalry between the two power blocs of the divided world, one led by the United States and the other by the Soviet Union. His argument could be summarized as follows:

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[74] Horowitz, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian*, 95–108.
[75] Jaroslav Klofáč and Vojtěch Tlustý, *Soudobá sociologie* (Praha: Svoboda, 1965), 276–278.
[76] Sochor, Afterword to *Sociologická imaginace,* 193–199.
[77] Horowitz, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian*, 101.

"Total war (understand nuclear) has become absurd as a means of national policy. The power elites of the United States and the Soviet Union continue to be ruled by a 'military metaphysics', which does not reflect the above reality. Their propaganda machines describe the world divided into two adversarial camps, 'ours' and 'theirs', where only nuclear bombs and intercontinental missiles guarantee security. The war is not 'fatally predetermined'. American officials who control the means of mass destruction and are irresponsibly bringing war closer, should be forced to promote peaceful international relations and favorably affect the attitudes of Soviet leaders. In fact, he called for a unilateral halt of nuclear testing and disarmament. Having lost his faith in the masses, Mills believed that the only way to affect such a change in American policy was for the community of scholars, writers, scientists, and ministers to stop buckling down before the mad strategy of the 'brisk generals', put forward alternative proposals for action and get them debated and adopted. American intellectuals should realize that 'war and not Russia is now the enemy'. It has to be remembered that *The Causes of World War Three* was written in a period when one could count the number of radicals with full-time appointments at American universities on one hand and when the preponderant ex-radicals had 'chosen the West', this equalization of responsibility for the world crisis between East and West endeared Mills neither to the Communists and their periphery, for whom the Soviet Union was virtually blameless for the state of things, nor to Cold War liberals, for whom any suggestion that United States foreign policy could contribute to the chances for the outbreak of World War Three was as shocking as it was absurd."[78]

The central message left by the treatise is the abstract sense of good and a concrete sense of evil. As Horowitz writes: "It was a negative book with a holocaust message: namely, prevent a war nobody wants and that all will perish from."[79] Mills bluntly stated that the major reason America's most powerful should be considered dangerous was that they controlled weapons of mass destruction and were in a position not only to contemplate their use, but to launch them. Mills also claimed that the United States and the Soviet Union were converging into a "fearful symmetry."[80]

In 1960, Mills wrote *Listen Yankee! The Revolution in Cuba*, of which 160,000 copies were published. It represented a fierce defense of the Cuban Revolution during its early years. Mills' enchantment with the Cuban Revolution was many-sided. Initially, there was the personality of Fidel Castro. In Mills' letter dated July 15,

78   Aronowitz, "A Mills Revival?", 17.
79   Horowitz, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian*, 292.
80   C. Wright Mills, *The Causes of World War Three*, 20–30.

1960, to Hans Gerth, Mills glowed about his upcoming trip to Cuba: the UN delegate tells me that Castro sat up in the Oriente reading and discussing with his band *The Power Elite*.[81] During his visit, Che Guevara also told Mills that he had studied *The Power Elite* during the guerrilla war.[82] Mills was very impressed by Castro.

"You just have to come up with the facts about what kind of man Fidel Castro is, and what kinds of men the forty-or-so commandantes and the two-hundred-or-so capitans of the Council of Ministers – all those who make up the revolutionary government of Cuba today – what kinds of men they really are. They have a real respect for the people and a real belief in the people. It's not some romantic idea. It's just something they know and something they are.These are the people-we revolutionaries think-and so you trust them. These are the people-and they can learn very fast what has to be done."[83]

It is clear that Mills was assisted by Castro's propagandists when preparing the book. *Listen Yankee!* contains blunt reminders of Cuba's recent past, in which the United States was branded as the main, if not the only source of misery in Latin America.

"Latin America is a great world region; it is a continent, long and repeatedly plundered; and it is in revolutionary ferment. That it is now in such ferment is a heartening testimony to the will of man not to remain forever an exploited object. For over a century Latin American man has been largely outside world history-except as an object; now he is entering that history-as a subject, with vengeance and pride, with violence. The unilateral Monroe Doctrine is part of the epoch of Latin American isolation. The epoch, and with it the Monroe Doctrine, is now coming to an end."[84]

It seems that Mills was so mesmerized by events in Cuba that he failed to see the course events there were taking. For example, he failed to recognize the increasing influence of the Soviet Union in Cuban affairs, the speed at which the private economy was being abolished, and the disaster of the single-crop (sugar) economy.

In Mills' opinion, Castro gained independence on the battlefield. Mills embraced Castro because Castro seemed to confirm Mills' belief in the decline of

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[81] Kathryn Mills and Pamela Mills, *C Wright Mills: Letters and Autobiographical Writings*, 304.
[82] Ibid., 312.
[83] C. Wright Mills, *Listen Yankee*, 124.
[84] Horowitz, *C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian*, 294.

liberalism in the West and the growing embrace of democratic values by Communist countries. In addition, Mills believed that the Cuban Revolution represented a victory of experimentation over and against the old American colonial yoke or the new Soviet ideological yoke.[85] In a prophetic tone, Mills basically predicted that the rest of Latin America would experience revolutions as well:

"We're talking sense to you, Yankee; listen to us, please. What will happen, for example, when the people of all those South American countries realize their enormous wealth, both the actual and what could be, and yet find themselves poor? When looking across to tiny Cuba, they see the Cubans are not poor? What will happen then?"[86]

Mills' account of Cuba was strikingly one-sided. He neglected to acknowledge the terror in the early stages of the revolution, the mass exodus from Cuba he lived to see and the Soviet domination, which followed the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Mills' predictions about the prospective economic strengths of Cuba and the rest of Latin America were also inaccurate. Horowitz correctly concludes that *Listen Yankee!* was Mills' poorest effort at social analysis.[87]

The Legacy of C. Wright Mills

In the last two years of his life, Mills became a public figure, whose pamphlets against the Cold War and United States Latin American policy were more widely read than any other radical's.[88] His *Letter to the New Left*, published both in Britain and the United States, became a Bible for the Students for Democratic Society (SDS). After Mills' death, his friend and neighbor Harvey Swados wrote:

"All these people were responding to what was at bottom not merely a logical indictment which could be upheld or attacked, but a poetic vision of America: an unlovely vision perhaps, expressed with a mixture of awkwardness and brilliance, but one that did not really need statistical buttressing or the findings of research teams in order to be apprehended by sensitive Americans as corresponding to their own sense of what was going on about them, more truly and unflinchingly than any other contemporary statement. They were responding in that unlovely decade,

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[85] Ibid., 296.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid., 300.
[88] Gitlin, Afterword to *Sociological Imagination*, 230.

the fat and frightened fifties, to one who refused to compromise or to make the excuses that others were making-excuses, mislabeled descriptions, or analyses-for what was happening to their country. They sensed correctly that, faulty and flawed as it was, the vision of C. Wright Mills cut through the fog and lighted their lives for them."[89]

Mills' impact on the 1960s has been discussed by Jamison and Eyerman, who characterize the stratification trilogy as follows: "These books stand alone as a comprehensive corpus of social criticism in the decades following the Second World War."[90]

Tom Hayden, a leading figure in Students for Democratic Society and author of the *Port Huron Statement*[91] wrote that "the two writers who had the most influence on the founders of the SDS were Albert Camus and C. Wright Mills.[92] Hayden also recalled:

"The Columbia University Sociology professor defied the drabness of academic life and quickly became the oracle of the New Left, combining the rebel life style of James Dean and the moral passion of Albert Camus, with the comprehensive portrayal of the American condition we were all looking for. Mills died in his early forties […] during the very spring I was drafting the *Port Huron Statement*, before any of us had a chance to meet him, making him forever a martyr to the movement. […] He seemed to be speaking to us directly when he declared in his famous letter to "The New Left" that all over the world young radical intellectuals were breaking the old molds, leading the way out of apathy. Mills's analysis validated us not only personally, but as a generation and as activist-organizers, the political identity we were beginning to adopt."[93]

Indeed, Mills' *Letter to the New Left* outlined the principles of participatory democracy and was perhaps the single most influential document in the early history of SDS, around which the *Port Huron Statement* had been focused. Tom Hayden even wrote his Master's thesis, entitled *Radical Nomad*, on Mills. Students were

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[89] Kathryn Mills and Pamela Mills, *C. Wright Mills: Letters and Autobiographical Writings*, 3.
[90] Andrew Jamison and Ron Eyerman, *Seeds of the Sixties* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 16.
[91] Francis D. Raška, "Impakt amerického studentského hnutí v šedesátých a sedmdesátých letech dvacátého století na domácí společnost," in *Konsolidace vládnutí a podnikání v České republice a v Evropské unii III*, ed. Jiří Pešek (Praha: Matfyzpress, 2002), 47–56.
[92] Kathryn Mills and Pamela Mills, *C. Wright Mills: Letters and Autobiographical Writings*, 4.
[93] Ibid.

attracted not only by Mills' radicalism, but also by his literary style and professionalism. The appendix to *The Sociological Imagination*, entitled *On Intellectual Craftsmanship*, represents not only an instruction manual for sociologists, but also an introduction to the adventure of intellectual work. Todd Gitlin, an acknowledged expert on the 1960s and also on Mills reminds us in his afterword to the most recent edition of *The Sociological Imagination* that the following excerpt from *On Intellectual Craftsmanship* was placed next to his typewriter when in college[94]:

"Before you are through with any piece of work, no matter how indirectly on occasion, orient it to the central and continuing task of understanding the structure and the drift, the shaping and the meanings, of your own period, the terrible and magnificent world of human society in the second half of the twentieth century."[95]

A distinguished sociologist, Stanley Aronowitz, has recently written that during the last three decades of the twentieth century, C. Wright Mills was consigned to a kind of academic purgatory.

"In the wake of scandals involving leading corporations and their Chief Executive and Financial Officers, which have become daily fare, even in the mainstream media, and the hegemony of corporate capital over the American state, which was widely reported in the press and television with unembarrassed approbation, Mills work is experiencing a small, but pronounced revival. Although his name rarely appears on the reading lists of fashionable graduate courses in social and cultural theory, the republication of four of his major books, with new introductions by the historian Nelson Lichtenstein (*New Men of Power*), the social critic Russell Jacoby (*White Collar*), political theorist Alan Wolfe (*The Power Elite*), and sociologist Todd Gitlin (*The Sociological Imagination*) is likely to aid in exposing his work to students and younger faculty."[96]

Mills remains a model for those who wish to become intellectuals. In his afterword to *The Power Elite* published in 2000, Alan Wolfe analyzes the book's validity in the present day. Wolfe believes that Mills was right about the corporate elites, but adds that Mills could not have predicted the rise of some industries, such as information technology, and the decline of others. However, Mills portrayal of corporate executives has turned out to be invalid today. Mills had portrayed them

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[94] Gitlin, Afterword to *Sociological Imagination,* 232.
[95] C. Wright Mills, *Sociological Imagination,* 225.
[96] Aronowitz, "A Mills Revival?", 1.

as men who "must fit in" with those already at the top. He was also disdainful of their competence. This may have been accurate in the 1950s, but is certainly not true today. In Mills' time, industrial leaders in the United States faced few challenges. Leaders at General Motors did not have to worry that Toyota or Honda would be their greatest challenge. In the stable American market of the 1950s, the best way to get ahead was by going along. The corporate executives of today face much stiffer competition and uniformity would drive their respective companies out of business.

As an interpreter of Weber, Mills accepted Weber's idea that a heavily bureaucratized society would also be a stable and conservative society. Only in such a society could the power elite control all events. The radical changes in the competitive dynamics of American capitalism have important implications for the characterization of the power elite today. While those in the corporate hierarchy remain today, as in the times of Mills, the most powerful Americans, even they cannot control rapid technological transformations and global competition. Often events control people, not vice versa.

Another part of the power elite were the warlords. Mills argued that America's military elite was linked to the economic and political elite. It is true today that politicians are extremely friendly to the military, and that military contracts are critical for key industries. The role played by the United States in world affairs has changed. Since the end of the Vietnam conflict, the United States has been unable to muster its forces for sustained use in any foreign conflict. Worried about the possibility of a public backlash against the loss of American lives, American presidents have either refrained from pursuing military adventures abroad or have confined them to rapid strikes. Moreover, since 1989, the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union has undermined the capacity of America's elites to mobilize support for military expenditures.[97]

A change came with the tragic events of 9/11 and President George W. Bush's response to it. The United States is, once again, involved in a prolonged military conflict abroad called the War on Terror. It is clear, however, that public support for Iraq intervention is in steady decline. The military continues to close its bases. At the height of the Cold War, military expenditures represented 60 percent of federal outlays. Today, despite the Iraq War, they are only a fraction of that. In contrast with Mills' time, it appears that the American economic elite finds more in common with economic elites abroad than it does with the military elite of its own country.

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[97] Wolfe, Afterword to *The Power Elite*, 366–373.

The third leg of the power elite are politicians and public officials in control of the executive and legislative branches of government. Mills believed that this part of the power elite must rely on public media and that access to such media is expensive. But Mills could not have foreseen the cost of the electoral process today and the media's role in it. Engaged in a permanent campaign for office, politicians have to become permanent fund raisers. As the political process becomes ever more expensive, corporate sponsors may have more power over politicians than when Mills wrote his books.[98]

In *The Power Elite*, Mills defined the "mass society" as a conglomerate of atomized individuals not connected through class interests and solidarity. It is a "lonely crowd" of human atoms formed by the decomposition of ties of classical class division. The mass in this concept is neither a creative, nor a destructive historical force, but only an inert base for extraordinary concentration of power in the hands of a determined minority. The mass society cannot be but a passive object of historical action. It is not a negative pole of historical dialectics, but has become a positive component of the one-dimensional society of "eternal return" of the same, to reproduction of basic relations of the existing society, i. e. relations of the "mass society" and "power elite."[99]

At the dawn of the new millennium, calls have been made to revive the Mills legacy. At the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Lauren Langman presented a lecture, *History and Biography in a Global Age: The Legacy of C. Wright Mills*.[100] Langman called for the application of the sociological imagination to the current state of society. In the 1960s, a number of audiences had begun to pay heed to the questions raised by Mills. This progressive moment of sociology, however, was ephemeral. Due to a variety of structural forces, a variety of mobilizations in favor of civil rights, against the Vietnam War, and to promote feminism had taken place by the end of that era. These events did inspire a number of sociologists who were informed by the sociological imagination. A number of social critiques addressed alienation, conformity, "one-dimensionality," and questions of meaning. The legacy of that era still endures if only in voto soce.[101]

Langman purports to answer why that era waned and how fewer sociologists pay attention to the sociological imagination as follows:

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[98] Ibid., 376.
[99] Sochor, Afterword to *Sociologická imaginace*, 207.
[100] Lauren Langman, *History and Biography in a Global Age: The Legacy of C. Wright Mills*, www.angelfire.com/or/sociologyshop/langmills.html.
[101] Ibid., 2.

"The Civil Rights Act and the end of the Vietnam War lowered the intensity of pressure for social change. At the same time, the Young Turks of sociology were seeking academic jobs and tenure, and the sociological establishment did not take kindly to leftist firebrands. Radicalism moved from social movements to deconstructing local texts and discourses. […] By the end of the 70s, the progressive movements of sociology had waned, as rock and roll became mainstream, sexual freedom became normative and remnants of activism became institutionalized. Yet in that era, radical changes in technology began to transform capitalist production. Little noted then, but Mills foretold what Bluestone, Bowles, and Gintis would later call the de-industrialization of an America being turned into an "industrial wasteland." New strategies of computerized, digitalized production, and/or the movement of production to off shore sites of cheap labor would portend the erosion of the labor movement and the decline of wages, colas, and many of the benefits that labor had won after hard struggles. By the 1980s, issues of unemployment, plant closings, and the growth of low paid service work garnered little attention in an era dominated by the make believe politics of the Reagan era in which the cultural tone was set by idolizing the rich of Dallas, Dynasty, and Knots Landing."

Langman calls for the revival of the sociological imagination and points out that changes in the labor market, the regional de-industrialization of America, sending production offshore, and the increase in low-paying jobs (called McJobs), and demands and enforcement of "pleasant" services by many service workers as well as the increasing number of people working from home has been leading to an increase in alienation. Some of the new arrangements of instrumental relations may provide "success" in business, but cannot provide a basis for social ties, connections, and commitments.

The nature of power elites has changed as well. The nation-state of Mills' era has been replaced by globalization. It is the condition of our age in which constraints of geography on economic, cultural, and political life have receded. Globalization now stands out as the fundamental historical context that most impacts people's lives. Thus, globalization is the central point of the sociological imagination of our time.

Globalization is accompanied by the changing dynamics of technologically advanced capitalism. Ownership is widely distributed beyond the country of origin and forms a network connected through the superfast electronic flow of information. It is also accompanied by the growth of multiple international regulatory agencies, global or continental, controlled by the most powerful members, namely the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the European

Union, NAFTA, CAFTA, etc. The dominance of international corporations, mergers, and acquisitions over national boundaries dominate most of the political and diplomatic decisions of today. Langman introduces some new terms, such as cyber-feudal society, and calls for cyber-activists as a needed balance of committed and concerned intellectuals whose role is to form conditions to publicize the information and impact publics for mobilization of demands for social policies of progressive change.[102]

In 2002, Kevin Mattson in his study of the New Left and radical liberalism reviews Mills' contributions in a chapter entitled *The Godfather, C. Wright Mills: The Intellectual as Agent*.[103] Mattson concludes that Mills became a "godfather" to the intellectuals who followed and who drew inspiration from him. It should be clear that they inherited tensions from Mills as well. Mills certainly left a living legacy. In 2003, John D. Brewer published a book *C. Wright Mills and the Ending of Violence*. He argues that it is possible to develop a sociological framework to explain the emergence and progress of the peace processes in Northern Ireland and South Africa, the two ethnically structured societies, using Mills' principle of "sociological imagination."[104] A brief evaluation of Mills by Dennis H. Wrong was published in 2003.[105] Wrong concludes that Mills was better at attacking the existing establishment than in proposing alternatives to it. As David Paul Haney writes in his recent book, *The Americanization of Social Science*:

"Mills himself, however, invoked the Deweyan principle of publicizing ideas in the name of the democratization of communication, regardless of the present obstacles to actual political activity. […] On the contrary, Mills set out to bend the mass media to his own ends, urging intellectuals to make the mass media the means of liberal-which is to say, liberating-education."[106]

Nevertheless, Mills' notions of what sociology should and might be remain powerfully attractive.

In his evaluation of Mills, Jan Balon points out the attempt of Michael Burawoy, who declared his allegiance to the concepts expressed in *The Sociological*

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[102] Ibid., 9–10.

[103] Kevin Mattson, *Intellectuals in Action: The Origins of the New Left and Radical Liberalism*, *1945–1970* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002), 43–96.

[104] John D. Brewer, *C. Wright Mills and the Ending of Violence* (London: Palgrave, 2003).

[105] Dennis H. Wrong, *Reflections on a Politically Skeptical Era* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 163–169.

[106] David Paul Haney, *The Americanization of Social Science* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), 230.

Imagination, to revive Mills' projects in 2005.[107] In a discussion that ensued, however, Burawoy's opinion was criticized and rejected.[108] Burawoy defends his opinions in *An Open Letter to C. Wright Mills*. He proposes, however, that Mills' contention that the ultimate values on which sociology and society rest, i. e. *reason* and *freedom*, should today be *justice* and *equality* instead.[109] Burawoy concludes his "letter" as follows:

"My admiration for your work knows no bounds. Your place in the history of sociology is assured. You have rightly been rediscovered as a pioneer of public sociology. But your vision here is still stuck in the past. Harking back to the classics of the nineteenth century and upholding the mythology of the non-attached free-floating intellectual, you present us with the Janus-faced sociologist-facing outwards is the independent intellectual talking down to publics and at kings, facing inwards is the self-absorbed craft worker, fighting off the pathologies of professionalization."[110]

Steven Seidman also postulates that the promise of freedom is no longer adequate for new analyses.[111] Balon quotes Seidman as stating:

"The scientific inquiry was almost destroyed by a flood of sharp attacks by those who consider themselves to be its casualties, namely people of color, those not residing in the West, women, lesbians, gays, the physically disabled, the poor or economically weak."[112]

Balon's analysis of Mills' *The Sociological Imagination* is a valuable contribution to the debate on Mills and his relevance to the discipline of sociology. Balon summarizes:

"His argument addresses crucially important questions about the public relevance of social inquiry and the underlying themes of social-scientific reflexivity, creativity, and non-conformity. However, despite his rhetorical force and stylistic

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[107] Jan Balon, "Ambivalentní odkaz Millsovy Sociologické imaginace," *Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review* 45, No. 5 (2009), 1058.

[108] Ibid., 1067.

[109] Michael Burawoy, "An Open Letter to C. Wright Mills", *Antipode* 40, No. 3 (2008): 374.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Steven Seidman, *Contested Knowledge: Social Theory Today* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).

