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EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

We are pleased to present to you the Fall 2013 issue of the journal *Acta Universitatis Carolinae – Studia Territorialia*.

This volume features, among other things, three original articles that discuss some noteworthy, and, in part also under-researched, topics in the field of Area Studies and Modern History.

The first article, by Stanislav Sýkora, explores the ascent of George Washington in the early years of his political career. The second contribution, authored by Jan Bečka, is a study of relations between Thailand and the United States in the era of Field Marshall Phibunsongkhram. Finally, Barbora Čapinská in her paper provides a critical assessment of the U.S. counternarcotics policies in Colombia in the context of President George W. Bush's War on Terror.

We hope that you will enjoy reading this issue at least as much as we have taken pleasure in editing it.

On behalf of the editorial team,
Jan Šír

ARTICLES

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THE MAKING OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: HIS EARLY ASPIRATIONS AND RAPID ASCENT

STANISLAV SÝKORA

Abstract

The article maps the formation of Washington's aspirations from his youth to the late 1750s. His rapid ascent was owing to the support of Lawrence Washington, the Fairfaxes, and Governor Dinwiddie who offered him fitting opportunities for service. Washington had his first taste of international acclaim following his early military ventures in the developing French and Indian War. In the army, his popularity grew mainly because of his fearlessness and desire for military action. Washington's rise to the top crust of the Virginia gentry was solidified by his marriage to Miss Custis, one of the wealthiest widows in the province. By joining the elite group of Virginia's political leaders in the House of Burgesses, Washington's political ascent in the colony reached a significant milestone of visibility and served as a springboard for colonial and continental prominence.
Keywords: George Washington, aspirations, ascent, gentry, honor

Introduction

Today, many remember Washington as the first president of the United States and visualize him as being an elderly man of wisdom and honesty with his characteristic air of quiet dignity visible in his formal bearing and powdered hair – an image perpetuated by the brush of the famed Gilbert Stuart, now imprinted on every American one-dollar bill.

However, this traditional depiction of Washington ignores the complexities of this man's efforts to earn a membership in the pantheon of illustrious men in world history. In fact, a majority of his biographers focus on the American Revolution and later events when Washington became a virtuous leader of the military and then of a new nation. Referring to the way in which this Founding

Father has been remembered, Samuel Eliot Morison noted that he "is the last person you would ever suspect of having been a young man."[1] Similarly, Nathaniel Hawthorne remarked, "He had no nakedness, but I imagine he was born with his clothes on, and his hair powdered, and made a stately bow on his first appearance in the world."[2]

Washington would have never achieved the high social status and respect had it not been for the crucial period of his formative years. Many of the principles Washington advocated in his later years have their roots in his quest for rules and virtues to guide his personal behavior during his adolescence. In addition to his strong desire to serve his country, Washington also wanted to rise from the lower gentry to the higher echelons of the colonial patrician families. These two aspects compliment each other extremely well, for it was primarily his developing patriotic principles and his venturesome disposition that won support from patrons that facilitated his ascent.

The Formation of George's Aspirations

Contrary to a common modern perception, "Washington was not born with 'a silver spoon in his mouth'."[3] At the time of his birth, Washington's family belonged to what could be called the "second tier" of the gentry class and neither their prominence or influence was such as to be anyhow significant beyond their home county.[4] George was only eleven years old when his father died, leaving his modest property to be shared among the family members.[5]

George's career opportunities were curtailed considerably when his widowed mother was obliged to be frugal, to budget household finances and to rely on the assistance of her sons to help with increased domestic duties. Consequently, the opportunity for George to obtain a good education at a reputable college at

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1 Samuel Eliot Morison, "The Young Man Washington," in *The Great American Parade*, ed. by H. J. Duteil (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1935; Kessinger Publishing, 2005), 118.

2 Nathaniel Hawthorne, *Passages from the French and Italian Note Books of Nathaniel Hawthorne* (Kessinger Publishing, 2004), 100, http://books.google.com/books?id=iSwvOIvzCWUC.

3 Mason Locke Weems, *The Life of George Washington; With Curious Anecdotes, Equally Honourable to Himself, and Exemplary to His Young Countrymen* (Philadelphia: Joseph Allen, n.d.), 27, http://www.archive.org/details/lifeofgeorgewashweem.

4 Mary V. Thompson, *"In the Hands of a Good Providence": Religion in the Life of George Washington* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 16.

5 Douglas Southall Freeman, *George Washington: A Biography* [hereafter as DSF], 7 vols., vol. 7 completed by John A. Carroll and Mary W. Ashworth (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948–57), 1: 72; Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., *Wills of George Washington and His Immediate Ancestors* (New York: Historical Printing Club, 1891), 42, http://www.archive.org/details/willsofgeorgewas00ford.

Appleby, in northern England, where his two older half brothers as well as his father had studied, was no longer realistic.[6] The exigency of the situation even prevented young George from attending the College of William and Mary, located within a convenient distance in his own province. His formal education did not include more than private instruction by a "domestic tutor" or attendance at some local school.[7] His school exercise books indicate that his training was of general scope with emphasis on mathematics and geometry.[8]

As to his first choice of vocation, John Ferling wrote in his recent *The Ascent of George Washington* that young George "was in a hurry, so much so that at age fourteen he sought to enter Great Britain's Royal Navy as a commissioned officer."[9] However, it is proper to note that Washington shared some of his remarks about this opportunity when commenting on a draft of David Humphreys' biography of him.[10] Washington remarked that "It was rather the wish of my eldest brother [Lawrence] […] that this should take place & the matter was contemplated by him." George consented to the proposal of his brother but, due to mother's objections, the plan was ultimately abandoned.[11] His mother's pleadings against this venture followed the advice of her brother in England who, when he learned of George's intentions, cautioned the lad against serving in the British Navy with the recommendation that "he must not be hasty to get rich […] without aiming at being a fine gentleman before his time."[12]

Thus, young George did not leave for abroad but remained at home and perhaps his uncle's admonition to first learn how to become "a fine gentleman" further stirred the young boy to acquaint himself with some of the rules of personal

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[6] Marcus Cunliffe, *George Washington: Man and Monument* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958), 29, http://www.archive.org/details/georgewashington005796mbp; Rosemarie Zagarri, ed., *David Humphreys' "Life of General Washington" with George Washington's "Remarks"* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991), 6.

[7] Zagarri, *"Life of George Washington,"* 6, 101–11; George Mason to George Washington, 12 Jun. 1756, in *The Papers of George Washington Digital Edition, The American Founding Era Collection* [hereafter as *PGW*], ed. Edward G. Lengel (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2007–2010), http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/GEWN.html/. In this letter to George Washington [hereafter as GW], Mason writes "on Behalf of my Neighbour & Your old School-fellow, Mr Piper."

[8] *George Washington Papers, 1592–1943 (bulk 1748–1799)*, *George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress 1741–1799* [hereafter as *GWPLC*], Archival Manuscript Material (Collection), Library of Congress. Washington, DC, Series 1a, School Copy Book: 2 vols., 1745, http://lccn.loc.gov/mm78044693/.

[9] John Ferling, *The Ascent of George Washington: The Hidden Political Genius of an American Icon* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009), 12.

[10] The only biography GW actually supervised.

[11] Zagarri, *"Life of George Washington,"* 7–8.

[12] Joseph Ball Letter Book, quoted in DSF 1: 198–99.

conduct that made one a true gentleman.[13] He was, of course, exposed to the rules of gentle behavior in both paper and practice. As part of his school exercises, he transcribed *Rules of Civility & Decent Behavior in Company and Conversation*.[14] The transcription of these 110 rules may have been intended by his teacher to polish the handwriting as well as manners of his young pupil. The origins of the *Rules* can be traced back to the sixteenth-century maxims of French Jesuits that recommended polite deportment and consideration for others that was fundamental if one wished to impress and receive favorable attention from his superiors. These precepts advise, for example, that "Every Action done in Company, ought to be with Some Sign of Respect, to those that are Present," or "Strive not with your Superiers in argument, but always Submit your Judgment to others with Modesty."[15] Washington's lifelong conscientious efforts at self-improvement leave no doubt that these *Rules* motivated the boy to master a becoming behavior and well-bred carriage.

There may be a number of other literary sources worth evaluating, but one in particular that has perhaps escaped the attention of Washington's biographers is H. de Luzancy's *A Panegyrick to the Memory of His Grace Frederick Late Duke of Schonberg*.[16] Although the panegyric contains some apparent encomiastic hyperboles, it is still worth analyzing. When fifteen, George purchased this book from his second cousin Bailey Washington.[17] The Duke of Schomberg is here portrayed as a virtuous hero whose accomplishments were on a par with other great European generals such as Montecuccolli, Turenne, and Condé. Incidentally, the panegyric also referred to Schomberg's adherence to the "Rules of Civility, Breeding, and all the Accomplishments of Men of Quality."[18] This reference to Schomberg's "Rules of Civility" served as an additional incentive for young George to emulate the

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Series 1a, Forms of Writing, and The Rules of Civility and Decent Behavior in Company and Conversation, ante 1747, in *GWPLC*, images 27–36.

[15] Moncure Daniel Conway, *George Washington's Rules of Civility Traced to Their Sources and Restored* (London: Chatto and Windus, Piccadilly, 1890), 55, 100.

[16] H. de Luzancy, *A Panegyrick to the Memory of His Grace Frederick Late Duke of Schonberg, Marquess of Harwich, Earl of Brentford, Count of the Holy Empire, State-Holder of Prussia, Grandee of Spain, & c. General of All His Majesties Land Forces, and Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter* (London: Garden, 1690).

[17] "Gen. Washington's Memorandum Cash Account, Sept. 10, 1747 to Oct. 14, 1749," Lloyd W. Smith Archival Collection (Morristown, [NJ]: National Historical Park). I first became aware of GW's purchase of this panegyric in 2009 thanks to Theodore J. Crackel, the then editor of *PGW*. The earliest treatment of this topic is probably in William Hale Wilbur, *The Making of George Washington* ([s. l.: Wilbur?; DeLand], 1973).

[18] Luzancy, *Panegyrick*, 30.

virtues and manners befitting a chivalrous hero. The fact that George's later career, in large measure, corresponds with Schomberg's life as described in this panegyric, suggests that the book had a considerable impact on his youthful mind and aspirations.

For instance, Schomberg was praised for the fact that "The most surprising dangers, never betray'd in him any fear."[19] Likewise, Washington taught himself to exhibit unwavering courage in dangerous situations. One of Washington's biographers even described him to be possessed of "soldier's knack of fatalism that permitted him to ignore the bullets."[20]

Luzancy further advised his readers "to be as intent to overcome our Selves, as our Enemies, is the highest improvement of Vertue," which he was said to have mastered.[21] Gilbert Stuart reportedly said Washington's facial features were "indicative of the strongest and most ungovernable passions, and had he been born in the forests […] he would have been born the fiercest man amongst the savage tribes."[22]

The panegyric also said that the European military leader "did not praise his own Actions," but was "silent, as if he had not been concern'd in the things that were said of him."[23] Styling himself after the duke of Schomberg in that regard, Washington learned to be modest about his own accomplishments. Brissot de Warville, an influential Girondist, once described his meeting with the American general thus: "He speaks of the American War as if he had *not* been its leader, and of his victories with a greater *indifference* than even a foreigner would."[24]

In a similar vein, Luzancy's description of Schomberg's alleged affability, virtue, and adherence to duty is strikingly analogous to many descriptions of Washington's character by his contemporaries. Considering such striking similarities and the impressionable age at which George read the work, it may have represented a major influence in the formation of his aspirations and behavior.

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[19] Luzancy, *Panegyrick*, 31.

[20] Thomas A. Lewis, *For King and Country: George Washington: The Early Years* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1993), 183.

[21] Luzancy, *Panegyrick*, 28.

[22] Isaac Weld, *Travels Through the States of America, and the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, During the Years 1795, 1796, and 1797*, 4th ed., 2 vols. (London: John Stockdale, 1799; repr., 1807), 1: 105, http://www.archive.org/details/travelsthroughs00weldgoog.

[23] Luzancy, *Panegyrick*, 29.

[24] J. P. Brissot de Warville, *New Travels in the United States of America, 1788*, trans. Mara Soceanu Vamos and Durand Echeverria, ed. Durand Echeverria (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1964), 344. Italics added.

George's Precocious Acclaim and Rapid Rise

Washington's association with members of the higher echelons of Virginia society was facilitated in 1743 by his eldest half brother Lawrence's marriage with Ann Fairfax, daughter of Colonel William Fairfax. The Fairfaxes were one of the most powerful families in the province with extensive land holdings.[25] It was through the instrumentality of the Fairfaxes that Washington was offered a convenient opportunity to work as a surveyor, which later became his vocation. For example, one of Washington's early assignments that included surveying the town of Belhaven, known today as Alexandria, Virginia, was delegated by the Fairfaxes, who were among the trustees of the town, and Lawrence Washington, who was assigned to report on the project to the Virginia Assembly.[26]

When only seventeen, Washington was appointed an official surveyor of the Culpeper County. Such a position was typically given to more mature men or to those who had served in the capacity of an apprentice or a deputy county surveyor. But he may have obtained "the post because of his ties with the Fairfaxes [since] the Culpeper County lay entirely within Lord Fairfax's proprietary."[27]

Surveyors were typically men of good status but, at the same time, did not require a college degree.[28] It was also a highly opportune time for the profession. The population of Virginia was growing rapidly and new frontiers to the west were continually under exploration. An experienced surveyor's salary was often twice as much as that of a prosperous tradesman. Additionally, surveyors were often granted land in lieu of cash, which afforded them good opportunities for land speculation. They oftentimes sold or leased the lands to others and thus secured additional long-term income.[29] Surveying and land speculation could

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[25] DSF 1: 75–76.

[26] H. R. McIlwaine, ed., *Legislative Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia*, 3 vols. (Richmond, VA: Colonial Press, E. Waddey, 1918), 2: 1047, http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924031311131. Some of GW's biographers have mistakenly claimed Lawrence Washington facilitated the job as trustee of the town. Lawrence, however, was not added to the list of trustees until at least two years later (DSF 1: 232n65).

[27] Henry Howe, *Historical Collections of Virginia; Containing a Collection of the Most Interesting Facts, Traditions, Biographical, Sketches, Anecdotes, &c. Relating to Its History and Antiquities, Together with Geographical and Statistical Descriptions* (Charleston, SC: WM. R. Babcock, 1852), 237, http://www.archive.org/details/historicalcollec03howe; Conway, *Rules of Civility*, 26, 42–43; Paul K. Longmore, *The Invention of George Washington* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988; reprinted Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999), 13.

[28] Ferling, *Ascent*, 12; Longmore, *Invention*, 13.

[29] Edward Redmond, "George Washington: Surveyor and Mapmaker," *Map Collections*, American Memory, Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gmdhtml/gwmaps.html#5; Ferling, *Ascent*, 12.

open the doors to substantial wealth, especially when the patron was a powerful gentleman.[30]

Douglas S. Freeman described the Old Dominion in the early eighteenth century to be "an ambitious landed society."[31] Gentlemen of that colony were particularly proficient in obtaining vast territories by land speculation, perhaps because ownership of land was a key factor determining one's status in society.[32] Thus, Washington's surveying for and close relationship with the Fairfaxes, who controlled several million acres in the province, set the young man on a good path to seek and take advantage of land ownership, which, in fact, constituted a substantial portion of Washington's wealth in his later life.[33]

Young Washington first met Robert Dinwiddie, the newly appointed governor of Virginia, on his return from Barbados, where his brother Lawrence hoped to recover from tuberculosis.[34] Washington was probably on an errand to deliver some letters to the governor on behalf of his brother and other men of prominence in Barbados. The unusually tall nineteen-year old Virginian was welcomed cordially by the governor; Washington recorded that he was "received Graceously" and was "enquired kindly after the health of my Br.[other] and invited me to stay and dine."[35] Some discussion may have ensued about Lawrence who was no longer physically able to serve as the colony's adjutant of the militia. William Guthrie Sayen posits that Washington "may have used this occasion to position himself as the next incumbent." Whatever Washington's intentions, the governor's first impression must have been favorable, for Dinwiddie entrusted the young man with a number of major responsibilities in the following years.[36]

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[30] Turk McCleskey, "Rich Land, Poor Prospects: Real Estate and the Formation of a Social Elite in Augusta County, Virginia, 1738–1770," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 98, no. 3 (July 1990): 451.

[31] DSF 1: 1.

[32] Richard Beale Davis, ed., "The Colonial Virginia Satirist: Mid-Eighteenth-Century Commentaries on Politics, Religion, and Society," American Philosophical Society, *Transactions*, N. S., LVII, Pt. 1 (1967): 48, quoted in Rhys Isaac, *The Transformation of Virginia, 1740–1790* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1982), 118.

[33] William Guthrie Sayen, "'A Compleat Gentleman': The Making of George Washington, 1732–1775" (PhD diss., University of Connecticut, 1998), 48; Joseph J. Ellis, *His Excellency: George Washington* (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 262.

[34] GW to Lawrence Washington, 5 May 1749, in *PGW*; Bernhard Knollenberg, *George Washington: The Virginia Period, 1732–1775* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1976), 8, 144n55; DSF 1: 247–248; *The Diaries of George Washington*, 6 vols., ed. Donald Jackson and Dorothy Twohig (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976–79), 1: 33–34, http://lccn.loc.gov/75041365/.

[35] 26 January 1752, in *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745–1799*, 39 vols., ed. John Clement Fitzpatrick (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Library, 1931–1944), http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/washington/.

[36] Sayen, "'A Compleat Gentleman'," 52–53.

Several months later, when it was determined that the adjutancy would be divided into several districts, Washington actively sought one of the posts.[37] Washington wrote to Dinwiddie, "If I could have the Honour of obtaining that [adjutancy] […] should take the greatest pleasure in punctually obeying from time, to time, your Honours commands."[38] Although he had no military training, the governor's council appointed the young man to the adjutancy of the Southern District, an office which included a bestowal of the title of major and a salary of £100 per annum.[39] Shortly after, he sought a change and desired the adjutancy in the Northern District, his home district. Washington sought advice from William Nelson, a member of the governor's council. Nelson thought his chances reasonable and wished him success. Before long, Washington's perseverance succeeded in having his adjutancy shifted to his home District.[40]

Washington's accelerated ascent in his younger years was, in large measure, owing to a favorable disposition of his influential neighbors and friends. But I concur with Ferling that "his patrons had not gone to bat for him solely because of family ties and kindness."[41] They were aware of his qualities and potential. He was blessed with an impressive figure, at least six feet tall, with large hands and feet, "penetrating eyes," and "a pleasing, benevolent, though a commanding countenance."[42] Furthermore, he appears to have been an audacious, adventurous, and promising man.

Relationships and good connections mattered greatly in enabling one's social upward mobility in colonial America. In this respect, Washington was extremely fortunate to be connected to the wealthy Fairfaxes through his brother Lawrence's marriage. It was probably through William Fairfax, member of the powerful

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37 Wilmer L. Hall, ed., *Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia*, 6 vols., (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1945), 5: 412, http://www.archive.org/details/executivejournal_e05virg.

38 GW to Robert Dinwiddie, 10 Jun. 1752, in *PGW*.

39 Commission as adjutant for southern district, Williamsburg, 13 Dec. 1752, Spotsylvania County Order Book, 1749–55, 284, Vi Microfilm, in *PGW*; Hall, *Executive Journals of the Council*, 5: 412–13. GW's commission is dated December 13, 1752, and he took the oath February 10, 1753, see *DGW* 1: 118n2.

40 DSF 1: 268; GW to Robert Dinwiddie, 12 Jun. 1752, William Nelson to GW, 22 Feb. 1753, in *PGW*; John E. Ferling, *The First of Men: A Life of George Washington* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988), 17. Although Ferling gives no evidence, he believes GW was assigned to his home District in 1753. My research yielded no specific date, but it appears that GW's reappointment occurred between the following two dates, see William Nelson to GW, 22 Feb. 1753, in *PGW*, and a governor's council held Jan. 21, 1754, see Hall, *Executive Journals of the Council*, 5: 458.

41 Ferling, *Ascent*, 13.

42 GW to Robert Cary & Company, 30 Nov. 1759, in *PGW*; Quoted in Joseph Meredith Toner, *George Washington as an Inventor and Promoter of the Useful Arts* (Washington, DC: Gedney and Roberts, 1892), 20, http://www.archive.org/details/georgewashington00tone.

governor's council, that Washington was notified about the colony's plans to caution a French commandant against encroaching on British territory on the southern banks of Lake Erie.[43] Obviously, a messenger delivering such a warning from the British governor to the French would not receive a cordial welcome. Washington, however, sensed a unique opportunity to serve his country. He must have also been aware that a successful fulfillment of such an assignment from the governor could greatly improve his career prospects. Washington did not hesitate and went to Williamsburg to petition the governor to be entrusted with the task.[44] Such instances suggest that Washington did not passively rely on nepotistic advantages but actively sought opportunities for rendering service to men of influence.

Governor Dinwiddie evaluated Washington's offer and, after considering it, consented. Dinwiddie then notified the members of his council that Washington "had offered himself to go" to deliver the warning to the French commandant. Washington spared no time, for after receiving the necessary documentation, he set out on the five-hundred-mile long trek the very same day.[45]

Washington returned with the news that the French commandant refused to depart from the disputed territory. Asserting controversial claims was a delicate subject for both the French and British, and both parties watched the developing negotiations closely. But Washington certainly did not return empty-handed. He kept a journal in which he recorded his travels and meeting with the Indians as well as a reconnaissance of the French forces. Dinwiddie was intrigued by the account and ordered it to be set in print without delay, possibly to drum up support for British claims by acquainting the public with the French occupation of British territory. Washington's narrative appeared in several American newspapers as well as in pamphlet form in England, adding to his growing fame. Dinwiddie even dispatched a few copies to the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, to the Board of Trade, and a number of British colonial governors.[46] Through the use

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[43] Knollenberg, *George Washington*, 11. Fairfax's earlier attempts to send a messenger to caution the French is recorded in Hall, *Executive Journals of the Council*, 5: 433.

[44] DSF 1: 273.

[45] Hall, *Executive Journals*, 5: 443–44; Commission from Robert Dinwiddie, Instructions from Robert Dinwiddie, Passport from Robert Dinwiddie, 30 Oct. 1753, in *PGW*; Robert Dinwiddie to M. de St. Pierre, 31 Oct. 1753, in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, 15 vols., trans. and ed. E. B. O'Callaghan (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons, 1858), 10: 258, http://www.archive.org/details/documentsrelativ10brod.; DSF 1: 130.

[46] R. A. Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751–1758, Now First Printed from the Manuscript in the Collections of the Virginia Historical Society*, 2 vols. (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1884), 1: 93, 98, 85–88, 91, 129, http://www.archive.org/details/officialrecordso02virg; Jared Sparks, ed., *The Writings of George Washington; Being His Correspondence, Addresses, Messages, and Other Papers, Official and Private Selected and*

of print publishing as a channel of communication, for the first time, Washington, who was only twenty-two years old, was placed in an international spotlight.[47]

Amid increasing publicity, Washington was entrusted with another momentous assignment, one that would contribute to his rise in the military. Less than a week passed after Washington's return and the members of the governor's council advised that "the cheif [*sic*] Command" of a force to be raised in two Virginia counties be given to "Major Washington." He was "to use all Expedition" to erect a fort for the defense of British interests in the upper Ohio, a territory under dispute with the French.[48]

Of course, Washington readily accepted the assignment. Such a step by the council of Virginia signalized that the dispute would not be settled without arms. Being well-informed about the developing situation, Washington, before departing, solicited Richard Corbin, a member of the governor's council, for a promotion above the newly acquired rank of major to support his status among the soldiers. Washington was aware that Corbin's membership in the council empowered him to have a substantial influence in the ranking of officers for this expedition. Corbin's actions are not documented, but Washington's request was granted within the next few weeks, as Dinwiddie sent him a commission as lieutenant-colonel of the Virginia Regiment.[49]

Seeking "Honour and Glory"

The expedition brought Washington international acclaim. On their way toward the upper Ohio, Washington's men encountered a small force headed by a French commandant named Jumonville. A skirmish ensued and the first shots of

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Published from the Original Manuscripts; with a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, 12 vols. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1847–48), 2: 431, http://www.archive.org/details/writingsofgeorge02washuoft; Knollenberg, *George Washington*, 15–16; George Washington, *The Journal of Major George Washington, Sent by the Hon. Robert Dinwiddie, Esq; His Majesty's Lieutenant-Governor, and Commander in Chief of Virginia, to the Commandant of the French Forces on Ohio; to Which Are Added the Governor's Letter and a Translation of the French Officer's Answer; with a New Map of the Country as Far as the Mississippi* (Williamsburg, VA: Williamsburgh Printed, 1754), 3, http://www.archive.org/details/journalofmajorge00wash.

47 Here, the adjective "international" denotes transatlantic (i.e., both the mother country and her colony in America).

48 Hall, *Executive Journals of the Council*, 5: 460; *DGW* 1: 162; Robert Dinwiddie to GW, Jan. 1754, in *PGW*. The site of the fort had been recommended by GW, see *DGW* 1: 132.

49 GW to Richard Corbin, [Feb.–Mar. 1754], Robert Dinwiddie to GW, 15 Mar. 1754, in *PGW*; *DGW* 1: 174.

the French and Indian War were fired.[50] Describing his first military experience, Washington wrote to his younger brother Jack, "I heard Bulletts whistle and believe me there was something charming in the sound."[51] That these events were closely monitored in the mother country is attested by the fact that Washington's catchy formulation was published in the London Magazine and, subsequently, came to the ears of the British monarch who commented wryly, "He would not say so, if he had been used to hear many."[52]

Washington's rapid rise was made possible also as the consequence of unexpected circumstances. When Washington's superior Colonel Joshua Fry suddenly died during the expedition, Washington was honored with a temporary commission from Dinwiddie only until the arrival of a new commander of the whole Virginia Regiment.[53] Regardless of the time limits of his commission, Washington found himself at the helm of the Virginia Regiment at the young age of twenty-two.

Cognizant of Dinwiddie's favors, Washington did not forget to express gratitude for the governor's trust in him. Mere sycophancy would have been considered opprobrious, but expression of gratitude strengthened the bonds with and increased the chances of continued favors from his superior. Gratitude did not only indicate good manners but it also invited gracious behavior from one's patron.[54] Washington expressed his gratitude to his benefactor, "I want nothing but oppertunity to testifie my sincere regard for your Person, to whom I stand indebted for so many unmerited favour's." The tone of the unusually long missive was highly deferential with the word "honour" occurring impressively not less than forty times.[55]

That Washington's appreciation was genuine is shown by the following account of an Indian ceremony, in which Washington participated, of bestowing an English name to the son of Queen Allaquippa, a Delaware sachem. In the ceremony, Washington presented the sachem's son with a medal in honor of the British king and called him after Colonel Fairfax, which in their language was interpreted as "the first of the Council." The Indians found the new name particularly pleasing insomuch that Half-King, a Seneca chief who also participated in the

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[50] *DGW* 1: 195; GW to Robert Dinwiddie, 29 May 1754, in *PGW*.
[51] GW to John Augustine Washington, 31 May 1754, in *PGW*.
[52] *London Magazine* 23 (Aug. 1754): 370–71, quoted in Longmore, *Invention*, 20; Horace Walpole, *Memoirs of the Reign of King George the Second*, 3 vols. (London: Henry Colburn, 1846), 1: 400, http://www.archive.org/details/memoirsreignkin01hollgoog.
[53] Robert Dinwiddie to GW, 4 Jun. 1754, in *PGW*.
[54] Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), 75, 79–80.
[55] GW to Robert Dinwiddie, [10 Jun. 1754], in *PGW*.

ceremony, desired Washington to give him an English name also, "which made me presume to give him that of your Honour's, and call him Dinwiddie – Interpreted in their Language the head of all."[56] Fairfax and Dinwiddie gave Washington the needed momentum in his early rapid ascent, for which he knew he was indebted and did not forget to express sincere gratitude to them.

In Washington's case, seeking "oppertunity to testifie" to the governor of his high regard for him placed him in the foreground of the kind of action where a man was most likely to achieve "Honour and Glory."[57] Gordon S. Wood explains that in the eighteenth century, honor implied the existence of "public drama" where a man's actions are evaluated. Given its element of drama, a battle was considered a particularly alluring event for an aspiring man seeking honor. Alexander Hamilton, for instance, even wished for war in 1769 so that he could place his life at risk for the sake of his country and gain honor.[58] John Adams admitted, "The more danger the greater glory."[59]

"Pushing My Fortune"

Vexed by incessant wrangling over the superior ranking of regular over colonial officers, Washington eventually resigned from his military commission in the fall of 1754.[60] His retirement from the army, however, did not last very long. With the arrival of Edward Braddock, the new British general, Washington voiced a "laudable desire" to serve his king and country again but, to avoid further disputes over rank, he entered the service as a volunteer.[61]

Braddock's high regard for Washington was manifested by his offering him the post of aide-de-camp, which he readily accepted. Washington confided to his

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[56] Frederick Webb Hodge, ed., *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico*, 2 vols., (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1907–10), 1: 45, 526–27, http://www.archive.org/details/handbookamerica04unkngoog; GW to Robert Dinwiddie, [10 Jun. 1754], Robert Dinwiddie to GW, 27 Jun. 1754, in *PGW*.

[57] GW to Robert Dinwiddie, [10 Jun. 1754], in *PGW*.

[58] Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), 39; John C. Miller, *Alexander Hamilton: Portrait In Paradox* (New York: Harper, 1959), 5, quoted in Wood, *Radicalism*, 39–40.

[59] John Adams to Charles Cushing, 19 Oct. 1756, John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, 3 Jan. 1775, in *Papers of John Adams,* ed. by Robert J. Taylor et al. (Cambridge, 1977–), 1: 22, 2: 210, quoted in Wood, *Radicalism*, 40.

[60] DSF 1: 441.

[61] George II's non-secret Instructions to Edward Braddock, in Winthrop Sargent, ed., *The History of an Expedition Against Fort Du Quesne, in 1755* (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott, 1856), 393, http://www.archive.org/details/historyofexpedit00sarg; GW to Robert Orme, 15 March 1755, in *PGW*.

younger brother that thanks to the office he had "a good opportunity" to acquaint himself with the general, which "may be serviceable hereafter, if I can find it worth while pushing my Fortune in the Military way."[62]

Washington's greatest moment of glory to date paradoxically occurred in 1755 when the British suffered a defeat on the Monongahela River before they were able to reach Fort Duquesne occupied by the French. As aide to Braddock, Washington rejoined the general's men while still recovering from a serious illness that left him considerably enfeebled. The battle, which took place merely hours after Washington's reuniting with the troops, was a surprise ambush and massacre of the British by French and Indian forces in the woods.[63] As pandemonium ensued, Washington impressively focused on his duties. He laid the mortally wounded general on a wagon and escorted him to safety "in the best order he could." While under fire, Washington had several horses shot from under him, and four bullets pierced his clothes, yet he amazingly remained unscathed. The battle was obviously highly unfortunate for the British, but for Washington it was a prime "oppertunity to testifie" of his whole-hearted commitment to his duty and country.[64]

Episodes like this one defined Washington's greatness and redounded to a rising esteem. After Braddock's debacle, Washington's popularity grew immensely. "Mr. Washington … [was] behaving the whole Time with the greatest Courage and Resolution," intoned the Pennsylvania Gazette.[65] A letter Washington received from his friend read, "Yor Name is more talked off in Pensylvenia then any Other person of the Army."[66]

Washington's popularity now reached its apex. His name was also mentioned as a potential appointment for the chief command of Virginia forces. This high esteem was something Washington had sought but he was not carried away by it – perhaps the contrary. He no longer contacted influential men to solicit their support on his behalf. In fact, in a letter to his mother, Washington wrote, "If it is in my power to *avoid* going to the Ohio again, I shall." He was willing to accept the command only if the office "is press'd upon me" by his colony.[67]

Of course, Washington had the "power to avoid" returning to the Virginia frontier but his irresistible sense of patriotic obligation "press'd" him to comply with

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62 GW to John Augustine Washington, 14 May 1755, in *PGW*.
63 Memorandum, 8–9 Jul. 1755, in *PGW*.
64 GW to Robert Dinwiddie, [10 Jun. 1754], in *PGW*.
65 "Extract of a Letter from an Officer, Dated at Fort Cumberland, July 18, 1755," *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia), July 31, 1755, NewsBank, http://www.genealogybank.com.
66 Christopher Gist to GW, 15 Oct. 1755, in *PGW*.
67 GW to Mary Ball Washington, 14 Aug. 1755, in *PGW*. Italics added.

the voice of his countrymen.[68] For Washington, patriotism constituted a major factor in his later acceptance of influential public offices. He did not seek any sort of vainglory. Rather, he hoped to prove his merit so that he could earn "the esteem and notice" of his fellow countrymen.[69]

As the commander in chief of the Virginia Regiment, Washington took pains to execute his duties in a methodical and orderly manner. He rode from one end of Virginia to another to supervise and train the troops stationed in various garrisons.[70] The dangers on the frontier were many and the situation was aggravated by a dispute over the right to command which again prompted Washington to retire from the army. When a Maryland officer claimed seniority of command over Fort Cumberland based on his royal commission, Washington was willing to leave the military once again. "I have determined to resign a Commission," he wrote to Dinwiddie, "rather than submit to the Command of a Person who I think has not such superlative Merit to balance the Inequality of Rank."[71]

Washington knew that obtaining a royal commission for himself would resolve many such issues, for having rank in the British Establishment carried high prestige and financial stability in contrast to colonial troops.[72] In 1756, Governors Dinwiddie, Sharpe and General Shirley were in favor of granting Washington the king's commission, but despite Washington's diligence and merit in the army, no favorable reply came from overseas.[73]

Whatever sanguine hopes Washington may have had for further promotion, they were again quelled by another change of command in the army leaving all decisions to the newly appointed General Loudoun. Making sure that Dinwiddie would not forget him, Washington reminded the governor to present his credentials to the new general.[74] Accordingly, Dinwiddie immediately penned a sincere recommendation of Washington to General Abercromby, who was his longtime friend and second in command. Dinwiddie wrote about Washington:

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[68] Ibid.

[69] GW to Warner Lewis, 14 August 1755, in *PGW*.

[70] GW's General Instructions for Recruiting, [1–3 Sep. 1755], GW's Memorandum [6 Sep. 1755], GW to Robert Dinwiddie, 11 Sep. 1755, GW's Orders, 17 Sep. 1755, GW to Peter Hog, 24 Sep. 1755, GW's Memorandum, [ca. 2 Oct. 1755], GW's Memoranda, 5 Oct. 1755, GW's Memorandum, [8 Oct. 1755], GW's Memorandum, [10 Oct. 1755], in *PGW*.

[71] Robert Dinwiddie to GW, 22 Jan. 1756, in *PGW*.

[72] George Mason to GW, 16 May 1758, in *PGW*; Knollenberg, *George Washington*, 45.

[73] Robert Dinwiddie to GW, 22 Jan. 1756, in *PGW;* Horatio Sharpe to William Shirley, 10 Apr. 1756, William Shirley to Horatio Sharpe, 16 May 1756, in *Archives of Maryland: Correspondence of Governor Horatio Sharpe*, ed. William Hand Browne, 3 vols. (Baltimore, 1888), 1: 389, 416, http://aomol.net/000001/000006/html/index.html.

[74] Robert Dinwiddie to GW, 27 May 1756, in *PGW*.

> "He is a person much beloved here and has gone through many hardships in the Service, and I really think he has great Merit, and believe he can raise more Men here than any one present that I know. If his Lordship will be so kind as to promote him in the British Establishment I think he will answer my recommendation."[75]

General Loudoun, however, received many recommendations and solicitations for recognition.[76] Again, Washington waited; but he waited in vain, and no royal commission was issued. Washington could have purchased such a commission, but the commander of Virginia preferred to earn it by merit.[77]

Washington took his responsibilities seriously. In despair he wrote to Dinwiddie, "I would be a willing offering to Savage Fury: and die by inches, to save a people!"[78] Thus, whenever criticism, though ill-founded, was leveled against the performance of his duties, he was in anguish and usually contemplated resignation. If he had been convinced that it would help his fellow countrymen, Washington would "resign without one hesitating moment, a command, which I never expect to reap either Honor or Benefit from […]. While the murder of poor innocent Babes, and helpless families, may be laid to my account here!"[79]

"Laudable Ambition"

Washington sought to be placed in the forefront of wartime action, but he apparently had an additional motive besides being seen. He claimed he wished to demonstrate his abilities to prove his worthiness and merit the country's honor. So convinced was Washington of his diligence and the propriety of his conduct that to Dinwiddie he professed that "no man ever intended better, nor studied the Interest of his Country with more affectionate zeal than I have done."[80] In fact, among his

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[75] Robert Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, 28 May 1756, in *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751–1758, Now First Printed from the Manuscript in the Collections of the Virginia Historical Society*, ed. R. A. Brock, 2 vols. (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1884), 2: 425, http://www.archive.org/details/officialrecordso02virg.

[76] Robert Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, 28 May 1756, Brock, *Robert Dinwiddie*, 2: 425.

[77] For instance, William Henry Fairfax, son of William Fairfax, purchased a commission and lieutenancy in the regular army for a total of £300 sterling, see William Henry Fairfax to GW, 9 Dec. 1757, in *PGW*.

[78] GW to Robert Dinwiddie, 22 Apr. 1756, in *PGW*.

[79] Ibid. With a degree of pathos, GW emphasizes his willingness to sacrifice even himself for the welfare of his fellow citizens, if it would of any assistance to them.

[80] GW to Robert Dinwiddie, 19 Dec. 1756, in *PGW*.

associates he was known for his "dissinterestedness, [his] unwearied Application & Zeal for [his] Countrys good."[81]

Indeed, Washington's zeal could hardly be ignored. In 1757 and 1758, he was a staunch advocate of offensive measures against the French at Fort Duquesne. One day he even dreamed of such an attack as a "glorious undertaking."[82] However, evidence suggests that his military zeal was not to boast of military rank or command as he had already resigned from the army and was always ready to do so again, but sought to gain honor by rendering service to his country and provide peace to the distressed families on the frontier.[83]

But if a man's honor was either achieved or lost by the public evaluation of his actions, Washington probably regarded the time spent in service as the commander of Virginia forces with a degree of melancholy. He had hoped for battle opportunities to display his heroic valor for the benefit of his fellow countrymen, but instead his service tried his patience as he faced various challenges, including the distress of families on the frontier, the disaffection and mutinies of soldiers, the "indolence and irregularity" of garrisons, and disputes over rank and pay.[84]

Moreover, much of the time Washington spent in the army he had to contend not only with fighting the enemy forces and disciplining and training his own troops, but also with his own health. During the winter of 1757, including a relapse in January, Washington suffered from a prolonged illness for at least seven months.[85] The unusually long time he could not perform his military duties even caused some to suppose "that Colo. Washington was dead!"[86] Perhaps weary of his frail health and disaffected by the absence of military offensives, Washington began to contemplate resignation again, "I have some thoughts of quitting my Command & retiring from all Publick Business."[87]

Like earlier, his thoughts of resignation eventually evaporated with the prospect of a new arrangement in the army. Presently, the news that another general

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[81] William Ramsay to GW, 22 Sep. 1756, in *PGW*.
[82] GW to John Robinson, 30 May 1757, in *PGW*.
[83] GW to John Robinson, 27 Apr. 1756, 9 Nov. 1756, in *PGW*.
[84] Wood, *Radicalism*, 39; GW to Robert Dinwiddie, 18 Apr. 1756, GW to Robert Dinwiddie, 9 Nov. 1756, Robert Stewart to GW, 31 Dec. 1758, Robert Stewart to GW, 20 Dec. 1758, GW to John Stanwix, 28 May 1757, in *PGW*.
[85] Robert Stewart to Robert Dinwiddie, 9 Nov. 1757, Enclosure III: Robert Stewart to John Stanwix, 24 Nov. 1757, Robert Carter Nicholas to GW, 5 Jan. 1758, GW to John Blair, 30 Jan. 1758, GW to John Blair, 20 Feb. 1758, GW to John Stanwix, 4 Mar. 1758, GW to Richard Washington, 18 Mar. 1758, in *PGW*; Zagarri, *"Life of George Washington,"* 106n59–60. The illness was probably a dysentery.
[86] Robert Carter Nicholas to GW, 6 Feb. 1758, in *PGW*.
[87] GW to John Stanwix, 4 Mar. 1758, in *PGW*.

was being sent to America with large reinforcements and with "many other Alterations" to be effected in the military reached Washington's ears; and he stayed.[88] Having almost abandoned the hope of becoming a professional soldier of the British Establishment, Washington explicitly assured his superior that he did not seek "military preferment." But a preferment of sorts he did still seek, though employing more subtle locution. He hoped to be mentioned to the new general in "favorable terms" in order to "be distinguished" at least "in some measure from the *common run* of provincial Officers; as I understand there will be a motley herd of us."[89]

Washington's good friendship with John Robinson, the speaker of the House of Burgesses, allowed the two to express themselves frankly in their correspondence. Washington's candor in his letters to Robinson is especially revealing with regard to his personal motives and aspirations. In 1758 when the prospects of an attack on the French at Fort Duquesne seemed to be diminishing, Washington exclaimed, "That appearance of Glory once in view – that hope – that *laudable Ambition* of Serving Our Country, and meriting its applause, is now no more."[90]

If Washington had been charged with self-centered military ambition, he would have vindicated himself, I believe, by emphasizing that the motives that actuated his behavior were "purely laudable."[91] While history can perhaps be the only unbiased judge, the contours of his ambition were more precisely delineated in his letter to General John Forbes in April 1758. Here, the commander of Virginia explained, "to merit a continuance of the good opinion you seem to entertain of me, shall be one of my Principal Studies; for I have now no ambition that is higher."[92] Likewise, in his letter to John St. Clair, his superior, Washington said he would be pleased "to stand well in your good Opinions." Washington then admitted having no other expectation for reward than "than what arises from a Consciousness of doing my duty. and from the good liking of my Friends thereupon."[93]

Although such expressions of his ambitions sound very diplomatic, the moral basis of Washington's actions seems to have contributed to an increased credibility in rendering his service in a disinterested manner. By proclaiming that the motives for his service were strictly patriotic and that he wished nothing more than good esteem from his fellow countrymen, others gradually began to trust that

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[88] John Stanwix to GW, 10 Mar. 1758, GW to John Blair, 9 Apr. 1758, GW to John Stanwix, 10 Apr. 1758, GW to William Henry Fairfax, 23 Apr. 1758, in *PGW*.
[89] GW to John Stanwix, 10 Apr. 1758, in *PGW*.
[90] GW to John Robinson, 1 Sep. 1758, in *PGW*. Italics added.
[91] GW to Thomas Gage, 12 Apr. 1758, in *PGW*.
[92] GW to John Forbes, 23 Apr. 1758, in *PGW*.
[93] GW to John St. Clair, 27 Apr. 1758, in *PGW*.

he would not misuse his authority. To John Blair, president of the governor's council, Washington wrote in 1758 concerning his newly acquired militia privileges, "I shall make a prudent use of the Power you have been pleased to give me."[94] Later that year, Washington penned a letter to Governor Fauquier similarly pledging to use his powers wisely, "Be assured, Sir, the confidence which you have reposed in me, shall never be wilfully abused."[95] Washington's credibility in not misusing his authority would prove vitally important in his later career.

An offensive against the French at Fort Duquesne did not begin until the late fall of 1758. Yet, as eagerly anticipated an event as that was for Washington, he was afforded no opportunities for distinguishing himself in the action, for there was none. Before any of the British troops arrived, the enemy chose to burn the fort and withdraw.[96] With the onset of freezing temperatures, the military season ended – as did Washington's service in the army. Debilitated by another unusually long bout of illness, Washington sensed that circumstances suggested it was time for him to resign for good.[97]

Out of esteem and respect for Washington, the officers of the Virginia Regiment composed a "humble Address" to their parting commander.[98] Genuinely grateful for the affectionate letter from his officers, Washington was particularly fond of their "approbation of my conduct," which he said, "will constitute the greatest happiness of my life." Despite what libels or aspersions may have claimed during his command of the Virginia Regiment, Washington insisted that his behavior had been invariably governed by principles of "steady honesty."[99] Tired by the incessant struggle with military issues, Washington turned his attention to civil matters. The "annimating prospect of possessing Mrs Custis" and leading a domestic life at his newly rebuilt estate at Mount Vernon were now the next items on his agenda.[100]

Marrying a Wealthy Widow

Washington's rise to the top crust of the Virginia gentry class was solidified by his marriage to Martha Dandridge Custis, one of the wealthiest widows in the

[94] GW to John Blair, 4–[10] May 1758, in *PGW*.
[95] GW to Francis Fauquier, 30 Oct. 1758, in *PGW*.
[96] GW to Francis Fauquier, 28 Nov. 1758, in *PGW*.
[97] Zagarri, *"Life of George Washington,"* 106n59–60; James Craik to GW, 20 Dec. 1758, in *PGW*.
[98] Address from the Officers of the Virginia Regiment, 31 Dec. 1758, in *PGW*.
[99] To the Officers of the Virginia Regiment, 10 Jan. 1759, in *PGW*.
[100] GW to Sarah Cary Fairfax, 12 Sep. 1758, Humphrey Knight to GW, 13 Jul. 1758, George William Fairfax to GW, 25 Jul. 1758, 5 Aug. 1758, John Patterson to GW, 13 Aug. 1758, in *PGW*.

province. The Custis estate, after the decease of Martha's late husband Daniel Parke, was appraised at an imposing £23,632 in Virginia currency. Like Washington, Martha was born in a lower gentry family, but with promising social ties to families of influence.[101] About one year before he began courting Martha, Washington had remodeled his house at Mount Vernon (which he leased from Ann, the wife of his recently deceased brother Lawrence), making it a more fashionable residence. The remodeling may have reflected Washington's attempt to approach the standard of living behooving a proper gentleman, or as Joseph J. Ellis suggests, it reflected his hope that "an appropriate consort would turn up soon."[102]

By the marriage (January 6, 1759), Washington not only espoused a widow with much property, but also became the step father of her two children from the previous marriage. Thus, Washington was at once established as a family man and, given their social status, the two immediately became one of the "power couples" of Virginia, enjoying more social prestige than either one would have had if single.[103]

Considering Washington's rapid ascent in his early years, it is not illogical to suspect the marriage to have been arranged for strategic reasons rather than affection.[104] Washington's wedding occurred in the mid-eighteenth century, a period of transition of marital behavior among the Chesapeake high society when *mariages de convenance* were decreasing in number in favor of spouse selection based on affection.[105] Robert F. Jones avers that the Washingtons were married "with a high regard for one another that matured into a quiet and deep love."[106]

Due to scanty records, it is not easy to ascertain what factors influenced Washington and Martha to marry. For the sake of confidentiality, Martha burned almost all letters exchanged between them, which makes an evaluation of their

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[101] Esmond Wright, *Washington and the American Revolution* (Middlesex, 1973), 41; Helen Bryan, *Martha Washington: First Lady of Liberty* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2002), 15, 21, 38, http://books.google.com/books?id=x-Jfr_nJ65UC; III-B: Schedule B: General Account of the Estate, [ca. Oct. 1759], in *PGW*.

[102] Knollenberg, *George Washington*, 26–27; Enclosure: Invoice to Richard Washington, 15 Apr. 1757, in *PGW*; Carol Borchert Cadou, *The George Washington Collection: Fine and Decorative Arts at Mount Vernon* (Manchester: Hudson Hills Press, 2006), 29, http://books.google.com/books?id=GN0RmDq-8nkC; Ellis, *His Excellency*, 35.

[103] Bryan, *Martha Washington*, 2.

[104] For example, see Morison, "The Young Man Washington," quoted in H. J. Duteil, *The Great American Parade* (2005), 137, http://books.google.com/books?id=S2ku4oO48x8C.

[105] Daniel Blake Smith, *Inside the Great House: Planter Family Life in Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake Society* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), 21–22, http://books.google.com/books?id=cobhC8uzacoC; Sayen, "'A Compleat Gentleman'," 143.

[106] Robert Francis Jones, *George Washington: Ordinary Man, Extraordinary Leader* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 23, http://books.google.com/books?id=LY8JTi-lmg8C.

relationship before and after marriage more difficult. G. W. Parke Custis, Martha's grandson, believed the correspondence was burned to avoid "desecrating their chaste loves," because "some word or expression might be interpreted to his disadvantage."[107] In any case, the records that contain a trace of Washington's evaluation of his marriage denote a long-lasting mutual affection. During the first year of his marriage, Washington wrote, "I am now I beleive fixd at this Seat with an agreable Consort for Life and hope to find more happiness in retirement than I ever experiencd amidst a wide and bustling World."[108] At the outset of the Revolutionary War, Washington assured Martha, "My dearest […] I retain an unalterable affection for you, which neither time or distance can change."[109]

The circumstances and events leading up to Washington's proposal to Martha may possibly serve as an argument in favor of a marriage of convenience. Such a claim, however, cannot be established as no conclusive evidence has been identified for or against the case. It is true that Washington found the genteel and well-bred company appealing, but considering Washington's personality, his association with the opposite gender, and the historical time frame of Chesapeake marriage behavior, one could hardly disagree that their betrothal was not motivated by the fortunate combination of mutual affection that was supported by profitable and pragmatic considerations.

Washington's Rising in the Esteem Among Virginia's Statesmen

Washington's rapid rise in the military was accompanied by his entering into the world of politics. The first time Washington seriously contemplated running for the House of Burgesses, the governing body of Virginia, was in 1755, shortly after his distinguished actions at the Battle of the Monongahela. Learning that his home county of Fairfax would be split into two counties, Washington contemplated taking a poll "if I thought my chance tolerably good."[110] Apparently, the chances were rather small so Washington decided not to run in the elections. Where Washington did run was not in Fairfax, but in the frontier county of Frederick, where he owned some land.[111] Peculiarly enough, Washington may not have been

[107] John Benson Lossing, *Mary and Martha: The Mother and the Wife of George Washington* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1886), 278n, http://www.archive.org/details/marymarthamother01loss.
[108] GW to Richard Washington, 20 Sep. 1759, in *PGW*.
[109] GW to Martha Washington, 23 Jun. 1775, in *PGW*.
[110] GW to John Augustine Washington, 28 May 1755, in *PGW*.
[111] Land Grant, from Thomas, Lord Fairfax, 20 October 1750, in *PGW*; Charles S. Sydnor, *American Revolutionaries in the Making: Political Practices in Washington's Virginia* (New York: Free Press, 1966), 39–40.

aware of his candidacy there as his name did not appear on the poll list until the day of the elections, presumably added by his friends. But with no advance notice or electioneering on his behalf, it came as no surprise that he lost to his opponents who won the two burgess seats for the county.[112]

With regard to Washington's political ascent in the late 1750s, the Fairfax election deserves even closer attention. Although he did not run in his home county, Washington participated in the election there in order to support the candidacy of his friend and neighbor George William Fairfax.[113] It soon became apparent that the election would be very close, perhaps only a few votes apart. Tempers rose quickly in such a situation and some freeholders, including Washington, decided to cast only one vote instead of the usual two. William Payne, one of the incensed voters, engaged in a physical altercation with Washington, during which he knocked the commander of Virginia down with his cane.[114]

The passions of election day subsided and the following day Washington apologized to Payne for being in the wrong. The incident not only demonstrates Washington's well-mannered use of humility and frankness but also his continued loyalty to the Fairfaxes, his patron family, to whom he was indebted for many favors. In his book about early Virginia politicking, Charles S. Sydnor reminds us that "If a young man wished to rise in politics, society, or wealth, it was well for him to vote for those who had the power to aid him in winning his goal."[115] While Washington probably supported his neighbor for being beholden to his powerful family, he may have equally sensed the advantages that came from promoting those who could reciprocate the support in a future election. Either way, Washington's favor was duly returned three years later.

In 1758, the second time his name appeared on the candidacy list of the Frederick County election, it was with Washington's consent. Like three years earlier, his thoughts of running for office were guided by deliberation and caution. He sought the advice of his friends on whether his standing in the poll in the Frederick County would hurt his "Interest as a Candidate."[116] Learning that his chances were reasonable, Washington permitted his name to be added to the candidacy list and allowed his friends to begin canvassing on his behalf. The other candidates in

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[112] Lucille Griffith, *The Virginia House of Burgesses, 1750–1774* (University of Alabama Press, 1970), 93–94, 159–60.

[113] Sydnor, *American Revolutionaries in the Making*, 75.

[114] John Gilman Kolp, *Gentlemen and Freeholders: Electoral Politics in Colonial Virginia* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 152; DSF 2: 146; Adam Stephen to GW, 23 Dec. 1755, in *PGW*.

[115] Sydnor, *American Revolutionaries in the Making*, 67.

[116] Nathaniel Thompson to GW, 20 Feb. 1758, in *PGW*.

the election were Bryan Martin, Martin West, and Thomas Swearingen. All three of them were involved in the pre-election canvassing, trying to make themselves more visible to the freeholders of the county. By contrast, Washington was not even in the county and attended to his military duties elsewhere on the frontier.

"Your being elected absolutely depends on your presence that day," Washington was advised by one of his friends.[117] Although Washington obtained a leave of absence to attend the election, he was hesitant about leaving his military camp some forty miles north-west of Frederick County. "Tho. my being there on that occasion woud, at any other time, be very agreable to me," admitted Washington, "yet, at this juncture, I can hardly perswade myself to think of being absent from my more immediate Duty, even for a few days."[118]

Not campaigning or being present at the election itself was rare among burgess candidates in Virginia. Washington justified his reluctance to attend the election by referring to his "more immediate" military duties.[119] Washington's presence in the county would have certainly increased his chances of being elected, but he may have felt that his popularity among the freeholders of the county was already such as to attract a sufficient number of votes. Keeping in mind the possibility of an impending call for an attack against Fort Duquesne at that time, it becomes more apparent why Washington was loath to leave his troops.[120]

Having received sanguine reports of voting preferences of the gentlemen of the county, Washington's outlook indeed seemed bright.[121] The leading gentry were the key to one's success in any Virginia political election. Members of this class were privileged to be the first to cast their votes and the value of their voting preferences cannot be underestimated because they had a substantial influence on how the rest of the freeholders voted.[122]

The first gentleman to cast his vote at the Frederick election was Lord Fairfax, a true peer and proprietor of extensive land holdings. Fairfax's two votes were in favor of Martin (his cousin) and Washington.[123] At the proprietor's heels was

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117 Gabriel Jones to GW, 6 Jul. 1758, in *PGW*.

118 GW to Henry Bouquet, 19 Jul. 1758, in *PGW*.

119 Ibid.

120 GW to Henry Bouquet, 21 Jul. 1758, in *PGW*. GW realized that by his participation in the long-anticipated offensive he would not only gain honor by displaying courage in battle but also gain further acclaim among the freeholders of Frederick and thus kill two birds with one stone.

121 Sydnor, *American Revolutionaries in the Making*, 52.

122 Kolp, *Gentlemen and Freeholders*, 146. The gentlemen's voting preferences influenced the rest of the voters because all voting was done orally and was accessible to the public.

123 Lyon Gardiner Tyler, ed., *Encyclopedia of Virginia Biography*, 5 vols. (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1915), 1: 285, http://www.archive.org/details/encyclopediaofvi01tyleuoft.

William Meldrum, a respected Protestant minister, who voted for the same candidates. James Wood, a founder of Winchester, the capital of Frederick County, and Washington's representative at the election, voted for Washington, of course, and strategically for West instead of Martin. The fourth gentleman to vote was Colonel John Carlyle who supported Martin and Washington.[124]

This Frederick County election represented almost an exemplary display of how gentry influenced the voting behavior of the rest of the freeholders. For example, Swearingen, who received no vote from any of the first four dignitaries, soon realized that he could not expect to win; he finished last. On the other hand, Washington was the first to lead the poll, though only by a small margin, which gave him a slight advantage over Martin. The results of the poll could have been guessed after the first dozen of prominent freeholders voted: Washington finished first, Martin second, and West third.[125]

One can only speculate how many votes Washington would have lost had Lord Fairfax determined not to support him. But Wood, Washington's representative at the elections, also served the absent commander of Virginia well. Prior to the elections, Wood and other supporters of Washington treated the citizens to food and drink for free as was common in Virginia at that time. The receipts Washington had to pay afterward were not small but such a generosity and open-handedness was expected of a gentleman who hoped to gain the support of local freeholders.[126]

Washington's friends from Frederick County and elsewhere sent him congratulatory notes. His accomplishments were praised and his burgess victory celebrated. On Washington's behalf, Wood "was Carried round the Town with a General applause, Huzawing Colo. Washington."[127]

Washington's 1758 election to the House of Burgesses was partially expected due to his rising social status and distinguished military career. However, the unconventional aspect of his political rise consisted of his winning a burgess election *prior to* occupying any of the local political offices. Serving in the local parish

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124 Sydnor, *American Revolutionaries in the Making*, 66.

125 Ibid., 66–67; Series 4, General Correspondence, Frederick County, Virginia, July 24, 1758, Election Poll (List of Voters), in *GWPLC*, images 756–67. The totals for each candidate sent by Lieutenant Smith and Joseph Carroll, the clerk, slightly differ from GW's copy, see Charles Smith to GW, 24 Jul. 1758, 26 Jul. 1758, Enclosure V: Frederick County Poll Sheet, 24 Jul. 1758, in *PGW*.

126 Enclosure I: Account with Henry Brinker, 24[–25] Jul. 1758, Enclosure II: Account with John Funk, 24[–26] Jul. 1758, Enclosure III: Account with Henry Heth, 24[–26] Jul. 1758, Enclosure IV: Account with Alexander Wodrow, 24 Jul. 1758, Enclosure: Account with John Hite, 24 Jul. 1758, in *PGW*; DSF 2: 320. Small of quantities of brandy and cider are omitted here. Kolp, *Gentlemen and Freeholders*, 28–29; Sydnor, *American Revolutionaries in the Making*, 70.

127 Charles Smith to GW, 24 Jul. 1758, in *PGW*.

vestry and subsequently as justice of the peace typically preceded one's membership in the House of Burgesses but, in Washington's case, the order was reversed.[128] In any case, seats in the House were traditionally reserved for the leading men of the respective counties. By joining the elite group of Virginia's statesmen, Washington's political ascent in his colony reached a significant milestone and served as a springboard for further colonial and continental prominence.[129]

Conclusion

Washington's prominence in serving his country did not begin in the Revolutionary War but long before – during his early military career, a period which shaped his aspirations and patriotic spirit. When George was just eleven years old his future looked bleak and hardly anything seemed to suggest that his name would ever be known beyond his own county. But there was something about the young Washington that soon began to earn him respect and favor from men of influence as he matured. His unusual physical height combined with his assiduous absorption of moral principles, gleaned from such sources as the panegyric of Duke Schomberg and the *Rules of Civility*, did not escape the attention of those who had the authority to accept his offers of service.

In mid-eighteenth-century Virginia, where relationships and connections with members of the gentry constituted the principal factors in determining one's ascent among the elite, Washington's propinquity with the patrician Fairfaxes and Governor Dinwiddie's sustained support ranked among his most fortunate relationships.

Washington's desire to gain honor by serving his country was deep-rooted and easily recognizable from his early military career. Volunteering to deliver a letter of warning from the governor of Virginia to a French commandant stationed in a disputed territory, Washington placed himself in the spotlight of developing military conflict that resulted in the French and Indian War. His conspicuous role in the early stages of the war could not have escaped the attention of many concerned statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic.

Evidence suggests that those soldiers who served under his immediate command respected him primarily for his great zeal and patriotism. Washington repeatedly assured his superiors that his chief aim is a "laudable Ambition

[128] Kolp, *Gentlemen and Freeholders*, 143; Sydnor, *American Revolutionaries in the Making*, 84, 100.

[129] H. R. McIlwaine, ed., *Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1758–1761*, 13 vols. (Richmond, VA: [Colonial Press, E. Waddey Company], 1908), 9: vii–viii, http://www.archive.org/details/journalsofhouseo09virg.

of Serving Our Country, and meriting its applause" and that his ultimate reward shall be "what arises from a Consciousness of doing my duty. and from the good liking of my Friends thereupon."[130]

Joining in matrimony the widowed Martha Dandridge Custis had a significantly wider social implication for Washington than merely establishing a family. Marrying a lady of good breeding and considerable wealth elevated Washington to the first tier of Virginia gentry – which in turn facilitated his association with other influential gentry families in the Old Dominion.

Washington's distinguished military career and the support of the leading gentlemen, the Fairfaxes in particular, aided the retired commander of Virginia in winning a burgess election without being physically present at the polls and without having first served as vestryman in a parish or justice of the peace at a court. Whatever Washington did during his early career as a military officer, would-be statesman, or citizen, seems to have contributed to his steep and steady rise among the men of his province.

[130] GW to John Robinson, 1 Sep. 1758, GW to John St. Clair, 27 Apr. 1758, in *PGW*.

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STUDIA TERRITORIALIA 3

EMBRACING THE "ENEMY": SOME ASPECTS OF THE MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THAILAND UNDER FIELD MARSHAL PHIBUNSONGKHRAM, 1948–1957

JAN BEČKA

Abstract
This article focuses on the relationship between the United States and Thailand under Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram between the years 1948 and 1957. It first seeks to show how Phibun, who had collaborated with the Japanese during World War II and had at one time faced prosecution as a war criminal, was able to overthrow the post-war liberal government and gain acceptance in the United States. Next, it will present and analyze the basic tenets and principles of the Thai-American relationship in the context of the Cold War and the bipolar rivalry in Asia. Finally, it will explain the issue of Phibun's changing image in the United States and his attempts to make his government more "democratic" as part of his struggle to retain power and to quell the growing internal discontent with his regime.
Keywords: Thailand, United States, Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram, Cold War, anti-communism, SEATO, democracy

Introduction

The Cold War and the bipolar division of the world that began to emerge soon after the end of World War II had a very significant impact on the U.S. foreign policy in Asia. The colonial domains of Great Britain, France and the Netherlands were experiencing serious difficulties, and communist-affiliated, pro-independence groups and movements were gaining momentum in many countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia. The United States was in desperate need of reliable, stable, pro-Western allies in the region. The Philippines, officially independent

since July 1946, was definitely counted on as one such ally. The other country that the United States placed a great emphasis on was Thailand.[1]

Thailand was an ally of Japan during World War II, but since the resignation of pro-Japanese Prime Minister Marshal Phibunsongkhram in late July 1944, it had been led by a liberal, democratic, pro-Western government. The key figures in the early postwar politics of Thailand were leaders of the anti-Japanese resistance, such as Pridi Phanomyong, or former ambassador to the United States Seni Pramoj. The liberal government, despite being initially supported by the United States, encountered serious challenges. It was unable to solve pressing socio-economic problems that included shortages of basic goods and commodities, inflation and corruption. It also failed to punish the war-time collaborators with Japan (Phibun and his aides), and its popularity and support among the Thai population was quickly eroding. In November 1947, the Thai army staged a coup which overthrew the government and forced Pridi, the main representative of the liberal segment of Thai politics, to flee the country and go into exile. After a short intermezzo during which a caretaker civilian government of Khuang Aphaiwong took charge of the country, another coup came in April 1948, which put Marshal Phibunsongkhram back into the position of prime minister. Subsequently, Phibun managed to secure the support of the United States and make Thailand one of the most important U.S. allies in Asia. This article seeks to analyze the U.S. perception and eventual acceptance of Phibun's return, and to explain its significance for the mutual relations between the two countries. As it will be discussed, the changing U.S. image of Thailand in general and of Marshal Phibunsongkhram in particular also reflected and symbolized profound changes in the American foreign policy of the postwar era.

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[1] The traditional name of the country was Siam. In 1938, this name was changed by the government of Marshal Phibunsongkhram to Thailand, which according to his opinion better suited the nationalistic policies and the nation-building approach of his administration. After Phibun's resignation in 1944, the name was changed backed to Siam but only until 1948, when Thailand was ultimately readopted. In this article, the word Thailand would be used except for direct quotations from contemporary sources, which use the word Siam. For a summary of the changes and an explanation of their possible underlying motivations, see for example, Charnvit Kasetsiri, "Siam to Thailand – A Historian's View," *The Bangkok Post*, June 23, 2009. For the political/nation-building aspects of this problem, see Michael R. Rhum, "'Modernity' and 'Tradition' in Thailand," *Modern Asian Studies* 30, no. 2 (May 1996): 331.