[112] Balon, "Ambivaletní odkaz," 1066.

brilliance, Mills' overall message is considered to be ambivalent. His concept of social inquiry based on identification of morally and politically relevant problems ultimately leads to the vaporization of the very substance of social inquiry and to the institutional debilitation of the field as such."[113]

Conclusion

The world has changed profoundly since the times of C. Wright Mills. His large following, particularly among young intellectuals, has waned over the last thirty years. Graduate course syllabi at major universities only rarely refer to Mills or his publications and he is seldom cited in the current academic literature. Some of Mills' early admirers or disciples try to keep his legacy alive. Yet, the modern sociological literature contains little analysis of Mills' ideas and contributions. The recent re-publication of four of Mills' major works, however, may be indicative of a revival of interest in Mills on the American intellectual scene. However, the accompanying chapters to these new editions are guarded and only point out that the new editions speak for themselves. The report on Mills' collaboration with Gerth raises more questions than it answers. C. Wright Mills' long-term legacy thus still awaits comprehensive evaluation. Enough time has elapsed to permit objective and unemotional analysis.

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[113] Ibid., 1055.

CHINA'S GROWING ASSERTIVENESS IN THE SOUTH CHINA AND EAST CHINA SEAS: REACTIONS OF THE U.S. AND OTHER REGIONAL PLAYERS

JANA SEHNÁLKOVÁ

Abstract

The article looks at the increasing assertiveness of China in its coastal areas and examines the response of the U.S. and other regional actors. The article analyzes the major causes of the tensions arising in South China and East China Sea and provides an outlook into the future. It argues that China's rise and the consequential hedging against its growing power by other regional actors and related disputes over territory have a potential of complicating the future security in Asia. It concludes that the U.S. must continue to play a key role as a guarantee of the regional order in Southeast Asia.
Keywords: US, China, Vietnam, Taiwan, South China Sea, East China Sea, Japan, Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, ASEAN, UNCLOS, territorial disputes, EEZ, arms races, hedging

> *In the end, whatever the challenges, U.S. core interests require that it remains the superior power on the Pacific. To give up this position would diminish America's role throughout the world.*
> Lee Kuan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore.[1]

> *The great power that controls the South China Sea will dominate both archipelagic and peninsular Southeast Asia and play a decisive role in the future of the western Pacific and Indian Ocean – together with their strategic sea lanes to and from the oil fields of the Middle East.*
> Former national security advisor to the Philippine government Jose Almonte. [2]

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[1]   Quoted by Christian Caryl, "Panda-Hugger Hungover," *Foreign Policy*, August 4, 2010, http://www .foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/04/panda_hugger_hangover.
[2]   See Brad Glosserman, "Cooling South China Sea Competition," *PacNet*, No. 22A (June 1, 2001).

Introduction

The region along the southern and eastern coast of China has been gaining a more prominent place in the U.S. foreign policy. It is the focal point of several phenomena that the U.S. perceives as a challenge to its influence and interests in the region. The rise of China contests the stability of the international order the U.S. helped to build in the second half of the twentieth century. China's gradual transformation into a dominant regional power raises many questions about Beijing's intentions and future use of its newly obtained status. China's rise is causing a shift of the regional balance of power and may in consequence put a question mark over the continued U.S. presence in Asia-Pacific. It also impacts the interests and policies of individual South East and East Asian nations, which in effect reassess their roles in the region. Economic success of many of the nations in China's neighborhood has been translated into a particularly notable phenomenon – an increase in military spending in response to the changing security environment and growing uncertainty about the future developments. Rising military expenditures by individual countries in the region have added to the growing volatility in the region.

In response to China's growing regional influence, President Obama's first steps in Sino-American relations indicated that his administration was going to favor cooperative engagement. China was viewed as a fundamental component of Obama's vision for the U.S. foreign policy where Beijing and Washington would work in concert to achieve common interests – the most prominent being an improvement in the quality of international governance. Obama's approach was based on the belief that treating China as an equal partner would satisfy the Chinese leaders and would in consequence facilitate Beijing's more active involvement in global affairs and encourage its cooperation on issues such as North Korea. However, so far, China has not reacted as favorably as Obama had probably expected. On numerous occasions, Beijing has been resistant, non-cooperative and assertive in many areas of U.S. interest. China's rather independent streak signals that it refuses to take up the role of a "responsible stakeholder"[3] in the U.S.-led international order.[4]

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[3] Expression coined by Robert B. Zoellick, "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility," Remarks to the National Committee on U.S. China Relations. *NBR Analysis* 16, No. 4 (December 2005), http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol16no4.pdf.

[4] For more on the shift of Obama's approach towards China, see e.g. "America and China: By Fits and Starts," *The Economist*, February 4, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/15452683; Mark Landler, "China Jittery About Obama Amid Signs of Harder Line," *New York Times*, January 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/24/washington/24diplo.html.

Chinese foreign policy of non-interference makes it very clear that China does not want to be the stabilizer or "policeman" that the West would want her to be. Recently, China's independent and more assertive behavior may also be attributed to the impact of the global financial crisis. Perceiving the U.S. as weakened by the economic fallout, China, which has successfully maintained economic growth during the crisis and took over Japan as the number two world economy, may now feel empowered on international issues. On the other hand, China's behavior must also be seen through the prism of its long-term effort to secure its own sphere of influence via reducing or obstructing the leverage of the U.S. in the region.

After investing his political capital into efforts to establish cooperative relationship with Beijing, which has not materialized, Obama administration was forced to change tactic. While still seeking ways to engage China, by the beginning of 2010, following a spat over arms sales to Taiwan, the U.S. shifted diplomatic focus on deepening ties with other nations in China's neighborhood. The administration adopted less compromising approach towards Beijing and did not shy away from policies and positions advancing U.S. interests despite upsetting the Chinese leaders,[5] such as expressing an unwavering support for South Korean government after the Cheonan sinking by North Korean military.

China's Peaceful Rise or China Threat?

The term "peaceful rise" was coined by Zheng Bijian, chairman of the China Reform Forum, in response to concerns over the direction of People's Republic of China's (PRC) economic and political transformation. In his 2005 *Foreign Affairs* article, Zheng Bijian emphasized that Beijing remains committed to a "peaceful rise": "China does not seek hegemony or predominance in world affairs. It advocates a new international political and economic order, one that can be achieved through incremental reforms and the democratization of international relations. China's development depends on world peace – a peace that its development will in turn reinforce."[6] In other words, Zheng Bijian outlined that the PRC's foreign policy would aim at promoting China's interest without using force (unless it is absolutely necessary). However, in the West, Mr. Zheng's policy pronouncement inspired (false) hope that China was moving toward being a 'responsible stakeholder', which will use its power to strengthen the existing international order.

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5   Thomas Wright, "How China Gambit Backfired," *The Diplomat*, July 28, 2010, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/07/28/how-china-gambit-backfired/.

6   Bijian Zheng, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status," *Foreign Affairs* 84, No. 5 (September/October 2005): 24.

Table 1: **Increase in the PRC's Military Budget from 2000–2010**

Budget Year	Official Budget in RMB	Official Budget in USD	Increase over the year (%)
2000	121.3	14.6	12.6
2001	141.0	17.0	17.7
2002	166.0	20.0	17.6
2003	185.3	22.4	9.6
2004	206.5	25.0	11.6
2005	247.7	29.9	12.6
2006	280.0	35.3	15.0
2007	350.92	45.0	17.8
2008	417.8	57.2	17.6
2009	480.7	70.3	14.9
2010	532.1	77.9	7.5

Source: China's Defense Budget, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm.

However, there were at the same time many Washington policy-makers and China watchers, especially from military circles, who voiced doubts over China's "peaceful rise" and China's contribution to upholding the liberal international order. They pointed out that Beijing and Washington do not share the same view on how the international system should operate – in their opinion, these differences will ultimately increase tensions.[7] China's military modernization in particular raises questions over Beijing's long-term goals and intentions.[8] In the eyes of many critics, China's "peaceful rise" rather amounts to China's threat. Prof. Stephen Walt of Harvard University points out: "Assuming China continues to grow economically, it will also increase its military power and thus its capacity to threaten certain U.S. interests."[9] In his January 2010 hearing before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Admiral Willard warned that China's "new military capabilities appear designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region and, if necessary, enforce China's influence over its neighbors – including our regional allies and

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[7] See e.g. Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the Republic of China, published annually by the U.S. Department of Defense.

[8] See Table 1 that indicates the growing spending on the People's Liberation Army. In the past ten years, the PRC's military budget grew by more than 10 percent annually (with the exception of 2010).

[9] Stephen M. Walt, "How Long Can Beijing and Washington Handle Their Relationship," *Foreign Policy*, September 15, 2010, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/15/how_long_can_beijing _and_washington_handle_their_relationship.

partners."[10] There are also serious concerns that China's increasing military power has been spurring regional arms race.[11]

The 2010 *Annual Report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China*[12] highlights several important areas of concern to the U.S.:

1. The modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) goes beyond China's immediate territorial waters: China is making progress in strengthening its *power-projection capabilities*. The *Report* emphasizes that while the military build-up is primarily intended to deter Taiwan from pursuing independence, it also increases the PLA's ability to "deter, delay, or deny any possible U.S. support for the Island of conflict."[13] As if to confirm the *Report's* concerns, Chinese officials stated that in the near future, they intended to deploy their own aircraft carrier(s), which will increase China's power-projection ability.[14]

2. Improvement of *anti-access/area denial capability* as well as increasing strike range of PRC's missiles continues to undermine U.S. ability to sustain its commitments to its partners in the region. In this respect, experts raise particular concern over China's anti-ship ballistic missiles, which China made operational in 2010. These missiles, against which the U.S. Navy has no defense, would substantially extend China's firepower, as it is estimated that the missile could strike targets within a range of 1,000 miles. In the future, they could target and effectively damage or even destroy aircraft carriers.[15]

3. *Transformation of cross-Strait balance*: While most analysts agree that China's military force remains inferior to the U.S. military for the time being, there are concerns that the PLA's capability to inflict increasing damage and casualties in case of conflict may erode the U.S. commitment to allies and particularly to the defense of Taiwan. Recent RAND study pointed out that China's grow-

[10] Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, the United States Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Before the House Armed Services Committee on Recent Security Developments Involving China, January 13, 2010.

[11] See e.g. Yoichi Kato, "U.S. Commander Blasts Chinese Navy's Behavior," *Asahi Shimbun*, June 15, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201006140534.html; "India is World's Largest Importer' of Arms, Says Study," *BBC News*, March 14, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12729363.

[12] *Annual Report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China* (A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010), Department of Defense, 2010.

[13] Ibid.

[14] "China Rebuilds Aircraft Carrier Body for Research, Training," *CCTV* News, July 27, 2011, http://english.cntv.cn/program/newsupdate/20110727/116731.shtml.

[15] Kathrin Hille, "Chinese Missile Shifts Power in Pacific," *Financial Times*, December 28, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3e69c85a-1264-11e0-b4c8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1BWcBVWUR.

ing military capabilities, combined with "geographic asymmetry – Taiwan lies close to China and very far from the United States – […] and the lack of basing options for U.S. forces in the vicinity of the strait, call into question Washington's ability to credibly serve as guarantor of Taiwan's security in the future."[16]

4. There has been *slow progress on China's military transparency*. In this respect, the *Report* points out that besides Taiwan Strait Contingency, it is still not quite clear what is the purpose and goal of PLA's modernization.[17]

5. For the first time, separate chapter of the *Report* is devoted to *military-to-military ties*, which are perceived as a crucial element of mutual confidence-building measures. However, the U.S. laments China's recurring willingness to suspend military contacts as an expression of its dissatisfaction with Washington's policies. Last time the Chinese suspended the military relations followed after Obama administration approved of arms sales to Taiwan worth $6.7 billion in January and after President Obama met with the Dalai Lama in February 2010.[18]

So far, *the Report* concludes that overall, despite its speedy progress, China's military still can't match the US forces in many aspects. With respect to projection of power, China's power is at best limited to coastal waters. Despite the efforts to enhance anti-access/area-denial capacities, these still remain limited: "It is unlikely […] that China will be able to project and sustain large forces in high-intensity combat operations far from China until well into the following decade."[19] Additionally, China has been so far dependent on foreign arms sales and is only gradually developing its own domestically-produced military capabilities, while facing many technological obstacles.[20] Most importantly, China's rise, particularly in military terms, has not caused a major transformation of the security order in East Asia.

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16 David A. Shlapak et al., *A Question of Balance. Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute* (RAND Corporation, 2009), 19.

17 *Annual Report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China* (A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010), Department of Defense, 2010.

18 The military-to-military contacts were renewed in October 2010. See Craig Whitlock, "Gates Meeting Marks Step in Warming Frosty Military Relationship with China," *Washington Post*, October 11, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/11/AR2010101102507.html.

19 *Annual Report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China* (A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010), Department of Defense, 2010.

20 However, this situation may change in the near future, as China's domestic capabilities to produce high-quality weapons that may challenge U.S. superiority. See e.g. "An End to America's Air Invincibility? China's New Stealth Fighter Jet Likely to Reshape U.S. Military Strategy in Asia," *Newsweek*, January 18, 2011, http://www.newsweek.com/2011/01/18/an-end-to-america-s-air-invincibility.html#.

Major alliances remain unchanged; the U.S. is still the partner of choice to counterbalance PRC's growing (military) power. In fact, some segments of the security cooperation with these countries have become even more relevant – especially after recent tensions in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

China's Claims over South China Sea

Although Washington's attention to China's rise has in the past often focused on the unresolved issue of Taiwan, the volatility of the Taiwan Strait issue has recently been reduced due to the rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei. What recently begins to stand out as a more important issue are China's increasing power-projection capabilities and more assertive behavior in Southeast and East Asia, particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

The potential for a conflict in China's neighboring seas is linked primarily to numerous sea border disputes over potential energy-rich maritime areas, which are not clearly demarcated.[21] While China's increasing demand for energy resources looms large in these disputes, stakes are also high for other countries in the region, such as Japan or the Philippines, which themselves are dependent on imported sources of energy. The area of South China and East China Sea also bears strategic importance as it serves as an important link between the Middle East and Northeast Asia (and Western Pacific). The sea lanes of communications running through the East China Sea and South China Sea are among the busiest in the world. Increased tension or armed conflict within the area would thus seriously disrupt global trade.

In the light of the above-mentioned arguments, the areas of South China and East China Seas play an important role in the U.S. strategic thinking, as they are closely linked to securing U.S. national interest – to keep open the sea lanes of communication, facilitate economic exchange and growth, and most importantly, to maintain the regional balance of power, sustain the prominent role of the U.S. as the guarantor of regional security in Asia and honor the U.S. commitments to the allies in the region.

The year 2010 has witnessed a number of cases, when China projected its power in Southeast Asia. The PRC continues its territorial disputes with East and Southeast Asian nations, including a dispute with Japan (and Taiwan) over Senkaku/Diaoyutai in East China Sea, with Vietnam over the delimitation of the Gulf

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[21] Suisheng Zhao, "China's Global Search for Energy Security: Cooperation and Competitition in Asia Pacific," *Journal of Contemporary China* 17, 55 (May 2008), 220.

Table 2: **South China Sea Territorial Disputes**

Claims by Country				
Country	South China Sea	Spratly Islands	Paracel Islands	Gulf of Thailand
Brunei	Within UNCLOS**	no formal claim	no	n/a
Cambodia	not applicable (n/a)	n/a	n/a	Within UNCLOS
China	all	all	all	n/a
Indonesia	Within UNCLOS	no	no	n/a
Malaysia	Within UNCLOS	3 islands	no	Within UNCLOS
Philippines	significant portions	8 islands	no	n/a
Taiwan	all*	all	all	n/a
Thailand	n/a	n/a	n/a	Within UNCLOS
Vietnam	all*	all	all	Within UNCLOS

**UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Source: South China Sea Territorial Issues, *U.S. Energy Information Administration*, http://www.eia.
doe.gov/cabs/South_China_Sea/SouthChinaSeaTerritorialIssues.html.

of Tonkin, with Vietnam over the Spratly/Nansha Islands and with Vietnam, Tai-
wan, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines over Paracel Islands (or the Xisha and
Zhongsha) in the South China Sea.

The PLA's Navy (PLAN) has stipulated more assertive approach to the South
China and East China Seas, often intimidating Japanese, Vietnamese, Indonesian
or even American vessels.[22] PLA's Navy has been regularly harassing fishing boats
of other countries, while Beijing unilaterally issues bans for fishing activities in the
disputed waters. Meanwhile, China has been carrying out explorations in areas
that are deemed by others as outside China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ).[23]

The territorial disputes in the South China Sea have a long history. Beijing
and Hanoi engaged in several bloody exchanges over the Paracels and Spratlys – in
1974, the PRC seized the Western Paracels from Vietnam. In 1995, Beijing took
over the Mischief Reef from the Philippines. In 2004, China strongly objected to
Vietnam's decision that national oil company *PetroVietnam* would start interna-
tional bidding for exploration and drilling in areas that Hanoi claimed to control.
Beijing interfered, claiming that Vietnam was violating China's territorial sover-
eignty.

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[22] The most significant being the harassment of the USS Impeccable by the Chinese in South Chi-
na Sea in March 2009. See e.g. Ann Scott Tyson, "China Draws U.S. Protest Over Shadowing of
Ships," *Washington Post*, March 10, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2009/03/09/AR2009030900956.html.

[23] Exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, usually extending up
to 200 naval miles away from the coast. See UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Figure 1: **Map showing rival claims in the South China Sea**
Source: Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/images/schinasea.gif

In March 2010, during their Beijing visit, two senior Obama administration officials, Jeffrey A. Bader and James B. Steinberg, were informed by Chinese officials that China would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea, which was now, in their own words, part of China's "core interest" of sovereignty.[24] Beijing

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[24] Edward Wong, "Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power," *New York Times*, April 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24navy.html. China thus claims ownership of territory of almost 3.5 million km².

thus elevated the importance of South China Sea on a par with Taiwan and Tibet, signaling it will be defended at any cost. Chinese interest was backed by a series of stealth missions by a small manned submarine, which descended three kilometers below the sea level and planted a national flag on the South China seabed.[25] Beijing thus not only demonstrated its technological readiness to explore the resources at the ocean floor, but implicitly also its claim over the South China Sea territory.

At the same time, China has been implementing a new ambitious strategy called "far sea defense." The most tangible manifestation of this strategy can be seen in the island of Hainan, where the PLA has just recently completed construction of a major submarine base at Yalong Bay, which can house both nuclear and non-nuclear submarines. The *Sanya* base is perceived as a crucial element to China's power-projection ambitions, as its location allows the Chinese nuclear submarines easy access to South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca.[26]

There are broader strategic considerations behind China's moves. For China, South China Sea represents a hub for most of the crucial sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), through which the PRC transports about 80 % of its oil imports.[27] Obviously, Beijing is seeking strategic posts for better protection of its sea lanes of communication. At the same time, South China Sea is believed to be an abundant source of energy resources, such as natural gas.[28] The PRC, with its dependency on Middle East oil and ever-increasing demand for energy, does not mind flexing its muscle to secure access to these resource-rich areas.[29]

Many of the disputed islands in the South China Sea are often in fact just small uninhabitable rocks. It is highly improbable that they could be used as military outposts and their importance lies solely in the strategic value. The chase after energy[30] and other resources (such as fish) explains China's assertiveness in

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25 William J. Broad, "China Explores a Frontier 2 Miles Deep," *New York Times*, September 11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/science/12deepsea.html. Obviously, from the legal perspective, planting one's flag anywhere does not constitute any valid claim to that territory, it however has significant psychological impact.

26 Richard D. Fisher Jr., "China's Naval Secret," *Wall Street Journal*, May 5, 2008.

27 Dan Blumenthal, Joseph Lin, "Oil Obsession," *Armed Forces Journal*, June 2006, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1813592.

28 For more information about the resources, see Briefs by the U.S. Energy Information Agency. For South China Sea at http://www.eia.doe.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=SCS, for East China Sea http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=ECS.

29 A Chinese estimate suggests potential oil resources as high as 213 billion barrels of oil. Estimate by the U.S. Geological Survey puts the oil resources of the South China Sea at 28 billion barrel. See South China Sea: Oil & Gas (Fact Sheet), *U.S. Energy Information Administration*, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/South_China_Sea/OilNaturalGas.html.

30 China's dependency on imported oil is growing. In 2008, 50% of oil consumption was imported. By 2015, China will have to import two thirds of its oil consumption and in 2030, four fifths. See

disputes over border demarcation. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gave each maritime country special rights over exploration and the use of resources within the EEZ area. However, China's EEZ overlaps with other countries' EEZs, often causing flares of tensions when e.g. Chinese vessels conduct exploration in area, which is deemed as EEZ by both China and Japan. Command over small islets would thus boost China's claim of control over the adjacent territory, which could be declared the PRC's EEZ.[31]

The U.S. approach complicates these matters even more. The U.S. signed the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, but the U.S. Senate has yet to ratify it.[32] The U.S. Navy expressed respect for the UNCLOS provision; tensions however arise over Washington's and Beijing's interpretations. The U.S. insists that activities, such as naval and air patrols, mapping of the sea bed of the EEZ, are legitimate, as long as they are carried out outside of China's territorial waters, which the U.S. defines (on the basis of UNCLOS) as waters extending up to 12 nautical miles from the shore. According to China, no such activities as military patrols may be carried out in the EEZ. In China's perspective, U.S. naval activities within the EEZ (which often focus on surveillance) violate the PRC's sovereignty.[33]

China's Claims in East China Sea

East China Sea has also been subject to territorial disputes – in this case between the PRC and Japan. The roots of the controversy go back to the 1970s when the U.S. decided to include the disputed islands of Senkaku under Japanese jurisdiction. China since then claims that these islands, located only 12 nautical miles

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Annual Report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010), Department of Defense, 2010.

[31] Obviously, the same works for other maritime countries in the region. For more details, see e.g. Mark Valencia, "Tempting the Dragon," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 11, 2009. The PRC ratified the UNCLOS with an exception: "The Government of the People's Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention." By this, China in fact refuses international mediation of its maritime territorial disputes.

[32] There has been quite an intensive pressure from various groups within the Senate and various lobbies for the ratification of the treaty. President Obama supports ratification of the UNCLOS, but so far no vote has taken place on the floor of the US Senate. There is a number of anti-UNCLOS Senators who often base their rejection on the usual claims about such treaties impeding U.S. sovereignty. See Lauren Morello, "U.S. Pushes for Law of the Sea Ratification as New Arctic Mapping Project Begins," *New York Times*, July 29, 2009.

[33] See e.g. Mark Valencia, "Tempting the Dragon," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 11, 2009.

Figure 2: **Map showing rival claims in the East China Sea**
Source: East China Territorial Issues, U.S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.gov /countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=ECS.

northeast from Taiwan, are part of the Taiwan province and therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the PRC. The matter is complicated even further by Taiwan, which raised claims of the Republic of China's sovereignty over the islands. Recently, there have been cases of activists from the PRC, Taiwan, and Japan arriving to these uninhabited islands with the goal of making the case for control over the islands for their respective government.

This dispute is also linked to differing interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. While Japan claims its EEZ is defined by "median line," Beijing claims its EEZ includes almost entire East China Sea on basis of extending the continental shelf. Obviously, access to valuable resources (particularly natural gas) is at the heart of this dispute.

The tensions between Beijing and Tokyo increased in 2005 when China started drilling for natural gas in so-called Chunxiao field, located only 3 miles from the

median line. Tokyo responded by launching its own drilling expedition to which Beijing angrily responded by military maneuvers, claiming that Japan violated Chinese territory.[34] Japan since then ceased further exploration and both Beijing and Tokyo are negotiating a framework for possible cooperation,[35] but obviously none of the sides wants to compromise over access to valuable resources. Therefore the potential for conflict escalation still exists, as hunger for resources, China's nationalism which often takes a form of anti-Japanese sentiment, and increasing popularity of China-bashing as a political tool in Japan create a potentially volatile mix. Occasional ventures of Chinese submarines,[36] naval vessels and fishing boats into Japanese waters have also raised suspicion.

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands represent one of the major flash points between Japan and China in the East China Sea. In September 2010, Japanese Coast Guard arrested crew of a Chinese fishing boat that was operating in the waters near to Senkaku, resulting in a major diplomatic row between Beijing and Tokyo. Beijing canceled Sino-Japanese summit, instructed tourists not to visit Japan, allowed anti-Japanese protests in many Chinese cities,[37] and also moved to stop export of rare minerals to Japan.[38]

China's bullish behavior however prompted a backlash from the U.S. In her comments on the Senkaku situation, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, while calling for peaceful and cooperative resolution of the dispute, clearly sided with the Japanese and warned Beijing: "Let me say clearly again the Senkakus fall within the scope of article 5 of the 1960 US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security."[39]

Is There a Chance for Diplomatic Solution?

Most of China's neighbors are rather ambivalent about Beijing's growing economic and military clouts as they see both opportunities and challenges. Although

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[34] James Manicom, "Hu-Fukuda Summit: The East China Sea Dispute," *China Brief* 8, No. 12, June 6, 2008.

[35] There have been numerous efforts to set up bilateral dispute-solving mechanisms (bilateral security dialog), but no major breakthrough has been reached yet.

[36] Such as the one in 2004. See Nao Shimoyachi, "Chinese Submarine Incursion Considered an Act of Provocation," *Japan Times*, November 19, 2004, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/member/member.html?nn20041113a4.htm.

[37] Alexa Olesen, "China Allows Rowdy Anti-Japanese Protests," *Associated Press*, Monday 18, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101018/ap_on_re_as/as_china_japan.

[38] China refused the claim that stalling the export of rare minerals was related to the Senkaku incident.

[39] Lachlan Carmichael, "U.S., Japan Hit Back at China's Muscle Flexing," *AFP*, October 28, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20101028/pl_afp/usaustraliaaseandiplomacyjapan_20101028150156.

growing increasingly dependent on China's economy, countries in the region become at the same time wary of China's growing military power and assertiveness in the region. Many of these nations thus seek counterbalancing Beijing's influence by strengthening their security ties with the U.S. It is however important to emphasize that most of these countries do not want to choose between Beijing and Washington. In fact, they refute such a choice, hoping to keep their options open. At this point, most of China's neighbors want to reap benefits from economic cooperation with China, but at the same time want to protect their national interests against possible encroachment by Beijing. China is hardly perceived as an alternative security partner to the U.S. So far, China's increasing presence in East Asia does not seem to be translated into increased influence.[40] The same however cannot be said about South East Asia, where China's influence grew enormously in countries such as Myanmar, Laos or Cambodia.

So far, China paid little attention to cultivating its soft power. In many cases, Beijing signals willingness to engage in multilateral negotiations, however the buck always stops with China's national interest. Seeing securing access to South China Sea as essential for its national interest, there can be – at this point – little expectation for major diplomatic breakthrough. In this respect, a good example of China's position can be seen in Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi's rebuke of criticism of the PRC's behavior in South China Sea. He laconically stated: "China is a big country and other countries are just small countries, and that's just a fact."[41]

In 2002, China and ASEAN signed Code of Conduct in the South China Sea which committed all the signatories to a peaceful resolution of conflicts. However, Beijing generally prefers bilateral approach to dispute-solving. Such "divide and conquer" approach deprives China's neighbors of the leverage they could use if negotiating through multilateral platforms of ASEAN or Asian Regional Forum (ARF) and in fact enables Beijing to push for more concessions. This has been the reason why in 2010 in Hanoi, China worked hard to keep the South China Sea issue off the official agenda. When the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton finally brought up the topic of South China Sea, China strongly objected to internationalization of the issue.[42] The PRC's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said: "Turning the

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[40] Evan S. Medeiros, "The New Security Drama in East Asia: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners to China's Rise," *New War College Review* 62, no. 4 (Autumn 2009): 39–40.

[41] Daniel Blumenthal, "What Happpened to China's Peaceful Rise," *Foreign Policy*, October 21, 2010, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/21/what_happened_to_chinas_peaceful_rise.

[42] Here, it should be mentioned that the U.S. "discovered" ASEAN only recently. While supporting multilateral fora in Asia in the past, Washington, similarly to Beijing, preferred dealing with Asian countries on bilateral basis.

bilateral issue into an international or multilateral would only worsen the situation and add difficulties to solving the issue."[43]

With respect to maritime disputes, ASEAN countries seem to be rather divided over dealing with Beijing. In the past, some of the countries, such as the Philippines, explored a possibility of a bilateral deal with the Chinese on joint exploration of potential energy resources, ignoring the other ASEAN members' efforts to find a common position to deal with China's claims over the South China Sea. In exchange, Beijing offered Manila substantial benefits – loans without preconditions to finance improvements in governance and funding for numerous construction projects. As a result of its charm offensive, China was able of to conclude a deal called Joint Maritime Seismic Understanding, which was signed by China National Offshore Oil Company, Philippines' PETRON and quite surprisingly Vietnam's national oil company PetroVietnam. This deal, however, was a mixed blessing as it brought more problems than benefits – other ASEAN countries criticized the Filipino government for breaking the ranks and several Filipino government officials were subsequently investigated for alleged corruption.[44]

Despite efforts to find ways to coordinate conduct in the South China Sea, tensions remain. Each of the parties involved seeks alternative ways how to populate and subsequently claim control over disputed islets, such as building tourist facilities.[45]

Most of the nations in the region have also responded by increase of their military budgets (see Tables 2, 3). Many of them take steps in modernizing their military forces that can be interpreted as a direct response to China's rise and behavior. As Washington Post's John Pomfret reported, "the nations of Southeast Asia are building their militaries, buying submarines and jet fighters at a record pace […] as a hedge against China's rise and its claims to all of the South China Sea."[46] According to SIPRI 2009 Report, South East Asian countries introduce weapons that give their militaries new capabilities for long-distance operations.[47] This includes Vietnam which recently agreed to buy six Kilo-class submarines, Sukhoi

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43 Ernest Bower, "A Tale of Bilateralism and Secrecy in the South China Sea," *CSIS Newsletter* 1, Issue 23 (July 27, 2010): 2.
44 Ibid.
45 Typical example being development of "bird-watching towers" in the Spratly Islands by groups from Taiwan or Vietnam.
46 John Pomfret, "Concerned About China's Rise, Southeast Asian Nations Build Up Militaries," *Washington Post*, August 9, 2010, A08.
47 Siemon T. Wezeman, "Arms Transfers to Asia and Oceania," *SIPRI Background Paper*, October 2009, http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIBP0910a.pdf.

Table 3: **Selected East Asian Countries' Defense Budgets in US$ billion (2005 US$)**

Country/Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Japan	43.50	43.50	44.50	44.70	44.70	44.20	43.80	43.50	43.30	43.20	43.40
Indonesia	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.20	2.70	2.60	2.50
Malaysia	2.30	1.90	2.30	2.50	2.60	2.30	2.50	3.00	3.30	3.40	3.20
Philippines	1.30	1.30	1.00	1.30	0.90	1.00	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90
Singapore	4.90	4.80	5.20	5.40	5.40	5.30	5.60	5.80	5.80	5.90	6.20
Thailand	2.20	2.20	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.10	2.00	2.00	2.60	3.10	3.70
Vietnam	2.10	2.60	3.10	2.60	2.60	3.00	3.20	3.20	3.30	2.10	2.10
China	14.80	16.50	19.40	23.00	25.20	27.60	30.20	35.50	39.90	43.90	50.60
South Korea	17.20	17.20	17.70	18.20	18.50	19.10	20.30	22.20	22.40	23.40	24.70
Taiwan	11.10	12.30	8.40	8.10	7.20	7.80	7.80	7.90	9.60	10.40	9.60

Source: Table compiled by the author using data from 2009 Economic Trends in Asia-Pacific, Australia's Department of Defense, 2009, http://www.defence.gov.au/dio/documents/DET_09.pdf.

aircraft and other military hardware from Russia.[48] Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia also seek to acquire submarines. South Korea has been investing heavily into modernization of its naval and amphibious forces. Many of these nations seem to be aware that their investment into advanced weaponry and capabilities for long-distance operations may be destabilizing; therefore, there has been an effort to introduce confidence-building measures and transparency mechanisms, such as regular publication of Defense White Papers.[49] However, as SIPRI points out, "the level of transparency on arms acquisitions and the reasons behind the decisions remain in some cases inadequate to prevent worst-case scenario reactions."[50] Given the growth dynamics of the South East Asian region, it may be however expected that the trend of increasing military procurement will likely continue in the future. According to an opinion survey among Asia's "strategic elites,"[51] China is perceived as the "most likely threat to peace and security in Asia in 10 years,"

[48] Richard Weitz, "Moscow's Asian Nuclear Campaign," *The Diplomat* (November 2, 2010), http://the-diplomat.com/2010/11/02/moscow's-asian-nuclear-campaign/.

[49] Usually promoted on multilateral basis, e.g. by ASEAN.

[50] Arms Transfers to Asia and Oceania, *SIPRI Background Paper*, October 2009, http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIBP0910a.pdf.

[51] The survey was carried out by CSIS. It was based on a selection of experts from the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Australia, and Singapore. For more details, see Bates Gill et al., "Strategic Views on Asian Regionalism: Survey Results and Analysis," *CSIS Report*, February 2009, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090217_gill_stratviews_web.pdf.

Figure 3: **Selected East Asian Countries' Defense Budget in US$ billion (2005 US$)**

outpacing even North Korea. The survey also underscored the fact that most of the respondents believed that "the United States would play a continued positive and stabilizing role in the region."[52]

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52 Bates Gill et al., "Strategic Views on Asian Regionalism: Survey Results and Analysis," *CSIS Report*, February 2009, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090217_gill_stratviews_web.pdf.

Figure 4: **Detail derived from Table 4: Selected East Asian Countries' Defense Budget in US$ billion (2005 US$)**


Figure 5: **Military expenditure in East Asia in constant US dollars, 1990–2009 (US$ b)**
Source: Graph created by the author using data from SIPRI Report. The graph aims to illustrate the trends in military expenditures in East Asia. SIPRI did not include data from Vietnam. North Korea's and Burma's expenditures are only estimates. See Military expenditures by region in constant U.S. dollar prices, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/worldreg2010.

It therefore seems logical that many of the South East Asian countries seek to strengthen their partnership with the U.S. "Rather than using the rise of China as a strategic counterweight to American primacy, most countries in Asia seem to be quietly bandwagoning with the United States to balance against China's future power potential," concludes a report by Australia's Lowy Institute.[53]

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[53] Malcom Cook et al., "Power and Choice: Asian Security Future," *Lowy Institute for International Policy Report*, June 2010, 22, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1306.

U.S. Reaction

The U.S. is pushing back on to reassert its presence in East Asia. In June 2010, the U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates described the territorial disputes in South China Sea as an "area of growing concern for the United States."[54] Few days after Gates, the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, Admiral Patrick Walsh, blasted Chinese aggressive behavior in East China Sea as irresponsible and unprofessional: "This is an issue that has us very, very concerned because, on principle, the interference with freedom of navigation in international water is a core interest for those who use the global commons."[55]

So far, the U.S. confronts China by underscoring U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia and by putting emphasis on maintaining regional balance and stability as one of U.S. primary national interests. Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton repeatedly emphasized the importance of respecting freedom of navigation, protection of SLOCs, and unimpeded economic development and trade.

Hillary Clinton expressed the U.S. concerns about China's moves in South East Asia during her visit to ASEAN regional security forum in Hanoi in July 2010. She weighed in on the side of smaller South East Asian countries by stating that "the United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea […]. We oppose the use or threat of force by any claimant."[56] However, Beijing immediately rejected any U.S. role in China's territorial dispute resolution. An editorial in Global Times, a sister newspaper of the People's Daily, blasted the U.S. for trying to "meddle in the region, and force countries to choose between China and the U.S." and forcefully pointed out that "China will never waive its right to protect its core interest with military means."[57]

Besides the above-mentioned rhetorical support, the U.S. has become more involved in South East Asian multilateral mechanisms, such as the recent U.S. effort at advancing the claim for a seat at the East Asian Summit[58] or participa-

[54] Ian Storey, "Shangri-La Dialogue Highlights Tensions in Sino-U.S. Relations," *China Brief* 10, No. 13 (June 24, 2010): 11. Shangri-La Dialogue (annual meeting of defense ministers, military officers) took place on June 4–6 in Singapore.

[55] Yoichi Kato, "U.S. Commander Blasts Chinese Navy's Behavior," *Asahi Shimbun*, June 15, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201006140534.html.

[56] Hillary Clinton, "Remarks at Press Availability," Hanoi, Vietnam, July 23, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm.

[57] "American Shadow Over South China Sea," *Global Times*, July 26, 2010, http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2010-07/555723.html.

[58] P. S. Suryanarayana, "East Asia Summit to include U.S., Russia," *The Hindu*, July 25, 2010, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article532086.ece.

tion at ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus with Eight Dialogue Partners in October 2010. The U.S. engagement in South East Asian multilateral organizations sends an important signal: it shows that the U.S. recognizes their importance and sees multilateralism as the primary vehicle of keeping China's power ambitions in check. Washington also actively supports confidence-building measures and expansion of military exchanges and dialog. However, in this respect, the U.S. has to face several challenges: First, the countries of ASEAN are mutually divided and often unable to act in concert. Second, even if put together, they may not have the capacity to stand up to China. Third, many of the ASEAN countries may refuse to deepen cooperation with the U.S. It therefore remains to be seen whether the U.S. would feel confident to confront China unilaterally over fundamental issues.

On its part, China obviously is not happy about what Beijing sees as U.S. interference and thus launched a campaign to protect its national interests. In June 2010, Chinese Admiral Guan Youfei complained that the U.S. for trying to encircle China.[59] In August 2010, Rear Admiral Yang Yi published an article in Chinese military paper People's Liberation Daily, in which he blasted the U.S. for "engaging in an increasingly tight encirclement of China and constantly challenging China's core interest."[60] According to American officials, such views are rarely heard in the mutual negotiations. However, a senior Chinese official confirmed to Washington Post that such views were in fact widely accepted in China, particularly in military forces that perceive the U.S. as China's biggest threat.[61]

Regional Response to China's Rise: Drawing Closer to the U.S.?

Japan

The relations with Japan are extremely important for the U.S. role in East Asia. Washington and Tokyo are bound by a 50-year old security pact that allows the U.S. to maintain substantial military presence in East Asia. The U.S. keeps several bases in Japan (Kadena Air Base and Okinawa) with about 50,000 forward-deployed troops. This enables the U.S. to stay within a close reach to the areas of potential conflict – North Korea and Taiwan Strait.

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[59] John Pomfret, "In Chinese Admiral's Outburst, a Lingering Distrust of U.S.," *Washington Post*, June 8, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/07/AR2010060704762 .html.

[60] See Michael Wines, "U.S. Alarmed by Harsh Tone of China's Military," *New York Times*, October 11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/12/world/asia/12beijing.html.

[61] John Pomfret, "Chinese Close Ranks on Criticism of U.S.; Americans Dismiss a Military Officer's Outburst, but Distrust Appears to Be Common in Beijing," *Washington Post*, June 8, 2010, A10.

However, the security alliance is not trouble-free. The Japanese population is divided over the U.S. presence in Japan. Many regret Japan's submissive position and would like to see the U.S. presence diminish. Some even call for the withdrawal of American troops from Japan. However, at the same time, most Japanese are aware of the fact that their country is dependent on the U.S. as far as security matters are concerned and they do not seem to be ready to give up U.S. protection.[62]

In 2009, the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) under Prime Minister Hatoyama called for a "more equal alliance" with the U.S. One of Hatoyama's goals was to close the U.S. base in Futenma, Okinawa,[63] and – if possible – negotiate final departure of the American troops. After a short diplomatic spat between Washington and Tokyo, Hatoyama admitted that removing U.S. base from Okinawa was impossible for the time being – the U.S. showed no intention of moving from Okinawa. According to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Okinawa was the "linchpin" of Washington's East Asian strategy; therefore the issue of U.S. troops departure from Okinawa is likely to resurface in the future.

In April 2010, the Chinese Navy deployed ten warships near the Japanese coast. In September, Chinese fishing boat crashed into two Japanese Coast Guard boats, resulting in a long diplomatic row between Beijing and Tokyo over release of the Chinese crew, which was imprisoned by the Japanese.[64] Suddenly, Japanese were engaged in a lively discussion over China bullying its way through. The tensions flared up so high that even the U.S. felt the urge to publicly affirm the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan to provide some assurances to the concerned nations of Southeast Asia. Given the recent tensions with Beijing, Japanese leaders do not shy away from calling China as Japan's potential military threat.[65]

China's rise, the territorial disputes with the PRC, the North Korean threat and also domestic discontent over Japan's rather tacit security role induced recent Japanese governments to pursue more proactive defense thinking. Coinciding with the rise of China's military power, Japan is in the process of amending its constitu-

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[62] Mark Thompson, "Why Japan and the U.S. Can't Live Without Okinawa," *Time*, June 8, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1994798,00.html#ixzz15pDwmmnL.

[63] Eli Clifton, "Japan Base Row Causes Regional Ripples," *Asia Times*, April 30, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LD30Dh01.html; Rajaram Panda, "Controversy Over Relocating the Futenma Base," Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, October 31, 2009, http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/ControversyoverRelocatingFutenmabase_RPanda_311009.

[64] Anne Applebaum, "China's Quiet Power Grab," *Washington Post*, September 28, 2010, A25.

[65] Defense of Japan 2010, Japanese Defense White Paper, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2010.html.

tion so as to allow its Self-Defense Forces greater freedom of action for overseas deployment or engagement.[66]

With the new government of Naoto Kan, Japan seems to be looking at strengthening its security cooperation with the U.S. Japanese prime minister announced that Japan would "develop an active foreign policy." Following on this pledge, Kan government dispatched Self-Defense Force (SDF) officers to observe U.S.-South Korea military exercises to demonstrate solidarity with Seoul in the wake of the March *Cheonan* incident.[67] This move can also be interpreted as a signal to China. In July 2010, Tokyo also announced unprecedented enlargement of its submarine fleet, first in 36 years. Aligning with the U.S., Japan also strongly supported the US-led draft of UN sanctions resolution on Iran.