The "Enemy": Marshal Phibunsongkhram, His Role in Thai Politics and His Image in the United States prior to 1948

Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram was, beyond any doubt, one of the most controversial Thai politicians of the twentieth century.[2] A career soldier who spent several years after World War I at a military academy in France, he belonged to the group of young, Western-educated military officers and civil servants who were unsatisfied with the slow progress of political, economic and social change in Thailand, still an absolute monarchy in the first decades of the twentieth century. This group, which called itself *Khana Ratsadon* (People's Party), ultimately carried out a coup in June 1932, after which Thailand became a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament and limited powers and role of the king and the royal family. While Phibun represented the military wing of the People's Party, Pridi Phanomyong, his close associate who later turned into his bitter rival, represented the civilian faction. Pridi, who by Thai standards was a very liberal politician and thinker, figured prominently in Thai political life after the coup. However, he quickly began to lose support after some of the steps he had proposed, mainly the Outline Economic Plan of 1934,[3] were attacked as anti-royalist and even "communist." Following these accusations, Pridi left Thailand, and although he soon returned, he was not able to regain his former influence and standing. Instead, the more conservative, nationalistic political forces, headed by the army with Marshal Phibunsongkhram as its main representative, were gaining the upper hand. Eventually, Phibunsongkhram became prime minister in December 1938.

The political developments in the 1930s were important, among many other reasons, because of the impression of Thailand that they had created in the United States. The American media had been following the 1932 revolution with some interest and, at first, with great caution. For example, on June 27, 1932, The Washington Post reported: "Although King Prajadiphok [Rama VII, reigned November 1925–March 1935][4] was one of the two remaining absolute monarchs in the world, he has never been a despot. Apparently there is no dissatisfaction with the king

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[2] For a detailed, although rather subjective, account of the Marshal's life, the reader may wish to consult Charun Kuwanon, *Chiwit Kantosu khong Chomphon P. Phibunsongkhram* [The Life and Struggles of Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkhram] (Bangkok: Aksoen Charoenthat, 1953).

[3] The plan, if implemented, would have brought government insurance for employees, would have aided in the establishment of industrial and agricultural cooperatives and would have nationalized some segments of the economy. The full text of the plan can be found in Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, eds., *Pridi by Pridi. Selected Writing on Life, Politics, and Economy* (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2000), 82–123.

[4] The additions to the direct quotations are made by the author, unless otherwise stated.

himself, but only with the economic conditions in which the country has found itself. When King Prajadiphok was in the United States, he outlined plans for extending suffrage of his people. […] Those plans seem to have been completely upset by the military revolution which has fastened its grip upon the little country. The present revolt is an uprising of the army and naval forces, and not a popular revolution."[5] The newspaper was right in stating that this was definitely not a popular revolution: by 1932, most Thais were not involved in the political life of the country and the very word for politics, *kanmuang,* sounded strange, even alien, to many people. Yet it was not just the army that was involved in the uprising and it was not just economic changes, but also political and social ones, that were sought by the leaders of the People's Party. Despite the initial criticism, however, it was acknowledged in the United States that there was a chance that a more democratic government would eventually be achieved, especially after the new constitution was promulgated. In this respect, it was stated that "The document [constitution], the outgrowth of the brief revolt last week that deprived the King of his absolute powers, provides that the dictatorship shall be replaced by suffrage when the people have been educated in the responsibilities of self-government."[6]

The constitution, along with other major political proclamations and documents of this period, was largely the work of Pridi. He represented, at least in the eyes of many Western observers, the main driving force toward modernization and democratization of the country. It should also be noted that some of his efforts, for example those included in the Outline Economic Plan, might have been appreciated by the Roosevelt Administration, which was also aiming at a major reform of the U.S. economy and society, although perhaps by less radical means. The American acceptance and support of the democratic government in Thailand was also evident from the fact that the United States was the first Western country to start negotiations of a new commercial treaty between the two countries, free of the "unequal privilege clauses" that were forced on Thailand in the past.[7] When Pridi's influence waned and the military led by Phibunsongkhram came to the fore, it was certainly a disappointment for the Roosevelt Administration. It must be mentioned in this respect that the political and economic reform plans of Pridi were too far-reaching and radical for the Thailand of the 1930s and that he

[5] "Revolt in Siam," *The Washington Post*, June 27, 1932.

[6] AP, "Siam Gets Constitution," *The New York Times*, June 29, 1932.

[7] The treaty was finally signed in November 1937. For the diplomatic correspondence regarding the treaty, see especially United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1937*. Volume IV. The Far East (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), 825–94.

would likely have failed regardless of the army's opposition. Besides, he was always somewhat detached from most of the population and perhaps did not possess the charisma necessary to create a strong base of supporters. Phibun's active role in transforming the country into a *de facto* military dictatorship in which only formal vestiges of democracy[8] were maintained, however, had made him the main culprit for the failure of Thai democratization in the eyes of the West. Those who believed in the spreading of democracy and western-style government into "less developed" parts of the world saw him as a reactionary, ultra-conservative figure, an assessment which would paradoxically help him in his political carrier after World War II.

Phibunsongkhram's policies and political style, which he fully implemented after becoming prime minister in December 1938, were a mixture of intense, militant nationalism and an emphasis on modernization of certain aspects of Thai economic and social life. The Marshal drew inspiration from Nazi Germany, and even more from Fascist Italy, and the *duce/führer* concept seemed to influence him deeply. He envisioned the creation of a modern Thai state, which would be able to oppose the encroachments of the colonial powers, Great Britain and France, on its territory and sovereignty. The key to this was strong leadership, the building of a modern army and also the adoption of a "western lifestyle," which, somewhat in the fashion of Peter I of Russia, was mainly meant to prove that Thailand was not an "underdeveloped, barbarous" country that should be subjected to the tutelage of the "civilized" European states. As Phibunsongkhram proclaimed in August 1939: "We must be cultured as other nations, otherwise no country will come to contact us. Or if they come, they come as superiors. Thailand would be helpless and soon become colonized. But if we were highly cultured, we would be able to uphold our integrity, independence and keep everything to ourselves."[9]

Much more sinister, however, was Phibun's apparent tilt toward imperial Japan. This new foreign policy orientation was seen with great anxiety in Paris, London and Washington, as Thailand's strategic location could serve as a launching

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[8] The parliament continued to exist and it still had the power to pass laws, but it was the prime minister and the army who exercised real control over the country. On the other hand, the parliament often opposed Phibun's policies and plans, creating an almost perpetual tension in their mutual relations.

[9] A statement made by Phibun in a cabinet meeting he chaired on August 30, 1939. Quoted in Thamsook Numnonda, "Pibulsongkhram's Thai Nation Building Programme during the Japanese Military Presence, 1941–1945," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 9, no. 2 (1978): 234. The Phibun-style westernization, however, was rather superficial, as it consisted mainly of such things as adopting western clothing, greeting each other in western style or using western technological inventions and innovations.

pad for an attack on Burma, Malaya, Singapore and even the Philippines. The Japanese aggression in China and Tokyo's ambition to create the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" were clear signs of the coming confrontation between the colonial powers and Japan. With the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, it became evident to Phibun that war in Asia was inevitable. While he was not necessarily a friend of Japan, he saw possible advantages in cooperating with the Japanese – mainly the possibility of regaining the territories in Cambodia, Laos, Malaya and Burma that his country previously lost to France and Great Britain. Besides, compared to the rather withdrawn approach of the United States and Great Britain in their negotiations with Thailand, the Japanese moved at a much faster pace. In June 1940, a mutual non-aggression treaty was signed between both countries which granted Japan that Thailand would remain neutral in the coming war.[10] The British made a similar pact with Thailand, but negotiations with France were halted because of the latter's defeat by Germany. Phibun then used France's weakness to attack the Vichy colonial forces in Laos and Cambodia in November 1940 and, with the help of Japan, was able to occupy some of the disputed territories.[11]

This aggression added yet another dent to Phibun's already tarnished image in Washington and London. No longer only a nationalist, reactionary, and anti-democratic dictator, he was now also viewed as an anti-Western opportunist who used the defeat of France to pursue his own ambitions. By early 1941, the United States saw Phibun's Thailand as already lost to the Allied cause, although this was not publicly admitted. The American legation in Bangkok reported to Washington that "there is good reason to believe that Japanese propaganda in Thailand is being intensified and there are some indications that a Japanese fifth column movement is being organized for any eventuality that may arise in this area making it possible for Japan to control this country. […] Thailand would thus be drawn definitely into Japanese orbit. […] There is the other possibility of *coup d'etat* in Bangkok resulting in the absolute control of Thailand by Japan."[12] While negotiations between Thailand and the Allies continued throughout 1941, much in the spirit of the traditional Thai maxim of "keeping feet on both sides of the boat," they were

[10] League of Nations, "Treaty between Thailand and Japan Concerning the Continuance of Friendly Relations between the Two Countries and the Mutual Respect of Each Other's Territorial Integrity," in *Treaty Series 1941–1942* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1943), 132.

[11] A final treaty with the Vichy administration, which granted Thailand part of the territories claimed, was signed in May 1941. For the negotiations and text of the treaty, see Direk Jayanama, *Thailand and World War II* (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2008), 356–72.

[12] United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1941*. Volume V. The Far East (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956), 1.

hindered by misgivings and suspicions on both sides. Phibunsongkhram believed the United States and Great Britain were too weak to help his country in case of a Japanese attack; he also knew that even if the aid from the Allies came, it would not be enough to stop the Japanese invasion. The Allies, on the other hand, were unwilling (but also unable to) offer any significant military aid to Thailand because they were afraid their weapons and supplies could be turned over to the Japanese.[13] It came as no surprise, then, that when the Japanese invasion of Thailand did start on December 8, 1941, the country was quickly overrun while it did not receive any significant assistance from the Allies. In the face of inevitable defeat, Marshal Phibunsongkhram asked for immediate ceasefire and a truce, which came into effect on the same day. Japanese forces subsequently marched through Thailand in their drive south and west without further opposition.

This rapid capitulation could hardly be used against Phibun by London or Washington as the Thai forces had no chance of halting the Japanese advance. What made Phibun's position much worse, however, was that he signed a treaty with Japan on December 21, which laid the foundations for economic, military and political cooperation between the two countries. In a secret clause, Thailand promised to support Japan in the war against the Allies in exchange for the recovery of lost territories not only in Indochina but also in Burma and Malaya.[14] Even though Japan did not necessarily pressure Thailand to enter the war – its main importance for Tokyo lay in providing military bases and raw materials – Phibunsongkhram made this fatal move and on January 25, 1942, Thailand declared war on the United States and Great Britain. The Marshal had thus made Thailand an official Japanese ally and in doing so he earned another label which would later stick to him – that of a "Japanese puppet."[15] This step had also aroused strong opposition both at home and abroad. The Thai Ambassador in Washington Seni Pramoj even refused to deliver the declaration of war.[16] A resistance movement known as *Seri Thai* (Free Thai) had gradually been established, with its main centers in the Unit-

[13] Great Britain did send the Thai army a limited quantity of airplane fuel, artillery equipment and ammunition. The request made by the Thai government to receive warplanes was not granted by either Washington or London – the former needed its planes to protect the Philippines, the latter for defending Singapore. James V. Martin, Jr., "Thai-American Relations in World War II," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 22, no. 4 (August 1963): 459.

[14] Jayanama, *Thailand and World War II*, 121.

[15] The American press was especially fond, for a time, of using this term. Reuter, "Siam Frees Puppet Head," *The New York Times*, March 25, 1946; The United Press, "Japan's Ex-Puppet at the Helm of Siam after Armed Coup," *The New York Times*, November 10, 1947 etc.

[16] When Seni met the U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, he stated: "I am keeping the declaration in my pocket because I am convinced it does not represent the will of the Thai people. With American help, I propose to prove it." See John B. Haseman, *The Thai Resistance Movement During World*

ed States and Great Britain. In Thailand it operated underground and its leading figure was Pridi Phanomyong, who by now served as one of the regents for the absent Thai monarch Ananda Mahidol (Rama VIII).

Initially, Japan had achieved a number of significant military successes, which made Phibun's decision appear quite wise and beneficial for Thailand. As the fortunes of war began to change, however, and the situation in Thailand deteriorated due to worsening economic conditions, caused, among other reasons, by excessive Japanese demands, Phibun's position began to weaken. By the summer of 1944, he might have realized that he could not hold on to power much longer. He thus used a largely trivial matter – a dispute with the parliament over the establishment of new capital city in Petchabun and over the creation of "Buddhist city," a center of Buddhist teachings[17] – and he summarily resigned.[18] Khuang Aphaiwong became the next prime minister, but it was Pridi and the *Seri Thai* who were now becoming the dominant force in Thai politics. Even though the *Seri Thai* did not get a chance to confront the Japanese in combat and thus prove their loyalty to the Allied cause, they were seen as the representatives of the "free," "democratic" Thailand by the United States.

By the time the war ended, the *Seri Thai* leaders had taken over the Thai political life, and they now steered the country through difficult negotiations with Great Britain and France, restored Thailand's international prestige, and tried to meet the economic challenges at home. Phibun, who retired to a private life after his resignation, faced the danger of being prosecuted as a war criminal under the so-called War Crimes Act,[19] passed by the National Assembly in January 1946. In April of that year, the Thai Supreme Court decided to stop the trial on legal grounds,[20] allowing Phibun and his associates not only to escape punishment but also to return to politics. The result of the court trial was no doubt a disappoint-

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War II (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2002), 22. As a result, the United States, unlike Great Britain where the declaration was delivered, did not consider itself at war with Thailand.

17 David K. Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003), 249.

18 For the exact developments surrounding the fall of Phibun's government, see Benjamin Batson, "The Fall of Phibun Government, 1944," *Journal of the Siam Society* 62, no. 2 (1974): 89–120.

19 The act was the work of Pridi Phanomyong and Seni Pramoj. The trial of war criminals was one of the demands of the United States and mainly Great Britain, but also a way for the new government to remove potentially dangerous opponents from political life.

20 The reason for the court's decision was that the War Crimes Act, which was used as the basis for prosecution, could not be applied retroactively. See Frank C. Darling, *Thailand and the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), 51–52. The question whether it was really a decision reached independently by the court or if Pridi (for personal or political reasons) intervened on Phibun's behalf still remains (and will probably remain) unanswered by historians.

ment for the United States, but its policy of non-intervention in Thai domestic affairs as well as its preoccupation with other problems prevented Washington from exerting more pressure on the government on this particular issue.

The liberal government in general was seen in the United States as proof that Thailand was moving forward and that it could show the way to democracy to other Asian states, mainly those that were soon to gain independence. The return of King Ananda to Thailand in early 1946, the promulgation of a new democratic constitution,[21] the personal devotion of Pridi to democracy – all these were promising signs. Pridi, who became prime minister in April 1946,[22] was even hailed as "as Siam's flaming liberal and an unswerving son of democracy."[23] However, serious problems soon began to reappear. The government was unable to tackle corruption, inflation, rising costs of living and a shortage of important commodities, mainly rice. The accusations of being a communist again began to mount on Pridi, especially in relation to his support for the anti-colonial movement in Indochina and in Asia in general. This soured relations with France[24] and worried the United States, which was slowly beginning to see the anti-colonial movement it had previously supported through the lens of the Cold War.

A major blow for Pridi came on June 9, 1946, when the young King Ananda was found shot to death in his bedroom in the royal palace. Although the government immediately ordered an investigation, rumors were rife that Pridi was behind the deed and this further weakened his popular support.[25] He first

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[21] The constitution of 1946 incorporated many elements from the Constitution of the United States, as well as those of some other western nations.

[22] Since August 1944, there had been four prime ministers in office – Khuang Aphaiwong (August 1944–August 1945), Tawee Boonyaket (August 1945–September 1945), Seni Pramoj (September 1945–January 1946) and again Khuang Aphaiwong (January 1946–March 1946).

[23] Chun Prabha, "Siam's Democratic King," *Asia,* 1946 (March), 117.

[24] France repeatedly accused the Pridi government of actively assisting the rebels in Cambodia and Laos. For example, on June 3, 1946, the French embassy in Washington wrote to the U.S. Department of State: "The acts of these bands, which are well armed and organized, and certain of which have radio sets at their disposal, are possible *only* because of the *complacency* of the Siamese government, which does not limit itself to giving them refuge, but has *never made any attempt* to disarm them, or disperse them, or make them leave the border. What is more, it *permitted* them to recruit new contingents on its territory, and to establish training camps in the vicinity of the Indochinese territory, and numerous duly confirmed facts show that its benevolence with respect to them does not stop there." United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1946.* Volume VIII. The Far East (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), 1012. Italics added.

[25] In Thailand, the person of the king is extremely important and any misdeed against the royal authority is considered a serious offense. In this particular respect, it is thus possible to argue with the assertion "that domestic political events alone, played as they are in Siam almost wholly over the heads of the masses, would probably not have produced another coup d'état." See Virginia Thompson, "Governmental Instability in Siam," *Far Eastern Survey* 17, no. 16 (August 25, 1948): 186.

responded to these rumors by instituting censorship and by having several of his most vocal accusers arrested. He was aware, however, that the army, directed from behind the scenes by Phibun, and the conservative opposition represented mainly by the Democrat Party of Khuang Aphaiwong, would not let this opportunity pass. In these difficult circumstances, Pridi decided to resign on August 23, and was replaced by Thamrong Nawasat, his close political ally. Pridi then spent much time traveling abroad, hoping to gain support for the Thamrong government in the United States and Western Europe.

The political instability in Thailand and its possible ramifications for the stability of the country as such and for its resistance against communism were of concern to the United States. President Truman made his worries clear when he remarked on the occasion of receiving the Thai Ambassador in March 1947 that "a democratic and *stable* Siam can make a great contribution to the peaceful progress of mankind, especially in Southeast Asia. […] Although since the war there have been *frequent changes* in administrative responsibility in your country [Thailand], *it is hoped* that as the war period becomes more remote there will be *fewer occasions* requiring governmental changes."[26] The suspicions regarding Thailand's vulnerability to communism were further deepened by several factors. In an effort to remove Soviet objections to Thailand's entry to the United Nations, the Thamrong government repealed the pre-war Anti-Communist Act in November 1946.[27] In July 1947, the Thai government announced that it would not support the proposition of the Franco-Siamese Conciliation Commission[28] to create a joint Pan-Asian Union, which both France and the United States saw as a possible to way to quell, with Thai help, the nationalist uprisings in Cambodia and Laos. The government declared that it would only join the Union if Cambodia and Laos were granted immediate independence.[29] Finally, in September 1947 Pridi announced that he would instead found a Southeast Asia League, which would support independence movements all across Asia. Rumors begun to circulate that Pridi was directly allied with the Communist Party of Thailand and was in fact preparing to establish a republic in Thailand.

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[26] "Truman, Receiving Envoy, Links Siam to Democracy," *The New York Times*, April 19, 1947. Italics added.

[27] *Ratchakitcha* 63, November 11, 1946, 561.

[28] The commission was established in 1946, following the signing of the Franco-Thai peace treaty, to settle the remaining disputes and to continue the talks between the two governments. It was composed of two representatives of both Thailand and France and three neutral experts. Its main objective was to "examine the ethnic, geographic and economic arguments" of Bangkok and Paris regarding the disputed territories in Indochina. USDS, *FRUS 1946,* 1084.

[29] AP, "Siam Rejects Plan for a Regional Union," *The New York Times*, July 6, 1947.

In the meantime, Phibunsongkhram was carefully polishing his conservative, anti-communist credentials and preparing, with other military officers, the army for a coup. He judged very correctly that he could not take over power by himself but that he needed to find a respectable person who would provide the necessary *façade* for the new regime. He also very correctly guessed that with anxiety about communism growing ever stronger in the United States, his coup would be much better accepted due to his much touted anti-communist credentials. He was proven right on both counts. On November 8, 1947, the army, led by *Khana Ratthaprahan* (Coup Group), consisting mostly of retired or lower rank military officials, captured Bangkok, proclaimed the Thamrong government overthrown and promised to set up an efficient administration of the country, free of subversive communist influence and founded on the traditional platform – Nation, Religion, King.[30] Pridi and many of his supporters fled the capital and Khuang Aphaiwong, leader of the conservative Democrat Party, was asked by Phibun to form a new government. For the time being, he provided the perfect cover for the Field Marshal.

The American public officials and media reacted with dismay to this turn of events, although the criticism could have been sharper and the tone more outraged. The New York Times contemplated the future of Thai democracy: "The Field Marshal [Phibunsongkhram] has tolerated few democratic processes in his previous years of command. There seems little hope that he has changed his way of thinking, although his first action in setting up a Privy Council of which he is not a member might indicate a decision to maintain at least *an outward semblance of democracy.* That move, however, may have stemmed more *from a fear of adverse British and United States reaction* rather than from any conversion to constitutional rule. His collaboration with the Japanese has not been forgotten in London and Washington."[31] The American Ambassador to Bangkok, Edwin F. Stanton, expressed his disappointment over these developments and warned that they might lead to a civil war or other serious complications.[32] No action, however, was taken by either Washington or London – the refusal by either government to extend official recognition to the Khuang administration remained the only tangible form of disapproval with the coup.

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[30] W. Ch. Prasangsit, *Phaendin Somdet Phrapokklao* [The Reign of King Rama VII] (Bangkok: Aksonsan Press, 1962), 170–71.

[31] The coup was ever more unfortunate, the newspaper argued, because "Siam has made better progress than most countries of Southeast Asia. It is to be hoped that the present *setback* will only be *transitory* and that with the *aid of the United States*, the peace loving Siamese people can again turn to the task of making their country a *going democracy* and a prosperous country." See "Setback in Siam," *The New York Times*, November 11, 1947. Italics added.

[32] Edwin F. Stanton, *Brief Authority* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), 209.

While the Khuang government set to work on tackling such problems as the rice shortage (which it managed to resolve quite fast), Phibunsongkhram started to eliminate his opponents. In a calculated move, designed mainly for "western consumption," he justified his actions by the need to suppress communism before it takes over the country. For example, on November 22, Phibunsongkhram announced that a planned coup by "800 revolutionaries from Northwest Siam" was discovered and foiled. He claimed that these revolutionaries had cooperated with China, which clearly indicated their communist affiliation. He also implicated the *Seri Thai* leaders in the plot, saying "I have no resentment against the Free Thai movement […] but some of their leaders[33] used their powers improperly after the war – for instance, arming the wrong element."[34] It soon became clear that the communist card was the right one to play at this particular time and Phibunsongkhram was quickly casting off the "wartime Japanese puppet" and "dictator" labels.

The Khuang government might have initially hoped to prevent the power from slipping completely into the hands of the military and to preserve at least some form of parliamentary democracy. The elections of January 1948, which the Coup Group had allowed to proceed, brought a great victory to Khuang's Democrat Party, while the Tharmathipat Party, founded and supported by Phibun, miserably failed.[35] The newly emboldened Khuang, whose government was finally recognized by the United States,[36] made plans for drafting new constitution and for strengthening the position of parliament *vis-à-vis* the Coup Group. All hopes were dashed, however, when on April 7 the prime minister was visited by a group of military officers, sent by Phibun, who asked him to "reconsider" his government, i. e. resign, within the next 24 hours.[37] Without any means to resist this pressure, Khuang resigned the next day and on April 8, Marshal Phibunsongkhram became prime minister. The reaction from London and Washington was rather muted. Even in the media, the change was obvious – Phibunsongkhram was now the "strong man" of Thai politics.[38]

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[33] This would be most likely Pridi, although he is not openly named here.

[34] U.P., "Siamese 'Plot' Thwarted," *The New York Times*, November 23, 1947. This wrong element would be the communist sympathizers and adherents.

[35] The Democrat Party won 53 seats in the 100-member parliament, the Independents 30 seats, the Prachachon Party 12 seats, the Tharmathipat Party only 5 seats. See Darling, *Thailand and the United States,* 63.

[36] The exchange of notes took place on March 6, 1948. See United States, Department of State, "Press Release," *The Department of State Bulletin* XVII, No. 154 (March 14, 1948): 360.

[37] Thak Chaloemtiarana, *Thailand: Politics of Despotic Paternalism* (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2007), 34.

[38] AP, "Siam's 'Strong Man' Is Picked as Premier," *The New York Times*, April 9, 1948.

The fall and rise of Phibunsongkhram, or the rise and fall of the liberal government in Thailand in the post-war years, could be attributed to a number of factors. As in 1932, Thai society, despite the initial enthusiasm, was not prepared for the perils and frustrations of democracy. The Pridi and Thamrong governments had clearly failed in solving some of the most pressing problems of the population, which in turn started to listen to those who offered quick "solutions." The inherent conservative nature of the society also generated a negative perception of most ideas and concepts, which were considered untraditional, radical or even "communist." This made the position of Pridi, who was an outspoken liberal, ever more difficult.

Some authors have argued that the United States, the key supporter of Thailand in the post-war years, could have done more to support the liberal government and to bolster its position. It has also been suggested that due to American opposition, the position of the Thai army, the main base of support for Phibunsongkhram, had not been seriously weakened and thus it preserved much of its influence as one of the most important forces in Thai politics and society. Had the British plans[39] for reorganization of the army been adopted, the liberal government might have survived longer, but it is still reasonable to believe, in the light of the previous pages, that it would have eventually succumbed to the conservative opposition and that the army would have regrouped and emerged triumphant. Besides, the British had their own interests, both security and economic, and their recommended reforms of Thai politics were no doubt intended to strengthen their own position in Thailand, of which the United States was aware and which it sought to prevent at all costs. The disagreements between the former wartime allies were evident from the very outset, and on a number of occasions the Thai government managed to use them to its advantage.

Finally, the nascent Cold War and the danger of communist insurgencies caused the United States to reevaluate some of its priorities. Pridi was a "flaming liberal" – a positive characteristic in 1946, but much less positive in 1948. Now, the devotion to progress, democracy and liberalism was no longer as important as stability, traditionalism and anti-communism. From this point of view, Phibun was a much more suitable leader than Pridi, despite his wartime past.[40] With the benefit of hindsight, an impartial observer could call the ensuing partnership of

[39] Some of these plans went so far that they would have actually placed the Thai army under direct British control, which was unacceptable both for the Thai government and for Washington. See Jayanama, *Thailand and World War II*, 210–13.

[40] It is difficult in this respect not to mention a possible parallel with General Franco and the change in the American approach to Spain in the post-war years.

Phibun and the United States a "triumph of pragmatism." As an official publication of the U.S. government duly concluded: "difficult economic conditions, corruption and the mysterious shooting death of King Ananda Mahidol caused many Thais to welcome the change in government, and, after some delay, the United States extended recognition. With communist strength waxing in China, insurgencies flaring in the neighboring colonial states and the Cold War getting colder in Europe, Pibul's regime at least offered some hope of stability."[41]

The Trade-Offs: The Role of Phibunsongkhram's Thailand in the Asian Strategy of the United States

When Marshal Phibunsongkhram became prime minister in April 1948, the international situation seemed very bleak from the American perspective. In February, the communist takeover had taken place in Czechoslovakia and the country became a firm part of the Eastern bloc. In Italy, there was a danger of communist victory in the elections, though it did not materialize in the end. In Asia, the outlook was even gloomier. In China, the Kuomintang was losing battle after battle and Mao's forces now controlled large sections of the country. In Vietnam, the French started negotiations with the former emperor Bao Dai to lead a "sovereign" state as a part of the newly established French Union, while at the same time the insurgent forces were growing stronger in all of Indochina.

In Bangkok, Phibun was closely watching these developments. He knew that despite his current success in eliminating the opposition and rising to the office of prime minister, his position was not unassailable. Without the support of the United States, not only moral, but also military and economic, he would find it difficult to withstand a possible challenge from the Democrat Party or even from within the ranks of the armed forces (the plot by army officers in October 1948 and especially the so-called "Manhattan Rebellion" of June 1951 attested to the lingering resentment of Phibun's return as well as to the deep divisions between the various branches of the armed forces – the army, navy and air force – and within the army itself).[42] Pridi's supporters were also still active, as became evident in February

[41] Vimol Bhongbhibhat, Bruce Reynolds and Sukhon Polpatpicharn, eds., *The Eagle and the Elephant* (Bangkok: United Production, 1982), 90.

[42] The "Manhattan Rebellion" was an attempt by the navy, which was dissatisfied with the prevalence of army and air force, to remove Phibun and his supporters and to install its own government. Like all the other coup attempts it was foiled and brutally suppressed. For accounts of the coup, see Thak Chaloemtiarana, ed., *Thai Politics, 1932–1957* (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1978), 594–673.

1949, when an attempted coup by the *Seri Thai* loyalists took place.[43] The easiest, and in fact the only way to secure American support, was to continue playing the role of the staunch anti-communist. For Phibun, anti-communism became not only a matter of personal choice or conviction, but in fact of political survival. He thus made sure that he reminded American audience of his resolute opposition to communism whenever the opportunity presented itself, as in May 1950, when he told The New York Times: "Our people cannot accept a Communist regime or foreign domination willingly. […] Under existing circumstances, the only threat to us could come from the Communists."[44]

It remains to be ascertained to what degree the United States realized that Phibun's anti-communism was at least partially a pragmatic way of ensuring that he would stay in power. It is likely that this fact was well-known to the officials of the Truman and later the Eisenhower Administration, but from their point of view, the concern for the political situation and democracy in Thailand was now secondary to that of stopping communism from spreading on the Asian mainland. In October 1950, the State Department summed up the situation as follows: "The principal US objectives in Thailand are: to strengthen ties of friendship and trust between Thailand and the US; to include Thailand, as a supporter of US policies, wherever possible in the various organizations of the UN; and to help Thailand establish itself against Communist forces in the Far East by encouraging it in *every feasible way* to achieve (1) *internal political stability*, (2) *a strong and solvent economy*, and (3) a situation wherein the average Thai citizen might have the maximum benefit possible for *modern technological advances*."[45] There were no more references to democracy, to liberalization, to western-style government. The security issues have clearly overridden all other concerns regarding Thailand's political development – which was a near-ideal situation for Phibun.

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[43] For details of the so-called "Palace Rebellion" coup, see Samut Surakhaka, *26 kanpattiwat thai lae ratthaprahan 2089–2507* [26 Thai Revolutions and Coups, 1546–1964] (Bangkok: Sue Kangphim, n.d.), 445–69. Pridi himself came back to Thailand to lead his supporters, but had to flee again after the coup was suppressed.

[44] The Marshal also proposed he would seek "military alliances with the United States, Great Britain and France." Other than flaunting his anti-communism, the main reason for this interview was to remind the United States of the promises of military and financial assistance, which it had made previously and which had not yet arrived. See C. L. Sulzberger, "Thailand to Seek Western Pacts in Move to Forestall the Communists," *The New York Times*, May 6, 1950. The timing of the publication of this interview, less than two months before the start of the conflict in Korea, later gave the Marshal's words even more weight.

[45] United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950.* Volume IV. East Asia and the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 1529. Italics added.