More forceful defense positioning by Japan can be expected in case of emergence of major security challenges, such as heightened nuclear threat from North Korea, nuclearization of South Korea and harassment of Japan's sea lanes of communications.[68] Japan is also concerned about Chinese missiles targeting Taiwan, as these can reach Japanese territory. The changing security environment in the region has been reflected in changing Japanese strategic thinking. The recent governments have opened up the debate about the need of building up its defenses and to confront China – not only militarily, but also politically and economically, e.g. by showing its support to countries such as Taiwan or South Korea or even Vietnam.

Taiwan

Taiwan holds an important strategic position in Southeast Asia. General MacArthur once described Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier."[69] Its unresolved international status has been a continuous cause of tensions between the PRC and the U.S.; Washington's support for Taiwan has often been regarded as a test of the U.S. commitment to Asia. Taiwan also plays an important role in China's calculations over securing its "core interest."

The relations between the U.S. and Taiwan continue to be very strong. Since 2008, the negotiations between Beijing and Taipei led to easing of the tensions in the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, it has become very clear that Taiwan is drawing

66 Kent E. Calder, "China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 131–134.
67 See Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, Green Shoots in the U.S.-Japan Alliance, *CSIS*, November 9, 2010, http://csis.org/files/publication/101109_Green_GreenShoots_JapanPlatform _formatted.pdf.
68 Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarization* (London: Routledge, 2009), 146.
69 Remarks by Gen. McArthur, "An Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier," *Time*, September 4, 1950.

closer to the PRC. Beijing and Taipei agreed to establish direct flights and signed an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, which substantially enhanced and bolstered mutual trade. There are still reasons for concern, however. Despite growing cooperation between Beijing and Taipei, particularly in economic terms, China still has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan. At the same time, Taiwan's government willingness to negotiate over mutual trade and exchanges so far has not been awarded by Beijing's move towards dismantling at least some of the estimated 1,500 missiles positioned along the coast of the Fujian province, targeting Taiwan. Even the generally pro-China president Ma Ying-jeou is aware of the fact that the "threat to Taiwan's security still exists."[70]

Some analysts, such as Robert D. Kaplan, warn of Beijing's long-term strategy of bringing Taiwan into its fold while increasing its military power will ultimately lead to a situation when the U.S. won't be able to "credibly defend Taiwan… [and] China will be able to redirect its naval energies beyond the first island chain in the Pacific to the second island chain."[71]

With respect to Taiwan, President Obama has in fact been continuing the policy of his predecessor George W. Bush. Washington holds on to one-China policy, does not support Taiwan's independence movement (which has meanwhile substantially weakened) and maintains strictly unofficial relations with Taipei. President Obama on several occasions praised the effort of both sides of the Taiwan Strait to relax the tensions.

It has been a continuous policy of the U.S. to provide arms sales to Taiwan for the purpose of self-defense. In January 2010, President Obama announced that he was approving of arms sales package to Taiwan worth $6.4 billion. The list of weapons included Blackhawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and anti-ship Harpoon missiles. The logic behind continuing arms sales is based on the belief that China would have less reason to engage in dialogue should Taiwan lose its ability to defend itself. Keeping Taiwan strong also serves the purpose of dissuading possible attack by China by increasing its potential cost.

South Korea

South Korea perceives China primarily through the prism of Beijing's relations with North Korea. There are concerns in Seoul over the long-term intentions of the

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[70] "President Ma Sees No Need to Rush Cross-Strait Ties," *Taiwan Today*, September 1, 2010, http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xitem=116120&CtNode=414.

[71] Robert D. Kaplan, "While U.S. is Distracted, China Develops Sea Power," *Washington Post*, September 26, 2010, A25.

PRC toward Pyongyang, especially after Beijing's reluctance to take a firm stance against North Korea after the release of an independent report that blamed North Korea for the sinking of the South Korea military vessel *Cheonan*. South Korea's growing frustration with China's role in managing North Korea has caused Seoul to look to its traditional security partner, the U.S.

As a tangible demonstration of their security partnership, the U.S. and South Korea recently held a large-scale military exercise in the Yellow Sea, which included the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, F-22 stealth fighter-bombers and hundreds of other aircraft, ships and thousands of U.S. and Korean personnel.[72]

South Korea has also invested in modernization of its naval and amphibious forces. According to SIPRI, South Korea has been looking into acquiring high-technology weapons for all three of its armed services, including long-range strike aircraft, submarines, and particularly anti-ballistic missile systems. The level of procurement currently makes South Korea the fourth largest military importer in Asia.[73]

Vietnam

Recently, Vietnam too has been carefully approaching the U.S. There has been increasing frequency of meetings between Vietnamese and American officials. The fact that Vietnam seeks to strengthen security relationship with Washington, once a major adversary, is a palpable evidence of Vietnam's effort to hedge against China. According to Carl Thayer, a veteran specialist on the Vietnamese military at Australia's Defense Force Academy, Vietnam's recent military acquisitions prove that Hanoi is "seeking a credible deterrent against China, hoping to defend its own claims to the South China Sea."[74]

Hanoi government feels bolder now and wishes to play a more prominent role in regional politics. In 2009, Vietnam and Russia signed a deal for purchasing six Kilo-class submarines worth USD 3.2 billion. However, Hanoi does not want to be dependent on Moscow for military purchases, given Russia's extensive military

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72 Daniel Ten Kate and Nicole Gaouette, "Clinton Signals U.S. Role in China Territorial Disputes After Asean Talks," *Bloomberg*, July 23, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-23/u-s -says-settling-south-china-sea-disputes-leading-diplomatic-priority-.html.

73 Arms Transfers to Asia and Oceania, *SIPRI Background Paper*, October 2009, http://books.sipri.org /files/misc/SIPRIBP0910a.pdf.

74 Greg Torode, "Vietnam Buys Submarines to Counter China," *South China Morning Post*, December 17, 2009, http://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/vietnam_buys_submarines_SCMP.htm.

cooperation with China. It therefore seeks to buy weapons from other countries, such as Canada, France, and also U.S.[75]

In his recent visit to Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates worked diligently to seek expansion of U.S.-Vietnamese cooperation.[76] The two sides have already established a close bilateral defense dialogue with primary focus on maritime security as well as civil nuclear cooperation with more proposals still on the table.[77]

It must be pointed out that despite positive developments between Hanoi and Washington there are still issues that may complicate the cooperation, such as mixed human rights record of Vietnam.

Indonesia

During Bush administration, the U.S. relations with Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, evolved particularly in the context of war on terrorism. Under President Obama, the U.S. wanted to expand the relation beyond the war on terror. Not only Obama wants to improve the relations with Muslim world, but, more specifically, he sees huge potential for U.S.-Indonesia cooperation, especially from the strategic perspective: Indonesia's position in between the Indian and Pacific Ocean gives it control over the ships passing through the Straits of Malacca. Indonesia can thus serve as an important base for anti-terrorism and anti-piracy activities.[78] Member of the ASEAN, Indonesia however also figures prominently in the hedging strategy toward China, as it is one of the nations with stakes in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. In this context, it should be noted that Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa publicly rejected China's demand that Southeast Asian nations keep America out of the South China Sea dispute.[79]

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[75] "Vietnam Asks France for Military Upgrades," *Asian Correspondent*, July 27, 2010, http://asian correspondent.com/breakingnews/vietnam-asks-france-for-military-up.htm.

[76] "Gates Seeks Expansion of US-Vietnamese Cooperation," U.S. Department of Defense, October 11, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=61217.

[77] Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam-United States Military Relation," December 14, 2009, http://www.scribd.com/doc/24097825/Thayer-Vietnam-s-Military-Relations-with-the-US-and-Russia.

[78] The U.S. lifted a 12-year ban on ties to a unit of the Indonesian army, thus creating prospect for closer military-to-military cooperation, which may include training of U.S. forces in Indonesia and possible arms sales. See Simon Tisdall, "Indonesia's Door Is Open for Obama," *Guardian*, August 2, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/aug/02/indonesia-obama-us-china.

[79] Joshua Kurlantzik, "A Beijing Backlash," *Time*, October 4, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/10/04/how-china-may-have-overplayed-its-hand.html.

Thailand

Thailand is a typical example of a country torn between Washington and Beijing. Bangkok traditionally seeks to reap benefits from both China and the U.S. in both economic and security terms. According to the *CRS Report*, Thailand, due to its geographic position, is strategically important for the U.S.: "Thailand has been a significant partner for the United States and an important element of the U.S. strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific. At the same time, Thailand enjoys a strong economic and political relationship with China, making it a potential battleground for influence in the region."[80] However, in reality, Thailand recently represents more of a challenge for the U.S. due to its increasingly independent streak and growing influence of Chinese business community and Chinese investments in Thai economy.

Thailand has been a traditional U.S. military ally, but the relationship grew complicated after the 2006 coup preceded by numerous domestic issues which drew the government's attention. Expansion of the U.S.-Thai relationship is stymied by Bangkok's balancing between Washington and Beijing. It appears that there is a difference between the perception of China threat in Washington and Bangkok, given Thailand's expanding political, economic and also military relations with Beijing. Differences over human rights and approach to Burma also represent an obstacle to the expansion of U.S.-Thai relations. Despite these long-term odds, the military relationship between the U.S. and Thailand grew stronger in the past. Thailand contributed troops to U.S-led military operations and even provided infamous "black site" where the CIA was allowed to secretly hold suspected terrorists.[81] The U.S. and Thailand share intelligence[82] and also conduct joint military exercises.

The Philippines

The Republic of Philippines has been recently seeking a balance between Beijing and Washington and therefore has been one of the primary targets of courtship from both the Bush and Obama administration.

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80 Emma Chantlett-Avery, "Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations," *CRS Report to Congress*, June 21, 2010, 4.

81 Dana Priest, "CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons," *Washington Post*, November 2, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html.

82 In 2010, Thailand extradited military contractor Viktor Bout to the U.S. despite strong objections from Russia. Bout is charged with trying to sell weapons to a terrorist group. See John Pomfret,

The Philippines has been a traditional U.S. ally due to their historical ties. After signing a Visiting Forces Agreement with the U.S. in 1999, Manila permitted the U.S. to hold military exercises in the Philippines. The U.S. also provided the Philippines with substantial military assistance. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the mutual ties were strengthened. The Philippines became the frontline of President Bush's War on Terror because the islands often served as a breeding ground for numerous terrorist organizations, including Abu Sayyaf group or branches of Al-Qaeda.[83] In cooperation with the Philippine military forces, the U.S. staged several counterterrorism exercises and also increased arms sales. However, the U.S. military presence in the Philippines has also been seen as a part of the hedging strategy against China. The Republic of Philippines has been engaged in several territorial disputes with China, the most notable being the Mischief Reef incident in 1995. Since then, the relationship between Manila and Beijing has improved; the PRC offered both economic and military assistance to the Philippine government, expanded the volume of trade and offered substantial investment into projects in the Philippines. This has been interpreted by some experts as an effort by the PRC to "has sought to forestall a greater U.S. military presence in the region, a clash over disputed territory in the Spratlys that might provoke U.S. involvement, and Philippine support of the United States in a possible military crisis involving Taiwan."[84] The political representation seems to be divided over the general foreign policy orientation. Some argue for closer ties with the PRC while others fear compromising the Republic of Philippines sovereignty. However, the Philippines generally do not perceive China as a threat, population's perception of Beijing is rather favorable, which is not the case of the popular perception of the U.S.

Conclusion: The rise of China is making many of the South East Asian countries nervous

China's rise and the consequential hedging against its growing power and related disputes over territory – all of these phenomena have a potential of complicating the future security in Asia. A resolution of the disputes in the South China and East China Sea cannot be expected any time soon. China will hardly be

"Suspected Russian Arms Dealer Bout to be Extradited to U.S., Thai Court Rules," *Washington Post*, August 21, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/20/AR2010082000452.html.

[83] Preeti Bhattacharji, "Terrorism Havens: Philippines," *Foreign Affairs Online*, June 1, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9365/terrorism_havens.html.

[84] Thomas Lum, Larry A. Niksh, "The Republic of Philippines: The Background and U.S. Relations," *CRS Report to Congress*, January 15, 2009, 18.

willing to compromise because its continuing economic development, dependent on access to energy resources, is directly linked to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.

We may expect China's neighboring countries to continue hedging against China's rise which will include substantial investments into strengthening their military forces. However, on a parallel track, diplomatic efforts, particularly in conflict and dispute resolution, can be expected too, just like expansion of economic cooperation with the PRC. Regional multilateral fora, such as the ASEAN and the ARF, will promote further integration both horizontally and vertically. By formalizing some form of participation of the U.S., these regional arrangements may strengthen the U.S. bond to the region – the U.S. envisions it will boost the legitimacy of the U.S. engagement in the Asia. Some Asian countries would also like to engage and possibly incorporate China into regional arrangements as a means of assuring that Beijing respects established rules and acts as a "responsible stakeholder." China scholar Evelyn Goh believes that the two goals are intrinsically linked. She argues that ASEAN engagement with China is built upon the intent for continued U.S. strategic commitment to the region.[85] It however remains to be seen whether this strategy will work in the future. So far, in many cases, China played down the push into the "responsible stakeholder" role.

The U.S. has long defined the U.S. dominance in maritime Southeast and East Asia and perceives this area as vital to its security. Sino-American relations will continue to be a blend of rivalry and effort at cooperation. In response to China's increasingly assertive approach to the region, the U.S. strengthened its position in Asia by actively seeking cooperation with the regional multilateral fora as well as individual states and by pushing for more efficient and substantive dispute-settling process. It has also strengthened its air and sea presence in Guam, which gives the U.S. increased capacity for power-projection in South East and East Asia. Most South East and East Asian nations will seek firmer relations with the U.S. to secure their security interests and balance China's influence. Therefore, for the time being, the U.S. will continue to play a key role as a guarantee of the regional order in the region of Southeast Asia.

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85 Evelyn Goh, "ASEAN's Adventures," *The National Interest* No. 94 (March–April 2008): 62.

REVIEWS

The political change that took place in Washington in 2008/2009 and the election of President Barack Obama intensified the debate on the redefinition of the role the United States plays in the world and on the foreign policy it should pursue to fulfill this role. A number of analyses and policy papers were published, dealing with both the long-term perspectives of the American foreign policy as well as the immediate steps the new administration should take. In the light of the events that had transpired in the previous years, it is not surprising that topics such as the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, weapons of mass destruction or energy security and climate change were among those discussed by most of the authors and experts involved.

The book under review in this article presents an interesting, yet somewhat unorthodox contribution to this ongoing debate. It is essentially a discussion between two of the most experienced foreign policy makers and experts in the United States, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft. Brzezinski, who served as National Security Advisor in the Carter Administration, still actively contributes to the American political discourse. He currently holds a position of professor at Johns Hopkins University and is also involved with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a well known foreign policy think-tank. The career of Brent Scowcroft in the government service was even longer, starting with the position of military advisor he held in the Nixon Administration. He later served as National Security Advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush. Both Brzezinski and Scowcroft are keen observers of the process of American foreign policy making and implementation and they regularly publish and present their observations in a number of forums. Their debate, which forms the basis of the book, was moderated by David Ignatius, a respected journalist and writer, who had worked during his long career for *International Herald Tribune*, *The Wall Street Journal* or *The Washington Post*.

The immediate impetus for the debate between Brzezinski and Scowcroft was the expected change of political establishment in Washington which by spring 2008, when their discussions largely took place, looked increasingly likely. It could thus be argued that the book presents sort of a "guidebook", a manual for the new administration on how to conduct its foreign policy. It is interesting to note in this respect that it was ultimately the candidate with lesser, or perhaps almost none, foreign policy experience who was elected president in November 2008. The often repeated assertion that President Obama needs an experienced group of advisors and assistants for his foreign policy agenda (further strengthened by the Obama's choice of his vice-presidential candidate, Joe Biden) gives *America and the World* (published in December 2008) a new relevance. It is likely that Brzezinski's and Scowcroft's advice, along with that of many other experts, was sought by Obama and his team on some of the matters discussed in the book, and that at least some of the strategies and priorities that Brzezinski and Scowcroft present here might have actually influenced Obama's policies.

The debate between Brzezinski and Scowcroft reflects their shared conviction that, as the introduction of the books duly states: "there is a widespread agreement that something in the American foreign policy is broken" (front cover). Both Brzezinski and Scowcroft were active in politics during the Cold War. They are well acquainted with the mentality that pervaded Washington at that time and the sway it still holds over certain segments of American foreign policy establishment. The world situation and the position of the United States in the new international system, however, had changed dramatically since and the Cold War paradigms, stratagems and policies no longer seem to work. Both of the authors are aware of this fact and realization of it compels them to present their own comprehensive views of the role that the United States should play in the coming decades. Brzezinski and Scowcroft are both more inclined to support international cooperation and multilateral approach as a way of solving problems rather than the sometimes openly unilateral, "superpower" based approach of the Bush Administration. Another salient characteristic of their foreign policy vision is pragmatism, focusing primarily on protecting the national interest, combined with a realistic appreciation of American strengths and weaknesses. The previous administration of George W. Bush was attacked for being too deeply rooted in the Cold War mentality and of mixing foreign policy with ideology. Thus, Brzezinski's and Scowcroft's vision, as presented in this book, might well appear an appealing and viable alternative to the Bush era policies. It is, however, necessary to keep in mind that neither of the two men were particularly successful themselves when in a position to directly influence American foreign policy-making. Especially the Carter Administration (where Brzezinski was one of the key influences on the president in matters of foreign policy) had suffered some heavy defeats on the international scene, leaving the country, as many would argue, in a much weaker position than it was during the Nixon and Ford years. The fact that the two main protagonists of the debate were actively involved in shaping the past events also sometimes leads them to exaggerate their role or to defend certain controversial moves which were later criticized. It is possible to mention for example Scowcroft defending the decision of the Bush Administration not to oust Saddam Hussein after the first Gulf War (pp. 12–13) and, conversely, Brzezinski praising Scowcroft and President George H. W. Bush for their handling of the fall of Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet sphere of dominance (p. 7).

The book (292 pages) is divided into eight chapters. The text is appended by an index and a short note about the authors.

The introductory chapter (*How We Got There*) focuses mostly on the issues preceding and closely following the September 11 attacks – the end of the Cold War and its ramifications, the "lone superpower syndrome," and the lack of a unifying factor in the American foreign policy of the 1990s. One of the most interesting points in this chapter, in my opinion, is the discussion on the role of international organizations in solving the challenges of the modern world system (pp. 28–30). While both Scowcroft and Brzezinski agree that during the Bush Administration, the United States was not committed sufficiently to the multilateral approach, they also tend to agree that as of now, no efficient means exist which could be applied to manage global crises. The United Nations is described as "weak" (p. 29) and NATO as a "cold war institution" (p. 30). While both authors see the need for the United

States to actively engage the world by means of multilateral diplomacy and international organizations, they also imply that in order to make this change effective, the United States must play an important part in restructuring these institutions or assisting to establish new ones. What I somewhat miss in this account, however, is among other things the fact that it was actually President Bush and his advisors who came up with a plan to reform the UN, with the hope of making it more efficient and representative of the current world situation and distribution of power.

The second chapter (*Crises of Our Own Making*) presents a discussion of one of the most pressing foreign policy topics for the new administration – the issue of Iraq War and the possible ways to end the American engagement there. The opinions expressed here tend to blame President Bush for starting the conflict without convincing reasons and without regard for the possible and even likely consequences of such a move. This is hardly surprising as Brent Scowcroft is known as an outspoken opponent of the attack on Iraq since the outset (pp. 37–38). On the other hand, given their experience as national security advisors, it comes as no surprise that neither Brzezinski nor Scowcroft see any chance for a fast withdrawal of American forces from Iraq without the security situation there dramatically deteriorating (p. 39). This "down-to-earth" realism is somewhat at odds with the President Obama's pre-election promises, although it is likely that even the President was aware by the time he made these promises that they would have to be scaled down at least to a degree. An interesting complement to the debate on Iraq is the part of the chapter devoted to the negotiations with Iran. While Brzezinski and Scowcroft are quite correct in stating that Iran is not a uniformly hostile, islamistic country (Brzezinski seems to claim on p. 69 this is the view most Americans hold of Iran), the practical advice they give the new administration on the potential negotiations with Tehran is rather vague or not very practical. For example, it is likely that Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme Iranian spiritual leader, holds more influence than President Ahmadinejad, yet it is quite unlikely that under the current circumstances he would be willing to meet with the American president as both authors suggest (p. 67).

The third chapter entitled *Two Unsolved Problems* is closely linked to the second, as it examines the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the present situation in Pakistan. Of these two parts of the chapter, it is probably the latter which offers more interesting insights. Especially the strengthening of mutual ties with the Pakistani army and support of its fight against Al-Qaeda without undermining its sovereignty and without exercising tight oversight over its activities (e.g. pp. 108–109) is a strategy that the new administration seems to have adopted (at least to a degree). Another interesting aspect of this discussion is the apparent unwillingness of both Scowcroft and Brzezinski to condone closer ties with India – a move which other experts, for example political scientist Robert Kaplan, see as a way to strengthen American position in the region. Again, the reader needs to be reminded that promoting closer ties with Delhi was a policy of the Bush Administration and that might be one of the reasons, although not the only one, for its cold reception by Brzezinski and Scowcroft.

No account of American foreign policy priorities and concerns would be complete without paying attention to China. In chapter four (*The Virtue of Openness: China and the Far East*) the relationship with Beijing and the rise of China is discussed in some detail. The

above mentioned pragmatism of Brzezinski and Scowcroft is reflected in their assertion that in order to incorporate China into the international system it would be necessary to redefine the boundaries existing within the system and adjust it to China's current position (p. 114). They both seem to be quite optimistic about the prospects of future cooperation with China and the development there. This optimism is not necessarily shared by other experts. While it is reasonable to agree with Brzezinski's prediction that Sino-Soviet alliance that once existed is not likely to pose a major threat to the American security in the future (p. 133), the Chinese influence on the mainland Asian continent (as well as other parts of the world) is likely to grow further and it is questionable whether the American diplomacy can actually handle this "complex game" to "work in [American] interest" (p. 126). This question comes to fore especially when Scowcroft repeats his skepticism of a more profound cooperation with India (p. 145), which could certainly have negative ramifications for the American relationship with Pakistan, yet on the other hand might be quite helpful in balancing out the growing influence of China.

Russia was not a major topic in the American foreign policy discourse for a time – this fact is criticized by Brzezinski and Scowcroft in the fifth chapter of the book, *The State with Unnatural Boundaries*. Both authors correctly point out that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a weakened and unstable Russia felt humiliated and snubbed by the United States and the West in general. This theme is recurrent in the Russian foreign policy of the last two decades and did not entirely dissipate even after President Putin strengthened Russia's domestic and international position. The United States for a time certainly did not pay much attention to fostering ties with Russia, as Scowcroft mentions (p. 171), and this attitude does need to change. Again, however, the setting of priorities for the future and of the policies to achieve them is somewhat insufficiently covered. It is definitely in American (and not only American) interest for a *modus vivendi* to develop between Russia and Europe. The question, however, is how to achieve a state when Russia would not feel "irredentist," "hostile" and "resentful" (p. 191) without "giving away too much" (especially when the de facto Russian energy monopoly and its security and economical ramifications are discussed).

The transatlantic cooperation, strained by the excesses and the unilateral actions of the Bush Administration, is discussed in a chapter six (*The Indispensable Partnership*). As the title implies, according to Brzezinski and Scowcroft the European allies and the NATO should remain, quite logically, high on the American agenda. The problem they see as the most crucial for Atlantic relations is a stronger leadership on both sides, committed to a more efficient and balanced cooperation – only then can the "West" remain an important geopolitical actor (e.g. pp. 209, 225). Both authors prefer the multilateral approach to solving crises and problems – which would require, in the current situation, an enhanced engagement of the European allies in Afghanistan and Iraq, a closer cooperation on tackling the financial and economic crisis, not to mention problems such as the global climate change and the fight against poverty. While there is an obvious inclination to prefer a unified leadership in Europe, Scowcroft at the same time admits that the European Union itself is divided and that there are almost no common objectives on which the Americans and Europeans could agree (p. 211). Under such circumstances, even with a new charismatic

leader in Washington, there is, in my opinion, little room for a significant consolidation of the transatlantic partnership.

The last two chapters, chapter seven (*The Politics of Cultural Dignity*) and chapter eight (*The First Hundred Days*), form the closing part of the book. Chapter seven is devoted mainly to the issue of globalization and the form of leadership the United States should exercise in the globalized world. For all their experience here, both Scowcroft and Brzezinski seem short of answers on how to find the delicate balance between respecting other peoples' cultures, religious beliefs and customs while focusing on securing the American national interest. Sometimes the debate falls into unnecessary generalizations and stereotypizations. For example, it is true that because of the war on terror, anti-Muslim sentiments rose in the United States, but Scowcroft's assertion that the Americans have "dehumanized" Muslims, turning them "into objects of hatred and fear" (p. 239) may be just a bit overstated. Chapter eight deals almost exclusively with suggested changes in the American foreign policy establishment, which, if implemented, should make it more efficient, cohesive and equipped to face the challenges of the globalized world.

America and the World does not pretend to be, and certainly is not, an impartial, unbiased analysis of the current American foreign policy and an equally impartial, unbiased set of suggestions how to improve it. Rather, it is an interesting attempt to present the views, visions and prognoses of two experienced American foreign policy experts. What makes their opinions definitely worth reading is the broad extent of experience they are based on and the depth of insight they display. This experience and insight, offering unique perspectives on a number of issues, are the greatest asset of *America and the World*, which makes it a valid contribution to the American foreign policy discourse.

Jan Bečka

Steven M. Gillon, **The Pact. Bill Clinton, Newt Gingrich, and the Rivalry That Defined a Generation.** Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 342 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-532278-1

The author, Steven M. Gillon, is Resident Historian for The History Channel and the professor of history at the University of Oklahoma. He has written numerous books and articles about modern American politics and culture. The Pact belongs to his latest books.

This volume tells the story of President Bill Clinton (D) and the Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich (R). Both men encounter in top U.S. governmental positions in the 1990s but with very different ideas how to lead the country. Nevertheless, both soon realized that to keep the government working they need to cooperate. Once they knew it is possible to work on bipartisan basis they focused on higher goals with the prospect of making history and that was reshaping the hot issue of American politics – the social security system. Both men were in their parties influential enough to make such a change pursuable and the times of budget surplus created good point for the debate.

Author stresses especially the importance of the 1960s which according to him played decisive role in lives of both men and he returns to the influence of this era many times during the reading. This sociological approach of seeing every aspect through the optics of the 1960s is quite interesting although I am not sure if it is applicable to every situation.

The publication is divided into seventeen chapters mapping complexly Clinton's and Gingrich's characters, personal life and their political career. What the both men had in common was the dissatisfaction with the situation inside their parties. That brought Gingrich at the head of Republican Revolution in 1994 and Clinton in front of New Democrats who were socially liberal but fiscally conservative. Many pages are devoted to the difficult situation of the Democratic Party and the revival of the G.O.P. and their tough cooperation in the House of Representatives and the degree of partisanship plays a role in American politics. Source of the conflict was the battle over the budget that led to governmental shutdown with political consequences for allegedly guilty party. Final compromise opened up the way for cooperation of both parties based on moderate support.

However, this book is not just about Clinton and Gingrich. It is also about the 1990s, the period when Cold War was over and the times looked peaceful and prosperous. Nevertheless it was necessary to give direction to this new energy and money. The high point in their cooperation was supposed to be described in motto: "Save the Social Security First." This entire endeavor ended with the Monika Lewinski scandal that moved the society for the remaining time when Clinton held the office. Gillon devoted almost whole two chapters to analyzing this delicate issue and the following consequences.

The author tries to be objective and to carefully handle the issue of the cooperation between the leader of the Republican revolution with Democratic President. Their careers in high positions were closely linked. According to Gillon, "The roots of the Clintons impeachment traced back to the cultural conflict of the 1960s, nurtured three decades of partisan wrangling." The statement is a bit controversial but it is interesting to follow author's thoughts and explanations from this perspective.

Eva Petrová

Susan-Mary Grant, **The War for a Nation: The American Civil War.** New York: Routledge, 2006. 261 pp. ISBN 0-415-97990-0

Grant's *The War for a Nation: The American Civil War* offers a shorter overview of the war, utilizing mainly original historical sources, to provide a brief, but detailed, narrative of the Civil War. It seeks to introduce the military history of the war to readers who might be apprehensive of military history in general and who may never before have thought about how military history is, in fact, social history enacted on battlefields. The American Civil War was not a war of conquest, but a conflict of ideals. For the Union, the American republican experiment was at stake; for the Confederacy, it was the right to secede from

that experiment and to establish a separate nation. This book attempts to do justice to both sides of that equation.

The War for a Nation is not a synthesis. It does not attempt to explain or even enter the Civil War historiography. The focus throughout is on the war itself, not on what its participants made of it afterward nor what the several generations of Americans and American historians have made of it since. Wherever possible Grant sought to allow the Civil War participants, both on and off the battlefield, to speak for themselves, to attempt to convey their reactions to, and experiences of, the war as it was being fought, avoiding as much as possible the many post-war debates that sought to apportion blame or praise to individual generals at specific points in their Civil War careers.

In seeking to offer the general reader a flavor of as much of the war as possible, Grant rushed through, completely flanked, or simply not mentioned, events, people, and places that are important. Throughout, the main intention was to highlight the origins and general thrust of the war, from its long-term and more immediate origins in the secession winter of 1860–1861 to its conclusion by focusing on the way it was fought, the type of people who fought it, and the weaponry the fought it with. These elements are set within the broader context of the motivations, expectations, and experiences of soldiers and civilians as the war grew up in scope and in brutality to provide a clear picture of its impact on the political, military and social arenas of the nineteenth century America at war.

The structure of the book is broadly chronological, with a few exceptions. The opening chapter, "Portents," provides a brief overview of the growth of both a national and a more dangerously sectional ideology in the period from America's founding to John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry in 1859. Chapter 2, "Divisions," focuses on the election of 1860, the subsequent secession of much of the South from the Union, and the birth of the Confederacy. Chapter 3, "The Road to Perdition," describes the raising of the Civil War armies in the war's early stages. Chapter 4, "All Quiet Along the Potomac," explores McClellan's ill-fated Peninsula Campaign, the importance of the blockade and the war at sea, and covers the first major engagement in the Western Theater, Shiloh, explaining the importance of gaining control of the Mississippi. Chapter 5, "Battle Cry of Freedom," looks at the issue of emancipation in the second year of the war. Chapter 6, "Into the West," juxtaposes events in the Western and Eastern Theaters, but not chronologically. Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg are placed in the broader context of the Confederate advance in the West. Chapter 7, "The People Embodied," contrasts the political situation in the Union with that of the Confederacy. Chapter 8, "Lee's Miserables" traces the evolution of the war from one of pitched battles to one of trench warfare and the development of a more structured, persistent and aggressive method of warfare that, in the end, brought down the Confederacy.

Throughout, the obvious purpose of this book is to introduce and explain the most significant war in the history of the American nation, showing how Americans at that time reacted to the reality of conflict that challenged all they held most dear, and what the conflict entailed.

Tomáš Kristlík

Ján Hlavinka, Eduard Nižňanský, **Pracovný a koncentračný tábor v Seredi 1941–1945.** Bratislava: Dokumentačné stredisko holocaustu, 2009. 192 pp. ISBN 978-80-969857-3-9

In their new study, two renowned Slovak historians of the Holocaust have focused on the history of three different camps in Sered.[1] All played a crucial role in the fate of the Jewish community in Slovakia. They consisted of: a "Labour Camp for Jews" (in Slovak, *Pracovný tábor pre Židov*, PTŽ) established in September 1941 by the Minister of the Interior, Alexander Mach, and guarded by the Hlinka Guard (HG, a paramilitary wing of the ruling Hlinka Slovak People's Party headed by Mach) and dissolved during the Slovak National Uprising (SNP) at the end of August, 1944; a "Concentration Center" (*koncentračné stredisko*) which was used as a place of detention for Jews transported from Slovakia during the first wave of deportations in 1942; and, finally, a concentration camp established in September 1944 under German command, in connection with the last phase of the Nazi "Final Solution" in Slovakia. The study is based on intensive research conducted by the authors in various archives in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Germany and Israel as well as on memoir literature and oral and visual history resources.

In the first chapter ("Jewish Forced Labour in Slovakia"), the authors provide the reader with contextualisation of the establishment of the PTŽ in Sered. Until now, the Nováky camp in the Prievidza district was the only one of the three Labour Camps for Jews in the fascist "Slovak State" to become the topic of a monograph[2]; the history of the smallest of the three camps at Vyhne in central Slovakia remains unwritten.

The Second Chapter focuses on the "Establishment and Beginnings of the Construction of the Camp in Sered". An unprecedented operation, in which some 7,000 Jews were expelled from Bratislava to various provincial towns and "dislocation camps" in Slovakia during the autumn of 1941, was a crucial incentive for the establishment of the camps at Sered, Nováky and Vyhne. The Central Economic Authority (*Ústredný hospodársky úrad*, ÚHÚ), responsible for the "solution of the Jewish question" – understood as it was as a primarily economic problem to be resolved by "aryanisation" of Jewish property – entrusted the Jewish Central (*Ústredňa Židov*, ÚŽ), an organisation with an obligatory membership for the racially defined Jewish community in Slovakia, with the practical realisation of the dislocation. In a memorandum from November 1941, Andrej Steiner and Oskar Neumann – both Zionist employees of the ÚŽ – came up with a proposal to employ the labour force of the dislocated persons. In plans presented to the Ministry of the Interior, Steiner and Neumann laid particular accent on Sered, which was to play the role of a "show case" among the Jewish labour camps. In the leadership of the ÚŽ, Steiner's and Neumann's plans aimed at raising productivity faced the opposition of Orthodox Jews who proposed to boycott works perceived as beneficial to the "Slovak State".

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1   The town of Sered was renamed Sereď in 1954.
2   Igor Bak: *Židovský tábor v Novákoch, 1941–1944* (Bratislava: Zing Print, 2001).

The history of "The Sered camp as a Concentration Center for Jews (March 1942 to September 1942)" is the topic of the third chapter. Tragically, the role of a station *en route* to the ghettos and extermination camps "in the East" fell to the Sered camp precisely in the period when ÚŽ's efforts to provide access to decent means of livelihood for the dislocated persons started to meet with visible success. A part of the camp was transformed into one of the five centres across Slovakia used for detention of deported Jews. According to Hlavinka and Nižňanský, some 4,463 Jews from western Slovakia were deported from the Sered Concentration Centre between 29 March and 21 September 1942. Only few survived, as was the case with the majority of Slovak Jews (some 58,000 persons altogether) deported from the country "to the East" in 1942. In addition to the *zaistenci* (detainees selected for deportation), hundreds of persons performing forced labour (*zaradenci*), along with their non-working family members, remained in the camp, their concentration in the fictitious "safety" of the camps being a result of tireless efforts on the part of the ÚŽ. In fact, the transport quotas were completed by adding labourers from the category of *zaradenci*, whenever necessary. This threat was hanging over the inmates in spite of the ordinance establishing the three Labour Camps for Jews which partially alleviated the tragedy of Slovak Jewry during the first wave of deportations. Even in this period, a confection workshop operated in the Sered camp alongside the carpentry which, as the camp's most productive workshop, managed to win customers from all over the "Slovak State". In addition, production of concrete pipes continued as well as agricultural works, including sericulture. In July 1942, the Jewish Hospital in Bratislava moved to the Sered camp area. In the following two years, it provided medical services to the labourers from all three Labour Camps for Jews as well as from the numerous labour centres all over the "Slovak State" and for the "free" Jews.

In the chapter entitled "The Labour Camp for Jews in Sered (September 1942 to August 1944)", Hlavinka and Nižňanský follow the development of the camp since the termination of the first wave of deportations. Until its dissolution during the Slovak National Uprising, the Sered camp was lagging behind its counterpart at Nováky in the number of detainees. It was, however, ahead of the Nováky camp in terms of production: in 1943, its gains accounted for 2 million Slovak Crowns, in spite of the necessity for the camp to finance its own administration, nourishment for its inhabitants and care for the non-working children, elderly and ill detainees. With labour duty from the age of 14, the proportion of working detainees was 81%, with no less than 90% of them working physically. With the high quality products of its largest manufacturing unit – the carpentry – the Sered camp managed to win a wide network of customers across the country. Famously, the Minister of the Interior, HG leader and one of the key initiators of the regime's anti-Jewish policy, Alexander Mach, was also among its clients. The labourers and – when necessary – their family members were sent to the camp by the government-appointed Commissioner for Jewish Camps, Július Pečúch, with a refusal to heed the call resulting in criminal prosecution. Hlavinka with Nižňanský provide a look at the ambivalent position of the detainees in the labour camps as well as of the ÚŽ as their founding institution with regard to the plans for resuming deportations pushed for by the radical wing of the HSĽS in 1943. The economic profit of the camps (particularly the one at Sered) was a clear argument for those opposing the renewing

of Jewish transports. However, as the Slovak government publicly declared after a wave of escapes from the camps, it considered the *zaradenci* as hostages to be deported in the first line if transports were to be resumed. The majority of Jews in Slovakia perceived the PTŽ as concentration camps. According to Hlavinka and Nižňanský, "on the one hand, Jews provided forced labour for a state which did not want them; on the other hand, the same people, being concentrated, feared deportations which the government was ready to realise speedily". In separate subchapters, Hlavinka and Nižňanský deal with topics such as production, living conditions, camp self-government (a "Jewish Council" headed by Alexander Pressburger was established by the Ministry of the Interior in April 1943), health and sanitation, education and child care (a kindergarten as well as an elementary school operated in the camp), culture and the resistance movement represented by the socialist Zionist youth organisation Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair. After the outbreak of the Slovak National Uprising, most members of the resistance movement moved to the liberated area to actively participate in the battle against fascism.

The history of the Sered camp from its reestablishment after the German occupation of Slovakia until the evacuation of the remaining inmates, as well as of the camp inventory, to Terezín on 31 March 1945 – barely touched upon in earlier literature – is discussed in the fifth chapter, entitled "The Concentration Camp in Sered (September 1944 to March 1945)". The discovery of a preserved part of the books of evidence from November 1944 until March 1945 in the Slovak National Archives in 2008 has significantly extended our knowledge about the Sered camp and the fates of its inmates in this period; no other camp documentation has been preserved. As Hlavinka and Nižňanský noted, they did not cover the full scope of the issue in their study: for instance, the fates of the inmates deported from Sered in 1944–1945 deserve further attention. The authors put the establishment of the concentration camp in Sered into the context of anti-Jewish measures taken by the German occupying power in Slovakia as represented, in particular, by the Security Police (SiPo) and Security Service (SD) apparatus with its *Einsatzgruppe H* (EG H) and the subordinated commandos (the EG H did not control the territory of Eastern Slovakia which fell into the operational space of the SiPo a SD Commander in Krakow). On the basis of reports to Berlin by the EG H Chief Josef Witiska, Hlavinka and Nižňanský conclude that the reestablishment of the Sered camp was not discussed during the first phase of short term planning in the framework of the "Final Solution" in Slovakia connected with the German occupation. As Witiska reported on 4 September 1944 – a day before the decision to restore the camp at Sered was made – a transport of Jews detained in Western Slovakia to Svatobořice located in the territory of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was considered. SS personnel originally active in the *Heimatsschutz* (a paramilitary wing of the Deutsche Partei, a Nazi ethnic German party in Slovakia) were responsible for transforming the former labour camp into a transit camp on the way to Auschwitz. Under the command of two ethnic Germans from Bratislava, Franz Knollmayer and Josef Häckl (it is unclear which of them acted as commander and which as deputy), inmates were brutally tortured, raped and murdered from the very first days of the restoration of the camp. At the end of September 1944, the Austrian *SS-Hauptsturmführer* Alois Brunner – one of the most ex-

perienced aides of Adolf Eichmann responsible for the mass murder of Jews from Vienna, Berlin, Thessaloniki, Paris and the Provence – took over as commander of the Sered camp. Immediately after his arrival, Brunner arrested Knollmayer for alleged financial machination and raping Jewish girls in the camp. After Brunner's arrival, the practice of brutal terror and murders continued in Sered.

As we can establish from the preserved part of the evidence books, the vast majority of inmates were transferred to Sered from Western Slovakia and especially from Bratislava, with only a handful from the domain of the EG H's *Einsatzkommando 14* (EK 14) in the Banská Bystrica and Zvolen area (the EK 14's role in the "Final Solution" lay especially in the organisation of mass murders with the involvement of especially Slovak and Ukrainian collaborators in Kremnička and Nemecká). Among the Jewish inmates of the SS camp in Sered, a number of foreign citizens are documented, with most of them from Hungary. Some of the inmates claimed to be "Aryan" (especially those living in mixed couples for which a separate barracks was assigned) or of mixed race (*Mischlinge*). Members of the Jewish Council of Elders, established by Brunner and headed by Emanuel Kolm, as well as members of the Jewish Police (*ordneri*) were excluded from transports and remained in the camp until its evacuation to Terezín. After 1945, Kolm was sentenced to six months of prison by the District People's Court in Bratislava on charges of "abetment of the activity of fascist occupants" and "participating in racial persecution". Under Brunner's command, several workshops in the Sered camp resumed their operation; inability to work was a criterion for adding an inmate to a transport. In the autumn of 1944, the number of inmates temporarily concentrated in the camp exceeded 3,000 (at the time of highest occupancy shortly before the outbreak of the Slovak National Uprising, there were some 1,100 to 1,200 inmates at the Labour Camp for Jews in Sered). With each transport, the camp was effectively emptied. According to Witiska's reports as well as testimonies of former inmates entrusted by Brunner with leading the books of evidence, more than 7,400 people were deported from Sered to Auschwitz from 30 September until the beginning of November 1944; most of them perished. From 16 November 1944 until the evacuation of the camp, more than 4,000 inmates were moved to Sachsenhausen, Terezín and Ravensbrück. Most of these late deportees survived the Holocaust. During the transports from Sered, some deportees managed to escape, using instruments distributed by an aid organisation founded by former members of the "Working Group" (*Pracovná skupina, Nebenregierung*) established at the margins of the ÚŽ,[3] including the rabbis Michael Weissmandel and Armin Frieder as well as the last chairman (*starosta*) of the ÚŽ, the earlier mentioned Oskar Neumann. Along with Jewish inmates, some 500 to 600 participants of the Slovak National Uprising, partisans and those accused by the Nazis of supporting the resistance movement were incarcerated

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[3]   For further reference about the fight of the Pracovná skupina against deportations, see Katarína Hradská, ed., *Holocaust na Slovensku 3. Listy Gisely Fleischmannovej (1942–1944). Snahy Pracovnej skupiny o záchranu slovenských a európskych židov. Dokumenty* (Bratislava: Klemo, 2003) as well as a monograph by Gila Fatranová *Boj o prežitie* (Bratislava: Slovenské národné múzeum, Múzeum židovskej kultúry, 2007), translated from the Hebrew original *Haim le-Hisardut. Hanhagat Yehudey Slovakia be-Tkufat ha-Shoah* (Tel Aviv 1992).

in the Sered camp. No documentation has been preserved about these non-Jewish inmates. Altogether, some 12,000 prisoners passed through the "Brunner's camp" in Sered, most of whom perished.