The mutual cooperation between the two countries began to increase in 1949. In accordance with one of the objectives stated above, Thailand became a member of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in May 1949. Not only was Thailand as an American ally gaining more reputation and a stronger position on the international scene, but the membership in these particular organizations also opened the way for massive loans which could be used to upgrade the country's infrastructure. In February 1950, a special fact-finding mission of Ambassador-at-Large Phillip C. Jessup arrived to Bangkok and, as a result of this visit, the United States approved a grant of USD 10,000,000 in military aid alone, with even more funds coming through the Economic Cooperation Administration.[46] In July and August 1950, three agreements were signed between the United States and Thailand – The Educational and Cultural Exchange Agreement, The Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement and The Military Assistance Agreement. The amount of aid from the United States then began to grow steadily. The military grants provided to Phibun's regime between 1950 and 1957 amounted to approximately USD 200,000,000; the technical cooperation aid reached USD 27,000,000 between 1952 and 1955 alone.[47] The provision of aid was again justified by referring to the overall American objectives – the gaining of Thailand's trust, building a strong and viable economy, and thus making the country resistant to the dangers of communist subversion. President Truman, when presenting the aid proposal for approval to the Congress, remarked in 1952: "The basic objective of the United States in Thailand is to support a *friendly government* which has *unreservedly committed itself* to the cause of the free world in maintaining *stability* in this country situated not far from China's Red Army, and bordering on unsettled areas of Indo-China and Burma. It is one of the world's greatest rice producers and exporters, *on whose supply many countries of the free world depend*, and it is also a source of a number of *critical* materials."[48]

Two crucial events had made Thailand even more important in the American foreign policy strategy in the region. The first came in June 1950 when the conflict in Korea started. Phibunsongkhram's Thailand decided to send Thai troops to fight in the war (the offer was made on July 21), and thus became one of only two Asian nations to be directly involved.[49] Although the impact of the deployment

[46] Darling, *Thailand and the United States,* 69–70.
[47] Chaloemtiarana, *Thailand*, 58 (f. 60).
[48] Bhongbhibhat, Reynolds and Polpatpicharn, eds., *The Eagle and the Elephant,* 96. Italics added.
[49] This, of course, does not include the two Korean belligerents. The other Asian state was Philippines, another staunch ally of the United States. China ROC also offered troops, but these were not deployed in Korea.

of Thai army on the battlefield was limited due to the relatively small size of the contingent dispatched,[50] the decision carried a strong symbolic significance. For the United States, it was a proof of what President Truman later called "unreserved commitment." The Department of State commented on Phibun's decision in the following manner: "It has been traditionally Thai procedure to balance political forces which beset Thailand in order to remain independent. If one force became strongly dominant, Thailand in the past has opportunistically made terms with that force in order to survive. […] Thailand's government, however, made a departure from its traditional policy of balancing political forces. […] A […] decisive move was made by Thailand on July 21, 1950, when it became the second nation (China was the first) [China ROC is meant here] to offer ground troops to the United Nations in support of UN forces in Korea. Thailand has thus irrevocably severed its ties with Communist countries and committed itself positively to the cause of free nations."[51] It is rather paradoxical that Phibun, who was almost an epitome of political opportunism, was credited here with leaving the traditional opportunistic line of Thai foreign policy.

Proclamations such as the one quoted above must of course be viewed in the context of the period in which they were made and in the light of the overall American priority, which was the fight against communism. Phibun's government was among many other right-wing dictatorships that the United States had cooperated with at this particular time and pragmatism and opportunism were present on both sides. The authors of the memorandum, however, also made the following remark: "The Thai government is apprehensive of mounting Communist threat in the Far East and has generally cooperated with efforts of the western powers to block Communist expansion. The *degree to which these efforts are successful* in checking the Soviet imperialism will be a *determining factor* in shaping the pattern of Thai foreign relations,"[52] which seemed to contradict their previous statements about the resoluteness of the Thai stance.

The second very important moment for Thai-American relations was the establishment of SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization). SEATO was founded during a conference in Manila in September 1954. The organization was to be

[50] Thailand sent infantry (a total of approximately 6500 Thai soldiers served in Korea), five frigates and additional transport vessels and airplanes. See Gordon L. Rottman, *Korean War Order of Battle. United States, United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval and Air Forces, 1950–1953* (Westport: Prager Publishers, 2002), 120–21.

[51] USDS, *FRUS 1950*, 1529–1530. The other "proofs" of the Thai commitment to the "free nations" was the Thai decision to recognize the non-communist governments in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, and conversely, not to recognize the People's Republic of China.

[52] USDS, *FRUS 1950*, 1538. Italics added.

modeled after the example of NATO, but the fact that many of the Asian nations rejected the offer of membership made its practical value rather limited from the outset.[53] The preamble of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty stated the goals of SEATO rather vaguely, as could be expected on such an occasion: "The Parties to this Treaty […] uphold principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose people desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities; […] to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area; […] to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and […] to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security."[54] Both the United States and Thailand were strong and resolute defenders and proponents of the project, but their motivations were rather different.

For the United States, SEATO was primarily a means to support and bolster the non-communist governments in former French Indochina. After the Geneva conference of 1954, a cease-fire was signed in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Vietnam was provisionally divided into two states, with the south under Bao Dai and later Ngo Dinh Diem remaining free of communist control. The governments of Cambodia and Laos were also not communist, though strong communist presence persisted in both countries. The Eisenhower Administration, guided by the principles of the "domino theory," wished to prevent the communist forces from winning in either of these countries. On the other hand, the president wished to avoid direct American intervention, and thus SEATO was created as a suitable collective security organ through which communism could be contained[55] – with American help, but not unilaterally. The American focus was of course on the

[53] Members of SEATO were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom and the United States, with South Korea and South Vietnam as associated members. India, Indonesia as well as Burma had refused to join. See Warren I. Cohen, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*. Volume IV. America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945–1991 (Cambridge, London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 96.

[54] "Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact): September 8, 1954," *The Avalon Project. Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu003.asp (last accessed on August 13, 2010).

[55] This containment-of-communism objective, as was the case of Thailand several years before, had forced the United States to accept and support regimes which were undemocratic and sometimes openly authoritarian (the case of Ngo Dinh Diem fits well into this picture). This was one of the reasons why SEATO was in general not very popular even among those nations which it was intended

countries that were directly threatened by the "communist menace" – from this point of view, Thailand was far more secure than Vietnam or Laos, and thus it was expected that it would play a more active, "protector" role, rather than a passive, "protected one" role.

For Thailand, the number one priority, at least from the foreign policy perspective, was the continuation of American military assistance, but also guarantees for its own security. Phibun had already declared his intention to sign a defense treaty with the United States in 1950. This, however, would be a bilateral defense treaty, not a collective defense treaty. These efforts on part of the Thai government continued. For example, during a meeting at the Department of State in January 1951, the Thai Ambassador to the United States Prince Wan Waithayakon asked the Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk the following question: "if Thailand were attacked, would the United States come to their support while they were fighting the enemy [in this context it was the 'Chinese Communists'] or would Thailand have to do as in the last war [World War II] when overrun by enemy – establish an underground which would cooperate with the United States and work toward their liberation with us. The Ambassador reaffirmed that his government saw eye to eye with the U.S. Government and wanted to know how to lay its own plans in order to meet the potential threat."[56] The United States gave a non-committal answer at that time, but Phibun kept raising the same questions repeatedly and his efforts intensified when the Eisenhower Administration came into office in January 1953. In fact, in the early 1950s, there was not much of a threat of a direct attack on Thailand, with the exception of minor incursions and clashes on the border. Phibun's demands and his use of the "siege mentality" tactics were intended to ensure Thailand and he personally remained indispensable to the policy-makers in Washington. He was given a good opportunity to show how "threatened" Thailand was when in January 1953, a "Thai Autonomous People's Government" was officially established by the Chinese government among the Tai tribal population in Yun-nan province of Southern China.[57] This move could hardly have

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to protect from communism. See Stephen W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II.* Eighteenth edition (Washington, D.C.: C. Q. Press, 2010), 72.

[56] United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1951.* Volume IV. Asia and Pacific (in two parts), Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), 1594.

[57] The Thai people belong to the Tai language group, which also includes the Lao, Shan and others. It is believed that the Tai peoples migrated to Southeast Asia sometime during the sixth and seventh centuries A. D. Some of the Tai remained in China and have been living there up to the modern day. For evolution of the individual Tai language and the ethnic subgroups, see for example Luo Yongxian, "The Subgroup Structure of the Tai Languages: A Historical Comparative Study," *Journal of Chinese Linguistics,* Monograph Series, No. 12 (1997).

threatened Thailand's security and was mostly intended as a propaganda gesture by Beijing, but Phibun and some of the hardliners in the U.S. Department of State presented it as a preparation on the part of China to start guerrilla warfare against Thailand.[58] While the Geneva Conference was in full swing, Thailand made yet another series of dramatic appeals to the United States for more help. Pote Sarasin, the Thai Ambassador to the United States, informed Secretary of State Dulles that "the Communists were pressing forward in Indochina while some of the Western allies argued whether they should do nothing until the outcome of the Geneva conference on Far Eastern affairs was known. […] Unfortunately, the Communists are not waiting."[59]

Subsequently, also in the light of the need to further upgrade Thailand's military capacity for potential use within the SEATO, the Eisenhower Administration significantly increased the military aid to Thailand and pledged to continue the investments in vital infrastructure projects, such as highways, railroads or modern airports.[60] Once more, the appropriation of this aid was defended by pointing to the menace of communism hanging over Thailand and by the need to support the Phibun government which was seen as an anti-communist bastion in the area: "It was *inevitable* that a *deteriorating* situation in Indochina should speed up the plans for the strengthening of Thailand. […] The government in Thailand has been and is strongly anti-Communist. But militarily Thailand is not yet strong enough to be a bridgehead that can be held against a southward and westward Communist advance. The need for our help, therefore, is *plain*. Fortunately, we are dealing with a people and a *Government* to which it can be given with *confidence.*"[61] Despite the apparent subjectivity of this and other claims, which served as justification for yet another increase in help to Thailand, similar arguments were commonplace during this time period. The communist threat to Thailand was in general presented as so grave that it would have been enough to justify almost any increase in spending, especially in military and defense aid. But even at this time, there were some in the United States who doubted that aid in such large amounts was necessary or that it was wisely and effectively spent.

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[58] Edwin F. Stanton, "Spotlight on Thailand," *Foreign Affairs* 33, no. 1 (October 1954): 78–79. Stanton, who was still serving at this time as the American Ambassador to Thailand, was writing the article after the Geneva accords were signed. He argued that "The Communist triumph in Geneva – for I think we should frankly face the unpalatable fact that it was indeed a major triumph for the Communists – turns the spotlight on the rest of Southeast Asia and in particular upon Thailand […] the heart and citadel of the region." Ibid., 72.

[59] Walter H. Waggoner, "Thailand Bids U.S. Send More Arms," *The New York Times*, June 6, 1954.

[60] Darling, *Thailand and the United States,* 102.

[61] "Strengthening Thailand," *The New York Times*, July 16, 1954. Italics added.

In 1950, for example, a study conducted in the Thai countryside discovered general discontent with the slow pace of change and the general lack of attention the Phibun government paid to farmers. Since Thai farmers were seen as those who, along with the Chinese minority and radically-minded students, could be perhaps the most susceptible to communist propaganda, the suggestion to spend more aid to improve their lives seemed to be logical. The study contended that "The rural Thai, who represent the future as well as the present, have started upon a new and irreversible way, having been stirred particularly during the past decade by the varied and often intangible influences of modernization. Yet, they have not been reached by international, national, or any other agencies with an effective program of economic or political development."[62] Despite these findings, confirmed by additional studies and surveys, most of the finances provided to Thailand were spent boosting the military and police force, and even those spent on development projects only seldom reached the farmers who in the 1950s still comprised the largest segment of Thai society.

It was also criticized that the U.S. aid was in fact helping to tighten the Thai military's grip on the country, and, as was bound to happen, that much of the aid was in fact being misappropriated by various government and military officials.[63] As early as in August 1952, John H. Ohly, an assistant director at the Office of the Director of Mutual Security, who was in charge of administering the U.S. military assistance to Thailand, wrote that he had "considerable doubts concerning (a) the precise objectives of, (b) the wisdom of maintaining and particularly, (c) the wisdom of maintaining at such high levels, the military assistance program for Thailand. Recent reports to the effect that arms were being delivered from Thailand to the Karens [an ethnic group in Burma] in exchange for wolfram and that certain Thai military authorities were in touch with Chinese Communists in Hong Kong, together with the recurrent participation over the past two years of several Thai services in military coups in support of different fractions, have strengthened these doubts at least to the point of believing that we should make a thorough reassessment of the purpose of this program and the desirability and, if so, at what level, of continuing this program in FY 1953 and FY 1954."[64] Ohly's arguments, however,

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[62] Lauriston Sharp, "Peasants and Politics in Thailand," *Far Eastern Survey* 19, No. 15 (September 13, 1950): 161.

[63] Wyatt, *Thailand,* 262.

[64] United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952–1954.* Volume XII. East Asia and Pacific (in two parts). Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), 649.

were judged by the State Department to be based on "unconfirmed reports"[65] and rejected.

The arguments listed above questioned the distribution and actual use of American aid but not necessarily its continuation and the general justification for it. Some of the critics went further, however, and questioned the very claim that Thailand was threatened by communism, especially by internal communist subversion. Writing in 1950, at the same time when Phibunsongkhram claimed that communism was the "only danger" for his country, American scholars Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff concluded that the Thai society was inherently resistant to communist ideology, that the Communist Party of Thailand was an absolutely powerless organization and that the number of communist sympathizers – Thai, Chinese and Indochinese – who actually lived in Thailand, numbered in the hundreds rather than in the thousands or even the tens of thousands.[66] Four years later, in 1954, after the already mentioned expansion of aid to Thailand, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, commenting on the possible developments in the country, concluded: "Thailand is relatively stable politically, with power closely held by top military and police leaders. Although inefficiency and corruption limit Government's effectiveness, the Communist movement is weak and no undercurrents of serious unrest or dissatisfaction are apparent in the population."[67]

These arguments were categorically rejected by both Marshal Phibunsongkhram and the hardliners in the American foreign policy establishment. Phibun was still using the tactic of justifying his crackdown on any anti-government opposition with claims of alleged communist plots to overthrow his government. For example, in November 1951, during the so-called "Radio Coup" or "Silent Coup," which led to the dissolution of the parliament and the suspension of the constitution, the population was informed by radio that communists were infiltrating the parliament and the government (!) and that this problem could not be solved unless the constitution was suspended.[68] To further emphasize the recurrent need to be on guard and to suppress the communist element within the coun-

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[65] Ibid., 650.

[66] Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Left Wing in Southeast Asia* (New York: William Slone Associates, 1950), 50–59.

[67] The authors of the survey saw as the greatest danger a possible communist attack from abroad. They warned, however, that "even with large increase in foreign and technical assistance, Thailand will not be able to develop security forces adequate to discourage a major Communist invasion or to delay more than briefly such an invasion if launched." This definitely cast even more doubt as to the effectiveness of spending even more funds on building up the Thai security forces. USDS, *FRUS 1952–1954,* 741–42.

[68] Pla Thong, *Phak kanmuang thai* [Thai Political Parties] (Bangkok: Kaona Press, 1965), 190.

try, a new Anti-Communist Activities Act was passed in 1952.[69] The New York Times, reporting on the passing of the bill by the parliament, quoted Police Chief Phao Sryianond, who argued that the bill was necessary because "plotters had planned to seize control of the country at the end of this year [1952] after forcing the King to abdicate or killing him in case of refusal […] Russia and Communist China were involved in the plot, which […] had been hatched recently in Peiping [Beijing] when the delegates of Southeast Asian countries had decided at a conference that the time was ripe for a coup here."[70] The American Ambassador in Thailand Edwin F. Stanton, while informing his superiors about yet another arrest of 145 people in November 1952, among them journalists and students, remarked that it was a "blow" for the "real left-wing" and "pro-Commie" elements and praised Phibun for ordering these arrests, which "may be first important instance of genuine strong anti-Commie program after four years of hollow promises."[71]

The preceding pages, while being only a brief sketch of the Thai-American relations between the years 1948 and 1957, make it possible to identify some of the basic principles and important aspects of this mutual relationship. From the American perspective, Thailand's stability and its continued anti-communist foreign policy orientation were an important part of the overall policy in Southeast Asia and the Far East. To achieve and bolster this stability and continuity, Washington was prepared to provide the undemocratic, militaristic government of Marshal Phibunsongkhram with significant military assistance, as well as technological and economic aid. The foundations for providing this assistance were already laid during the Truman Administration and were later reaffirmed and enhanced after Dwight D. Eisenhower became president in 1953. It seems to be clear that at least some American officials were aware of the fact that the communist threat to Thailand was not as grave as its leader would make the United States believe, especially when the actual strength of communist movement and its adherents within the country was concerned. On the other hand, it was important for the United States to keep Thailand as a loyal, committed ally in the region (for practical but also for propaganda purposes), and the prospect of the discontinuation or even any major cuts to the aid provided was seen as adverse to that purpose. For the same reason, the United States in general refrained from sharp criticism of the domestic affairs of Thailand, even though it was clear, especially after the coup of 1951, that the last

[69] For the full text of the act, see Chaloemtiarana, ed., *Thai Politics, 1932–1957,* 819–21.
[70] "Stiff Anti-Red Bill Adopted in Thailand," *The New York Times*, November 14, 1952.
[71] USDS, *FRUS 1952–1954,* 655–56.

vestiges of democracy were slowly dismantled and that the military was tightening its grip on power.

For Marshal Phibunsongkhram, the support of the United States was one of the few possible ways to stay in power, since his position, even after the defeat of Pridi, was relatively weak. His professed anti-communism, while also stemming from his conservatism, was thus largely motivated by personal political ambitions. In the same manner, it could be said that contrary to the American assessment that the Thai foreign policy was no longer as opportunistic as it often was in the past, Phibun's tilt to the United States and to the "free world" was again an opportunistic move, designed to ensure the survival of Thailand and of the Marshal personally. It could be argued that he now saw the United States as a "strongly dominant force" and thus found it wise to "make terms with that force."[72] This view was not necessarily shared by some of the other top ranking politicians and military officials in Bangkok, and soon accusations of a too one-sided foreign policy began to pile up against Phibun, especially after 1954.[73] It has to be noted, however, that even after the Marshal was removed by another coup in 1957, nothing much had changed in Thai-U.S. relations, which is a proof that the foundations of this relationship that were laid in the preceding period were strong and that even the new regime of Sarit Thanarat found some common ground with Washington. It must also be noted that Phibun was quite successful in his dealings with the United States and, while falling short of securing a bilateral security pact, he ushered in a new era of the mutual relations between the two countries and in general raised these relations to a much higher level.

The Image: Marshal Phibunsongkhram – A "Democracy-Loving" Dictator?

Marshal Phibunsongkhram was definitely supported by Washington for reasons other than his "love" for democracy and western-style government. His often ruthless, dictatorial approach to governance was, as had been mentioned several times before, justified by the need to consolidate the country and to purge it of

[72] See quotations on the previous pages (f. 51).

[73] Bhongbhibhat, Reynolds and Polpatpicharn, eds., *The Eagle and the Elephant*, 103. The 1954 Geneva conference brought hopes, albeit brief, of a possible peaceful settlement with the communists in the Far East and especially Southeast Asia. China's stance on some of the divisive issues (for example Vietnam) also seemed to be more reasonable for some time, but that was mostly caused by China's own interests rather than by a genuine desire to seek peaceful accommodation with the United States.

subversive communist elements. On the other hand, Phibun was aware that at least certain democratic elements should be preserved and that he should present himself as a man who has respect for democracy and for the rights and liberties of his fellow citizens. The rationale behind his actions was twofold. On the one hand, he did not want to completely alienate Thai people, who had gotten used to some measure of democracy during the previous years, even if they had not fully grasped all the principles of democratic government. On the other hand, professing respect, if not love, for democracy could have made his position and his image better in the United States, where he was still seen as an old-school type of dictator. Phibun realized that Thailand, especially during the early post-war period, was viewed in the United States as role-model for other Asian countries, as a nascent democracy, the land of progress, and a home of freedom-loving people. By maintaining at least an outward *façade* of democratic government, he could not only improve his own image, but he could make it easier for the United States to defend its support for his government.

Phibun set out to build his new image almost immediately after he became prime minister in April 1948. In one of his first public statements regarding his new government, he claimed that "the Siamese people can remove him from office whenever they want to do so" and that he was now a "constitutional monarchist."[74] Although a crackdown on some elements of the opposition was instituted, the parliament continued to function, a new constitution was promulgated, and elections continued to be held. The "tolerated" opposition, however, was often coerced into supporting the government's policy and its options to confront the military and police were severely limited. In an additional move to control the situation, the *Sahaphak* (United Front) was created, which incorporated the parties supporting the government. These parties were then granted a certain number of positions in the government. The result was that the actual distribution of ministerial positions very seldom reflected the election results. For example, in the elections of June 1949, the results were as follows: the Democrat Party (still led by Khuang Aphaiwong) gained 40 MPs, the Prachachon Party 31 MPs, the Issara Party 14 MPs, Phibun's Tharmathipat Party 12 MPs, and the Independents took 24 seats. In the government, however, Democrats received only two posts while the Tharmathipat occupied 5.[75] Phibun was often unable to control individual parties within the *Sahaphak* and their MPs; he also had to deal with growing tension between

[74] He also used the opportunity to again reassure everyone of his own anti-communism. The government was to be "neither of the left nor of the right" but the Marshal said he personally was "anti-Communist." See "Siam Premier to Follow People's Will," *The Washington Post*, April 12, 1948.

[75] Chaloemtiarana, *Thailand,* 46.

the army and the police. To an outside observer, the politics of this time period must have appeared convoluted, void of ideas and ideology (except perhaps for anti-communism) and marred by power struggles and personal feuds. It was most likely the frustration with this situation, which led the Coup Group to execute the already mentioned "Radio Coup" of November 1951. After this coup, the Constitution of 1932 replaced the Constitution of 1949, meaning that political parties were banned and candidates ran for the elections on an individual basis. As a result, by 1952, when the next elections were held, the military junta (still loosely organized in the Coup Group) secured control of both houses of the parliament.[76] The elections were then followed by the promulgation of yet another, even less democratic constitution. Phibun thus managed to gradually dismantle all that was left of the experiment with the liberal government from the post-war years and only the most rudimentary elements of democracy remained, often void of actual content.

By this time, Phibun was confident that criticism from the United States regarding his undemocratic policies would only be muted, if any at all. He was not far from the truth. The reaction to the coup of November 1951 from the American perspective dealt almost solely with the expected stability/instability of the new government and with possible impacts on its foreign policy. American *chargé d'affairs* in Bangkok Turner cabled to the Department of State on November 30: "Govt announced Coup purely internal and foreign policy will remain unchanged. Probably true inasmuch mil leaders desire foreign recognition and continuance US aid. First impression new Govt under Coup party less stable than previous, however, necessary not to underestimate Phibun's polit acumen."[77] The New York Times offered a more critical assessment of the situation, but not nearly as critical as it could have been: "Thailand is now under virtual military rule. The liberal 1948 Constitution has been replaced by the 1932 Constitution, which […] facilitates the curtailment of the press and political freedoms and authoritarian control. […] The coup group has pledged a more vigorous policy against internal communism, but some observers fear that the new regime may breed rather than check communism by squelching genuine democratic opposition and running a corrupt and oppressive government. […] But the life of the Thai masses goes on without much disturbance, and baring inter-service strife [between the police and the army]

[76] The members of the Democrat Party boycotted the elections after calling them undemocratic. In the end, supporters of Phibun's government gained 85 seats, Independents 9 seats and those who declared themselves to be in opposition to the government 29 seats. Many of the "opposition" MPs later defected to the government fraction. Darling, *Thailand,* 118.

[77] USDS, *FRUS 1951*, 1640.

Thailand's new Government may turn out to be no worse than its predecessors. Indeed, some Thais see the possibility of a stronger and more effective administration."[78] There was no hint at a possible discontinuation or at least limitation of the American assistance to Thailand – the dismantling of the liberal state and the *de facto* destruction of democracy were taken as a given fact, disappointing perhaps, but a one that has to be accepted and counted with. Similarly, after an amended version of the 1932 Constitution was readopted in March 1952, The Washington Post reported in a matter-of-fact fashion that the new constitution was "backed by the military junta" and that "it is considerably less liberal than the constitution thrown out after the coup d'etat of last November 20."[79]

The position of Marshal Phibunsongkhram was actually somehow weakened by the coup of November 1951 and by the subsequent militarization of the government. He was no longer in control of the more aggressive members of the Coup Group and was unable to resolve completely the lingering disputes between the police and the army chiefs. It was likely that he was not even an ardent supporter of the coup itself, although that does not make him less complicit in setting up of the undemocratic government that followed in 1952. From the perspective of Thai-American relations, one of the most important results of these developments was that Phibun was even more dependent now on the United States and on its support. As The New York Times correctly pointed out, "the coup group needs Marshal Pibul's *international and domestic prestige* and his *practiced ability* at balancing off political elements and mediating political squabbles."[80] It was especially the first part, the matter of international and domestic prestige and image, which was important for Phibun's political survival. Even though he was never a democrat, he was still more acceptable to the United States and more presentable on the international scene than people like Police General Phao Sryianond, who lacked the necessary charisma and experience. Ironically, much like Khuang Aphaiwong provided the democratic *façade* for Phibunsongkhram in 1947 and 1948, the Marshal found himself in a similar position now – serving as a prime minister of a government that was in fact more and more under the control of the hardliners within the armed forces and police.

It is interesting to note that even after the coup of 1951, Phibun still tried to appear, both to the domestic audience and to the United States, as a supporter of democracy and of a western-type government. The *de facto* military take-over

[78] "Rule of Thailand in Military Hands," *The New York Times*, December 11, 1951.
[79] AP, "New Thailand Constitution Signed by King," *The Washington Post*, March 9, 1952.
[80] "Rule of Thailand in Military Hands," *The New York Times*, December 11, 1951. Italics added.

was presented as only a temporary measure, dictated by external circumstances beyond Phibun's control. American Ambassador Edwin F. Stanton later recalled that when talking to the prime minister in the spring of 1952 about the undemocratic changes that took place, the Marshal argued that "the country was not yet ready for full democratic government and that some of the *elected* members of the Lower House had been obstructive. [Phibun and his friends] professed to be supporters of democracy but asserted that dangers surrounding the country called for strong leadership."[81] The argument that the Thai people were simply not prepared to live under democracy was given quite often as yet another explanation of the military coup, in addition to the need to counter the communist threat. For example, in April 1952, when responding to the criticism of his new military-controlled government, Phibun "asked for patience regarding Thailand's democracy. He said the process of establishing democracy had taken generations in other countries, even Britain."[82]

While these assurances and promises appeared rather hollow in view of the actual steps taken by Phibun and the Coup Group, they gave the United States some additional pretext for its continuous support of Phibun. It was no longer his anti-communism alone which made him indispensable – by 1952, virtually all members of the cabinet and a majority of the important figures of Thai political life could call themselves conservative and anti-communist. Phibun's allusions to democracy, questionable as they were, gave him an edge, an "added value" compared to, for example, his future successor, Marshal Sarit Thanarat. Sarit publicly proclaimed that western democracy was not the right type of government for Thailand and instead advocated a return to the traditional *pho-luk* (father-children) leadership model of the Sukhothai period.[83]

Phibun was thus keen to bolster his image of a "lover of democracy" in the eyes of the American government and public. He often emphasized the need for the Thai people and for himself personally to learn about the western democracy first hand and then to apply what had been learned in Thailand. Thus, when his visit to the United States was being prepared in the spring of 1955, the Thai Ambassador in Washington Pote Sarasin informed the U.S. Department of State that the chief reasons for the visit were "that he [Phibun] felt necessary to become familiar at first hand with the governments in Asia and Europe with whom he had aligned himself in the United Nations against the Communist aggression. […] the

[81] Stanton, *Brief Authority,* 270.
[82] Tillman Durdin, "Thailand's Regime Shows Its Defects," *The New York Times*, April 6, 1952.
[83] Chaloemtiarana, *Thailand,* 94.

Prime Minister would like to come directly to Washington in early April [1955] for a few days visit and then spend several weeks travelling informally to the principal points of interest in the United States."[84]

The Marshal's visit to the United States in May 1955, followed by a visit of several European capitals, was arguably one of the greatest foreign-policy achievements of his post-war career. He was received personally by President Eisenhower, who had conferred the Legion of Merit on him for his resolute opposition to the communist danger.[85] Phibun spoke in both the House and the Senate, where he assured the legislators that "my country will always be on your side. […] Thailand had sent soldiers to Korea to fight side by side with the United States and the United Nations against aggression."[86] He repeatedly emphasized that Thailand belonged to the "free nations" and "free world" and stated that "the spirit of freedom is strong among Thai people. […] We are clear in our minds as to what kind of life we want, just as you are clear in your mind that the American way of life is what you cherish. Let there be no mistake about our intention to belong to the free democratic nations."[87] Phibun's entire American tour thus served as a way to promote himself as well as the achievements of Thailand under his rule. The Eisenhower Administration, feeling sort of indebted to Phibun, decided to play along and thus, to an uninformed observer, the Marshal, as portrayed by certain articles in the American press and public declarations of some U.S. government officials, would have appeared as a truly outstanding, democratic leader.

The trip, although seemingly successful, marked, rather ironically, the beginning of Phibun's downfall. Following his return to Thailand, the prime minister had instituted some minor reforms to make his regime appear more democratic. These "reforms" included regular press conferences, somewhat relaxed censorship of the media and the setting up of a Thai "Hyde Park" (a section of Sanam Luang, an open space in central Bangkok, was designated for this purpose), where criticism of the government could be publicly voiced.[88] A Political Party Act was passed, which again permitted the creation and operation of political

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[84] United States, Department of State, *The Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957.* Volume XXII. Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 807. The Department of State was not initially favorably inclined to this visit, officially because of a very busy schedule of President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon. In the light of the Ambassador's arguments, however, the officials of the department promised to "do everything possible to arrange to receive the Prime Minister". Ibid., 808.

[85] Bhongbhibhat, Reynolds and Polpatpicharn, eds., *The Eagle and the Elephant*, 103.

[86] "House and Senate Hear Thai Premier," *The New York Times*, May 5, 1955.

[87] "War Inevitable, the Chief Says," *The New York Times*, May 11, 1955.

[88] Chaloemtiarana, *Thailand*, 71.

parties.[89] It soon became clear, however, that many of these steps were taken primarily with a view to discredit political opponents – for example, in "Hyde Park" Phibun permitted and even encouraged criticism of Phao Sryianond, who was increasingly difficult to control. When such results failed to materialize, these measures were abandoned.[90] Quite contrary to Phibun's expectations, these "democratic" reforms did not gain him more popularity but instead enabled, albeit for a short time, his critics to attack his government. Especially vocal were those who were returning from abroad. A Fulbright exchange student complained in 1955 that "I came back from America full of ideas and enthusiasm to help my country. But every day I see that nothing is being done here except by personal influence and favoritism. Every bit of policy is controlled by the people put into their jobs by political friends, regardless of their ability. They are always making promises but never fulfill them."[91] Anti-American feelings also began to surface, with Phibun being accused of tilting too far toward the United States.

The fall of Phibun finally came in August 1957. Several events preceded his removal – a scandal surrounding the sale of timber in Tak province, the inability of the government to help the victims of a drought in Thailand's Northeast – but the most serious of these was the elections of February 1957. Desperate to add to the legitimacy of his government and bolster his position, Phibun allowed the elections to be held, claiming that "[i]n the past I came into power through coup d'etat. From now on I shall not seek power through a coup. I shall seek election."[92] As with the other "democratization" attempts, this experiment backfired. The government party, Seri Manangkhasila, easily won the elections by taking 83 seats, while the main opposition Democrat Party, led by the indomitable Khuang Aphaiwong, only gained 29; the remaining seats were divided between six other parties and independent candidates.[93] Intimidation of voters by police was omnipresent before the elections and the results were so obviously rigged that they created a massive outrage. The government initially denied the claims of "cheating,"[94] but

[89] For the full text of the bill, see Chaloemtiarana, ed., *Thai Politics*, 880–84.
[90] Thong, *Phak kanmuang thai*, 223–29.
[91] James Macgregor, "The Tragedy of Thailand," *The Progressive* (November 1954), 13. Quoted in Darling, *Thailand,* 129.
[92] Bernard Kalb, "Thai Rule Facing an Elections Test," *The New York Times*, February 25, 1957.
[93] Albert Pickerell and Daniel E. Moore, "Elections in Thailand (II)," *Far Eastern Survey* 26, no. 7 (July 1957): 106. A total of 160 seats were for up for grabs in the elections. Slightly different results (85 seats for Seri Manangkhasila, 28 for the Democrats) are listed in Chaloemtiarana, *Thailand,* 72.
[94] This allegation was first made by Khuang Aphaiwong immediately after the election results were announced. Bernard Kalb, "Premier Leading in Bangkok Vote," *The New York Times*, February 27, 1957.

in the face of growing protests, joined by pro-democracy activists and students, Phibun finally resorted to declaring martial law on March 3 (lasting until March 14), with the army commander-in-chief Sarit Thanarat given the responsibility for maintaining order. The American Embassy in Bangkok observed with increasing concern the instability of the Phibun government, remarking in a dispatch dated April 22 that Thailand was engulfed in the "most serious political crisis since November 1951."[95] Anxiety was apparent in Washington regarding the possible outcomes of this situation and its impact on the Thailand's anti-communist foreign-policy orientation. From this point of view, however, the final resolution was satisfactory for the United States. On September 16, 1957, the army, led by Sarit Thanarat, staged another coup, removed Phibun from power and sent him into exile in Japan. The new Thai leadership, while instituting a rather different political style, remained friendly to the United States and was equally committed to fight communism. The remarkable political career of Marshal Phibunsongkhram, which spanned over three decades, thus finally ended.