The study by Hlavinka and Nižňanský about the Sered camp is an important contribution to the mosaic of knowledge about the Holocaust in Slovakia, based on sources not earlier used. The integration of oral and visual history resources is particularly important as they extend and modify our knowledge about this tragic chapter in Slovak history.

Daniel Putík

G. John Ikenberry, **The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century.** Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. 157 pp. ISBN 978-0-691-13969-2

The Crisis of American Foreign Policy is an interesting insight to the debate over contemporary American foreign policy and its ideologies. Rather than a comprehensive book, it is a collection of four essays by G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Tony Smith debating the ideologies and ideas behind the controversial Bush doctrine.

In the years since September 11, the Bush administration pursued one of the most controversial policies in American history based on provocative ideas about American global dominance. The center piece of this foreign policy was an extensive new doctrine of national security which provided the intellectual background for the invasion to Iraq in the spring of 2003. As the invasion turned into a protracted war, the Bush administration increasingly invoked liberal internationalist ideas to justify its action, where the echoes of Woodrow Wilson were unmistakable. Bush wanted Iraq to be seen ostensibly as part of America's historic commitment reaching back to Wilson to advance the cause of freedom and democracy in the world.

In all four essays, the authors, who are all experts in American foreign policy, are debating whether this premise is true, whether Bush foreign policy reflects continuity with America's liberal internationalist past or a radical break with it. Another question is whether Bush foreign policy and the Iraq war in particular, really grow out of the Wilsonian tradition. Tony Smith in his essay Willsonian after Iraq argues that America's commitment to promote democracy in the world was the main idea behind the Bush doctrine and thus the Bush administration was the natural heir to the Wilsonian tradition, because the promotion of the democracy worldwide is the core of Wilsonianism. On the other hand, Thomas Knock (Playing for a Hundred Years Hence) and Anne-Marie Slaughter (Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first century) argue that the Wilsonian vision was not directly concerned with the spread of democracy but rather with the building of a cooperative and rule-based international order, which is an idea that the Bush administration actively resisted. In argu-

ing their stance on the ideology behind Bush doctrine, the authors also deal with a broader understanding of Wilsonianism and its essential logic. Their different understanding of the Wilsonian vision shapes their different stance concerning Bush doctrine.

The authors come to different conclusions using different criteria, which makes the debate very interesting. The book does not provide any final collective conclusion, so, it is up to the reader which side of the debate he or she will support. This makes the book even more valuable. The Crisis of American Foreign Policy fully satisfies all attributes of the academic work and is highly recommended to anyone who is interested in American foreign policy and its influences, and especially to those who are interested in Bush foreign policy and its ideological origins.

Lenka Staňková

M. Kent Bolton, **US National Security and Foreign Policy Making After 9/11: Present at the Re-Creation.** Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008. 433 pp. ISBN 978-0742559004

In *US National Security and Foreign Policy Making after 9/11: Present at the Re-Creation* M. Kent Bolton provides an invaluable insight into the fundamental processes of U.S. national security policymaking. The key aim of this publication is to present readers with an explanation of the processes leading to the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act (IRTPA) of 2004. In order to provide this explanation, Bolton traces the decision-making frameworks since the end of the Second World War. By doing so he is, hence, able to create a theoretical road map for understanding U.S. national security and foreign policy making since 1945.

The author suggests that the IRTPA represented a fundamental alteration in the course of U.S. national security policymaking, thus making it the first significant change of the policymaking framework since the 1947 National Security Act (NSA) came into effect. Key to Bolton's analysis is the concept of impact of foreign policy crises on creating new national security policy. He contends that there were only two such crises able to initiate the immense change in the national security bureaucracy, the first being the events surrounding the outbreak of the Cold War (1946–1950), and second the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, of September 11, 2001. These events, Bolton follows, were the central incentive for the extensive changes that became codified in the NSA and IRTPA.

The 1947 National Security Act created the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the unified and permanent Department of Defense, and established the President-NSC policymaking model. This model, Bolton argues, formed the basis of all post-WWII presidential national security and foreign policymaking decisions. While this decision-making framework proved sufficient and appropriate for the Cold War *modus operandi*, the unprecedented and massive terrorist attacks of 9/11 emphasized the inefficiency of the bureaucratic system in the post-Cold War world.

Bolton contends that it was the events of 9/11 that challenged the 1947 NSA status quo and hurled the United States into the environment of asymmetrical, non-state threats. He argues that the creation and enactment IRTPA and establishment of new administrative framework post-9/11 was an outcome of parallel and interconnected external systemic, societal and governmental drivers of the change *vis-à-vis* the foreign policy crisis. The three drivers, described in detail in separate chapters, include: (1) the 9/11 and subsequent debate about and actual intervention to Iraq; (2) "rise of the Vulcans" in President Bush's administration; and (3) series of governmental post-mortems such as the 9/11 Commission Report, the Iraq Survey Group, and the Robb-Silberman WMD Commissions, which recommended substantial and widespread changes. All of these drivers were subsequently instilled in the IRTPA and leading to the re-creation of the U.S. national security policymaking.

Out of the main changes, Bolton stresses out the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as an essential transition in the national security decision- and policymaking model. The DNI, with full cabinet status, was charged with two major tasks drawing upon the experience of 9/11: reforming the intelligence community and improving the process of gathering, dissemination and accuracy of intelligence and other essential information to policymakers. The final chapter is therefore devoted to the intelligence-policymaking nexus as well as the review of the actions and progress of the office of the first DNI, John Negroponte.

Bolton does view the future of the IRTPA as uncertain. He presents Negroponte's actions towards integration of the U.S. intelligence community as a relative success. It is therefore possible to suggest that the IRTPA and the DNI have had a relative positive influence on the U.S. national security and its bureaucratic framework. However, detailed look at the second main task of the DNI – the oversight of the process of gathering and providing the right and precise intelligence to decision makers – remains unfulfilled. Thus, Bolton's claim of re-creation aspect of the IRTPA is still being challenged, even more notably with the basically unchanged structure of the NSC-President policymaking model.

Therefore, the full scope and impact of the IRTPA remains to be seen. The true re-creation character of the IRTPA will also largely depend on the ability of the DNI to overcome the different turf wars between particular agencies of the intelligence community as well as other governmental agencies such as e. g. the Department of Homeland Security.

Overall, the publication provides an invaluable insight into the processes, which led to the unchallenged position of the U.S. national security bureaucracy, as well to the attempted change to adapt the U.S. foreign and national security decision-making processes to the post-Cold War environment. Although the book is full of acronyms and details, which can be at times confusing, it presents an all-embracing analysis, essential for M.A. level students interested in U.S. national and security policymaking both before and after 9/11.

Alžběta Bernardyová

Michal Kopeček, **Hledání ztraceného smyslu revoluce. Zrod a počátky marxistického revizionismu ve střední Evropě 1953–1960.** Praha: Argo, 2009. 388 pp. ISBN 978-80-257-0100-3

The author of this long-awaited monograph, Michal Kopeček (born 1974), is one of the most promising young Czech historians. "Quest for the Revolution's Lost Meaning: Origins of the Marxist Revisionism in Central Europe 1953–1960" is his slightly revised Ph.D. dissertation, defended in 2005 at the Institute of International Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences (Charles University, Prague). Kopeček, currently affiliated to the Prague Institute of Contemporary History of the Czech Academy of Sciences, belongs to the generation that has already profited from substantial formative contact with Western historiography. Not only has he completed several study and research stays in Germany, Austria and the United States, but since 2008 he has been one of the principal coordinators of the international project "Socialist Dictatorship as the World of Meaning," establishing solid contacts between the most innovative centers of historical research in Europe and the USA and the Czech historical milieu. His first book indeed represents convincing proof of how beneficial such interactions can be for historical writing.

In fact, its most original characteristics, certainly in the context of contemporary Czech historical research on the Communist dictatorship, resides in its conceptual equipment. In his analysis of early Central-European Marxist revisionism, Kopeček imports and adroitly applies notions forged on the one hand by the "Cambridge school" of the history of political thought (based around Quentin Skinner and John G.A. Pocock) emphasizing the necessary reconstruction of ideas in their historical contexts and on the other by the "deconstructive" scholars (Dominick LaCapra et al.), not to forget the German *Begriffsgeschichte*. It is needless to say that such an ambitious undertaking is unprecedented in this field of study. Kopeček certainly does not hide the fact that the evolution of political and social thought in Central Europe shows "substantial differences" (p. 39) when compared to the West European or North American experience of the twentieth century. He also admits that "political languages" (his key, Cambridge-inspired concept) have so far been studied predominantly in the context of early modern Europe. Nevertheless, his soundly constructed argument justifies this somewhat adventurous choice and successfully represents Central European Marxist revisionism as a more or less elaborate system of constantly shifting political and philosophical principles and notions offering an alternative to the institutionalized political doctrine of the Communist dictatorships and exercising a particular role in the public spheres of each of the authoritarian regimes.

The interest of this original approach is not purely intellectual but is also, in a sense, political. In the Czech context (and elsewhere in Central Europe) research topics related to the post-war period (and specifically to the "ideological" issues) remain, most often, victims of the "quasi-natural" interpretations of the witnesses (p. 41) or of various political initiatives connected with the demand for the never-ending (and impossible) "coming to terms" with the burdensome past. Kopeček's methodological choice affords a scientifically legitimate opportunity to elude these dangerous cliffs and navigate more freely in the extremely

interesting area of political thought in Central European communist dictatorships which he presents as a specific variety of European modernity (p. 111, 123 etc.) and convincingly describes as a multilayered reality prolific in tensions and conflicts (certainly after 1953). A particular intellectual dynamic is, as a matter of fact, the main common denominator of the three case studies that constitute the core of Kopeček's analysis, each of which is centered around one key actor – Poland around Leszek Kołakowski, Hungary around György Lukács and the Czech lands around Karel Kosík.

Kopeček begins his story with a stimulating interpretation of the implementation of Marxism-Leninism in Central Europe after 1945, the generational factor being the key issue (except for Hungary). After the phase of rapid "self-sovietization" (p. 97) of local young intellectual elites at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s who were deeply involved in the revolutionary project of the creation of a new socialist society, the first signs of the inevitable process of autonomization from the rigid political views formulated by national leaders of the Party appeared soon after Stalin's death. Kopeček proposes an interesting explanation of this process based on the concept of an "unwitting intellectual cultivation" (p. 98). How did this work? The young fighters on the "philosophical front" who were determined to lead their struggle against the remnants of "bourgeois thinking" in a rigorous way could not avoid an exhaustive study of the works of their opponents. In most cases, this effort resulted in their being confronted with the intellectual impotence of anti-bourgeois campaigns and also exposed them to uncomfortable questions on the validity of some of the oversimplifying ideological precepts they were asked to transfer to their students and to preach (in a yet more vulgarized and debased version) to the masses.

1956 represents another turning point and chronological break in Kopeček's narrative. In the chapter on the problem of the legitimization of communist regimes and their relation to the "national consciousness" he puts across the intensity of the confusion of still fairly young communist philosophers (most often sincere Stalinist believers) caused by Khrushchev's revelations. Their "fundamental crisis of identity" (p. 115) led them to search for a new basis of legitimacy for the socialist project (and corresponding political regimes). From this view-point, revisionism can be interpreted as a compensation mechanism for this particular generation of Central European social scientists who, certainly after 1956, started to emphasize the socially emancipatory and radically democratic elements in Marx's thought. However, Kopeček does not forget to underline the fact that the leading role of the Party remained an overall fixture on the horizon for the revisionists and this serves as a necessary balance to the witnesses' version (focusing understandably on the democratization dimension, albeit limited, even in revisionists' thought, strictly to the internal structures of the Party). Kopeček argues persuasively that the aggressive reaction of the higher echelons of Communist Parties against revisionism (orchestrated from Moscow from autumn 1957) reflected an internal dualism in Marxism-Leninism offering both so-called scientific grounds for the legitimacy of existing political regimes and at the same time a powerful tool of critical social analysis based on Marxist historicism.

This is the general thematic and chronological frame in which Kopeček deconstructs the specifics of Polish, Hungarian and Czech revisionist constellations. He characterizes

the Polish case (with Leszek Kołakowski as the principal actor), analyzed in the first place, as the "paradigmatic" version of revisionism in Communist dictatorships (p. 211) because of its, comparatively speaking, prime political relevance in the fateful year 1956 and because of its most explicit reactive dimension. In Poland revisionists could, surely more easily than elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, communicate with and react to non-Marxist intellectual currents which were allowed to survive even in the 1950s or, more precisely, which the Polish communist leadership never succeeded in eradicating completely. The efforts of Kołakowski and his colleagues to understand their own "historical role" (p. 205) after 1956 in the context of their painful emancipation from and coming to terms with their own Stalinist youth led them instinctively toward "young Marx" and his reflection on alienation. Their ambition to reinterpret Marxism as an open way of thinking on the human condition in the modern world logically brought them near to the contemporary Western existentialism.

It is impossible to overlook another very stimulating variant of this "socialist humanism" in the Hungarian context – connected specifically to the anthropocentric ethics of Agnes Heller, one of the most talented students of György Lukács, who himself cannot but be the center of Kopeček's Hungarian chapter entitled significantly "Dialectics of pragmatic power." The author introduces Lukács's story in all its amazing width and depth with its fascinating ups and downs: from the beginnings in Kun's revolution through Vienna, Berlin and Moscow back to Hungary, where Lukács became one of the main stars of Nagy's government, to his final fall from grace after 1956. Lukács's dominant and imposing position (certainly intellectually justified, even Kopeček does not hide his admiration of Lukács's works which offer "ravishing reading" p. 283) determined the character of Hungarian revisionism. This circumstance helps us to better understand the fact that the critique of Stalinism does not represent a fundamental issue in the Hungarian revisionist context. It was the collapse of European liberal democracy, the success of fascism and the apocalypse of the Second World War that constituted the formative experience of Lukács born in 1885. His ambition (passed on to his students and admirers) did not consist then in the analysis of a particular form of communist rule (Stalinism) but in a wider reflection on the legitimacy of the communist project in its historical dimension.

Contrariwise, in the Czech case analyzed in the last chapter entitled "Economy of conservative power," coming to terms with the Stalinist episode played an essential role for young intellectuals like Ivan Sviták or Karel Kosík, who started their careers at the beginning of the 1950s when they acted as passionate vectors for the rapid sovietization of Czech academia. Similar to their Polish colleagues in their disenchantment, they had to face a comparably much less progressive Party leadership whose specialty, according to Kopeček, was to feel out the atmosphere in Moscow in order to become the conservative outpost of the Bloc – as happened for instance with the anti-revisionist campaign in 1957. Moreover, the Czech communist leaders could rely on very smart young dogmatists like Zdeněk Mlynář who as partners in the discussion were intellectually equal to the revisionist philosophers. Kopeček reconstructs even their (today not so attractive) arguments as faithfully as possible which is certainly a great asset of this book. In Kopeček's detailed descriptions

of what at times were very esoteric debates on the relationship between theory and practice, science and propaganda, on Marxist epistemology, bureaucracy, etc., we can observe very clearly one of the principal and most interesting cleavages, i.e., the question of fundamental (according to the conservative Party ideologues and intellectuals) and not-so-fundamental (in the revisionist version) differences between capitalist and socialist societies, prefiguring in a way the still very lively (and probably never-ending) debates on totalitarianism and modernity of the communist project and social reality.

What results from this extremely stimulating analysis is indeed a picture of a very vigorous intellectual life even in the Czech lands. Kopeček thus invalidates to a certain extent one of his own conclusions stating that Czech revisionism was "beyond compare" socially less resonant than its Hungarian and Polish variants (p. 294). This is really a less than happy statement considering the fact that the question of the reception of revisionist concepts in a wider social context does not (and surely in the current phase of research cannot) constitute an adequately analyzed research problem in Kopeček's monograph.

A more serious problem consists, however, in the comparative dimension of this book which the author himself announces as one of the principal objectives of his work (p. 17). Historical comparison is undoubtedly a very risky enterprise that turns most often into a juxtaposition of "compared" cases crowned with a few final comments on what seems similar among them. Kopeček does not fully avoid this trap for the comparative issue represents a series of sketchy appendices to the chapters (centered around "national" constellations and problematics) rather than the principal axis of his argument. But this weak point is in no way fatal for the whole opus. It could perhaps even have a very pedagogical dimension. Is it really worth investing intellectual energy to compare what people thought in different places at the same time and come to the not so surprising conclusion that roughly they thought in a very similar way? Would it not be more stimulating to analyze how concretely this happened and by means of what kind of social practices – i.e., how ideas and their authors and proponents circulated and influenced one another? The few interesting traces mentioned by Kopeček (the visits of not just Schaff, Kołakowski, Bauman but also Garaudy, Sartre, Fromm to Prague and elsewhere, the possibility of international book loans without the intervention of the censor etc.) open many fascinating questions for a truly transnational history. In this way, the book's limitations can be perceived as added value for further research. Kopeček offers a very solid basis in the field of the history of ideas in Central and Eastern Europe in the second half of the twentieth century and his Quest helps to formulate new questions for other (hopefully more social-historically centered) quests to come. Thanks be to him for this courageous step.

Ondřej Matějka

Paul Krugman, **The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008.**
New York: W. W. Norton, 2009. 191 pp. ISBN 978-0-393-07101-6

The economic crisis troubling the United States has brought to the bookshelves several inspiring titles. The reedition of Paul Krugman's *The Return of Depression Economics*, however, stands out even in the broad variety of recently issued books. The language used to describe the turmoil of the twenty-first century remains to be accessible for the general public even though the author addresses the matter in a complex manner.

Krugman, a Nobel Memorial Prize winner, extended his first edition printed out in 1999 and assessed past material anew. Krugman's grim warning that despite the optimism a major depression might return became true and the reedition of *The Return of Depression Economics* explains why. Furthermore, rather than merely drawing a comparison with past and analyzing the causes leading to the latest bubble, Krugman offers conclusions relevant in our near future.

Albeit a foremost clarifying title, *The Return of Depression Economics* is partly limited by Krugman's approach to the topic and by the short scope offered by a revised edition. The book was written with an intention to present ideas in a form accessible to people at large rather than to construct an intellectual edifice and compresses the development of past decades in less than 200 pages. The content thus serves as a narrative to the contemporary development rather than detailed explanation of the latest trends.

The new edition, however, stresses one crucial aspect of the crisis of 2008. While in the 1990s people of the developed world believed that the crisis happen elsewhere and that the dot-com bubble was merely a glitch in the system, the housing and investment downfall in the United States has proved them wrong. *The Return of Depression Economics* is thus a book instrumental for better understanding of the ills troubling present world and both the original and new chapters deserve close attention.

The original content issued in 1999 introduced the depressions of the 1990s in three steps. First, a belief that the depressions are a matter of the past led to maladjustment during the crisis in Latin America. Then the booming Asian "tigers" failed to learn from the development in Mexico and Argentina and had to experience the lesson on their own. The third part, the conclusion, warned that all should be aware of similar prospects and anticipate the malevolent tendencies. Ten years later Krugman justly assessed these factors anew and exposed past crisis as even more relevant.

Compared to the downturn of new millennium seems the unfounded optimism of the 1980s boastful especially after previous warning slumps. While the 1960 brought up a belief that the business circle had been tamed, the next decade coined term stagflation and witnessed the oil crises. However, in comparison with the Great Depression, all shortcomings seemed to be only minor inconveniences and even affluent pundits succumbed to the illusion of continuous prosperity. But, as Krugman noted already in late 1990s, examples of the opposite were quite abundant.

Countries in Latin America, East and Southeast Asia consequently failed from each other's mistakes. Most importantly, first Mexico stumbled upon insufficient devaluation of

peso, Argentina's currency board failed to avoid the run at currency, Japan narrowly tiptoed around liquidity trap and several Southeast Asian countries borrowed heavily from abroad till they effectively undermined own currencies.