Conclusion

This article's main objective was to identify some of the main trends and defining moments of the relations between the United States and Thailand in the period of 1948–1957. For this reason, it was necessary to show what the main American priorities were during this era and how they gradually changed. The initial U.S. support for liberal government in Thailand was eventually set aside as fear of the infiltration and expansion of communism began to occupy an ever more prominent position in the American foreign policy strategy. This in turn enabled Marshal Phibunsongkhram, a war-time dictator and collaborator with the Japanese, not only to come back to power but to become a "friend" and "ally" of the United States, his former enemy. The underlying motivation on both sides was primarily pragmatism. Phibun was expected to maintain stability in Thailand and to side with the United States in its fight against communism. The United States, on the other hand, was expected to prop up Phibun's government by the means of massive military assistance and economic aid and to help him maintain his position. As the preceding pages have shown, in general both sides kept their part of the bargain, though arguably it was Phibun who benefited more from the deal. On the other hand, the limits of American "friendship" became apparent when Phibun's influence began to wane and his regime's cherished stability began to

[95] USDS, *FRUS 1955–1957*, 913.

erode. The American approach to the 1957 political crisis was purely pragmatic and as soon as the continuation of Thailand's foreign policy orientation was affirmed, Phibun was largely forgotten – a very fitting conclusion to a relationship that was based on pragmatism, and virtually only on pragmatism, from the very outset.

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STUDIA TERRITORIALIA 3

WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR, LOSING THE WAR ON DRUGS? U.S. POLICIES IN COLOMBIA DURING GEORGE W. BUSH'S PRESIDENCY

BARBORA ČAPINSKÁ

Abstract
The article describes the basic elements of U.S. policy in Colombia during George W. Bush's presidency. It points out several issues for which the U.S. government has been continuously criticized, but focuses on two main aspects of the policy: the two-pronged war against illegal armed groups and the aerial eradication of illicit crops. I argue that although broader U.S. objectives such as strengthening of Colombian democracy have been fulfilled, the aerial eradication has not only proven ineffective in the long run, but is inherently flawed and continues to cause massive ecological destruction.
Keywords: United States, Colombia, war on drugs, war on terror, illegal armed groups, aerial eradication

Introduction

The tragic events of September 11, 2001, greatly affected United States foreign policy towards Latin America in general and Colombia in particular. On the one hand, the U.S. interference in Colombia's domestic affairs, substantial already during Clinton's presidency,[1] intensified during Bush's tenure because the global war on terrorism became a new reason to exercise even more control over the Andean region. In addition to illegal drugs, terrorism became a reason to increase U.S. military presence there. On the other hand, however, the Bush administration's commitment to the global war on terror and its involvement in wars in

[1] See, for example, the interventionist policies of the U.S. in Colombia during the Ernesto Samper's presidency (1994–1998), in Russell Crandall, "Explicit Narcotization: U.S. Policy toward Colombia during the Samper Administration," *Latin American Politics and Society* 43, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 95–120, http://www.jstor.org (accessed February 21, 2013).

Afghanistan and Iraq diverted a great deal of U.S. resources as well as attention away from the war on drugs. Thus in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. sought to extend its control over Colombia, while at the same time desired to reduce its financial obligations there.

Apart from continuing counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, ending the country's protracted internal conflict became a priority for George Walker Bush's administration (2001–2009) as part of the global war on terror.[2] To this end, in 2001 the two major Colombian leftist illegal armed groups – the FARC (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo*, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army), and the ELN (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*, or National Liberation Army) – were re-certified as foreign terrorist organizations and the same category was newly given to the right-wing group AUC (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*, or United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia).[3] Additionally, an interesting shift occurred in the U.S. State Department's terminology. While during the Cold War era left-wing illegal armed groups were referred to only as *communist insurgents* or *communist guerrillas*, during Clinton's tenure these designations were replaced by a term *narco-guerrillas*. Finally, in the wake of the terrorist attacks in 2001 they were again renamed *narco-terrorists*. This term accurately reflected the groups' reliance on drug money as their principal source of revenue,[4] as well as the change in their tactics: they had increasingly engaged in sabotage, extortions, attacks on civilians in public places, and kidnappings. At the same time, their struggle became less ideological. This shift was accompanied by a major change in U.S. policy: during Bush's presidency the U.S. Congress allowed the Colombian government for the first time to use U.S. military equipment in counterinsurgency operations, whereas previously this had been designated solely for counterdrug efforts. The war on drugs thus merged with the war against "terrorist" insurgents.

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[2] Isaac Isacson, "Extending the War on Terrorism to Colombia: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, February 6, 2002, http://www.fpif.org/articles/extending_the_war_on_terrorism_to_colombia_a_bad_idea_whose_time_has_come (accessed September 28, 2010).

[3] FARC and ELN were designated as foreign terrorist organizations for the first time in 1997. See Connie Veillette, *Plan Colombia: A Progress Report* (Congressional Research Service, June 22, 2005), 3, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32774.pdf (accessed November 9, 2007).

[4] The FARC began to raise funds from coca production in 1993. Although the most recent estimates of the Colombian government state that FARC earns annually about 2.4 to 2.5 billion U.S. dollars from the drug trade, these numbers differ greatly from the estimates provided by the Colombian Attorney General's Office of 1.1 billion U.S. dollars and also from 2003 estimates of United Nations Development Program of 204 million U.S. dollars. See Elyssa Pachico, "70% of FARC Assets Held Outside Colombia," *InSight Crime*, September 18, 2012, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/70-of-farc-assets-held-outside-colombia (accessed February 14, 2013).

Both the U.S. and the Colombian government agreed that a defeat of the narco-terrorists was an indispensable prerequisite to stabilizing the country, stimulating economic growth, improving human rights situation, and eventually to solving the drug issue. These goals were also endorsed by Alvaro Uribe Vélez (Colombian president from 2002–2010), who already during his presidential campaign declared the re-establishment of security and state presence in the entire country as his foremost objective. Hence both governments converged in putting emphasis on counterinsurgency operations, but also on policies aiming at strengthening the rule of law and democracy, and support for existing Colombian institutions. The core of the counterdrug policies remained aerial chemical eradication, which gained momentum at the beginning of the new century.

The main aim of this article is to describe the basic framework of U.S. assistance to the Colombian government, to enumerate main elements of it, and point out several issues for which the U.S. government has been continuously criticized, such as overemphasizing the military aspect of its policies or the ineffectiveness of forced eradication. Since the overall U.S. strategy in Colombia is too complex to be covered in detail, this article focuses on two main aspects of it: firstly, it contrasts massive offensives against leftist insurgents with controversial demobilization of the right-wing paramilitaries; and secondly, it examines closely the aerial eradication of illicit crops.

While the priority of this article is for the reader to comprehend complex U.S. policies in Colombia, my main argument is that although broader U.S. security objectives and support for Colombian democracy have been fulfilled, the aerial eradication of illicit crops has not only proven ineffective in the long run, but is inherently flawed and continues to cause massive ecological destruction and for these reasons should be radically changed.

Although counterterrorist policies have ensured an improvement in day-to-day security in the urban areas for the majority of Colombians (about 75% of the Colombian population is urban) and the position of illegal arms groups was weakened, these successes came at a high price. Since Clinton's presidency, reports of human rights abuses committed by the Colombian security forces multiplied.[5] In the last decade, however, the U.S. government has been ignoring or denying such allegations and kept providing practically unconditional financial and military assistance to army units suspected of attacks on civilians. Consequently, this

[5] Amnesty International, Colombia: Stop the Massacres. Stop the military Aid, Press Release, AI Index: 23/110/2001 (Public), News Service No. 181 (October 2001), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR23/110/2001/en/244d296c-fb1e-11dd-ac08-b50adaf01716/amr231102001en.pdf (accessed September 30, 2010).

attitude has tarnished the image of the United States as a promoter of human rights.

Regrettably, due to the limited scope of this paper, I cannot elaborate on the issues related to human rights abuses. The impunity of military forces involved in extrajudicial killings of civilians and the lot of internally displaced persons or indigenous communities are topics which merit more attention and consideration than just one paragraph and therefore I have chosen to omit these issues from the more detailed analysis that follows. Nonetheless, they deserve further research attention that will together with this paper produce a more comprehensive picture of the complexities of U.S. counternarcotics policies in Colombia and their related controversies.

An Overview of U.S. Policies in Colombia

Although U.S. military assistance dates back to the early 1950s and the first counterdrug programs in Colombia originated already in the beginning of 1970s,[6] it took until September 1999 for the Colombian government to present a comprehensive policy plan. Plan Colombia (precisely Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and Strengthening of the State) consisted of five interrelated elements: support for a peace process, the strengthening of the national economy, a counterdrug strategy, justice system reform and protection of human rights, and greater democratization and social development. The Plan was envisaged as a global strategy to attack the socio-economic roots of the drug industry and the conflict, but regional security concerns were more important than the drug trade itself. The Colombian government, however, did not receive funding from the EU, because the latter objected to the excessive militarization, and so the final circle of donors and the scope of the Plan had to be limited. The bulk of U.S. assistance was thus allotted mainly to the Colombian army for the procurement of military hardware, law enforcement and interdiction efforts, as well as crop eradication.[7] The original Plan was followed in

[6] More about U.S. military programs in Colombia see Barbora Capinska, "United States Counterdrug Policies and Colombia" (Master thesis, Jagiellonian University in Cracow, 2008), 7–17; For early counternarcotics assistance see Ibid., 28–38.

[7] Although meager in comparison to military assistance, development programs received much more funding than they had in previous years. While from 1996 to 2000 USAID provided Colombia with only 18.6 million U.S. dollars, 228 million U.S. dollars were allotted for social, economic, development, judicial, and law enforcement components of Plan Colombia. In U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. Plan Colombia, Fact Sheet, July 19, 2000; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Social, Economic, and Development Support of Plan Colombia, Fact Sheet, February 20, 2001.

2005 by a new ambitious project called Plan Colombia II; in January 2007, a new six-year follow-upon Plan Colombia Consolidation Phase was announced by the government of Colombia.[8]

In the spring of 2001, President Bush presented a new framework for regular provision of assistance for Plan Colombia called the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI, since 2004 called Andean Counterdrug Initiative, ACI, since 2008 called Andean Counterdrug Program, ACP).[9] The ARI took a very broad regional approach to tackle drug-related problems, support democratic institutions and foster economic development not only in Colombia, but also in its six neighbors Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela where the drug problem (and partly the internal conflict) had spilled over the years.[10] This time, however, 45% of the total funding, or 399 out of 882.29 million U.S. dollars, was earmarked for Colombia, with only half of the total (442.5 million dollars) being assigned for law enforcement and security, which was a progress in comparison to the assistance provided by the Clinton administration to support Plan Colombia. But although the ARI claimed to be novel in its regional approach, it very much resembled George H. W. Bush's Andean Initiative, announced back in 1989. Overall, neither the policy nor the strategy changed much. The program still lacked a more specific implementation plan, and alternative development projects remained underfinanced.

The total grant aid provided during the presidency of G. W. Bush was 5,375 million U.S. dollars, of which about 80 percent was military and police aid (see Table 1).[11]

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[8] In fact, all of these plans relate to the same policy, they only change the designation.

[9] Sources for programs related to counternarcotics operations in Colombia are numerous and the funding is very complex and not entirely transparent. These foreign assistance accounts are Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP), Development Assistance (DA), Economic Support Fund (ESF), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR). Additionally, Department of Defense receives annually extra funds and uses also Section 1207 Assistance program. For detailed information see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Counternarcotics Assistance. U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results, GAO-12-824, July 2012, 41, http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592241.pdf (accessed March 3, 2013).

[10] The target Andean countries are currently only Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.

[11] It is difficult to comprehend the complexities of federal "drug war" budget due to various sources of funding and a very large number of agencies involved in the "drug war." It is stressed by the fact that different reports provide different data due to different methodology which are partially due to the discrepancies between requested budgets and obtained. Since GAO and CRS reports seem to be the most reliable, the author inclines to use primarily these sources, as is convenient. For detailed information about the numerous agencies and departments involved see Liana Sun Wyler, *International*

Table 1: Total counternarcotics aid to Colombia, FY 2001–2008 (in millions USD)

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
276.2	560.4	808.1	797.5	769.1	741.1	722.6	700	5,375

Adapted from: June S. Beittel, *Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional Interest* (Congressional Research Service, November 28, 2012), 38, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32250.pdf (accessed March 3, 2013).

For most of the decade, since the adoption of Plan Colombia, the so-called 80-to-20 percent formula (about 80% of the funding for military purposes, and about 20% for economic and social issues) prevailed. However, between 2004 and 2006 the U.S. South Command and the Colombian Ministry of Defense began developing a new civil-military strategy, which seemed to address some of the previous weaknesses, such as too much emphasis on militarization and forced eradication, or insufficient development programs.[12] This process became apparent already in the 2008 and 2009 U.S. counternarcotics budgets, in which assistance for security forces and eradication programs was reduced, while resources for non-military programs were increased. Whereas previous ratio was 76% to 24% for military and non-military aid respectively, the new allocation was 55 to 45.[13] At the same time, the Colombian government proposed a scheme called Integrated Action, which focused on stabilizing the areas previously under the control of the guerrillas and consolidating the central government's presence there.[14] However, the military element was still prevalent in this strategy, even though it included agricultural, transportation, educational, environmental, and other policies. This strategy began to be implemented in the spring of 2009 and thus coincided with the end of George W. Bush's presidency.[15]

Although grant aid to Colombian security forces always represented the bulk of the total aid, the distribution of this assistance between the Colombian National Police (CNP) and the Colombian Army (COLAR) changed a few times in the past

Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses (Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34543.pdf (accessed March 3, 2013).

12 Adam Isacson and Abigail Poe, *After Plan Colombia. Evaluating "Integrated Action", the next phase of U.S. assistance* (International Policy Report – Center for International Policy, December 2009), 5, http://justf.org/files/pubs/091203_col.pdf (accessed September 15, 2010).

13 Washington Office on Latin America, Congress to Take Up New Drug Policy Commission: Time to Re-Examine Decades-Old Drug Control Policies, October 2009, http://wola.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=viewp&id=1004&Itemid=8 (accessed August 19, 2010).

14 Isacson and Poe, *After Plan Colombia*, 6.

15 Ibid., 6–8.

with the shifts in the policies' emphasis. During the 1980s most of the U.S. aid was channeled to the Colombian police, but in the 1990s that body became so corrupt that with the approval of Plan Colombia, most of the aid was earmarked for the Colombian army. However, U.S. decision-makers soon realized that the COLAR was needed primarily to combat the guerrillas and thus assigned counternarcotics tasks again to the CNP and its special Directorate of Antinarcotics (DIRAN, established back in 1987).

Apart from the counternarcotics tasks, the DIRAN supports a special judicial branch established in 2006, responsible for gathering evidence for asset forfeiture,[16] and also has an aviation unit (ARAVI) which comprises of 18 fixed-wing and 58 rotary-wing aircraft.[17] The CNP's main interdiction force, though, are the so-called *Junglas* (DIRAN's Jungle Commandos), three 500-man elite airmobile units specializing in the destruction of clandestine laboratories and the capture of High-Value Targets (leaders of guerrillas, narcotraffickers, etc.).[18] They were trained by U.S. Army Special Forces and are "among the finest Special Forces units in Colombia, if not Latin America."[19] The funding for the CNP is primarily used for the maintenance of its aviation fleet, purchases of herbicide, but also for spare parts or ammunition.[20] The CNP received about 2.5 times less in funding than the Colombian army during the Bush presidency.[21]

Following the increase in violence accompanying the legislative and presidential elections in Colombia in early 2002, during which even Bogotá came under heavy mortar fire, in July 2002 the U.S. Congress authorized the use of counternarcotics assistance to include fighting the insurgents, expanding the operations previously labeled only "counterdrug." Thus in late 2002 the COLAR's Counternarcotics Brigade, created back in September 1999, was re-organized and officially

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[16] U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2009, 201, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/120054.pdf (accessed September 5, 2010).

[17] Ibid., 206.

[18] U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2010, 202, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137411.pdf (accessed September 5, 2010).

[19] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Plan Colombia. Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance, GAO-09-71, October 6, 2008, 44, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0971.pdf (accessed September 21, 2010).

[20] U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget. Program and Budget Guide, 65–66, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/121735.pdf (accessed September 4, 2010).

[21] For comparison of funding for COLAR and CNP see U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Plan Colombia*, October 6, 2008, 28.

given authority to operate in the entire Colombian territory and to participate in counterterrorist operations. Above all, the Brigade provides ground security for the aircraft in the spray zones, but it also conducts operations to destroy clandestine laboratories, and seize cocaine or precursor chemicals. In early May 2003, one of the Brigade's battalions was already operating in the Nariño department, where most of the coca was cultivated. All three existing battalions received new training in order to transform into a rapid action force and were provided with additional helicopters (UH-1N and UH-60 Blackhawks) to increase their mobility; they were also restructured into three combat units and one support unit.[22]

For both the CNP's and the COLAR's aviation units (consisting of aircraft both for transportation and eradication purposes) private contractors were indispensable, although the U.S. insisted on the nationalization of the counternarcotics programs since the adoption of Plan Colombia. In order to pressure the Colombian government to gradually take over responsibility for all programs supported and managed by the U.S. agencies and thus reduce Colombia's dependence on U.S. assistance, funding for aviation programs was decreased. The main problem has been the dearth of Colombian pilots and mechanics, so these positions had to be filled by private contractors. Although it was envisaged that all programs would be nationalized by 2012, the number of contractors in Colombia was still high at the end of George W. Bush's presidency.[23]

The use of private contractors intensified after the adoption of Plan Colombia, because in July 2000 the U.S. Congress limited the number of U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilian contractors to 500 and 300, respectively.[24] In October 2004, these were increased to 800 military personnel and 600 civilian contractors,[25] but it was still necessary to employ private contractors. By 2000, there were around 160 to 180 U.S. private contractors; in 2002, three private companies had contracts with the State Department and seventeen with the Department of

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[22] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Financial and Management Challenges Continue to Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia, GAO-03-820T, June 3, 2003, 6, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03820t.pdf (accessed February 28, 2008); U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2004, IV–21, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol1/html/index.htm (accessed November 15, 2007).

[23] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Plan Colombia, 16, 62, and 64.

[24] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Civilian Contractors and U.S. Military Personnel Supporting Plan Colombia, May 15, 2001, http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/3509.htm (accessed November 15, 2007).

[25] The Library of Congress, *A Country Study: Colombia*, February 2007, 28, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Colombia.pdf (accessed October 28, 2008).

Defense.[26] The most important among them were DynCorp Aerospace Technologies (operational in Colombia already since the early 1990s), which had been providing pilots and mechanics for the spraying aircraft; Lockheed-Martin, Northrop Grumman and Eagle Aviation Services and Technology (EAST); and *AirScan* (operating in Colombia since 1997), whose airplanes guarded the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline and searched for guerrillas in the jungle areas.[27] Although exact data are not available, while in 2002 private contractors got about 150 million (about 37%) out of the total 400 million dollars of U.S. military assistance,[28] in 2006 the State Department reported that almost half, or more than 300 million U.S. dollars of its overall spending in Colombia, went to private companies.[29]

The State Department claims that U.S. contractors take part in search-and-rescue missions or in spray operations never as gunners, but only as pilots or medics.[30] It is, however, doubtful that these U.S. citizens would not take part directly in risky operations and occasional clashes with guerrillas or other armed groups. Indeed, their uncertain military status is alarming because it makes them unaccountable to the U.S. public or the Colombian government.[31] On the other hand, since they often participate in clandestine operations, when they are captured by the guerrillas it is easier for the U.S. government to deny all responsibility.[32]

A high priority for both governments was establishing police presence in the entire country, because in the past various self-defense groups and guerrillas

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[26] Washington Office on Latin America, "Protecting the Pipeline: The U.S. Military Mission Expands," *Colombia Monitor* 2, no. 1 (May 2003): 12, http://www.wola.org/media/Colombia%20monitor_may03_oil.pdf (accessed October 22, 2007).

[27] Juan O. Tamayo, "Colombia: Private Firms Take on U.S. Military Role in Drug War," *Miami Herald*, May 22, 2001, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11094 (accessed September 4, 2010). AirScan was brought to Colombia by the Occidental Petroleum to provide air surveillance of the company's complex and a part of the pipeline. However, this contractor was directly involved in the bombing of Santo Domingo in which eleven adults and seven children died and 25 other civilians were injured by an unfortunate mistake. However, the Occidental Petroleum as well as the AirScan denied all responsibility. See Douglas W. Cassel, Jr., "A Corporate Cover-up?," *Chicago Daily Law Bulletin*, January 9, 2003, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/communicate/newspages/article_full.cfm?eventid=547 (accessed September 5, 2010); and Christian T. Miller, "A Colombian Village Caught in a Cross-Fire," *Los Angeles Times*, March 17, 2002, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0317-01.htm (accessed September 5, 2010).

[28] Toby Muse, "U.S. contractors get half of aid to Colombia," *Associated Press*, June 15, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-06-15-colombia_N.htm (accessed September 3, 2010).

[29] Center for International Policy, U.S. Contractors in Colombia, November 2001, http://ciponline.org/colombia/contractors.htm (accessed September 7, 2008).

[30] U.S. Department of State, Civilian Contractors, May 15, 2001.

[31] Washington Office on Latin America, Protecting the Pipeline, 12.

[32] Juan Forero, "Colombia: Private U.S. Operatives on Risky Missions," *New York Times*, February 14, 2004, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=7830 (accessed September 4, 2010).

provided security in rural areas. In February 2004 for the first time in Colombia's history all municipalities had an official police presence.[33] This could be achieved by a successful *Carabineros* program – these 120 to 150-man Mobile Rural Police Squadrons maintain police presence in remote areas and provide security for manual eradicators.[34] Manual eradication, necessary in areas where chemical spraying is prohibited (such as border areas or national parks), became an obligatory task for municipal police units in 2006.[35]

During the Bush's presidency interdiction efforts in Colombia were enhanced by the re-introduction of the Aerial Bridge Denial (ABD) program in August 2003. Originally it was initiated in the 1990s in Colombia and Peru and was relatively successful in the latter until in April 2001 a civilian aircraft was shot down and two U.S. citizens killed (a missionary and her little daughter).[36] However, new safeguards and control measures were implemented and the program resumed the detection of illegal aircraft involved in smuggling. The U.S. supported financially the ABD fleet consisting of five Cessna Citation 560 aircraft and two C-26 aircraft, but also provided training for Colombian crews.[37] Thanks to this program, in 2003, four airplanes were destroyed and three seized;[38] in 2004 it was thirteen and three respectively,[39] and in 2005 two aircraft were destroyed and five captured.[40] It has also been quite successful in deterring the drug traffickers from using certain air routes: the number of illegal flights over Colombia decreased by

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[33] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Drug Control: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Is Beginning to Show Intended Results, but Programs Are Not Readily Sustainable, GAO-04-726, July 2, 2004, 20, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04726.pdf (accessed February 28, 2008). As many as 169 municipalities had no police presence prior to 2002. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Plan Colombia, 45.

[34] By 2010, 20 out of 71 squadrons were assigned to this task. See U.S. Department of State, 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: 202.

[35] U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2008 Budget. Program and Budget Guide, 59, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/93449.pdf (accessed September 4, 2010).

[36] This incident triggered a heated debate because pilots from U.S. private contractor Aviation Development Corp. accidentally helped track down the missionary's plane. See Tamayo, "Colombia: Private Firms."

[37] U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, 62.

[38] U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2004, 97, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/29957.pdf (accessed November 15, 2007).

[39] U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2005 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2005, 131, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/42867.pdf (accessed November 15, 2007).

[40] U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2006,107, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/62379.pdf (accessed November 15, 2007).

more than 70 percent, from 637 in 2003 to 171 in 2007.[41] Consequently, though, the use of Colombia's complex river system, long Pacific and Atlantic coasts and numerous ports increased and about 40 percent of the cocaine leaves Colombia this way instead by the air.[42] The ABD program was fully nationalized by the end of December 2009.[43]

Apart from military support for Colombian security forces, an important element of U.S. policies in Colombia was the support for the rule of law and reform of civilian judiciary, especially its transition towards an oral accusatory system similar to the U.S. one. This area likewise saw some significant progress: on January 1, 2008, the Colombian government finally completed its judicial reform (started in 2005) which shortened the trial time from years to months and thus increased the system's efficiency: the number of cases solved increased from three to over 60 percent.[44] The project also provided training to thousands of prosecutors, judges, public defenders, private lawyers, and police investigators.[45] The USAID-supported Justice Houses program was also successful: altogether more than 40 houses were built in order to provide access to legal services, handle about three million cases, and train judges.[46] The U.S. government also emphasized the improvement of the rule of law in general and initiated a Culture of Lawfulness program that promotes respect and appreciation for the rule of law among the youth of Colombia.[47] President Uribe has been cooperating with the U.S. in the matter of extradition: between 2002 and 2010, 975 individuals were extradited, among them notorious Cali cartel leaders Miguel and Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela.[48]

Although the ARI was originally designed as a regional initiative, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela benefited to a small extent, because only the Colombian government, a traditional U.S. ally, accepted such a close cooperation due to the urgent and serious situation prevailing in the country. In consequence, many minor successes are often thwarted by the lack of such a concentrated effort in the neighboring countries – a phenomenon referred to as the spill-over effect. What is more, due to the lack of international funding, Plan Colombia and its ambitious

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41 U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, 63.
42 U.S. Department of State, 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 204.
43 Ibid., 206.
44 Ibid., 200.
45 U.S. Department of State, 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 207.
46 Veillette, *Plan Colombia*, 12.
47 U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, 64.
48 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. I (March 2010): 206, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137411.pdf (accessed September 5, 2010).

comprehensive projects to tackle all aspects of Colombian internal conflict and drug production were curtailed as well and the emphasis was shifted to military solutions. While this approach is understandable given the fact that the war in Colombia represents a serious regional security problem, it must be remembered that the choice of the elements of Plan Colombia for implementation is a political one. Certainly, socio-economic development projects are difficult to realize amidst protracted violent conflict, but they are essential for the transition to legal economy, the re-integration of demobilized fighters, and the consolidation of the state's presence in the entire country beyond police offices, army roadblocks and checkpoints. What is more, the continuous U.S. support for the Colombian army – which since the presidency of Uribe and G. W. Bush has not only been fighting the insurgents, but also raiding laboratories, eradicating illicit crops and carrying out other counterdrug operations – is dangerous and antidemocratic, because the army is to a great extent politically and financially independent, making it less accountable to the civilian government.[49] Nonetheless, due to the fact that the Colombian conflict is a part of global war on terror this policy has remained almost unchanged under G. W. Bush's successor, Barack Obama (president since 2009, re-elected in 2012).

"The War on Terror" – a War with a Double Standard

The primary goal of president Uribe was to defeat the leftist armed groups and re-establish security in all parts of the country, especially in the "reconquered" territories, where for many years the insurgents supplanted the state. The main reason for this was the worsening security situation, which resembled that of the late 1980s: the murder rate hit an astonishing 34,000 per year, the highest in the world. The annual rate of 3,000 to 3,600 of kidnappings in Colombia accounted for 60% of the total number of kidnappings in the world.[50]

Reversing the efforts of previous Colombian presidents, including his immediate predecessor, of working to achieve a negotiated peace settlement with the guerrillas, Alvaro Uribe denied their legitimacy and refused to negotiate – unless the insurgents promised to give up terrorist practices and complied with a ceasefire.

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[49] For the involvement of the army see George Withers, Lucila Santos and Adam Isacson, *Preach What You Practice: The Separation of Military and Police Roles in the Americas* (Washington Office on Latin America, November 2010), http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Regional%20Security/2010/preachwhatyoupractice.pdf (accessed March 5, 2013).

[50] Speech by Alvaro Uribe upon His Inauguration as President of Colombia, August 7, 2002, http://library.cqpress.com/cqpac/hsdc02-151-7252-395043 (accessed April 6, 2006).

His solution was a massive military offensive, backed by the U.S. with military equipment, training and intelligence. The first operations were launched in June 2003 in the department of Cundinamarca (of which Bogotá is the capital) with the *Mission Libertad 1*. In December 2003 it was followed by *Operation Año Nuevo* in the department of Caquetá, later extended to the southern departments of Guaviare, Meta, and Putumayo, but also Antioquia in the north.[51] At the beginning of 2004, Colombian president presented a new plan for an ambitious offensive in southern Colombia against the still powerful FARC rebels. Under the aegis of *Plan Patriota* around 18,000 Colombian soldiers assisted by U.S. military advisors were deployed in the southern part of the country, a traditional stronghold of the guerrillas. As a part of President Uribe's Democratic Security and Defense policy, the foremost objective of this offensive was to weaken the FARC militarily and economically.

The *Plan Patriota* was considered a great success: the government purportedly reduced the number of FARC fighters to 12,000, took control of 11 villages which FARC had controlled, destroyed 400 guerrilla camps and captured large amounts of weaponry, ammunition, and explosives. However, critics argued that this campaign had a detrimental effect on the local population, which was forcibly displaced during the operations and therefore made even more prone to support the guerrillas.[52] Moreover, this military operation, as many similar efforts in the past, lacked a necessary non-military plan that would "bring the rest of the government" into this conquered territory.[53]

President Uribe's tough and resolute stance towards the guerrillas contrasted with his approach towards Colombia's right-wing paramilitary "self-defense" groups. According to the Santa Fé de Ralito agreement signed July 15, 2003, the AUC agreed to complete total demobilization by December 31, 2005. Although these right-wing "*paras*" were involved in drug trafficking, extortions, kidnappings, and massacres at least as much as the leftist insurgents, they were offered amnesty (thanks to the Justice and Peace Law in effect between July 2005 and October 2007), shorter prison terms, and not in a single case were members of the AUC prosecuted for human rights abuses.[54] Reportedly as many as 31,000 demobilized,

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[51] Catalina Martinez Tovar and Michael Lettieri, Plan Patriota: What 700 Million Dollars in U.S. Cash Will and Will Not Buy You in Colombia, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, April 20, 2006, http://www.coha.org/2006/04/20/plan-patriota-what-700-million-in-us-cash-will-and-will-not-buy-you-in-colombia/ (accessed November 9, 2007).

[52] Veillette, *Plan Colombia*, 10.

[53] Isacson and Poe, *After Plan Colombia*, 5.

[54] Amnesty International, "Colombia: Justice and Peace Law will guarantee impunity for human rights abusers," Press Release, AI Index: AMR 23/012/2005 (Public), News Service No. 106, April

although this figure seems disproportionately high compared with previous estimates of the total number of combatants.[55] Interestingly, although the U.S. had designated the paramilitary groups as narco-terrorists and had acknowledged the fact that they had perpetrated some outrageous crimes, the U.S. Congress did not object to the appropriation of special funds to support their dubious demobilization process.[56]

The impunity of the *paras* – who according to some reports are responsible for the majority of atrocities committed in Colombia – was met by much criticism, especially in the light of the revelation about the nexus between the members of high governmental echelons and army officers with the paramilitaries. As a result of this so-called "para-political" scandal which broke out in November 2006, many Colombian congressmen, governors and military officials have been investigated, jailed and even sentenced to prison for collaborating with paramilitaries.[57] The possible collaboration of Uribe's government and the paramilitaries was not proven, but the scandal significantly affected President Uribe's position.[58]

Finally, one additional important counterterrorist measure cannot be omitted: in Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003, the U.S. Congress allocated special funding of 6 and 93 million U.S. dollars respectively for training and equipping a special brigade within the Colombian army to protect the first 110 miles of the Caño Limón-Coveñas 477-mile pipeline in Arauca department in northern Colombia. The U.S. Department of Defense financed a mission of the U.S. Army's 7th Special Forces Group which trained about 7,000 Colombian soldiers. The Department of Defense also furnished ten helicopters, but their late arrival in 2005 seriously delayed the mission.[59]

2005, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR230122005?open&of=ENG-COL (accessed November 14, 2007).

55 June S. Beittel, *Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional Interest* (Congressional Research Service, November 28, 2012), 5, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32250.pdf (accessed March 3, 2013).

56 For the demobilization see Human Rights Watch Report The 'Sixth Division': Military-Paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in Colombia, HRW Index No. 2653, September 2001, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/colombia/6theng.pdf (accessed November 19, 2007); and Human Rights Watch Report Smoke and Mirrors: Colombia's Demobilization of Paramilitary Groups, Vol. 17, No. 3 (B), August 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/colombia0805/colombia0805.pdf (accessed November 19, 2007).

57 U.S. Department of State, 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 202–203.

58 Beittel, *Colombia: Background*, 5.

59 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure Colombia's Caño Limón-Coveñas Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain, GAO-05-971, September 6, 2005, 2, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05971.pdf (accessed March 7, 2008).

The Arauca department has one peculiarity: it is much better linked with Venezuela than with Colombia, which gives the ELN guerrillas traditionally strong in the region a strategic advantage. Before the arrival of FARC and self-defense groups to the region in 2001, the ELN insurgents had operated quite freely, making profit not only by extortions, but also through drug trafficking. The Caño Limón oilfields in Arauca were discovered in 1983 and are Colombia's second largest oil reserve.[60] The pipeline carries about 123,000 barrels (or about 20% of Colombia's oil) daily from the northeast Colombian department of Arauca through six other departments to the port of Coveñas at the Caribbean coast, and it is vital to the regional as well as the national economy.[61] During 2001, 170 attacks shut it down for 200 days and thus reduced production by an average of 70,000 barrels a day, resulting in a loss of 500 million dollars in revenues and royalties that year.[62] What is more, between 1990 and 2003 about 2.9 billion barrels of oil were spilled due to bombings, causing serious environmental damage.[63]

Thanks to the special U.S. funds, the number of attacks was reduced dramatically (from 170 in 2001 to a mere 13 in 2005),[64] and there was only one attack in 2007.[65] However, following the enhancement of security on the first portion of the pipeline, the attacks began to occur outside the protected range in the department of Norte de Santander. The attackers also changed their tactics: instead of bombing the pipeline they sabotaged the electrical grid system supplying the oilfield's wells.[66]

Despite these successes, however, critics point out that their consequence was the extreme militarization of the region. Since October 2002, the inhabitants of Arauca have suffered from unprecedented violence attributed not only to guerrillas and to paramilitaries, but also to the troops of the Colombian Army's 18th Brigade which has been operating there with complete impunity. Overall, the murder

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[60] Eduardo Mackenzie, *Les FARC ou l'échec d'un communisme de combat. Colombie 1925–2005* (Paris: Editions Publibook, 2005), 510.

[61] "Drogues et antidrogue en Colombie," *Les Cahiers de la sécurité* 59, 4th trimester 2005, Paris INHES (Institute National des Hautes Etudes de Sécurité): 174. See also Mackenzie, *Les FARC*, 510.

[62] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Security Assistance, September 6, 2005, 1 and 7.

[63] Washington Office on Latin America, Protecting the Pipeline, 9. The pipeline is approximately three meters underground so previously the insurgents used to put bombs in holes. The oil spills were causing great environmental damage. For example, in November 2001, 7,000 barrels spread over 50-mile area and got into the Arauca River. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Security Assistance, September 6, 2005, 7.

[64] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Security Assistance, September 6, 2005, 15.

[65] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Plan Colombia, October 6, 2008, 35.

[66] Ibid., 7.

rate in Arauca has reached 160 victims per 100,000 in 2003, several times more than the national average.[67]

Overall, Alvaro Uribe's tough security measures (including long-term curfews and restrictions on news media, some on the verge of being unconstitutional),[68] known as the Democratic Security Policy, his decision to enlarge the security forces (almost doubling their size and tripling the defense budget),[69] and the offensives against leftist insurgents helped improve the situation and assure everyday security for the majority of Colombians. It is noteworthy that between 2002 and 2009 murder rates declined by 40% and the number of kidnappings fell by 76%.[70] However, security improved at a significant cost: in the first two years of Uribe's tenure, arbitrary arrests increased and were estimated to be at least 6,000 in that period.[71] An alarming increase in extrajudicial executions was also observed: between 2002 and 2007 at least 955 were perpetrated mostly by the COLAR, and these were only the documented cases.[72] Finally, only in 2009, more than 286,000 people were newly displaced; the majority of the IDPs are Afro-Colombians and indigenous people from remote rural areas who suffered the most from the excessive militarization, yet received almost no assistance, nor reparations, and had no access to basic services.[73] But although the U.S. assistance was conditioned on the human rights record of the recipient unit – the so-called Leahy Amendment adopted already in 1997 prohibits U.S. funding for units whose members were implicated in human rights violations – the U.S. government did not stop the flow of aid to the COLAR; Congress only withheld a portion of it for a short period.

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67 Washington Office on Latin America, Protecting the Pipeline, 4; See a detailed report on the situation in Arauca: Amnesty International, Colombia: Laboratory of war – repression and violence in Arauca, AI Index AMR 23/004/2004, April 2004, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR23/004/2004/en/23614880-d63d-11dd-ab95-a13b602c0642/amr230042004en.pdf (accessed September 24, 2010).

68 Washington Office on Latin America, Colombian Government's Controversial Security Measures, September 2002, http://www.wola.org/news/colombian_government_s_controversial_security_measures (accessed April 13, 2011).

69 Isacson and Poe, *After Plan Colombia*, 4.

70 U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, 62.

71 "Drogues et antidrogue en Colombie," 183.

72 Washington Office on Latin America, U.S. groups, alarmed by increase in extrajudicial executions in Colombia, urge stricter enforcement of U.S. human rights conditions, October 2007, 1, http://www.wola.org/media/Extrajudicial%20Executions%20in%20Colombia%20Oct%202007%20Release.pdf (accessed November 9, 2007).

73 Amnesty International, Colombia – 2010 Annual Report, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/colombia/report-2010 (accessed March 5, 2013). For the internally displaced persons see Human Rights Watch, Colombia: Displaced and Discarded. The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá and Cartagena, Vol. 17, No. 4(B) (October 2005), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/colombia1005web.pdf (accessed March 5, 2013).

Aerial Eradication and Alternative Development Projects – An Unbalanced Strategy

Besides border interdiction, crop eradication is the most important element of the U.S. counterdrug strategy and has been since the 1970s, when defoliation of cannabis was tested for the first time in Mexico. Although chemical aerial eradication was introduced in Colombia in July 1984 against cannabis, due to a lack of environmentally safe herbicides it was approved only in 1992 against opium poppy and in 1994 against coca. Colombia is the only Andean country which has authorized aerial chemical eradication, and this decision should mainly be attributed to the fact that the government lacks effective control over a large portion of its territory. The large-scale manual eradication programs that were successful in Bolivia in 1998 are inapplicable in Colombia. The second reason why the U.S. generally prefers defoliation to the other elements of the counterdrug policies is that it is much easier to detect and destroy the illicit crops before they are processed into a narcotic than to intercept it once it is already on its way to the U.S. Finally, aerial eradication provides an immediate (albeit short-lived) result and hence is the best indicator for cost-benefit analysis: the U.S. agencies evaluate the effectiveness of the aerial eradication – and even of the whole counterdrug program – by the area of illicit crop sprayed.

In order to understand why aerial eradication has received so much criticism we must explore every aspect of it. Firstly, how is aerial eradication carried out? In each eradication mission two aircraft (one to spray, the other to observe) participate, but they are often accompanied by a few heavily armed helicopters. Therefore, eradicating one hectare of coca costs approximately 8,000 dollars.[74] In addition, the Counternarcotics Brigade provides security support on the ground. The fields which are scheduled for fumigation are designated by the government of Colombia in advance, but pilots are permitted to release the spraying mixture only if they confirm visually that the crop is really coca. In order to enhance the effectiveness, the missions are canceled if the weather conditions are unfavorable – they should not be executed "if wind speed at the airport is greater than 10 m.p.h., if relative humidity is below 75 percent, or if temperature is over 32° Celsius to avoid drift that might come from a temperature inversion."[75] Other strict regulations

[74] "Drogues et antidrogue en Colombie," 31.

[75] U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Report on Issues Related to the Aerial Eradication of Illicit Coca in Colombia: Chemicals Used for the Aerial Eradication of Illicit Coca in Colombia and Conditions of Application, September 2002, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rpt/aeicc/13234.htm (accessed November 19, 2007).

also state that spraying wet coca should be avoided: "the goal is to have no rain on the targeted fields from two hours before to four hours after the spraying."[76] Unfortunately, in practice these regulations are often violated: pilots refuse to spray certain zones[77] or they release the herbicide at too high altitudes (the approved altitude is less than 100 feet, or 30.48 meters, which is very low) without having ensured that illicit crops were indeed targeted because they fear possible presence of armed groups, which is mainly the case in southern and south-eastern Colombia.[78] What is more, the pilots fly over too fast (at average speeds of 140 mph to 205 mph, or about 225 to 330 kph)[79] to spray the chosen pieces of land and thus often the neighboring forests or fields of licit crops are affected.

The number of sprayed hectares is established by a simple formula of "flow-through" calculation: the amount of herbicide necessary to eradicate one hectare of illicit crop under normal conditions is compared with the total amount used during the daily spraying activity for each type of spray aircraft.[80] Subsequently it translates into multiplying the number of net hectares sprayed by a given "kill rate."[81] The sprayed fields are often verified on the ground, but the insurgent threat makes such a procedure too risky. It is then almost impossible to ensure that the areas claimed to have been fumigated were, in fact, sprayed. These inconsistencies in methodology make it impossible to truly establish the area that has been sprayed – which is, as it has been pointed out, the most important indicator of cost-effectiveness of the whole strategy.

More controversies arise, of course, around the use of the herbicide, its very composition, and its purported adverse effects on humans and the environment. According to the U.S. State Department information, the spraying mixture consists of 55% of water, 44% of commercially available glyphosate formulation, and 1% of surfactants, COSMO FLUX-411F and COSMO-IN-D.[82] Surfactants help dissolve

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[76] Ibid.

[77] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: U.S.-Supported Efforts in Colombia and Bolivia, NSIAD-89-24, (November 1, 1988): 35, http://archive.gao.gov/d17t6/137207.pdf (accessed March 7, 2008).

[78] "Drogues et antidrogue en Colombie," 18.

[79] Betsy Marsh, Going to Extremes. The U.S.-Funded Aerial Eradication Program in Colombia, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, March 2004, 5, http://www.lawg.org/docs/Going2ExtremesFinal.pdf (accessed October 21, 2007).

[80] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control, November 1988, 34.

[81] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: U.S. International Narcotics Control Activities, NSIAD-88-114, March 1, 1988, 10, http://archive.gao.gov/d34t11/135305.pdf (accessed February 28, 2008).

[82] Curiously, in 2000 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report two adjuvants were mentioned, but since the 2001 report the State Department mentions only one, the COSMO FLUX-411f. It may

it in water, but also help it to "stick" to and penetrate the sprayed plants.[83] Although the brand name of the glyphosate was not disclosed by the U.S. government, it has been confirmed by its Colombian counterparts to be Roundup Ultra, manufactured by the U.S. agrochemical company Monsanto.[84] Glyphosate, a non-selective herbicide (it kills any plant it comes into contact with), was approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for general use in 1974, and was re-certified in September 1993 and is being used in more than a hundred countries including the U.S. Although the State Department admits that it is slightly toxic to wild birds and fish – because it takes between one to eight weeks to dissolve in water and soil, it purportedly does not build up in organic tissue.[85] The EPA concluded that if used properly, it has adverse impact neither on the environment nor on humans.[86]

However, this herbicide is being applied in an inaccurate and damaging way. Already in 1988 GAO drew attention to the excessive use of herbicides in marijuana spraying – at that time 3.4 liters were needed to fumigate one hectare of marijuana, but sometimes 27 liters were used on 24 hectares (an average of 1.1 liter per hectare), and then two days later 200 liters were sprayed over a mere 16 hectares equating to 12.5 liters per hectare. It was even reported that once 24 hectares were sprayed by 285 liters of the herbicide (11.9 liters per hectare).[87] However, the herbicide's manufacturer Monsanto recommends the application of only 2.5 liters per hectare with the concentration of 2.5 grams per liter equating to a mere 6.25 grams per hectare. The State Department, on the other hand, refers in its reports to a mixture of 147 grams per liter, and the Colombian National Police admits to using 23.65 liters per hectare with a concentration of 158 grams per liter. This corresponds to a stunning 3.7 kg per hectare, which is about 500 times the

signify that it is not known what the mixture exactly consists of, as some independent organizations signal.

83 "Drogues et antidrogue en Colombie," 29.

84 According to the manufacturer's description the composition of Roundup Ultra is 41% of glyphosate, 14.5% surfactant, and 44.5% water. The exact identity of the surfactant is unknown. See Jim Oldham and Rachel Massey, Health and Environmental Effects of Herbicide Spray Campaigns in Colombia, Institute for Science and Interdisciplinary Studies, March 18, 2002, 2, http://www.laslianas.org/Colombia/SprayingReview_Oldham-Massey.pdf (accessed April 6, 2011).

85 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Aerial Eradication of Illicit Crops: Frequently Asked Questions, March 24, 2003, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/18987.htm (accessed November 19, 2007).

86 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2000 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2001, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2000/ (accessed November 15, 2007).

87 U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control, November 1988, 35.

recommended amount.[88] In March 2002 the Colombian government authorized the reduction of the spraying mixture's strength, but this restriction was lifted already in August of that same year in order to improve the effectiveness of aerial spraying. The application of 2.5 liters per hectare for opium poppy and 10.4 liters per hectare for coca was approved.[89] At this excessive concentration the environmental impact can be disastrous. Let us remember that in Colombia illicit crops have already been sprayed for more than twenty years. The quantities of herbicide which have been poured into the Colombian ecosystem are therefore difficult to estimate.[90]

Interestingly, officially the EPA says "glyphosate-based products […] could cause vomiting, swelling of the lungs, pneumonia, mental confusion and tissue damage" and in the U.S. it is advised to use Roundup with caution.[91] The manufacturer also warns that persons or livestock should not come into contact with it directly nor through drift for it may cause skin, eye, or gastrointestinal irritation.[92] Because the spraying occurs without any prior warning, it is almost impossible to meet these conditions. Since 2001, when complaints began to be recorded, until the end of 2008 the government of Colombia received 8,750 complaints about damage to the licit crops caused by aerial eradication and it has investigated a great majority of them. However, only 117 have been found valid so far, and no case of adverse effects on humans was verified.[93] While local and international non-governmental organizations, as well as some Colombian institutions such as the Human Rights Ombudsman or the Comptroller-General's offices, produce piles of reports documenting cases of herbicides' adverse effect on human health, livestock and legal crops,[94] the U.S. and Colombian governments have dismissed such complaints as implausible and their very source – coca growing farmers – as unreliable and easily manipulated by narcotraffickers or armed groups.[95]

Interestingly, the U.S. government prefers to emphasize that coca cultivation, production and trafficking have resulted in the destruction of – at an absolute

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88 "Drogues et antidrogue en Colombie," 47.

89 U.S. General Accounting Office, "Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia," GAO-03-319R, January 2003, 12, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03319r.pdf (accessed October 5, 2008).

90 Oldham and Massey, Health and Environmental Effects, 9–10.

91 Scott Wilson, "Aerial Attack Killing More Than Coca," *The Washington Post*, January 7, 2001, page A01, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/aerial.htm (accessed September 15, 2010).

92 Oldham and Massey, Health and Environmental Effects, 6–7.

93 U.S. Department of State, 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 204.

94 Oldham and Massey, Health and Environmental Effects, 11.

95 Ibid., 13.

minimum – 2.4 million hectares of the fragile tropical forest in the Andean region over the last 20 years.[96] That is, of course, true: coca growing peasants establish new plots each time deeper and deeper into the jungle.[97] What is more, large quantities of chemical precursors are used in the processing of cocaine and heroin in the jungle laboratories. However, the U.S. State Department makes the further claim that "spraying a single-crop field in a way that does not harm the soil in fact encourages the natural reintroduction of native species and increases diversity," because it allows plants to rejuvenate rapidly.[98] Unfortunately, the studies conducted on this are inconsistent. Some emphasize the fact that glyphosate is a broad-spectrum herbicide that kills a wide range of plants and affects all living organisms and, used inappropriately, its potential environmental damage may be disastrous and irreversible.[99] Others maintain that the risks to health and environment are negligible when compared to risks associated with the cultivation of illicit crops and drug refining.[100] However, a recurrent argument found in both samples of such studies is that it is the surfactants that determine the toxicity of the formulation and that very often they are more toxic than the glyphosate itself.[101] The biggest problem remains the surfactants added to the final mixture, because the exact formulation is not known and thus their effects are difficult to evaluate.

Apart from the incorrect use of the herbicide, there is one more problematic aspect of aerial eradication. As it is at the core of the counterdrug efforts, the eradicated area is used as the sign of progress in the whole war on drugs. However, just like drug seizures and apprehensions are a questionable evaluation tool in border interdiction or law enforcement, the number of hectares eradicated of illicit crops is even more unreliable. The area under cultivation and other indicators – such as the potential coca leaf production per hectare, per yield or per year; or the amount of coca leaves needed to produce one kilogram of cocaine hydrochloride according to which the amount of cocaine produced annually is estimated – are all *mere* estimates. As the State Department itself admits, "[the

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96 U.S. Congress. Senate, Andean Regional Initiative, testimony of Rand Beers, July 11, 2001, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/jun_aug/4054.htm (accessed November 19, 2007).

97 Oldham and Massey, Health and Environmental Effects, 11.

98 U.S. Department of State, Aerial Eradication of Illicit Crops, March 24, 2003.

99 Oldham and Massey, Health and Environmental Effects.

100 Keith R. Solomon et al., Environmental and Human Health Assessment of the Aerial Spray Program for Coca and Poppy Control in Colombia, A report prepared for the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) section of the Organiza tion of American States (OAS) (Washington, DC, USA, March 31, 2005), 90, http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/glifosatefinalreport.pdf (accessed April 7, 2011).

101 Ibid., 93; Oldham and Massey, Health and Environmental Effects, 7.

figures] represent the midpoint of a band of statistical probability that gets wider as additional variables are introduced and as we move from cultivation to harvest to final refined drug."[102] The White House's Office on National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) decided in 2007 to finally present the data not as point estimates, but as intervals.[103] Hence, for example, the 2006 interval estimate was "subject to a 90 percent confidence interval of between 125,800 and 179,500 hectares [and this] means that it is not possible to infer year-to-year trend information."[104] The gap between these numbers is too big to deduce any trends in either cultivation or cocaine production.

Nonetheless, the State Department likes to present year-to-year fluctuations as evidence of great success, even though they are often due to changes in methodology or realization. For example, the initial short-lived "success" of the aerial eradication in 2001 and 2002 can partially be attributed to an increase in the number of spraying helicopters from 10 in July 2001 to 17 in January 2003 and their ability to carry twice as much of the spraying mixture.[105] The success of the 2001 and 2002 eradication was also due to the fact that the cultivation was concentrated in the Putumayo region and thus it was much easier to conduct the spraying there.[106] On the other hand, the increase in coca cultivation between 2005 and 2007 was attributed to the expansion of the area surveyed.[107] Besides, the data are the accumulated sprayed area figures, which take into account also fields sprayed several times in the same calendar year.

As can be seen in Table 2, the data provided by the State Department and the United Nation's Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in some cases differ substantially, which is especially important for the evaluation of trends in coca cultivation.

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[102] U.S. Department of State, 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 20. For methodology see Ibid., 20–22.

[103] See John M. Walsh, Reality Check, Washington Office on Latin America, June 2007, http://www.wola.org/media/Reality%20Check%20June%202007.pdf (accessed October 22, 2007).

[104] White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 2006 Coca Estimates for Colombia, June 4, 2007, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press07/060407.html (accessed October 31, 2008).

[105] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Financial and Management Challenges Continue to Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia, GAO-03-820T, June 3, 2003, 12, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03820t.pdf (accessed February 28, 2008).

[106] "Drogues et antidrogue en Colombie," 51.

[107] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Plan Colombia, 5.

Table 2: Comparison of estimates on coca cultivated and area eradicated by U.S. State Department and UNODC, 2001–2009

	Area cultivated in hectares		Area eradicated in hectares (chemically and manually)		Year-to-year change in cultivation	
	STATE	UNODC	STATE	UNODC	STATE	UNODC
2001	169,800	145,000	89,200	94,150		
2002	144,500	102,000	127,900	130,360	−15%	−30%
2003	114,000	86,000	133,000	132,810	−21%	−16%
2004	114,000	80,000	147,490	136,550	0%	−7%
2005	144,000	86,000	170,085	138,770*	+26%	+8%
2006	157,000	78,000	213,710	215,100	+9%	−9%
2007	167,000	99,000	219,530	219,940	+6%	+27%
2008	119,000	81,000	229,230	229,600	−29%	−18%
2009		68,000	165,270	165,320		−16%

*Chemically eradicated only.
Compiled by the author from U.S. Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports from 1996 to 2010 and UNODC Coca Cultivation Surveys 2001–2010.

The State Department does boast with one more success: a decline in opium poppy cultivation. During the 1990s, the cultivation of this crop and the production of heroin were continuously on the rise so that by the end of the decade Colombia became a principal supplier of heroin to the U.S. market – Colombian heroin replaced that from Southeast Asia, especially on the U.S. East Coast.[108] Increasing eradication since 2001, with the adoption of Plan Colombia, resulted in a tremendous decrease in poppy cultivation to such an extent that in 2006 it was declared that no more plantation-sized plots of opium poppy existed in the country.[109] Interestingly though, while the potential production of it was estimated at only 1.9 metric tons,[110] in 2010 it was reported that "60 percent of the heroin seized in the United States originates in Colombia,"[111] and these shipments

[108] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Narcotics Threat From Colombia Continues to Grow, NSIAD-99-136, June 22, 1999, 5, http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99136.pdf (accessed October 5, 2008).
[109] U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, 59.
[110] Ibid., 212. This estimate is as of 2007; newer data are not available.
[111] U.S. Department of State, 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 201.

were confiscated primarily east of the Mississippi River.[112] This apparent success is a perfect example of how false methodology may lead to an assumption that the problem has been solved. Firstly, clearly the opium poppy crops are hidden in licit crops or its plots are too small to be detected. Secondly, due to false cultivation data, it is impossible to estimate the potential production.

Indeed, as in the case of opium poppy, one of the major side effects of the intensive spraying of coca in the southern departments of Putumayo[113] and Caquetá (under the operation Push into Southern Colombia during Clinton's presidency) was the diffusion of its cultivation.[114] While in 1999 it was present only in twelve departments, in 2008, 24 out of 32 were affected.[115] In 2008, almost half of the total coca cultivation took place in just three departments: Guaviare, Nariño and Cauca (the latter two are on the southern Pacific coast).[116] Indeed, after the successful eradication in the neighboring departments of Putumayo and Caquetá, Nariño has been the biggest coca producer in the country since 2003: 37% of all cocaine laboratories detected and destroyed in 2009 were in Nariño.[117] The diffusion of cultivation also caused a shrinking of coca fields: the average field size further decreased from 2.05 in 2001 to 0.66 hectares in 2009,[118] with coca bush often ingeniously hidden in the shade or intercropped with licit crops. Colombian farmers have also introduced new coca varieties called Tingo Maria, White Bolivian, and Black Bolivian which have bigger leaves, give more yields, contain more alkaloid, and are becoming resistant to glyphosate.[119]

Intensified eradication also resulted in an increase in illicit cultivation in Colombia's national parks where herbicide treatment is forbidden. There are fifty-five National Natural Parks in Colombia covering about ten million hectares, which represents the fifth greatest system of protected area in the world.[120] Unfor-

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[112] U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, 16.

[113] In 2000, cultivation in Putumayo represented 40% of the total area under coca cultivation in Colombia. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey 2009, June 22, 2010, 27, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Colombia/Colombia-Coca-Survey-2010-ENGLISH-web.pdf (accessed September 22, 2010).

[114] See maps presenting gradual dispersion between 1999 and 2002 in United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey, June 2004, 84–87, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/colombia/colombia_coca_survey_2003.pdf (accessed November 9, 2007).

[115] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey 2009, 10.

[116] Ibid., 14. In 2006–2007, these were Nariño, Putumayo and Meta.

[117] Ibid., 23 and 40.

[118] Ibid., 11.

[119] CNN, "New possible threat in drug war," September 1, 2004, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/threat.htm (accessed September 4, 2010).

[120] Washington Office on Latin America, Chemical Reactions. Fumigation: Spreading Coca and Threatening Colombia's Ecological and Cultural Diversity, February 2008, 2, http://wola.org

tunately, in 2009 at least 18 of them (up from 14 in 2008) were affected with the illicit cultivation, accounting for about 6% of the total area under illicit cultivation in Colombia. Thus, illicit cultivation in national parks has increased by 17%.[121] What is alarming is that in 2006 the government of Colombia authorized for the first time the aerial spraying of 2,090 hectares in the National Natural Park Sierra La Macarena.[122] Furthermore, the coca cultivation has also increased along the borders with Ecuador and Venezuela, where chemical spraying is prohibited within 10 kilometers of the borderline. In 2006–2007, the CNP sprayed more than 15,600 hectares of coca near the border with Ecuador, which resulted in diplomatic skirmishes between the two countries.[123]

For a long time the U.S. government had been insisting that the eradication is unsuccessful only at first sight, because it simply needs time before it shows positive results. Towards the end of George W. Bush's presidency, policymakers both in Washington and Bogotá finally acknowledged that fumigation is an expensive program with poor results. As a consequence, in the 2008 counternarcotics budget aerial eradication received slightly less funding (approximately a 20 million dollars decrease).[124] Chemical and forced manual eradication, however, still remained the most important element of the counternarcotics efforts.

The U.S. government also continued to support research to find a more effective way to destroy the coca bush. In late 2006, Congress authorized that fungal plant diseases called mycoherbicides be tested against illicit drug crops.[125] The U.S. government, Congress and Southern Command had also long been pressuring the government of Colombia to undertake research into a fungus which occurs naturally in coca. This fungus, *Fusarium oxysporum,* was rejected for use both for environmental and political reasons back in 1999. Fusarium is a very dangerous fungus which mutates easily and hence makes it difficult to predict its impact on the fragile Amazon ecosystem. In point of fact it can be considered a biological weapon.[126] The Andean governments have vehemently refused and decisive-

/media/WOLA%20Chemical%20Reactions%20Februaryruary%202008.pdf (accessed September 19, 2010).

121 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2009, 19.

122 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey (June 2007), 74, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/icmp/colombia_2006_en_web.pdf (accessed November 9, 2007).

123 U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, 59.

124 Washington Office on Latin America, Chemical Reactions, 1. See also U.S. Department of State's Fiscal Budget Reports for respective years.

125 Washington Office on Latin America et al., Evaluating Mycoherbicides for Illicit Drug Crop Control: Rigorous Scientific Scrutiny is Crucial, February 2007, 3, http://www.wola.org/media/Mycoherbicide_Research_Plan.pdf (accessed October 22, 2007).

126 For the fungus' characteristics and risks see Ibid., 4–5.

ly prohibited the application of any mycoherbicides, but this eventuality cannot be completely excluded in the future. Some argue that its efficacy is uncertain, because growers can use a fungicide or can breed a coca resistant to the fungus. On the other side, advocates argue that it may be less damaging to the ecosystem than chemical herbicides.[127] The debate about the most efficient weapon against the coca bush only illustrates the principle behind the war on drugs: every means should be considered to prevent coca from growing.

In order to alleviate the negative side-effects that aerial eradication is having on coca growing peasants, alternative development schemes were implemented. Prior to the adoption of Plan Colombia, USAID's engagement in Colombia was virtually none (although some alternative development projects were started in 1985). Between 1996 and 2000 it provided a mere 18.6 million U.S. dollars used primarily for promoting alternative economic development, the administration of justice, and respect for human rights.[128] Although this funding increased substantially with the announcement of the Plan, it did not represent more than 20% of the total U.S. assistance. This ratio changed to 55% to 45% for military and non-military assistance in 2007, but alternative crop programs remained underfinanced. Although a new civil-military strategy named *Integrated Action* was launched in 2009 (with pilot projects started already in 2007), which combined military offensive with non-military projects (land distribution, aid for internally displaced people, voluntary eradication, alternative crops cultivation, provision of basic services), the rural communities tended to view this as just another strategy "designed at a desk in Bogotá."[129] The farmers did not trust a central government that had so often disappointed them.

Most of the coca is cultivated in areas of extreme poverty where living standards are appalling. Approximately 35% of Colombians live in poverty and therefore constitute an almost endless supply of cheap workforce.[130] Indeed, in 2007

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[127] Tim Golden, "Fungus Considered as a Tool to Kill Coca in Colombia," *New York Times*, July 6, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/06/world/fungus-considered-as-a-tool-to-kill-coca-in-colombia.html (accessed September 2, 2010).

[128] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce Results, GAO-01-26, October 17, 2000, 32, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0126.pdf (accessed November 20, 2007).

[129] Isacson and Poe, *After Plan Colombia*, 2.

[130] Data vary according to chosen indicators. According to the CIA World Factbook it is 37.2% (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html, accessed February 21, 2013); according to the World Bank it is 34.1% (http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia, accessed February 21, 2013).

it was estimated that 80,000 households were involved in coca cultivation,[131] all from poor rural areas. Understandably, forced eradication backed by no food or financial assistance further aggravates the already precarious living conditions of Colombian peasants.

Although alternative development projects should in theory literally follow the spraying planes, this has not always been the case. For example, while the department of Putumayo was subject to the most intensive spraying, between 2002 and 2004 it obtained almost 35% of the total alternative development budget which was, of course, instantly mirrored in the coca cultivation reduction from 66,000 to 4,400 hectares. Following this short-term success however, since 2005 it has been reduced to only 0.4% which resulted in an immediate increase in coca cultivation from 4,400 to 12,250 hectares.[132] This was also the case in the departments of Meta, Caquetá, Guaviare, and Vichada which accounted for 40% of the total cultivation but received only about 5% of the total budget.[133]

Another shortcoming was that the projects often concentrated on the areas with strong governmental presence because it facilitated their implementation instead of addressing the most remote areas which had long been neglected. The Afro-Colombian population of the Pacific coast's Nariño department suffered the most. In addition to discrimination, forced displacement, intimidation, violence, and disadvantaged access to governmental schemes, they were struck by fumigations more than other regions: about one-third of the total number of hectares sprayed between 2001 and 2008 was in Nariño.[134] On the other hand, the fact that the incentive to cultivate licit crops was poor is reflected in a 2005/2006 UNODC survey, which found that overall "only 9 percent of the coca farmers reported having received any kind of assistance to stop growing coca plants," – and no farmers did so in Nariño.[135] The adverse effects of chemical eradication and the internal war on the Afro-Colombian communities thus contrast strikingly with the lack of

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131 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region. A Survey of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru (June 2008), 59, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Andean_report_2008.pdf (accessed September 16, 2010).

132 Washington Office on Latin America, U.S. Congress Takes Step in the Right Direction on Colombia, June 6, 2007, 27, http://wola.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=viewp&id=452&Itemid=8 (accessed September 16, 2010).

133 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region, 59.

134 Calculation based on the data from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2009 (June 22, 2010), 77.

135 Washington Office on Latin America, Chemical Reactions, February 2008, footnote, p. 25.

adequate assistance and programs mitigating these damages, which often led to their displacement and further impoverishment.[136]

By and large, aerial eradication has proved rather controversial and counter-productive. Its evaluation is based on flawed methodology, its implementation is problematic, it is too costly but not very effective. It is especially harsh on coca growing peasants, who earn the least of all those involved in the drug trade. What is more, it incites rather than deters growing more coca, because the temporary decline in production drives up coca leaf farm-gate prices, it contributes to the deforestation, and drives peasants deeper into the jungle, into national parks, and into border areas. At the same time, the alternative development programs that accompany eradication are poorly designed, administered, and underfinanced. Overall, the effectiveness of the eradication efforts is more than questionable: the estimated area under coca cultivation remains stable, while cocaine production continues to be robust and cocaine and heroin street prices keep falling.[137]

Conclusion

Ten years and almost six billion dollars after the implementation of Plan Colombia, the traffic in drugs is still booming and there is still plenty of cocaine available in the U.S. Many claim that drug processing and trafficking will not cease as long as the demand for narcotics continues. Yet the traffic in drugs cannot be simply explained by demand and supply. It must be remembered that it is the Colombian government and the elites who failed to implement necessary and long-overdue reforms to modernize their rigid class-ridden social systems, improve tax collection, introduce a universal conscription to the army, or distribute unused arable land, and thus contributed to the impoverishment and polarization of Colombian society. Bad policies, mismanagement, a lack of political will, and most importantly the complicity of individuals who fail to resist the temptation of profit and thus allow the drugs to flow – all of these have contributed to sustaining the production and supply of drugs. Drugs are simply too good a business.