While most of problems of developing countries seem irrelevant for the economic giant of the likes of the United States, all of the above mentioned examples shared interesting pattern. A seemingly unimportant factor doubted the general prosperity of particular country, like the growth of GDP in Mexico, but the rate of investment led to the claims of sound economy. Following troubles were then either addressed by insufficient reaction, in case of devaluation of Mexican peso, or spread beyond the capability of a single government like in the case of Thailand. In other words, a seemingly minor shortcoming might mark larger structural problems that might not be contained conventionally.

And, as explained in chapters 6 to 8, conventional wisdom regarding the demand-side fluctuations left many economic pundits ill equipped to deal with the emerging crisis. Believing that the economic circles had been tamed, mainstream research focused on the productivity and long-term growth rather than on hypothetical flaws distorting the demands. The optimistic expectations that new technologies and theories will solve everything were epitomized in the rise and fall of Long Term Capital Management, but the failure to outsmart the market was not the only reason why a demand crisis struck so hard.

In the 1990s, the hedge funds and rating agencies began to rule in what is today referred to as the shadow banking system. Financial derivatives like subprime mortgages and collateralized debt obligations rationalized speculation beyond any reason and sudden confidence in risky investment led to equity and estate bubbles. Secondly, the FED was in the long run weakened by the monetary policy advocated by Alan Greenspan. Cutting interest rates to the minimum limited the options of Federal Reserve Bank to act when the real crisis came. In general, the positive expectations did not reflected the actual potential for downturn.

As Krugman concludes in two last chapters, the extent of the crisis came as a shock and the public reacted accordingly. Individuals and firms cut down spending and in the end aggravated income of others. Thus governments, rather than focusing on the outcomes of fiscal globalization, have to regain public confidence necessary for credit flow and overall spending. Krugman recommends to put in more capital and in the long run reform of the murky shadow banking.

However, he introduces his concept only briefly and thus his conclusion that the stimulus has to be sufficiently big to succeed is widely opened for criticism. Not all government have the luxury to be able to spend as much as they want and reckless stimuli contribute to hazardous belief that the government will always come for rescue. The solution for current thus greatly vary according to particular country and "filling the bowl" does not, a priori, build up public confidence. The main actor of current crisis, the United States, serves as an interesting examples of how different situations the governments face.

Despite all ills troubling the economy of the United States, Washington firmly remains in a unique position. As long as dollar remains to be the undisputed reserve currency and as long the United States maintain the lead in most economic indexes, US budget will always

find enough creditors to back up the deficit. Most nations, however, do not have such luxury and depend on the remedies prescribed by the IMF. In other words, not all may follow the policy of extensive spending at the cost of debt and can not easily escape the liquidity trap beyond the means offered by central bank. Krugman's recommendations are thus valid mostly to nations with good debtor credit.

The usefulness of Krugman's argumentation does not, however, rest in proposing universal solution. As already stated, he never intended to write an elaborate scholarly dispute and rather offered an explanation of current affairs easily understandable by general public. Wry humor, parables, whimsical examples and sound arguments are indeed a better way of introducing a complicated matter than a cryptic jargon adopted by the likes of Alan Greenspan. Using the Capitol Hill co-op as a model thus served his aims better than baffling statements about the "irrational exuberance." Furthermore, simple models invite reader to derive a conclusions of their own and enable another helpful parables.

And one parable seems to be especially fitting. So as the adverbial pharaoh had dreams of seven fat cattle followed by seven lean, both nations and individuals should expect a slowdown after a boom. Unless having an extraordinary debtor credit, one should prepare for the necessity to spend savings so as to be able to run a deficit after a surplus. While individuals at the brink of personal bankruptcy are able to abandon their mortgages and shed liabilities at the cost of personal comfort, states bear the burden that cannot be simply avoided. Social welfare, infrastructure and public safety require adequate spending and all statesmen should beware to plan before the depression strikes again.

While far from offering a miraculous solution for the contemporary crisis, reading Krugman's *The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008* is indisputably beneficial in two distinct ways. First, it condemns the unsound optimism that all problems of economic circles had been forever solved and addresses the flaws that cannot be easily mended in current economic system. And, secondly, Krugman's clear prose presents complex ideas that are often detached from general public in a manner that intrigues everyone to read the book to the end. Too many sound policies failed due to the lack of public support, and without a lucid, understandable and widely read analysis other are doomed to fail too.

Michal Švajda

Michael Lewis, **The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine.** London: Allen Lane, 2010. 266 pp. ISBN 978-0393072235

The Big Short by Michael Lewis is a fascinating and tumultuous read, documenting the events and personalities behind the biggest stock market crash since the Great Depression. The story doesn't focus itself around the powerful figures – the bankers, CEOs and politicians – that are normally featured in such an account, but rather on a select few people who had the intelligence, bravery and luck to be on the other side of the market, finding

themselves predicting the downfall of sub-prime mortgage bonds. The title of the book, the Big Short, is a play on the fact that these characters end up shorting the system and the biggest financial players to make millions out of the financial crisis. They are not, however, portrayed as the bad guys; these men did their best to notify the authorities and institutions as to the blatant fraud and money manipulation going on, but when nobody listened, they simply decided to bet against the system and ride out the devastation that would be caused when it eventually collapsed.

The book deals frankly with some major economic concepts: sup-prime mortgage lending, credit default swaps and short selling. Sub-prime borrowers are those borrowers with poor credit histories or no history at all, who present a substantial risk to lenders. Historically, these people have found it very difficult to get loans, but as the US economy boomed in the 1990s and 2000s, banks and financial institutions became more flushed with money, enabling them to lend to a more diverse base. To deal with the risk of the sub-prime borrowers, they often lent to them with a sneaky ploy: two years at a low, fixed rate, which after the two years becomes adjustable, usually with a base rate of much higher than the initial one offered (borrowers were enticed with, for example, 5% interest, but after the end of the two-year period they saw it jump to 12%). So long as housing prices were growing, however, these kinds of loans presented little risk, as the borrower could always refinance or the bank could seize the valuable assets. A credit default swap involves spreading the risk of a default on an investment or bond to other parties to limit the risk to the investor. The buyer of a credit swap receives credit protection, while the seller of the swap guarantees the credit worthiness of the product. By doing this, the risk of default is transferred from the holder of the fixed income security to the seller of the swap. In the event of a default, the seller must pay the investor the value of the investment that was defaulted upon. Short selling involves the selling of a security that the seller does not own. Short sellers assume that they will be able to buy the stock at a lower amount than the price at which they sold short. The opposite of short-selling is going long (betting that a price will go up), so basically is is a bet that the value of the product being shorted is going to decrease.

The book reserves its most scathing remarks for what is known as CDOs – collateralized debt obligations. Basically, a CDO is made up of the worst parts of the sub-prime loans. They are the bottom-level triple B tranches of the sub-prime tower, but then repackaged as new financial products, which somehow got rated as triple A, through the creative devices of the financial institutions and the gross incompetence of the ratings agencies. The book quotes one of the main characters, Steve Eisman, as referring to CDOs as: "the equivalent of three levels of dog shit lower than the original bonds." For the first part of the book, the main buyer of these is AIG, the American Insurance Group, but it later opts out, leaving smaller investment groups and hedge funds to pick up the slack.

One of the people that the book follows is Steve Eisman, a Jewish New Yorker, who, despite being a lawyer, ended up on Wall Street thanks to the contacts of his parents. In the 1990s, while working for Oppenheimer, an old-fashioned Wall Street partnership, he was one of the people pushing for sub-prime mortgages, as he saw it as a way of evening out the playing field between the rich and the poor – taking the consumer out of high-interest

credit card debt and into a lower-interest mortgage. He first published a report damning sub-prime mortgage loans in 1997, after being tipped off by a colleague, much to the consternation of the industry. There were big problems in the industry in 1998, but instead of examining the causes of the problems, the loans, the industry saw it as an indictment on dodgy accounting practices. He eventually becomes the most vocal and influential critic of the CDOs, and consequently spends years trying to figure out what was going on in the industry. He comes up with the idea of credit-default swaps on CDOs, and approaches the major Wall Street banks to ask if they will offer them to him. They had to be created, but he gets what he wanted in the end. Interestingly, the banks think that he is dumb money, which turns out to be exactly the opposite.

Vincent Daniel, one of Eisman's colleagues, despite growing up in a lower-middle-class family, always seemed to be the one raised with a silver spoon in his mouth. He was a pessimist, always looking to see how somebody was trying to screw him – a quality that later became an asset as they worked against Wall Street. He had the skill with numbers that Eisman did not, which made them a valuable working team. He was the person on Eisman's team that first noticed the problems with sub-prime loans, as he found irregularities in the loans of people with mobile homes. The irregularity was that people were defaulting, but the financial institutions were saying differently, calling the defaults "involuntary prepayments."

Michael Burry is one of the more compelling characters in the story, and you find yourself strangely attached and transfixed by him throughout. He has one eye, is autistic and, despite being on residency to become a doctor, devotes extraordinary amounts of time to mundane things like reading the financial prospectuses, contracts, basically anything in detail, of Wall Street firms or anything to do with finance. From doing so, he set up a financial website which soon became widely-read. He was soon able to set up a hedge fund, called Scion Capital LLC, through which he ended up hedging bets that the market would fall apart in 2007. It is a difficult path for him; at the beginning, he was able to bring in great returns, but the more convinced he became about the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market, the more investors began to doubt him. Just months before his bets were vindicated, he nearly lost a lot of his clients, only keeping them because he worked around a clause in their investment contracts. He became reviled in the financial community, and a number of newspaper articles and editorials called his actions into question. When the market in the end collapsed, as we all now well know, it did not give him the elation he craved. He closed his business, more-or-less removing himself from society, although as a much richer man. During the eight years he was running it, his company brought in a net profit of 489 percent, and he exited with a cool $100 million. But the money was not what he wanted, and he walked away a bitter and sad man, not triumphant as he had expected.

The book lambastes the incompetence of the ratings agencies and government regulators in particular. The main ratings agencies are shown to be poorly-run outfits, operating on the meager scraps that Wall Street left for them. The fact that, or at least according to the author, the ratings agencies accepted data so readily from the institutions they were supposed to be watching was laughable. The fact that the main tenet of deeming the data acceptable was that the American house prices would continue appreciating in value without

fail was downright stupid. The author describes the workers at the ratings agencies as the bottom of the barrel; the leftovers that Wall Street didn't want to take. The fact that several of the main characters approached the ratings agencies to warn them, but were laughed off, says something about the massive mismanagement. The ratings agencies were, as it turns out, in the employ of the very people they should have been examining the investments of. The financial institutions paid them for the ratings, so it was worth their while not to dig too deep. The government regulators, on the other hand, don't take up too much print space, as the author sees them as barely worth mentioning, considering how much of an ineffective non-entity they are.

The book does manage to demonize many of the typical character you would expect: chapters are devoted to Bear Sterns, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and the like, and, in particular, their leadership. One of the more interesting so-called villains is a man named Wing Chau, who out of his own incompetence and arrogance ended up entirely on the wrong side of the market. He was the end buy of the sub-prime CDOs that the book focuses so much of its attention on, and the scene where Eisman ends up sitting beside him during a dinner party is amusing, if not deeply disturbing. Wing Chau acted as a conduit for the events of the crisis – without people to buy the CDOs, there would have been no market for them and they would have disappeared. Eisman, after a long conversation with Mr Chau, returns to the others and tells them that they have to bet against him. Whatever Chau was offering, he wanted to short it. Mr Chau's business eventually ended up imploding under the weight of the CDOs, but Chau himself was able to walk away with a handsome profit, as he himself only managed the investments, taking a sizeable commission.

Overall, this is a thrilling read. I personally found it unputdownable, as I found myself riding the waves of the economic boom right up to its collapse. The author has a frank and believable style, without flourish or unnecessary additions. You believe this re-telling of the tale, and it makes you ask yourself a great number of important questions: Why did nobody listen? Why did nobody wake up to what was going on, considering all of the evidence? Where were the government regulators and ratings agencies in this, and are they at least partly culpable? How is it that hardly anything has been done to punish the perpetrators? Nobody really knows the answers to these questions, but the book does at least attempt to answer them. This is a book about human ego, complacency and incompetence, and how in the end they will always result in the fall of Rome.

James King

Roy Rempel, Dreamland**: How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined Sovereignty.** Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006. 189 pp. ISBN 1-55339-118-7

Roy Rempel, a former foreign and defense policy advisor of Steven Harper's government, wrote a critical analysis of contemporary Canadian foreign policy named: *Dreamland:*

How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined Sovereignty. In his well-argued book, Roy Rempel claims that Canada's international significance is declining and that Canadians have come to believe in a false global identity.

Although many Canadians have believed that Canada has a powerful position and influence on international affairs, the Canadian foreign policy has actually subverted this myth. Rempel argues that in the past decade the Canadian government has conducted an ideological foreign policy that lost sight of the national interest. As a consequence of this foreign policy, Canada has lost much influence over the world. Rempel is persuaded that the situation has got even worse and that the decline is about much more than a simple loss of influence: "Canada is becoming internationally irrelevant. Within North America, it is at risk of becoming little more than an object rather than an independent actor in terms of its relationship with the United States."

Thus, Canadians, according to Rempel, have to realize that expressing national interests are the core of foreign policy and that the foreign policy is not just about such things as peacekeeping, aid in Africa or diplomacy in the United Nations organization. The main problem of current Canadian foreign policy is a frequent clash between Canadian "interest" and "values." Moreover, according to the author, what Canadians need to understand is that if the country wants to have a real influence on a particular problem in a way that actually promotes the national interest, then much greater focus in areas where they can make a difference will be required. The process of choosing where to focus, in turn, has to be based on clear understanding of what the national interest is.

The most important thing what should the Canadian foreign policy take into account is the fact that Canada is a North American power, bound to the United States by common interests and shared values. One of Canada's most significant tools of power is the perception by the rest of the world that Canada enjoys a uniquely close relationship to the United States. Hence, the preserving Canada's good relationship with the United States should be the greatest foreign policy concern, as Rempel says: "The more political distance that Canada establishes from the United States, the less relevant Canada will be. For Canada, at every level, it is influence in Washington that matters most."

In this eight chapter scathing analysis of Canadian foreign policy Roy Rempel provides a conservative point of view of a current Canada's position with the international system. He argues that Canada's position has declined due to the fact that previous governments did not build their foreign policy agenda on the principal of national interest, which is the most important component of any foreign policy. Thus, the current government should set clear foreign policy priorities and objectives based on the country's national interests and put the security and prosperity of Canadians first. Rempel's Dreamland fully satisfies all attributes of the academic work and is well-recommended to anyone who is interested in contemporary Canadian politics.

Eva Petrová

Gary Rosen, ed., **The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq.** New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 254 pp. ISBN 0-521-67318-6

In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington American foreign policy underwent a dramatic shift. Led by a committed president enjoying significant popular support, the United States launched war on terror, characterized by invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and ensuing swift military victories. However, successes on the battlefield were followed by a protracted counterinsurgency effort that has hitherto not been won in either of the countries.

Whereas the invasion of Afghanistan was generally perceived as an understandable response to the barbaric acts of 9/11, the decision to start combat operations against the regime of Saddam Hussein was controversial in nature. It reflected sweeping changes in American national security policy, which henceforth reserved for the United States the right to act preemptively against any possible threats to its people or territory. Moreover, it established the ideological link between terrorist groups and the so-called "rogue regimes," making no difference between terrorists themselves and those harboring them and supporting their activities. Thus, taking also into consideration the danger of WMD proliferation, America could no longer afford to wait for a concrete threat to materialize.

Needless to say, the argumentation in the run-up to the war in Iraq was met with ardent opposition, not only abroad, but also domestically. In addition to its liberal critics, the war found resistance even within the conservative wing of American politics, where various schools of thoughts argued about its viability, necessity and appropriateness. Ultimately, this Republican intra-party debate between traditionalists, neoconservatives, realists and other factions was won by neoconservatives who advocated robust military action along with an emphasis on democracy promotion.

"The Right War," edited by Gary Rosen, offers an examination of the next stage of the conservative debate on Iraq. It is a collection of twenty-two articles, essays and op-eds, published in leading periodicals such as *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal* or *Weekly Standard* and written by prominent American conservative thinkers and opinion-makers in 2004 and 2005, i. e. in a period after the termination of major military operations and during a growing insurgency following the fall of Saddam Hussein. They are indicative of the political atmosphere in Washington, D.C., when the jubilant mood following the impressive military victory against Iraqi regular army had slowly dissipated and questions about the future of "post-war" American efforts in Iraq, turning out to be more lethal than the actual combat phase, had begun to arise. It was in this moment when it became painfully clear that the project of pacifying, let alone democratizing Iraq and possibly the entire Middle East, will be much less of a "cakewalk" than the previous military campaign. As a result, American conservatives had to react to new realities on the ground, reflect on their own past contemplations and, most importantly, provide a suggestion for a future course of action.

Rosen's book does a good job demonstrating that the conservative movement is not a unitary monolith as it selects works by authors of various ideological backgrounds. From the neoconservative perspective, it offers ardent support for America's war effort and advo-

cacy of staying the course. Robert Kagan and William Kristol explain in their own terms the reasons why the United States is involved in fighting in the Middle East. Norman Podhoretz expansively argues that war on terror represents a new paradigm in international relations comparable to World War II or the Cold War. Charles Krauthammer builds on his earlier works about unipolar moment and defends the world view he calls democratic realism. Other authors challenge the neoconservative agenda and assumptions. Fouad Ajami writes about the likely failure of the democracy-building project in Mesopotamia while Francis Fukuyama suggests his own alternative of a mix of American interests and values. Realists have their say in the words of Henry Kissinger, who questions the feasibility and desirability as a foreign policy goal of nation-building efforts in the Middle East. Columnist George Will calls on the Bush administration to return to the true principles of conservatism. The paleoconservative point of view is presented by Patrick Buchanan, who poses uncomfortable questions about the goals of the ongoing war.

Strictly speaking, "The Right War" does not bring any new information about or analysis of the intellectual debate on the Iraq War in America as it, in fact, consists of reprints that could eventually be obtained elsewhere. Neither does it address the impact these writings had on the decision-making processes in Washington, D.C., as the Bush administration contemplated further course of action in the Middle East. However, its foremost contribution lies in the fact that it offers an overview of the main ideological groups within the conservative movement along with concrete examples of their products in a concise and well-organized form. Rosen, Harvard-educated managing director of the Commentary magazine, managed to compile a truly resourceful book for any student of modern American foreign and national security policy.

Jiří Skoupý

Simon Schama, **The American Future: A History from the Founding Fathers to Barack Obama.** London: Vintage, 2009. 416 pp. ISBN 978-0099520399

Simon Schama is a renowned British historian who lives in the United States since the beginning of the 1980s. In 2008, he produced a documentary series for the BBC, which analyzed American history in the light of the then upcoming elections. His research for the TV series became the starting point for his book *The American Future*.

The author explores the idea that Americans, when making decisions concerning the future of their country, are often influenced by their interpretations of history. The biggest asset of the book is its focus on micro-historical episodes, which Schama introduces in the context of their own age as well as in their origin and effect on the current dilemmas. This is not a book that would try to forecast the future. It is a highly selective and in many cases strongly simplified interpretation of history, which doesn't strive for objectivity, but provides arguments. His main argument is that it is impossible to cut history out of the context of current discourse. History according to Schama is a living organism, not an objective reality.

The prologue lefts little mystery about Schama's political inclinations. Under the title Iowa waltz, the author reports about Barack Obama's victory in Iowa's democratic primaries as a day "when American democracy came back from the death." The first chapter titled "American war" shows the conflicted roles that the American army played and continues to play in the US. The vehicle for Schama's craft fully carved story telling is the Meigs family. One of its members, Montgomery Meigs, led the logistics of Union army during the Civil war. His systematic approach is described as one of the strategic advantages of the Union and his engineering skills as one of the pivots of the development of Washington, D.C. Schama here argues that besides the expansionist tradition, there is also a constructive, practical role for the American army.

The following part, titled "American Fervor," also tries to set a progressive light on an institution much more connected with conservatism. Here, the author stresses the positive role that the organized religion had in promoting religious tolerance, in a time span that covers the Founding fathers as well as the Civil rights era. The most interesting parts cover the role of black churches in opposing slavery and supporting social cohesion. The analysis, however, ends with the late 1960s and unfortunately doesn't deal with the current role of Christianity on politics. The third chapter asserts that nativism and xenophobia have been parts of the American society since its beginnings. It also, however, shows an idealistic and inclusive idea of American identity.

The last chapter is less consistent, trying to deal with the history of Native American forced resettlement and the problems of managing natural resources. The example of re-location of the Cherokee Indians shows the tragedy of the Trail of Tears in the light of the economic pressures to use the natural resources in their territory. Then the story jumps into the 1930s, when precisely the area in Oklahoma, where the Cherokees were relocated to, became the Dustbowl, where soil overuse led to catastrophic dust storms. Furthermore, Schama introduces current Las Vegas as an efficient system of water management.