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[136] For the indigenous and Afro-Colombians see Gimena Sanchez-Garzoli, *Stopping irreparable harm: acting on Colombia's Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities protection crisis* (Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre June 2012), http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/04fcd8f818b16e1c31c4306ad74dfb70.pdf (accessed March 5, 2013).

[137] Coletta A. Youngers and John M. Walsh, *Development First. A more humane and promising approach to reducing cultivation of crops for illicit markets* (Washington Office on Latin America, March 2010), 3–4, http://justf.org/files/pubs/1003wola_df.pdf (accessed March 30, 2011).

Although U.S. assistance has been crucial in helping the Colombian government to fight organized crime and subversion, the counterdrug efforts have been a failure so far. It is impossible to speak about partial successes in eradication unless the drug availability on the U.S. market decreases and the trend is sustained, because *this* is the actual goal of the war on drugs. So far, all decreases in street-level drug availability and retail prices were temporary.[138] Still, U.S. government officials emphasize that without such policies the situation would have been even worse. They admit that counternaroctics efforts have above all a symbolic value which "lies in the demonstration of [its] national will to oppose drug smugglers, to defend [the U.S.] borders and to protect the security and well-being of U.S. citizens."[139] But apart from this symbolic value, they also claim to have "a real value [which] is derived from the disruption of trafficking organizations and seizure of drugs, thereby raising their cost of doing business."[140] Instead of raising the costs however, it raises the profit, which in turn makes interdiction losses more inconsequential.

As ardent critics of the counterdrug policy maintain, "both history and theory suggest that the prospects [of the counterdrug strategy] are not bright because the principal flaws are inherent in the strategy itself."[141] Enormous amounts of drugs would have to be seized in order to significantly affect prices on the U.S. market; virtually *all* coca in *all* coca-growing countries would have to be eradicated *at the same time* in order to influence the total potential cocaine production. For instance, due to the balloon effect, the recent decline in production in Colombia has been offset by increases in production in Peru and Bolivia. Furthermore, the failure of the supply-side counternarcotics policies (eradication, interdiction) has been demonstrated by the downward trend in cocaine price on the U.S. market, even though the availability, quality and prices should have been falling due to increased shipments to other markets in West Africa and Europe.[142] Recent

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[138] Ibid., 7.

[139] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Increased Interdiction and Its Contribution to the War on Drugs, T-NSIAD-93-4, February 25, 1993, 4, http://archive.gao.gov/d42t14/148735.pdf (accessed March 3, 2008).

[140] Ibid., 4.

[141] Washington Office on Latin America, In Dubious Battle. Fumigation and the U.S. War on Drugs in Colombia, June 2006, 3, http://www.wola.org/media/Drug%20Policy/In%20Dubious%20Battle%20--%20Fumigation%20in%20Colombia%20--%20WOLA%20June%202006.pdf (accessed October 24, 2007).

[142] Washington Office on Latin America, Latest Comprehensive Analysis Shows Resilience of Cocaine Market, Despite Disruptions, April 14, 2009, http://wola.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=viewp&id=900&Itemid=8 (accessed August 18, 2010); U.S. Government Accountability Office, Drug Control. International Programs Face Significant Challenges Reducing the Supply of

reports actually show that "cocaine's U.S. retail price per pure gram in 2007 was the lowest figure on record – nearly 22 percent lower than in 1999, the year before Plan Colombia was launched."[143] These failures only suggest that the anti-drug war' emphasis on supply-side policies is misguided and wrong.

Above all, however, it must be acknowledged that when clear indicators of success and failure are not established, it is impossible to evaluate any policy, and the program can be perpetuated endlessly due to its deep institutionalization. As it has been mentioned, existing evaluation methods are incorrect and unreliable, yet they are used as rationale for continued existence of a host of agencies. What is more, the fragmented purview and responsibility for overseas and domestic drug-related programs and the lack of evaluation measures make these agencies unaccountable for any failures or mismanagement of their resources. As some commentators rightly observed: "historically, the State Department, more than the DEA, was given blame for failed efforts in other countries, […] but now […] almost nobody takes responsibility. If opium production is booming in Afghanistan, who does Congress blame? Nobody."[144]

One can only wonder why the U.S. government continues to ignore recommendations from many independent think-tanks and nongovernmental organizations and refuses to change a policy – which has proven to be ineffective. Is it because too much money of the U.S. tax payers has been spent over the years and it would be scandalous to admit that it had been in vain? Is it because the U.S. decision-makers truly believe in the righteousness of their strategy? Or is the primary goal of the counterdrug strategy actually not the elimination of drugs? Is it too good a business for all the private contractors who work in Colombia, for Monsanto, the producer of Roundup herbicide, or for the U.S. banks which "launder" millions of narcodollars every year? Given the mediocre results of the intensive chemical and manual eradication and the enormous environmental damage that has been caused by the incorrect use of herbicides it is unacceptable that this strategy continues unaffected.

The new Colombian president, Juan Manuel Santos (since 2010) has greatly benefited from the tough strategies of his predecessors, and could, to some extent, soften his discourse and policies. While emphasizing security and the consolidation of the state's presence in remote areas, in October 2012 he opened

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Illegal Drugs but Support Broad U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives, a statement of Jess T. Ford (July 21, 2010), 5, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10921t.pdf (accessed September 17, 2010).

143 Washington Office on Latin America, Congress to Take Up New Drug Policy.

144 Lee Hudson Teslik, The Forgotten Drug War, Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, April 2006.

negotiations with the leftist guerrillas who had been previously categorized as combatants in an internal conflict. President Santos also focused on long overdue reforms such as land reform or compensation for victims of the internal conflict, introduced anti-corruption measures, and reforms aimed at improving the justice system.[145] Nonetheless, in isolated rural areas other criminal activities, apart from growing illicit crops, have occurred, such as illegal mining, so-called BACRIMS (*bandas criminales*), created by the demobilized members of paramilitary groups, but also by members of state security forces have been mushrooming all over the country.[146] Sabotages of infrastructure have also been on the rise: between 2011 and 2012, attacks on pipelines grew by more than 250%.[147]

Indeed, internal and regional stability are U.S. priorities and to this end the U.S. helped prevent Colombia from descending into an abyss of violence and chaos. Thanks to this sustained assistance Colombia has also become more democratic, improved in upholding the rule of law, and has strengthened the judiciary. Yet it must be remembered that winning the war against illegally armed insurgents would not necessarily bring about an end to drug production. As long as the drug trade is profitable, there will always exist groups willing to take over the illegal trade. It would therefore be a mistake to withdraw all assistance from Colombia, because it is indispensable for the further stabilization of the country. However, the U.S. should adjust its policies so that they are acceptable for the EU and the international community, and should at the same time keep pressuring the Colombian government to adopt the necessary reforms and do away with the level of impunity for serious violations of human rights. Above all, however, the highly dubious strategy of chemical eradication should be terminated and substituted for more sophisticated programs aiming to curb drug demand and boost economic development, employment and the production of licit crops.

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145 Beittel, *Colombia: Background*, 7–10.

146 For the recent situation in Colombia under the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos see U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Washington, DC (March 2012): 170–78, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/184314.pdf (Volume I, accessed March 3, 2013); Beittel, *Colombia: Background*.

147 Beittel, *Colombia: Background*, 17–18.

REVIEWS

Tracing Karl May in the History of Transatlantic Indian Imagery

Review essay of the exhibition titled *Po stopě Karla Maye / Tracing Karl May* in the Náprstek Museum of Asian, African and American Cultures, Prague, October 25, 2012 – April 30, 2013

> Karel May created characters which were not real and placed them in a world which only outwardly resembled reality. His heroes possessed characteristics, knowledge and experience which exceeded the bounds of even the most capable people. They were brave, honest, untiring but also visionary; heedless of their own gains, they rushed into danger whenever they saw a threat to justice or to the basic rights of decent people, regardless of their race, creed or colour. They didn't hesitate to risk their lives when such threats to others – capture, fraud or theft – were undeserved. They expected no reward for their efforts, and even when it was offered, they often refused. Karel May created a world full of injustice, often of cruelty and violence, but also brought to it a sense of hope for change, for unexpected rewards. Many people, of many generations, believed in this hope, and marvelled at his heroes. And that's no small thing.
>
> *Tracing Karl May* exhibition opening panel label.[1]

The opening panel of the Náprstek Museum's exhibition on the works of Karl May promises to give the visitor a tour of the worlds of this *fin-de-siécle* German novelist – with a subtext. The label and the exhibition itself not only tap into a rather obvious nostalgia for one's Central European childhood readings and movie experiences, and make a fair interactive effort to entertain and educate about the German, Christian and – through our prism, European – values expounded by May. The subtext of the exhibition is for the adult mind. It invokes the childhood ideals of superhuman heroes righting the wrongs of an ill society – at a time when our minds and policies are ineffectually grappling with the effects of global "fraud or theft" the likes of which our own world has never seen. In at least one way, the exhibition summons the fictional spirit of Old Shatterhand and Winnetou, because it seems that no one else can save us from this scrape, help us out of this mess – not even our politicians, who have promised us "hope for change."

Its subtext aside, what the exhibit really gestures towards is the rich and problematic European tradition of using American Indian images and characters to make statements about our own Central European issues, values, identities, and relationship with certain aspects of U.S. culture. Whether published under the name Karl May, May Károly, or Karel May, the works of the German author are only tenuously about the historical reality of the settling of the U.S. West. What they reveal is rather the multiple ways in which Central Europeans have engaged with U.S. culture over more than a century – our Transatlantic cultural relations. Just as much, Karl May's oeuvre is about Central European cultural history, and about the politics of the cultural imaginary of American Indians, the European

[1] Personal visit to the *Po stopě Karla Maye / Tracing Karl May* exhibition in the Náprstek Museum of Asian, African and American Cultures, Prague, January and February, 2013.

images projected on "the buckskin curtain."[2] This essay reviews the history of American Indian imagery in Central Europe in an effort to unpack Karl May's oeuvre in a way that the exhibition cannot be expected to do. In a variety of media, I will analyze the composite Central European image of American Indians, and I will argue that what makes for its enduring popularity is Karl May's central ideal of a European–American Indian alliance based on mutual attraction and admiration of character.

Painting, Playing, Printing Indians: Karl Bodmer and George Catlin

In a fashion characteristic of the Central European cultural landscape, the exhibition's four panels titled "Indian Tribes – Karl May versus Reality" all feature uncredited reproductions of paintings from the early nineteenth century. Tracing the origins of these images provides us with a starting point for our intellectual journey.

The Central European forms and traditions of "playing Indian" were Transatlantic in their production and circulation.[3] One early example of this is the Indian paintings of Swiss painter Karl Bodmer, who in the early 1830s traveled to the Upper Missouri Valley with German Prince Maximilian of Wied-Neuwied.[4] While wintering at Fort Clark, present day North Dakota in 1833–1834, Bodmer created many likenesses of the Mandan and Hidatsa people. After his return to Europe, Bodmer used his sketches to make scores of paintings, which were then published in the prince's travel account in German in 1839, and subsequently in French and in abridged form in English.[5] Among them were his most famous

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[2] "The buckskin curtain" was a term coined by American Indians and Canadian First Nations during the Cold War to describe the body of colonialist and oppressive representations of Native Peoples in mainstream North American society.

[3] In his 1998 book of the same title, Philip Deloria traces the centuries-old tradition of whites impersonating natives as a way to articulate their colonial and U.S. American identities. The "Mohawk" participants of the Boston Tea Party, various early national republican fraternities, Lewis Henry Morgan's literary-turned ethnographic society in the 1840s, Earnest Thompson Seton's Woodcraft Indians, the Campfire Girls, the Koshare Boy Scouts of the Southwest in the early twentieth century, and the re-enactment hobbyism and the New Age Indians of Cold War America all used Native cultures and personae to define their identities *vis-à-vis* British colonial rule, the meaning of the young United States, authentic American literature and lifeways, contemporary social mores, urban modernity, and consumer society. In this, Deloria establishes the surprising elasticity of Indian impersonation and fantasies for whites both in the United States and abroad. In my framework, "playing Indian" refers to the Transatlantic representations of Native North Americans in a wide variety of cultural forms. See Philip J. Deloria, *Playing Indian* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1998).

[4] One place of departure for a more comprehensive overview is Colin G. Calloway, "Historical Encounters across Five Centuries," in *Germans and Indians: Fantasies, Encounters, Projections*, ed. by Colin G. Calloway, Gerd Gemünden and Suzanne Zantop (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).

[5] See Stephen S. Witte and Marsha V. Gallagher, eds., *The North American Journals of Prince Maximilian of Wied I–II.* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008). Also see Calloway, "Historical Encounters," 65.

ones, the 1834 *Mató-Tópe (Four Bears), Mandan Chief*, and his *Pehriska-Ruhpa of the Dog Society of the Hidatsa tribe*. Bodmer is usually credited with highly accurate ethnographic detail, and is known as a visual artist who documented Plains Indians in the early stages of European contact.[6] In the long run, Bodmer's prints became so popular and ubiquitous that today they are regularly used in uncredited reproductions in Central European museums.[7] Thus, Bodmer's visual representations of Plains Indians have become a part of the cultural landscape, serving as "raw material" or "props" for playing Indian in Central Europe.

U.S. painter George Catlin spent much of the same decade visiting and painting some of the same Native communities in the same region. Catlin and Bodmer overlapped to the extent that, for example, both painted the Mandan leader Four Bears – Catlin in his 1832 *Máh-to-tóh-pa, Four Bears, Second Chief, in Full Dress*. Much more than Bodmer, Catlin's enterprise ran the gamut of "playing Indian" in its variety of media. After spending years on the Missouri River, Catlin published his travel account as *The Manners, Customs, and Condition of the North American Indians* in 1841, then lectured and exhibited his Indian Gallery in a variety of U.S. cities before he took it to Europe.[8] There, Catlin first complemented his collection with *tableau vivants* of Europeans dressed up as Indians, himself masqueraded as a Sac warrior, and he exhibited groups of living Ojibwa and Iowa Indians who drew large audiences. Complete with an open air encampment and horses,[9] Catlin soon operated a veritable proto-Wild West Show, which he took to Brussels, Dublin, London and Paris. In London in 1848 he published a companion book to his American West travel account, this one titled *Catlin's Notes of Eight Years' Travels and Residence in Europe, with his North American Indian Collection. With Anecdotes and Incidents of the Travels and Adventures of Three Different Parties of American Indians Whom He Introduced to the Courts of England, France and Belgium.*[10]

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[6] See William H. Goetzmann et al, *Karl Bodmer's America* (Lincoln: Joslyn Art museum and University of Nebraska Press, 1984).

[7] Other such examples include the permanent exhibition on the Indians of North America in the Übersee Museum [Overseas Museum] of Bremen, Germany. Personal visit, July 2007.

[8] See George Catlin, *The Manners, Customs and Condition of the North American Indians* (London: the author, 1841).

[9] For more on Catlin's European tour with these groups, see Christopher Mulvey, "Among the Sag-a-noshes: Ojibwa and Iowa Indians with George Catlin in Europe, 1843–1848," in *Indians and Europe: an Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays,* ed. by Christian F. Feest (Aachen: Edition Herodot, Rader Verlag, 1987), 253–75.

[10] See George Catlin, *Catlin's Notes of Eight Years' Travels and Residence in Europe with his North American Indian Collection: with Anecdotes and Incidents of the Travels and Adventures of Three Different Parties of American Indians Whom He Introduced to the Courts of England, France, and Belgium* (New York: Burgess, Stinger & Co., 1848). For more on Catlin's gallery and performances, see W. H. Truettner, *The Natural Man Observed: A Study of Catlin's Indian Gallery* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1979); Brian W. Dippie, *Catlin and His Contemporaries: The Politics of Patronage* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990); and Joan Carpenter Troccoli, *First Artist of the West: George Catlin Paintings and Watercolors* (Tulsa, Oklahoma: Gilcrease Museum, 1993).

In his writings, Catlin deployed the figure of the American Indian as a foil for celebrating U.S. democracy and critiquing European Christian practice and industrial society. According to his account, the Iowa and Ojibwa in his service recurrently wondered about the great wealth and dire poverty coexisting in European cities, and even berated Christian missionaries for attempting to convert them instead of tending to the poor.[11] At best, actual Native agency was buried in Catlin's rendering of the cultural and literary trope of the *noble savage* of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. An account likely closer to the actual experience of the Indians was published in 1848 by Maungwudaus (The Great Hero), a member of Catlin's second Ojibwa group, titled *An account of the Chippewa Indians, Who Have Been Travelling Among the Whites, in the United States, England, Ireland, Scotland, France and Belgium*.[12] Another Indian critique of European and American society is provided by the very context of these encounters: as observed by Christopher Mulvey, the Iowa and Ojibwa crossed the Atlantic because of white encroachment on their land and way of life – and during their European tour, some eleven of them died of smallpox and other causes.[13]

The "Wild West" Tours Europe: Buffalo Bill Cody

Karl May's productive life coincided with that of the most famous U.S. producer of Indian imagery of his age. The American pioneer who turned "playing Indian" into a long-term business venture on both continents was Buffalo Bill Cody. L. G. Moses documented how, after the tragedy at Wounded Knee in 1890, some of the members of the Great Plains ghost dance movement were allowed by the U.S. government to be hired as performers for Buffalo Bill's European tours.[14] This was a characteristic transfer between Indian cultures, government policy and "playing Indian" in popular culture. When a number of Native tribes engaged in the spiritual practice of ghost dancing, the U.S. government perceived this as a real threat to the status quo of Indian relations, and responded with repressive measures that culminated in the killing of Big Foot's band at Wounded Knee. As part of its crackdown on the ghost dance movement, the U.S. government then partnered with Buffalo Bill Cody

[11] Catlin as quoted in Mulvey, "Among the Sag-a-noshes," 256–58.

[12] An early indication of the sexual politics of such Transatlantic encounters is an episode in Maungwudaus' account where some British military officers request that the Indians allow themselves to be kissed by the officers' wives, who likely were prostitutes in reality. The Ojibwe obliged, but then commented that these women were not good for anything else, certainly not to be wives. Here, the joke first seemed to be on the Indians, then on the women – and possibly on the officers, who proved their bad taste in women, and were very rude as hosts. Maungwudaus as quoted in Mulvey, "Among the Sag-a-noshes," 269. For more, see Maungwudaus, *An Account of the Chippewa Indians, Who Have Been Travelling Among The Whites, in the United States, England, Ireland, Scotland, France, and Belgium* (Rochester, New York: privately published, 1848).

[13] Mulvey, "Among the Sag-a-noshes," 272–73. For more on Catlin's tours of Europe, see Peter Bolz, "Indian Images for the King: George Catlin in Europe," in *I Like America: Fictions of the Wild West*, ed. by Pamela Kort and Max Hollein (München, New York: Prestel, 2006), 68–85.

[14] L. G. Moses, *Wild West Shows and the Images of American Indians, 1883–1933* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996).

to remove the troublemakers, and channeled them into performing nostalgic and exotic re-enactments of the Indian Wars in the U.S. and abroad. Moses argues that considering the circumstances, these Plains Sioux performers exercised some agency in representing their own history, and benefited financially from the arrangement.[15] As performances of colonial rule, Buffalo Bill's successful tours of Europe were akin to the fin-de-siècle *Völkerschau* (exhibition of "exotic" native people from far-flung European colonies) by Carl Hagenbeck, and they spawned imitators in content or form, among them the Sarrasani circus of early twentieth century Germany.[16]

Pressed in Pulp: Dime Novels and the World of Karl May

Tracing Karl May commendably educates the visitors about the history of the publication of Karl May's works "in the Czech lands" from the time of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy through the early twenty-first century.[17] It is important to understand that much of this was rooted in the traditions of a Transatlantic popular literature publishing business. With advances in printing and transportation technology, by the mid-nineteenth century publishers were perfecting the production and mass dissemination of popular literature at low prices. In the United States, the firm of Beadle and Adams are credited with publishing the first dime novel series in 1860. Their first dime story, *Malaeska, the Indian Wife of the White Hunter*, established a major theme in the genre: pioneer and Wild West stories that featured American Indian characters. With the onset of the U.S. Civil War, the publishers established their Transatlantic arm, Beadle's American Library, which for five years reprinted some of their runs for the British market.[18] This was one of the early instances of the Transatlantic publishing of U.S. dime novels – a practice that not only provided Europeans with a steady fare of Western fantasies but also inspired Karl May's "native" European literature about American Indians, and thus helped provide the "script" for Europeans "playing Indian."

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[15] Ibid., 271.

[16] Katrin Sieg, *Ethnic Drag: Performing Race, Nation, Sexuality in West Germany* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 125–26. For more on these shows and their Indian performers, see Rudolf Conrad, "Mutual Fascination: Indians in Dresden and Leipzig," in *Indians and Europe: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays*, ed. by Christian F. Feest (Aachen: Edition Herodot Rader-Verlag, 1987), 455–73; Peter Bolz, "Life Among the "Hunkpapas": A Case Study of German Indian Lore," in *Indians and Europe*, ed. by Feest, 480–84; and Eric Ames, "Seeing the Imaginary: On the Popular Reception of Wild West Shows in Germany, 1885–1910," in *I like America*, ed. by Kort and Hollein, 212–29.

[17] "Published Works of Karl May" panel. Personal visit to the *Po stopě Karla Maye / Tracing Karl May* exhibition in the Náprstek Museum of Asian, African and American Cultures, Prague, January and February, 2013.

[18] Beadle and Adams Archives online finding aid. University of Delaware Library Special Collections Department, http://poole.lib.udel.edu/ud/spec/findaids/beadle.htm.

While James Fenimore Cooper's *Leatherstocking Tales* were published in German as early as 1845,[19] the foremost and most influential example of home-grown Central European stories about American Indians remains the *Winnetou* cycle of novels written by German author Karl May around the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century.[20] Karl May's formula of positioning a German hero in an alliance with noble Indians against greedy and evil whites and warlike Natives proved to be immensely successful in Central Europe. Over time, the author's oeuvre developed into veritable "culture industry," with between 80 and 100 million copies sold in 28 languages.[21] As the Náprstek Museum's exhibition attests, May's works have served as "scripts" to whole generations of Central Europeans for playing Indian in a variety of cultural forms from stage performances to feature films and cultural hobbyist re-enactment.

One of the most fascinating endeavors of the *Tracing Karl May* exhibition are its four panels titled "Indian Tribes – Karl May versus Reality," which contrast the profile of the Indian "tribes" in May's novels with approxiamate historical reality.[22] While the specific Indian nations featured in his novels suggest that they are set in the Southern Plains region of the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century,[23] both scholars and ordinary Germans point out that Karl May's stories are purely fictional and not based on much (if any) personal experience with American Indians.[24] He was more likely influenced by

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[19] Irmgard Egger, "*The Leatherstocking Tales* as Adapted for German Juvenile Readers," in *James Fenimore Cooper: His Country and His Art*, ed. by George A. Test (Papers from the 1984 Conference at State University of New York College – Oneonta and Cooperstown.), 41–45. Also an excerpt online: http://external.oneonta.edu/cooper/articles/suny/1984suny-egger2.html (accessed September 10, 2011).

[20] The figure of Winnetou first appeared in Karl May's writing in 1875, and subsequently became a more refined and idealized character. See Sieg, *Ethnic Drag*, 88. In the early 1890s, May's stories were republished in three major volumes: *Winnetou I–III. Karl May – Life And Works. The Years 1875–1912*, http://www.karl-may-stiftung.de/engl/biograph2.html. For more on Karl May's creation of Winnetou, see Karl Markus Kreis, "German Wild West: Karl May's Invention of the Definitive Indian," in *I like America*, ed. by Kort and Hollein, 249–73.

[21] Sieg, *Ethnic Drag*, 81.

[22] Four panels titled "Indian Tribes – Karl May versus Reality." Personal visit to the *Po stopě Karla Maye / Tracing Karl May* exhibition in the Náprstek Museum of Asian, African and American Cultures, Prague, January and February, 2013.

[23] Ibid. I base this observation on the scholarship of Jacki Rand on the mid to late-nineteenth century life of the Kiowa, Comanche and other native nations in the region of the Southern Plains. Personal communication, November 2011.

[24] Conversations with Germans about Karl May's Winnetou novels. In July 2007, a tour guide at the Karl May Museum in Radebeul claimed that by the time May visited the United States for the first time, he had already written several of his Winnetou books; and his journey took him only as far as a Tuscarora reservation in New York State. Author's personal visit to the Karl May Museum in Radebeul, Germany, July 2007. Likewise, the timeline of Karl May's life in the Náprstek Museum's exhibit states that May visited the United States only in 1908, by which time he had already written most of his Winnetou novels. Panel "Karel May – His Life." Personal visit to the *Po stopě Karla Maye / Tracing Karl May* exhibition in the Náprstek Museum of Asian, African and American Cultures, Prague, January and February, 2013.

popular literature's accounts of the Wild West and the Indian Wars of the late nineteenth century, and their renderings in the transatlantically circulating dime novels.

Combined with his lack of personal experience, this inspiration allowed the author a liberty to "play Indian" as a German in more than one way. May deliberately blended his own personality with that of his narrator and protagonist: he masqueraded as the hero of his own Wild West adventure stories. The two rifles on display in *Tracing Karl May* are, according to the explanatory label, "literary invented firearm[s] on the border between fiction and reality."[25] From a Dresden arms maker Karl May commissioned replicas of Winnetou's silver studded rifle and the Henry carbine, and posed for photographs in costume as Karl/Sharlee/Old Shatterhand.[26]

The exhibition's imagery and paraphernalia most often portrays a white man and an American Indian standing side by side. In his stories, Karl May positioned his German hero in a peculiar alliance with his fictional American Indian characters. The inherent skills, strong body and character of Karl/Charlie, a German immigrant to the U.S. West, soon allow him to outperform the Americans in frontier skills, and his feat of knocking out a man with his bare first earns him the nickname "Old Shatterhand." After his early encounters with good and evil frontiersman and Indians, Shatterhand soon chooses sides and strikes up a friendship with the Apache warrior Winnetou. With his Indian "brother," Old Shatterhand lives through a series of adventures in which he battles white bandits and the hostile Kiowa and Oglala Sioux.

May's literary partnership between German frontiersmen and American Indians has a peculiar politics that I argue is a key reason for their endurance in popularity for over a century. Scholars have observed that in the process of Karl's (almost overnight) transformation into Old Shatterhand, the frontiersmen who are key allies to him and the Apache all turn out to be German immigrants.[27] In an especially emotional scene of the first story, the white Klekih-petra, who had spent decades with the Apache and had taught their chiefs the tenets of Christianity, is fatally wounded by the bullet of a drunken white surveyor. Dying in the arms of his beloved pupil Winnetou, Klekih-petra turns to Karl/Old Shatterhand, whom he had met only hours ago, but whose German origins he shares. Speaking in German which the Apache do not understand, Klekih-petra asks Karl/Shatterhand to take his place and be a friend and teacher to Winnetou. Karl vows to fulfill this role.[28] Through this

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[25] Winnetou's silver studded rifle and Old Shatterhand's Henry cabine in display cases. Personal visit to the *Po stopě Karla Maye / Tracing Karl May* exhibition in the Náprstek Museum of Asian, African and American Cultures, Prague, January and February, 2013.

[26] Personal visit and tour of the Karl May Museum in Radebeul, Germany, July 2007. For more on the museum, see http://www.karl-may-museum.de/web/start.php.

[27] Klekih-petra, friend of the Apache and teacher of Christianity to Winnetou, came to the Wild West to atone for his sins of inciting terrorism with his demagogy in his native Germany. Sam Hawkens, trapper, scout for the railroad surveyors, and tutor and friend to Karl, also turns out to be German. Karl May, Winnetou (Translated by Michael Shaw. New York: The Seabury Press, 1977), 82–86.

[28] May, *Winnetou*, 88.

and subsequent scenes,[29] May positions Germanness as a commitment to an alliance with American Indians, in particular with the Apache.[30] This, however, is not a commitment to mass and violent resistance: after the Apache warrior's father and sister are shot dead by another white outlaw, Old Shatterhand successfully talks Winnetou out of convening all the Indian tribes and waging war on the whites.[31]

At the core of Old Shatterhand's alliance with the Apache is attraction. Karl is immediately drawn to the "noble" appearance and behavior of Winnetou, and he later finds that the feeling is mutual.[32] However, the fulfillment of the two men's secret hopes for friendship is delayed for a long time by the fact that the Apache consider Karl an enemy not only because he surveys their land for the white railroad, but also because one of his fellow surveyors has killed Klekih-petra. What follows is a series of adventures in which Karl and white hunter Sam Hawkens successfully manipulate the Apache and a band of Kiowa marauders in order to survive and punish the evildoers. These adventures are rich in reversals which successively feature Winnetou and Karl as each other's prisoner and jailor. Throughout, a combination of pride, cunning and misperceptions keep the two men from disclosing their strong sympathy for each other. Only after Karl/Old Shatterhand fights a series of duels – including one against Winnetou that leaves him severely wounded – is his allegiance adequately proven, and is he reconciled with the Apache leaders. Now Old Shatterhand and Winnetou swear blood brotherhood and, in the words of Apache chief Intshu-tshuna, become "[a] single person and warrior with two bodies, howgh!"[33] Meanwhile, Old Shatterhand also admires the beauty of Winnetou's sister Nsho-tshi, whose love for the German hero is nipped in the bud by her untimely death from a bullet of a white bandit.[34] Thus, May's German hero experiences attraction and becomes the subject of desire for both an Indian man and an Indian woman. This trope of attraction and desire informed successive forms of Central Europeans "playing Indian."

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[29] These include the narrator's reference to the historical context and the moral position of Germanness: "It was the eve of the Civil War. […] As a German, I could not see eye to eye with the Southerners regarding the slave question, and might arouse suspicion. And I did not feel inclined to involve myself in complications whose resolution I could not foresee." May, *Winnetou*, 411.

[30] Such a literary positioning of a European hero in alliance with American Indians may not have been unique to Germany. In the 1980s, a Polish solidarity group derived their initial interest in American Indians from *Tomek na wojennej ścieżce* [Tomek on the War Path], a novel of Polish juvenile literature published in 1959 by Alfred Szklarski. Here young Tomek's alliance with American Indians is motivated not only by his upright character and sense of justice, but also his observations that the Polish and American Indians share a history of oppression by other nations. Ewa Nowicka, "The 'Polish Movement Friends of the American Indians'," in *Indians and Europe*, ed. by Feest, 606–607.

[31] May, *Winnetou*, 331, 364.

[32] May, *Winnetou*, 71, 92.

[33] May, *Winnetou*, 271.

[34] May, *Winnetou*, 202, 288, 328–29.

Staging Indians: The Karl May Festivals

Besides their mass marketing in dozens of languages, Karl May's novels have been also adapted in a variety of other media and cultural forms. One of the most remarkable of these is the dozen or so Karl May stage festivals scattered throughout Germany and Austria.[35] Mostly established in the post-World War Two period, these venues usually feature a Wild West theme park with vendors, merchandise, an Indian "village" or "reservation," and other attractions. The main event, however, is invariably the performances of the adaptations of the *Winnetou* stories on a "natural" stage, with horses, amplifiers, stuntmen and pyrotechnics. Held in amphitheaters that can seat up to thousands, these performances are always carefully choreographed for spectacular visual effect and action. According to Katrin Sieg, over time the stage plays have used Karl May's novels to amplify or advocate a variety of successive and sometimes contradictory attitudes that include imperialism and anti-imperialism, racism and multiculturalism, anti-materialism and commodity fetishism.[36] Commodifying a peculiar German fantasy of American frontiersman and Indians, these stage performances and the surrounding industry[37] have entertained and shaped the attitudes of generations of German-speaking Central Europeans towards the history of Native Americans.