Simon Schama's book *The American Future* is to some point limited by the atmosphere of presidential campaign in 2008, by precisely that kind of "new beginning" excitement, which led Barack Obama to victory. However, it is not a book that would become irrelevant within two years. It is an interesting exercise in the use of material from private archives. The strong appeal of this book comes from the connections made between personal stories and a specific understanding of the development of some current issues. The fact that Schama presents a strong opinion on each of these issues is not harming the book. It is neither meant for academic audience neither as a text book. It is more of a polemic essay, which convinces the reader of the importance of history and the power of its different interpretations.

Kristýna Pašková

Robert D. Schulzinger, **A Time for Peace. The Legacy of the Vietnam War.** New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 252 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-507190-0

Schulzinger's *A Time for Peace: The Legacy of the Vietnam War* tells the story of how the American War in Vietnam has been remembered and the effects different memories have had on current events. Americans and Vietnamese who lived through the decades-long fighting remembered the war as an experience that shaped their lives, their outlooks, their beliefs, and their feelings. More than a generation in both countries viewed some aspects of contemporary war, politics, foreign affairs and culture through the prism of their memories of the Vietnam-American War. These memories have not been fixed, and they have altered over time. Nor did the world stop when the Vietnam War ended with the Communist victory in April 1975. International affairs went forward, and the United States and Vietnam adjusted to changing circumstances over the next twenty-five years. Some of these changes were among the most dramatic in modern history as the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed.

The book is divided into four parts. Part I, "International Affairs," tells how the United States and Vietnam went from enmity to reconciliation from 1975 to 2000. Along the way, international alliances shifted and ideologies changed and sometimes dissolved. Eventually, the United States and Vietnam found they had great incentives to reach common ground. Part II, "Veterans and Vietnamese Americans," recounts the ways in which American veterans of the Vietnam War and Vietnamese who fled their country for the United Sates in the years after 1975 assimilated their experiences in the present. The veterans' and Vietnamese experiences helped shape postwar beliefs and memories about the war. Part III, "Cultural Legacies," analyzes the most popular of the hundreds of movies, TV shows, novels and memoirs of the Vietnam era. These representations of the war helped determine the meaning of the war in the minds of Americans in the postwar era. Finally, Part IV, "Conclusion: Political Echoes of a War," consists of one chapter, "The Living Legacy of the Vietnam War," which explicitly explains the ways in which American policymakers and ordinary citizens learned a variety of different lessons from the Vietnam war and how they applied those lessons in the conduct of their current affairs.

A Time for Peace tries to consolidate the findings of much of the existing literature on the legacy of the Vietnam War. Schulzinger's interpretation of the legacy of the Vietnam War, like that of many of writers who have dealt with subject, is that it represented a national trauma for the United States, a psychological shock like the Civil War, the Great Depression, and World War II. Vietnam shook some of the basic shared assumptions Americans held about the honesty and competence of their leaders and the wisdom and morality of their actions in foreign affairs. But they disagreed about the memory, the lessons of the war, the integrity of public institutions, and their country's role in the world. Recollections of the war became focal points of many divisions over how Americans should conduct their affairs in the present.

Tomáš Kristlík

Joseph E. Stiglitz, **Freefall: Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy.** New York: Norton, 2010. 361 pp. ISBN 978-0-393-07596-0

"I told you so!" This is what Columbia University professor and the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz could say to all those movers and shakers who were shaping the U.S. economic system for the past 30 years, especially in the 1980s and 2000s, after the Great Recession stormed the globe leaving the whole of humanity to deal with its aftermath. Instead of shouting this chant, he wrote a book. *Freefall: Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy*, his latest monograph published in February 2010, scrutinizes the reasons and consequences of the world's biggest economic crisis after the Great Depression. Taking into account the fact that the U.S. and the world economies are still recovering from the Great Recession and prospects for the future are still gloomy, he didn't hesitate to produce and deliver a comprehensive study about how and what happened. The major reason encouraging him to do so before everybody else was the fact embodied in the first sentence of this paragraph, namely that he was right all the time and that he predicted the storm was coming.

Over the past fifteen years as he was occupying prestigious posts such as a member of the Clinton administration's Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Chief Economist of the World Bank and professor at Columbia University, Stiglitz was constantly criticizing economic policies that led to the U.S and subsequently world-wide economic meltdown. This standpoint in a great portion cost him the position in the World Bank and even some kind of silent exclusion from the mainstream U.S. economic academic community. Books such as *Making Globalization Works, The Roaring Nineties: A New History of the World's Most Prosperous Decade, Globalization and Its Discontents* were criticized as obsolete conservative manifestos of a Keynesian approach advocating harmful and progress-blocking state interventionism. Even the 2001 Nobel Prize he won didn't do any good to make his arguments at least a little bit more valuable to his critics. But what goes around comes around. As all the main levers of the American and global economy started to break down one by one, his arguments were getting on-the-ground confirmation, and all that was left for his critics to do after the storm was over was to state grumpily: "Damn! He was right."

Therefore, *Freefall* represents vindications of all Stiglitz's arguments that were disputed. This book in ten chapters reveals all those weak and corroded links in the American economic system that caused the global meltdown: unjustified and suicidal deregulation, the greed of bankers, speculative behavior, lack of morals and ethics in the economic sector, unsustainable overconsumption, and government misbehavior concerning bailouts, loans and public deficit. Using the method of "peeling back the onion," as he calls it, Stiglitz is trying to reach a conclusion as to what went wrong. Furthermore, he doesn't stop here. He is trying to draw lessons and recommendations for the future in order that this situation never repeats itself. Though the spectrum of his analysis is broad, it's possible to say that *Freefall* covers four major topics: reasons, causes and timeline of the Great Recession; the behavior of the major companies during the crisis; the Bush and Obama administrations' responses and policies; and future recommendations for the restructuring of the economic system as

well as changes in the behavior of society. What makes this book even more valuable is the style of Stiglitz's writing. In easy readable, plain English, he makes *Freefall* understandable to one without almost any economic knowledge or background. That is why *Freefall* is to become compulsory literature for all those who want the Great Recession never to happen again.

What happened and how it happened: In the very first paragraph of the first chapter (p. 1), Stiglitz bluntly draws the outline of the crisis:

"A deregulated market awash in liquidity and low interest rates, a global real estate bubble, and skyrocketing subprime lending were a toxic combination. Add in the U.S. fiscal and trade deficit and the corresponding accumulation in China of huge reserves in dollars – an unbalanced global economy – and it was clear that things were horribly awry."

Stiglitz points out that clues to the forthcoming breakdown were visible both in the previous and current decade. At that time three-quarters of the economy (of the GDP) was house related, the dot-com bubble burst in the spring of 2000 showing what was the consequence of speculative experiments in the stock-market, and oil prices rose from $32 per barrel in March 2003 to $137 per barrel in July 2008.

The first ones to be pushed to the wall of shame in *Freefall* are the bankers, the Wall Street, and the Bush administration (especially Alan Greenspan as the director of the Fed). Banks failed to do their main task, to provide small and medium-size business and the general population with accessible loans. Instead, they focused on "promoting securitization, especially in the mortgage market." Wall Street, in its "Frankenstein laboratories," created risky and poisonous products that were the major instrument for exporting the crisis from the U.S. to the rest of the world. In addition, Bush and Greenspan are blamed for the senseless deregulation enabling the bad behavior of the previously mentioned tandem of financial institutions.

Government's Response: Once the downturn was on the roll, naturally, the government was obliged to do something and save the economy. Stiglitz argues that all that both the Bush and Obama administration did was to create massive bailout programs for "too-big-to-fail companies." The initial move to rescue the economy was Bush's tax-cut program worth $168 billion. Though Stiglitz considers Bush's economic policies devastating and crisis-causing, he is much more critical of the Obama administration's response. He thinks (p. 37) that the major mistake of the new president was that:

"Instead of redesigning the system, the administration spent too much of the money on reinforcing the existing, failed system. 'Too big to fail' institutions repeatedly came to the government for bailouts, but the public money flowing to the big banks at the center of failures actually strengthened the part of the system that had repeatedly run into trouble. At the same time, government wasn't spending proportionately as much on strengthening those parts of the financial sector that were supplying capital to the dynamic parts of the economy, new ventures and small and medium-sized enterprises."

The author emphasizes the negative role of the legislative and executive branch in the creation of bailout programs, as well as the legally questionable role of the Federal Reserves in overriding standard procedures when it comes to dealing with such a massive amount of taxpayers' money. Stiglitz depicts cloudy decisions made by the White House and Capitol Hill using two examples of how bailout programs were created. First, one made by the Bush administration was now well-known $700 billion-heavy Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). TARP was initially rejected in Congress, but the Bush administration "organized auctions asking each of the opposing congressmen how much they needed in gifts to their districts and constituents to change their vote." After these "auctions" were held, thirty-two Democrats and twenty-six Republicans who initially opposed this bill switched sides to support TARP. The other one was Obama's Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP), which has continuity with TARP. The Government would use $75 to $100 billion in TARP, plus capital from private investors, to buy toxic assets from banks. What was described as partnership was actually the draining of taxpayers' money, where up to 92 % of the money was provided by the government which would collect only half of the profits and bear almost all of the losses. Stiglitz describes PPIP as a "Rube Goldberg device that Wall Street loves – clever, complex, and non-transparent, allowing huge transfers of wealth to the financial markets."

According to Stiglitz, the central role in the U.S. economic meltdown, when it comes to the public sector, was played by the Federal reserves. Its influence was crucial "from the creation of the crisis through lax regulation and loose monetary policies through the failure to deal effectively with the aftermath of the bursting of the bubble." Fed was the only Federal institution that didn't have to get Congressional permission to use billions of taxpayer dollars. As Stiglitz puts it (p. 144):

"While the Federal Reserve Board in Washington benefits from better oversight and accountability, the role that it played in the bailouts should be deeply disturbing. It was the non-transparent instrument of choice used by both the Bush and Obama administrations as the bailout became increasingly costly and as the bad behavior of the banks became increasingly clear. The full eventual costs of the bailouts and lending programs through the Fed – and the recipients of the munificent gifts – remain unknown."

Too-big-to-fail companies' behavior: The central place on the dissection table of Stiglitz's criticism is reserved for major American banks. He claims that with the support of the government they staged "the great American robbery," as he titled the fifth chapter of *Freefall*, and one of the biggest allocations of wealth in human history. Banks were successful in this endeavor because they were recognized by the government as "too big to fail." Stiglitz argues that if they are too big to fail, then they are too big to exist. Bankruptcy, he states, is one the cornerstones of capitalism. Companies go bankrupt, shareholders lose everything, bondholders become the new owners and the process continues. When the government interfered to prevent this, it distorted the market and caused further problems.

Until the beginning of January 2010, the magnitude of guarantees and bailouts approached 80 per cent of the U.S. GDP, some $12 trillion. Stiglitz claims that big banks and

car companies were rewarded for their mismanagement and greed. The bigger the loss was the bigger the bailout and opportunity to get taxpayers' money is. Using examples of big car companies, banks and insurance companies, such as AIG, Stiglitz portrays how hundreds of billions of dollars were poured into the private pockets of CEOs and other high-ranking managers while low-paid workers had to put up with lower wages and health care funds cuts. He criticizes Bush's and Obama's unwillingness to cope with these problems and to actually punish these giants for producing and exporting the crisis. The author thinks (p. 131) that they shouldn't go unpunished and proposes:

"A principle borrowed from environmental economics, called 'polluter pays' offers guidance on how should they pay. American banks have polluted the global economy with toxic waste […] and they must be forced, now or later, to pay the price of the cleanup, perhaps in the form of taxes."

In almost 100 pages the author explains how big banks caused the crisis and then cried for help in order to survive. Mortgage scams, predatory lending, risky derivatives, filtration of balance sheets, lack of transparency, suppressing innovation, and the absence of any kind of moral or ethical standards are just some of the crucial factors that caused the too-big-to-fail failure. Ending the analysis about the U.S. bailout clients, Stiglitz concludes that bailouts are nothing new and nothing strange in economic theory, practice and history. However, the public money that has been spent was needed to take care of people and not of managers and CEOs of companies. In this case, "it was just an expanded version of Corporate Welfarism American-style."

Reforming the Nation: As Stiglitz is approaching the end of his book, he sounds more like a sociologist and philosopher than an economist. He argues that economic problems in the contemporary U.S. are not only rooted in the economy *per se*, but also in the absence of moral values and unwritten ethical and moral norms. "Moral crisis" and "moral deficit," as he calls it, only nurtured and allowed the crisis to develop. He outlines this problem stating (p. 278) that:

"Much has been written about the foolishness of the risks that the financial sector undertook, the devastation that the financial institutions have brought to the economy, and the fiscal deficits that have resulted; too little has been written about the underlying 'moral deficit' that has been exposed – a deficit that may be larger and even harder to correct. The unrelenting pursuit of profits and the elevation of the pursuit of self-interest may not have created the prosperity that was hoped, but they did help create the moral deficit."

Overall, Stiglitz's conclusion is that structural and all-reaching changes need to be made. The situation is bad but not as bad as the one back in the 1930s. He calls for restructure to be made in both the U.S. and in the global economic system. In addition, the U.S. needs to reevaluate its moral and ethical standards because a morally healthy society is the precondition for a healthy economy. He concludes *Freefall* with limited optimism and cautiousness (p. 297):

"We now have the opportunity to create a new financial system that will do what human beings need a financial system to do; to create a new economic system that will create meaningful jobs, decent work for all those who want it, one in which the divide between the haves and have-nots is narrowing, rather than widening; and, most importantly of all to create a new society in which each individual is able to fulfill his aspirations and live up to his potential, in which we have created citizens who live up to shared ideals and values, in which we have created a community that treats our planet with the respect that in the long run it will surely demand. These are the opportunities. The real danger now is that we will not seize them."

Srđan Karalić

Jeffrey Toobin, **The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court.** New York: Anchor Books, 2008. 452 s. ISBN 978-1-4000-9679-4

The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court offers a great insight into the inner world of the Supreme Court, based on interviews with the justices themselves and over seventy five law clerks. Toobins' narrative starts in 1980 on the day that Ronald Reagan was elected president and he traces the changes of the court, in terms of justices, landmark decisions, and ideological shifts (or lack thereof), until the selection of Barack Obama as the Democratic presidential candidate in 2008. Throughout this narrative Toobin provides outstanding insights into the backgrounds and personalities of each of the nine judges who served under Rehnquist (Sandra Day O'Connor, Clarence Thomas, Davis Souter, Stephen Breyer, Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Antonin Scalia and John Stevens) giving the reader an understanding of the beliefs and experiences that inform each of their Supreme Court decisions and dissents.

Toobin also provides outstanding analysis and description of each of the major court decisions in the twenty years that the book covers. His access to the law clerks and justices allow him to describe the intricate details of how the justices appealed to one another on certain issues, and the inner torment that the justices felt on matters of immense personal interest. He chronicles in great detail the torment of O'Connor over the Casey case and the way in which she came to an agreement with Souter and Kennedy to work secretly on an opinion in the case. We also get great detail regarding Bush v Gore and the Guantanamo Bay controversy.

The prevailing theme of *The Nine* is the ideology of the Court and the way that the appointment of justices is influenced tremendously by the ideology of both the justice themselves and that of the presiding president. Toobin looks in great detail at the selection processes undertook by Clinton and Bush, in their attempts to fulfill manifesto promises and the ideological desires of their parties. The issue of Roe v Wade features prominently throughout the book, signaling its continuing importance in American politics, as well as alerting an outsider reader such as myself to just how much of a contested and controversial

issue it remains in the U.S. With this in mind Toobin attempts, through all aspects of his narrative, to "plumb the court's deepest mystery; why a tribunal so stuffed with Republicans hasn't shifted more radically rightward."[1] Common sense would suggest that a strong Republican presence on the bench would allow the party to achieve its greatest aim by overturning the Roe decision. Instead, Toobin paints a picture of a court where moderation prevails "the court is defined more by continuity than change" (p. 27), but where political agendas still hold sway.

As mentioned, Toobins' focus is very much on how political ideology affects the decisions of the court. One of his main arguments is the extent to which the political leaning of the president affects the court, with one of his closing points being that "one factor – and one factor only – will determine the future of the Supreme Court: the outcomes of presidential elections" (p. 395). However, the evidence for such a claim, both in the rest of the book and in reality, is limited.

Toobin himself spent the opening chapters of the book summarizing how, despite the bubbling of a "conservative revolution" and the appointment of three supposedly conservative justices by Ronald Reagan, such a shift to the right failed to materialize. He states in the first chapter that "With Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas completing the roster, how could the conservative cause lose?" (p. 26) and then proceeds to tell us how the moderate view of some justices, and the personal concerns of O'Connor, led to the decision being maintained. This would imply that when faced with decisions of huge social significance the justices are more than willing to depart from the goals and ideals of the president that elected them, with O'Connor in particular playing a crucial role in "upholding the essence of Roe" (p. 62), and thus making Toobins' argument that the outcomes of elections drive the path of the Court obsolete.

On the other hand the case of Bush v Gore provides a degree of evidence of how much the decisions of the justices are affected by their politics and ideologies. We are clearly told how Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas predictably sided with Bush and how O'Connor's agreement was almost guaranteed (p. 200). However O'Connor chose to side with Kennedy's alternative majority opinion because she "did not relish the idea of joining with the three conservative judges on such a politically charged case" (p. 200), denoting an awareness amongst the justices of how their political roots are perceived as being a determining factor by the public. This awareness is also expressed regarding Souter in Casey, where Toobin accuses him of being naive in his belief that law could be separated from outside events (p. 61). This suggests that appearing neutral is important for many justices and that they resent the accusations of the Court serving a political agenda, undermining Toobins' argument that the president influences the path of the court. Also, I am wary of Toobin accusing Souter of being "naive" as it points to a real bias on Toobins' part and I believe undermines the neutrality and validity of his argument. He is clearly liberal in his opinions and at times this overruns the narrative and forces the reader to see things a certain way, ignoring alternative arguments.

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1   David Margolick, "Meet the Supremes," *The New York Times*, September 23, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/books/review/Margolick-t.html.

Furthermore, whilst Toobin states that O'Connor allied with Kennedy to ensure she was in the middle, her favored position on the court according, she also demanded a provision on the opinion stating that the decision made by herself and Kennedy was "limited to present circumstances" (p. 203). This is crucial in the debate over the political allegiance of the justices. By including such a provision O'Connor was clearly helping Bush in the immediate circumstances and by departing from the traditional role of the court to advance the interests of a presidential candidate she strongly supported O'Connor is adding fuel to the fire that the politics of the judges affects their decisions.

It would therefore seem that there is a degree of accuracy in Toobins' claim that presidency affects the path of the court because at times it appears that the judges have a strong allegiance to the party that appointed them and have a desire to help them achieve their political goals. The situation is complicated though by the fact that the Court took a moderate route for much of the Rehnquist years when one would have expected them to become inherently conservative. If the court did not take that direction when it had a conservative majority it would seem that such an argument is irrelevant in the broader context of the Supreme Court.

I therefore feel that Toobins' argument that the presidency determines the decisions of the court to be exaggerated but not completely inaccurate. Politics undoubtedly has a role in the Supreme Court because the Justices have to be aware of the public feeling over the key issues that are brought to the court. But Toobin seems to imply, in light of Bush v Gore, that the Justices will twist the law top favor the party in power. Whilst there is certainly evidence for this, I feel it is a gross exaggeration, as seen in the early Rehnquist years, hence Toobin contradicts himself in the text.

Finally, Toobin asserts that the Bush appointments of Roberts and Alito are what will finally give the conservatives the votes needed to achieve their aims. Toobin suggests that as of September 2008 the conservatives were within one vote of total control, but how much can Alito and Roberts really change the direction of the court? There will always be Justices who are more moderately inclined and aware of public opinion to counter any real revolution. Furthermore, with Obama's presidency Supreme Court appointments are, by Toobins' logic, likely to be liberal. Any revolution is likely to be stalled for the duration of Obama's presidency and unless the Republicans gain massive support and the luck of many appointments in the near future such a revolution seems unlikely to ever happen.

In conclusion, whilst I very much enjoyed *The Nine* I believe that there are flaws in Toobins' main arguments and that his liberal bias very much affects the accuracy of his predictions for the future of the court. One could be forgiven for taking his view as the truth when coming to the book relatively uninformed. His style of writing, novelistic with huge emphasis on character, gives a personality to each judge which makes the reader view them as principled human beings and makes it easy to read each of their decisions ideologically. However, this is undoubtedly the purpose of anecdotes and helps Toobin drive home his point and paint a picture of Justices that are severely influenced by their beliefs and ideals. I feel that such an argument must be taken with a pinch of salt, because if the Supreme Court is led by the president then it will fail fulfill its judicial role.

Hannah Wilkes

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Manuscripts for consideration are to be sent to the editorial board via the e-mail address stuter@fsv.cuni.cz in a standard format (.doc or .rtf). All correspondence between the author and the editorial board will take place via e-mail.

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Authors should adhere to the classical reference style. References should be presented in the form of footnotes. Bibliographical information from consulted works is included in the footnotes themselves, not in a separate bibliography.

5. Reference Examples

Books

One Author or Editor

Richard Sakwa, *Postcommunism: Concepts in the Social Sciences* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999), 51–58.

Two Authors or Editors

Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth, eds., *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998).

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