Into the Woods: The Central European Re-enactment Hobby

> An Indian suit inspired by the film dress of Winnetou. The author formed it in 2003 during a stay in the U.S. as a symbol and honor of values that were personified by Winnetou, and which have become determinative for him on his life journey: courage, truth and an open mind.
>
> *Tracing Karl May* exhibition label for a buckskin shirt and pants.[38]

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[35] The author's research on the Internet in 2007 revealed at least a dozen such locations in the German-speaking countries of Central Europe. In July 2007, the author also personally visited for field research two such locations: Elspe, and Bad Segeberg.

[36] Sieg *Ethnic Drag*, 76. Sieg's analysis of the theater festivals as well as German cultural hobbyism leads her to argue that Germans, who after the Second World War had to banish the issue of race from their public discussions, used Karl May's Western fantasies to exonerate themselves from the collective feeling of guilt over the Holocaust. In Sieg's reading, the German immigrant-turned frontiersman Old Shatterhand's brotherhood with the Apache chief Winnetou is a *Wiedergutmachung* – the use of a distant American historical era and its native characters as a proxy or *surrogate* to finally right of the wrongs committed against Jews by Germans in the Second World War. I disagree with Sieg's analysis because it attempts to subsume in its framework the *multiple* ways in which the postwar generations of Germans produced and consumed fantasies about American Indians in a variety of media.

[37] Another of these forms of playing Indian at the theme parks is a store where the visitors can have their photos taken in the surplus Wild West costumes of the stage plays. Personal visit to the Karl May stage festival in Elspe, Germany, July 2007.

[38] Personal visit to the *Po stopě Karla Maye / Tracing Karl May* exhibition in the Náprstek Museum of Asian, African and American Cultures, Prague, January and February, 2013.

The beaded buckskin shirt and leggings on display in *Tracing Karl May* are only one example of the impressive array of self-made paraphernalia shown in the exhibition. Parallel to the more business-oriented cultural forms, playing Indian in Central Europe[39] also developed into a "grassroots" movement with its own material and performance culture. The fans of dime novels, Wild West shows, and Karl May books became cultural producers and authors/performers in their own right by organizing Western and Indian clubs, circulating newsletters and journals, and holding conventions and performances. While these societies ran the gamut from literary to social, the German and Central European hobbyist re-enactment of American Indian cultures received some scholarly attention in the last twenty years.[40]

Some of Central European Indian hobbyism dates back to the 1910s, but by the early twenty-first century its groups numbered in the hundreds.[41] One Central European tradition of re-enacting Indian cultures initially existed within the German Wild West clubs: established in 1913, the members of the Cowboy-Club München Süd studied history of the American West, collected books and artifacts, and learned Indian songs and dances, as well as the cowboy skills of riding and lassoing – to prepare for the Wild West shows staged by their and other clubs.[42] German clubs founded in the 1930s included one named Manitou (likely after Winnetou's designation of the Great Spirit), and the Indianerklub Frankfurt West.[43] Inspired by the popular literature sent by his brother Raul from the U.S., in the 1930s Hungarian Orientalist Ervin Baktay created a "saloon," held "meetings" in cowboy regalia, annually re-enacted the battle of the Little Big Horn, camped out on the

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[39] It is important to point out that while the strongest sources of such fan cultures were the German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria and Switzerland), other Central European countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary also had Western or Indian clubs or societies. As Katrin Sieg observes, the annual Indian hobbyist meetings in Germany came to have participants "from almost every other European country." Sieg, *Ethnic Drag*, 123.

[40] These include Peter Bolz, "Life Among the "Hunkpapas": A Case Study of German Indian Lore," in *Indians and Europe*, ed. by Feest, 475–90; Yolanda Broyles Gonzales, "Cheyennes in the Black Forest: A Social Drama," in *The Americanization of the Global Village: Essays in Comparative Popular Culture*, ed. by Roger Rollin (Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1989), 70–86; Birgit Turski, *Die Indianistikgruppen in der DDR: Entwicklung, Probleme, Aussichten* (Idstein: Baum, 1994); John Paskievich, director, *If Only I Were an Indian* (Winnipeg: National Film Board of Canada, 1995); Marta Carlson, director, *Das Pow-wow* (2001); "Germans Playing Indians," in *Germans and Indians*, ed. by Calloway, Gemünden, and Zantop, 213–16; Katrin Sieg, "Indian Impersonation as Historical Surrogation," ibid., 217–42; and Katrin Sieg, "Winnetou's Grandchildren: Indian Identification, Ethnic Expertise, White Embodiment," in Sieg, *Ethnic Drag*, 115–50; Friedrich von Borries and Jens-Uwe Fischer, *Sozialistische Cowboys: Der Wilde Westen Ostdeutschlands* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2008); and Petra Tjitske Kalshoven, *Crafting the Indian: Knowledge, Desire and Play in Indianist Reenactment* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012).

[41] Sieg *Ethnic Drag*, 82, 122; Von Borries and Fischer, *Sozialistische Cowboys*, 17.

[42] Bolz, "Life Among the 'Hunkpapas'," 484. Other clubs established in the 1910s included the *Cowboy Club* of Munich, and the *Wild West* and *Cowboy Club Buffalo* of Freiburg, Germany. Von Borries and Fischer, *Sozialistische Cowboys*, 17.

[43] Respectively, ibid., 14, and Bolz, "Life Among the 'Hunkpapas'," 480.

Danube near Budapest, and posed both as a sheriff and as Plains Indian chief "Buffalo Lying Down."[44] Another example of the Transatlantic circulation of ideas and forms of performance, one of the influences of the Czech and Slovak hobbyist groups was the Woodcraft Indian movement launched by Ernest Thompson Seton's books for boys published in the first two decades of the twentieth century.[45]

After a hiatus imposed by World War Two (although the Hungarians held a camp as late as in 1943), Central European Indian hobbyism picked up again. In the postwar period the Hungarian Danube group saw increased attendance at their events.[46] Old Manitou, the first Indianist club of East Germany was founded near Radebeul in 1956; it was followed in 1958 by a group of Mandan re-enactors who called themselves Hiawatha and lived near Leipzig. The town of Meißen saw the emergence of The Dakota in 1961; and the Sieben Ratsfeuer (Seven Council Fires) established their own club in Magdeburg in the year 1963.[47] Inspired by the *Leatherstocking Tales* and the *Winnetou* stories, Hungarian singer-songwriter Tamás Cseh and his friends started playing Indian shortly after they graduated from high school, and by the mid-to late-1960s had launched the second Hungarian hobbyist group, known for their annual camps in the Bakony hills.[48] By the time John Paskievich made a documentary of the Czech and Slovak Indianist hobby in the early 1990s, that movement had been going strong for several decades.[49]

In his seminal treatment of embodied representations of Indians by white Americans, Philip Deloria explains how, as the result of a new discourse of cultural relativism and a crisis of individual identity, Cold War white hobbyists began engaging Native American cultures by dancing and singing with Indians.[50] Here Deloria distinguished between two groups of hobbyists. "Object hobbyists" replicated Indian artifacts as their objects of desire without engaging living Indians, who they considered part of the past and racially other. "People hobbyists" engaged in intercultural encounters with live Indians on the powwow circuit, and negotiated the differences between Native agency and Euro-American

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[44] Raul Baktay made at least one trip to Montana, where he studied the traditions and history of the Blackfeet. The photos of Baktay's "cowboy" meetings used props and were posed to look much like scenes from the early Western films. Baktay's own Indian name is possibly a reference to Sitting Bull, the famous Hunkpapa Lakota Sioux chief of the late nineteenth century. Personal visit to the Baktay Ervin Museum of Cowboy and Indian / Western Games, Kisoroszi, Hungary. Tour and conversation with tour guide, himself a veteran re-enactor, July 2, 2011.

[45] John Paskievich, director, *If Only I Were an Indian* (Winnipeg: National Film Board of Canada, 1995). For more on Thompson Seton's ideology and forms of playing Indian, see "Natural Indians and Identities of Modernity," in *Playing Indian*, by Deloria, 95–127.

[46] Personal visit to the Baktay Ervin Museum of Cowboy and Indian / Western Games, Kisoroszi, Hungary. Tour and conversation with tour guide, himself a veteran re-enactor. July 2, 2011.

[47] Von Borries and Fischer, *Sozialistische Cowboys*, 14, 29.

[48] László Bérczes and Tamás Cseh, *Cseh Tamás: Bérczes László beszélgetőkönyve* [Conversations with Tamás Cseh by László Bérczes] (Budapest: Palatinus, 2007), 71–72.

[49] John Paskievich, director, *If Only I Were an Indian* (Winnipeg: National Film Board of Canada, 1995).

[50] Deloria, *Playing Indian*, 128–35.

imagination.[51] It is important to point out that while postwar Germany underwent a suppression of racialist discourse of identity that was more forceful than the one in the United States,[52] German and other Central European hobbyists did not have access to living Native people the way Euro-Americans did.

With the dearth of opportunities for interaction with live Indians, the Germans became "object hobbyists" by default. Like the Hungarians,[53] many German Indian hobbyist groups self-admittedly transitioned from rather crudely acting out popular culture fantasies of American Indians to a kind of Native impersonation that was based on what they regarded as rigorous research.[54] The German hobbyists emphasized the authenticity and ethnographic detail[55] of their activities to set themselves apart both from their less rigorous fellow hobbyists and from the general public, who they aimed to educate about false stereotypes and the "real" cultures of American Indians.[56] These discursive and embodied practices of "authenticity" conferred authority and legitimacy, but they could also disrupt the hobbyist movement. As their chief measure of acceptance and esteem, the authenticity of hobbyists' bead- and quillwork and dancing and singing were also often subject to dispute, and such policing of the hobbyist movement sometimes led to the splintering of groups.[57]

The creator of the Winnetou costume allowed the Karl May exhibition to display his pieces only on condition that he remains anonymous in the credits.[58] This caveat points to the vexed interpretation of such Indian imagery. In the Performance Studies terminology of Katrin Sieg, the West German Indian hobbyists progressed from self-admittedly amateurish play acting, or *masquerade*, to what they considered masterful and accurate replication, re-enactment, or *mimesis*.[59] We have seen that this origin narrative was professed by other Central European hobbyist groups as well. Thus, as Katrin Sieg observed, Central European hobbyists positioned themselves as *the* heirs and guardians of American Indian history and

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[51] Ibid., 135.

[52] Katrin Sieg observed that this suppression of notions of race opened the door for hiring Germans to perform Indians on stage – and claimed that this also transferred to German Indianist hobbyism. Sieg, *Ethnic Drag*, 2, 4, 22, 128.

[53] Cseh recalls cutting up an unused leather sofa set owned by the parents of a friend to make buckskin clothing as seen in a French Wild West comic book – and then later meeting with two other hobbyists, whose accurate replicas of Plains Indian objects and clothing taught him humility about his hobby. Bérczes and Cseh, *Cseh Tamás*, 72–73; Personal visit to the Baktay Ervin Museum of Cowboy and Indian / Western Games, Kisoroszi, Hungary. Tour and conversation with tour guide, himself a veteran re-enactor. July 2, 2011.

[54] Sieg, *Ethnic Drag*, 123.

[55] The words "accuracy" and "authenticity" are used not as analytical terms, but are descriptive of the notions important to the German Indian hobbyist movement.

[56] Sieg, *Ethnic Drag*, 118; Michael Schubert quoted in Bolz, "Life Among the 'Hunkpapas'," 477; Von Borries and Fischer, *Sozialistische Cowboys*, 42, 56.

[57] Sieg, *Ethnic Drag*, 122.

[58] *Tracing Karl May* exhibition label for a buckskin shirt and pants. Personal visit to the *Po stopě Karla Maye / Tracing Karl May* exhibition in the Náprstek Museum of Asian, African and American Cultures, Prague, January and February, 2013.

[59] Sieg, *Ethnic Drag*, 118.

cultures. I agree with her assessment that this kind of positioning in effect supplanted live Indians and their living traditions with a German identification with and authority over the Native past.[60] This is indeed a colonialist practice. However, Sieg's theoretical conclusion needs to be qualified in the context of early Cold War Central Europe, where Native American presence was small at best. To use Diana Taylor's analytical framework[61]: without the embodied repertoire of living Native Americans, the Central European (object) hobbyists utilized white-made popular and artistic representations and ethnographic scholarship as the archive for their own performances of Indian authenticity. The Central European hobbyists of the early to mid-Cold War did what they enjoyed doing and rationalized it a service to American Indians, the Western world, and their own societies.

Indians as Ideology

As the Cold War intensified and expanded to the realm of cultural production and consumption, Wild West and Indian fandom first became subject to state control, then they were turned into a battleground of ideologies. The government-controlled *Kulturbund* association of the German Democratic Republic seized on the figure of the American Indian as a tool of anti-American propaganda.[62] At the same time as it elevated American Indians, the East German state proceeded to "purge" Western fandom in the country. Cowboys, white pioneers and frontiers people were designated as the historical "henchmen" of U.S. imperialism. Originally opened in 1928, the Karl May Museum of Radebeul was renamed "Indian Museum" in 1956, and references to Indians killing General George Custer, or playing in Buffalo Bill's show were removed from the exhibits. Finally, the Museum was moved to Bamberg one year before the Berlin Wall was completed.[63] As part of the ideologically correct realignment of popular culture, East German and Hungarian authorities also made sure to remove any firearms from Wild West fan communities,[64] and the former also suppressed cowboy fandom. In response, re-enactors of white frontiers people pretended to impersonate Indians in public, and indulged in playing cowboys in private.[65] Clandestine

[60] Sieg, *Ethnic Drag*, 130–131.

[61] In her 2003 book *The Archive and the Repertoire*, Diana Taylor theorizes the categories and relationship between forms of knowledge fixed in objects, and embodied practices. Taylor defines the archive as containing "documents, maps, literary texts, letters, archaeological remains, bones, videos, films, CDs, all those items supposedly resistant to change." On the other hand, the repertoire "enacts embodied memory: performances, gestures, orality, movement, dance, singing – in short, all those acts usually thought of as ephemeral, nonreproducible knowledge." Diana Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 19, 20.

[62] Sieg, *Ethnic Drag*, 122.

[63] Von Borries and Fischer, *Sozialistische Cowboys*, 18–19, 31–32.

[64] Von Borries and Fischer, *Sozialistische Cowboys*, 32–33; interview with long-time member and leader of the Bakony group, June 2011. Source kept anonymous due to research ethics regulations.

[65] Von Borries and Fischer, *Sozialistische Cowboys*, 31–32, 54.

cowboy life largely came to an end after some clubs were shut down and others reorganized into Indianist fan circles.[66]

The Cold War's re-evaluation of the ideological elements of culture extended to the realm of publishing. After the war, the *Winnetou* novels had become suspicious because Hitler and his Nazi youth movement had admired Karl May's oeuvre; now people in East Germany were discouraged from reading them.[67] A potential candidate for elevation, a cycle of novels about the life of early nineteenth century Shawnee Confederacy leader Tecumseh written in the 1930s by Fritz Steuben, was likewise reviled for being proto-fascist.[68] The author who became East Germany's literary spokesperson for the historical experience of American Indians was Liselotte Welskopf-Henrich, professor of ancient history at Humboldt University, Berlin, and subsequently a member of the German Academy of Sciences. Beginning in 1951, Welskopf-Henrich wrote a six-book series of historical novels titled *The Sons of the Great Mother Bear* about the odyssey of the Teton Sioux during the gold rush in the Black Hills.[69] Buttressed by her day-job as a scholar and professor, Welskopf-Henrich's novels were regarded as "historically accurate"[70] – for example, the Sioux chief at the beginning of her story bore the name *Mattotaupa* or "four bears" – obviously taken from Bodmer and Catlin's 1830s paintings of the Mandan chief Mah-to-toh-pe / Mató-Tópe (Four Bears). With her books translated into several other Central European languages, Welskopf-Henrich "self-consciously created a socialist tradition of Indian literature,"[71] and distinguished it from the "clichéic" stories of Karl May, J. F. Cooper, and Fritz Steuben.[72] Starting in the early 1960s, Welskopf-Henrich also paid visits to reservations in the U.S., and in the 1970s she would become a node in the Transatlantic alliance for American Indian sovereignty.

Katrin Sieg has observed that in postwar Germany, Wild West fandom redefined the German position from conquered oppressor to a friend to the resistance to oppression.[73] At first, Karl May's novels may have worked analogously, reflecting the new political and economic alliance: Winnetou's blood brotherhood with Karl / Old Shatterhand may have recast German-U.S. relations from an adversarial relationship into a new alliance sealed with pledges and in-kind assistance. This may have well been a reason why West Germany upheld the esteem of Karl May. With the East German state rejecting the same tradition, it

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66 Ibid., 35.

67 Sieg, *Ethnic Drag*, 82; Von Borries and Fischer, *Sozialistische Cowboys*, 18–19.

68 Gonzales, "Cheyennes in the Black Forest," 78; Glenn Penny, "Elusive Authenticity: The Quest for the American Indian in German Public Culture," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 48, no. 4 (October 2006): 800.

69 *Die Söhne der Großen Bärin – The Sons of the Great* [Mother] *Bear* cycle of books were as follows: *Über den Missouri* [Over the Missouri] 1951; *Der junge Häuptling* [The Young Chief] 1951; *Heimkehr zu den Dakota* [Return to the Dakota] 1951, 1963; *Die Höhle in den schwarzen Bergen* [The Cave in the Black Hills] 1963; *Der Weg in die Verbannung* [The Path in Exile] 1962; *Harka* 1962.

70 Penny, "Elusive Authenticity," 800.

71 Sieg, *Ethnic Drag,* 144.

72 Glenn Penny, "Elusive Authenticity," 800.

73 Katrin Sieg, *Ethnic Drag*, 24.

was only a matter of time before the two sides would start using such popular culture for ideological propaganda.

Screen Indians: The *Winnetou* Movies and the *Indianerfilme*

The two single largest images in the *Tracing Karl May* exhibition are Miroslav Pospíšil's life-size paintings of the movie characters Winnetou and Old Shatterhand, "borrowed from the Restaurace u Raušů."[74] These point to the cinematic tradition of Transatlantic Indian imagery. With the increasing availability of audiovisual technology, by the early to mid-1960s the cultural front of the Cold War had moved into cinema and television. Beginning in 1962 and through most of the decade, West German studios produced a dozen movies based on Karl May's Winnetou stories.[75] Made in West German, Italian, and Yugoslav co-production, these movies starred an athletic, blond and blue-eyed Lex Barker as Old Shatterhand opposite a genteel and graceful Pierre Brice as Winnetou – both dressed in fringed buckskin.[76] From the mid-1960s through the early 1980s, the East Germany's government-owned DEFA studios responded by releasing a dozen of their own so-called *Indianerfilme,* which it co-produced with fellow Communist and non-aligned countries like the Soviet Union and Romania.[77] The lead actor in these films was Serbian physical education student Gojko Mitič, who had been an extra in some of the early *Winnetou* movies.[78] Through partial nudity, Mitič's manly physique was emphasized in almost all of the Indianerfilme, and his physicality and facial structure made for a more erotic and exotic Indian warrior.[79]

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[74] "Miroslav Pospíšil: VINNETOU. Borrowed from the Restaurace u Raušů." "Miroslav Pospíšil: OLD SHATTERHAND. Borrowed from the Restaurace u Raušů." Personal visit to the *Po stopě Karla Maye / Tracing Karl May* exhibition in the Náprstek Museum of Asian, African and American Cultures, Prague, January and February, 2013.

[75] These films included the 1962 *Der Schatz im Silbersee* [Treasure of Silver Lake], the 1963 *Winnetou 1.* [Apache Gold]; the 1964 *Old Shatterhand*; the 1964 *Winnetou 2.* [Last of the Renegades]; the 1964 *Unter Geiern* [Frontier Hellcat]; the 1965 *Der Ölprinz* [Rampage at Apache Wells]; the 1965 *Winnetou 3.* [Winnetou: The Desperado Trail]; the 1965 *Old Surehand 1.* [Flaming Frontier]; the 1966 *Winnetou und das Halbblut Apanatschi* [Half-Breed]; the 1966 *Winnetou und sein Freund Old Firehand* [Thunder at the Border]; and the 1968 *Winnetou und Shatterhand im Tal der Toten* [Winnetou and Shatterhand in the Valley of Death].

[76] Sieg, *Ethnic Drag*, 103–104; Von Borries and Fischer, *Sozialistische Cowboys*, 46.

[77] These films included the 1966 *Die Söhne der Großen Bärin* [The Sons of the Great Mother Bear]; the 1967 *Chingachgook, die große Schlange* [Chingachgook the Great Serpent]; the 1968 *Spur des Falken* [The Trail of the Falcons]; the 1969 *Weiße Wölfe* [White Wolves]; the 1969 *Tödlicher Irrtum* [The Fatal Mistake]; the 1971 *Osceola*; the 1972 *Tecumseh*; the 1973 *Apachen* [The Apache]; the 1974 *Ulzana*; the 1975 *Blutsbrüder* [Blood Brothers]; the 1977 *Severino*; and the 1983 *Der Scout* [The Scout].

[78] Von Borries and Fischer, *Sozialistische Cowboys*, 49. For more on the East German *Indianerfilme*, see Gerd Gemünden, "Between Karl May and Karl Marx: the DEFA Indianerfilme," in *Germans and Indians*, ed. by Calloway, Gemünden and Zantop, 243–56.

[79] Sieg, *Ethnic Drag,* 105.

These two sets of Central European Westerns competed over their shared German-based identification with American Indians. Many of both sets of movies were shot on location in Yugoslavia, thus both sharing and contesting the very landscape of their setting – the same rocky scenery displayed in the diorama of *Tracing Karl May*. In the person of Gojko Mitič, who had been an extra in some of the early *Winnetou* movies before becoming the perennial star of the *Indianerfilme*,[80] these movies also shared a technical expertise and screen presence that migrated across the iron curtain.

The lines of battle over the two Germanies' shared professional savvy and popular cultural heritage of "playing Indian" were now drawn with ideology. If the *Winnetou* movies rehearsed the cultural equivalent of the postwar West German – U.S. political alliance, the *Indianerfilme* were a socialist cultural assault on U.S. imperialism and capitalism, including its product the clichéic Western,[81] as well as a claim of a more "just" and "authentic" German identification with Indians. Through portraying the Indians' heroic but ultimately doomed resistance to white Americans' ruthless encroachment on their land for gold, the socialist Westerns used historical materialism to critique the genre of the classic American Western, and to condemn not only U.S. colonialism, but also to indict American capitalist expansion[82] in the past, and, by implication, in the present. As Gerd Gemünden pointed out, these screen Indians stood in for East German and other socialist responses to American imperialism.[83] In the 1973 East German movie *Apachen* (The Apaches) Indian resistance raises class awareness: the Mexican miners gradually come to question the wisdom of the white American company, and the relations of production in which they participate. Likewise, in the 1971 *Osceola*, the Seminole leader negotiates decent wages for all plantation workers. As Gemünden's observed, Osceola's rallying cry "Indians of all countries, unite!" is at the same time a banner for socialist solidarity against American imperialism.[84] Here, the historical call for an all-Indian ethnic coalition (espoused by other figures like the Shawnee leader Tecumseh and later by the actual sovereignty movement) is made "red" in a different sense by a Marxist class-based movement. In the absence of Native critiques, the *Indianerfilme* assimilated historical American Indians into the struggle of the working class against capitalist exploitation.[85] This ideologically motivated identification with Indians and the resulting openness for cooperation would in time become a component in the Transatlantic alliance for American Indian sovereignty.

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[80] Von Borries and Fischer, *Sozialistische Cowboys*, 49, 50–51.

[81] As Gemünden shows, the *Indianerfilme* were just as guilty of stereotyping American Indians as the classic Western. See Gemünden, "Between Karl May and Karl Marx," 245–46.

[82] Ibid., 244–45.

[83] Ibid., 245.

[84] Ibid., 245.

[85] For a more nuanced scholarly analysis of the Eastern Westerns and their context, please see Anna Bánhegyi's recent dissertation "Where Marx Meets Osceola: Ideology and Mythology in the Eastern Bloc Western." History Department, Southern Methodist University. Personal communication.

Conclusion: Karl May' s World and a Transatlantic Alliance for Social Justice

By the late 1960s, a longstanding Central European cultural fascination with American Indians converged with a variety of commercialized forms of popular culture, and the use by national governments of the figure of the American Indian for ideological propaganda. Importantly, the above variety of Transatlantic cultural forms and their consumption have made for a curious specificity in playing Indian in Central Europe. The Indian tribes played for and by Central Europeans were overwhelmingly either the Apache of the Southern Plains or the Sioux peoples of the Northern Plains – in the second half of the nineteenth century.[86] Whether it was Tecumseh, Mató-Tópe, Sitting Bull, Winnetou, Osceola or Ulzana, the specific figure most available for identification was invariably a male warrior or chief. Karl Bodmer's 1835 painting of *Pehriska-Ruhpa of the Dog Society of the Hidatsa tribe* was admired and re-enacted by Central European hobbyists enamored with the Indian warrior ethos.[87] Different from most U.S. white representations, the Central European figure of Indian was stereotyped positively as an exotic noble savage[88] and a subject of desire and identification. In general, this figure came to stand for a "beleaguered yet defiant" heroic resistance to overwhelming forces, whatever they be.[89]

> Heroes of Karl May were brave and courageous, honest and fair, truth-loving and truthful. WILL YOU ALSO BE A PERSON OF THAT KIND?
>
> *Tracing Karl May* exhibition closing panel label.[90]

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[86] Peter Bolz traces this image back to what he calls the "massive appearance of Sioux Indians in Germany between 1890 and 1914" in ethnic shows, zoos, and Wild West shows. See Bolz, "Life Among the 'Hunkpapas'," 483.

[87] While a definitive claim requires more research, it is likely that during the Transatlantic reworkings of the image of the Indian warrior in the late twentieth century, this painting was the source of much glorification and vilification of the so-called dog soldiers or dog society of the Cheyenne and other tribes. The assertions of radical sovereignty activists that AIM was a warrior society that any Native community could call for help, as well as the 1976 "dog soldiers" memo of the FBI seem to have resonated with this image. In the early 1980s, the annual gatherings of West German Indianist hobbyists over the Pentecost weekend also featured "men's societies like the Dog Soldiers, who exercise[d] a kind of police power." See Bolz, "Life Among the 'Hunkpapas'," 487; also Von Borries and Fischer, *Sozialistische Cowboys*, 141. In the early 1990s, the author heard a Hungarian Indianist hobbyist explain that in a battle, the members of the dog society would pin their train into the ground to signal that they will fight until they win or die – and that they would do this in order to cover the withdrawal of their fellow warriors.

[88] Gemünden, "Between Karl May and Karl Marx," 245–46.

[89] In Sieg's words, some German hobbyists saw themselves as a community of the "persecuted yet defiant." I generalized and complemented her model to apply across a variety of forms of playing Indian. The "overwhelming forces" was an interchangeable component of the meaning of whites playing Indian. It could be a communist bureaucracy, the oppressive state, consumer society, U.S. imperialism, big corporations, or modern society in general. See Sieg, *Ethnic Drag,* 144.

[90] Personal visit to the *Po stopě Karla Maye / Tracing Karl May* exhibition in the Náprstek Museum of Asian, African and American Cultures, Prague, January and February, 2013.

What sounds like a didactic benediction to the children among *Tracing Karl May*'s visitors is itself a trace of Karl May's potential to inspire his readers to pursue social justice in earnest. The identification of Central Europeans with imaginary Indians articulated the potential for a variety of alliances. Karl May's novels positioned their German-turned American hero in a latently Christian alliance with the Apache that he had earned through the performance of frontier feats, and which was based on mutual sympathy and a blood brotherhood that practically meant adoption into the tribe. This alliance, however, precluded mass organized ethnic resistance. Central European hobbyists asserted their guardianship and authority over North American Indian cultures (again, primarily Plains Sioux in the late nineteenth century) through their "research-based" replication and performances of "authentic" representations of these societies. In their turn, the popular *Indianerfilme* portrayed American Indians as a group in a potential class-based international coalition against U.S. imperialism in the past and present. These tropes of playing Indian enabled the building of a Transatlantic network for Native sovereignty in the Late Cold War.[91] As Lakota medicine man Archie Fire Lame Deer explained about his travels in Central Europe in the 1980s, "I have to thank this man called Karl May, even though it was a world of fantasy that he had written about, never seen Lakotas, and made ridiculous things like Navajos with Mohawk haircuts – but he still raised the consciousness of the people, about the Indian people."[92]

While this latter alliance between live Indians and Central Europeans across the iron curtain awaits its own exhibition, to some extent it was definitely inspired by Karl May's oeuvre. And *that's* no small thing.

György Tóth

Francis D. Raška, **The Long Road to Victory: A History of Czechoslovak Exile Organizations.** Boulder, CO: East European Monographs No. DCCXCIX, Distributed by Columbia University Press, 2012. 251 pages. ISBN 978-0-88033-706-9

The political collapse of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union continue to attract scholarly attention. A number of studies have been published on the subject. Much remains to be done, especially due to the fact that there are many documents in Russian archives that are still waiting for

[91] For a history of this alliance, see György Tóth, "Red Nations: The Transatlantic Relations of the American Indian Radical Sovereignty Movement of the Late Cold War." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. The University of Iowa, 2012.

[92] Box 135, Folder 631. "Archie Fire, Tape 3; Wolakota." Audio recording, 1/2. March 2, 1986. Richard Erdoes Papers. Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library.

declassification. Thankfully, the sources on Czechoslovak exile organizations active during the postwar decades are accessible, although some of their archives may suffer from a lack of funding.

Francis D. Raška has studied Czechoslovak exile for many years. His book under review follows his earlier publications devoted to Czechoslovak political exiles: *Opuštění bojovníci: historie Rady svobodného Československa 1949–1961* [Deserted Warriors: A History of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia] (2009) and *Československý exil v boji za lidská práva* [Czechoslovak Exiles' Struggle for Human Rights] (2011). His books are based on meticulous research of published sources, archives, (e. g. at the Palacký University in Olomouc, which hosts the largest collection of materials relevant to Czechoslovak exile), and last but not least on interviews with surviving participants. The interviews are especially valuable as almost a quarter of a century has passed already since the end of the communist regime.

In his latest book, the author focuses on Czechoslovak exile organizations in the period between the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 and the collapse of the communist dictatorship in 1989. There were several waves of exiles of varying motives and persuasion in the four decades between 1948 and 1989. The post-February 1948 exiles were of a different ilk from those leaving for the West in 1968 and later. Many of the former were political opponents of the communists, often members of the prewar elites, wartime heroes who had participated in the Battle of Britain as RAF airmen or fighting the Germans in North Africa. By 1968, the regime had "mellowed" quite significantly, with many communists becoming reform-, i. e. liberal-minded. After the Soviet-led invasion in August 1968, there were reform communists, many of them prominent in the 1948 coup, in the repressive regime in the 1950s, and in subsequent purges, who decided to go to Western democratic countries, some of them hoping to return after the Soviet occupation had ended. Another category of exiles consisted of so-called economic emigrants, people who lost hope for personal advancement in Czechoslovakia and headed for a "better life." However, it would be too much of a simplification to claim that they strove for a better standard of living only. The social atmosphere in Czechoslovakia during "normalization" was quite stuffy and oppressive, and soon after August 1968 it became obvious that there was no end of the regime in sight as the communist system received a new lease on life by the Soviet-led invasion.

The post-1968 exiles included some communists who had participated in post-1948 purges; e. g. Jiří Pelikán was a member of the vetting commission which, in 1948, expelled pro-democracy students from Charles University, Prague. Pelikán, whose career in the 1950s and 1960s included prominent positions in the communist-dominated International Students' Union, also worked as the director of the Czechoslovak [State] Television. In the latter position, he supported the reformists in the Communist Party. In 1969, he became a political exile. The fact that both the persecutors and the persecuted of the 1950s found themselves in the same situation – in exile – led to discord within the Czechoslovak diaspora.

The body of the text gives a systematic description of individual segments and activities of exile organizations and persons. Chapter 1 deals with the emigration wave following the

crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968. Chapter 2 looks at the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and its activities after 1968. Chapter 3 analyzes the Listy group of reform communists who found themselves in the West. Chapter 4 deals with perhaps the most influential periodical over the four decades of communist dictatorship in Czechoslovakia, the Paris-based Svědectví [Testimony], published by Pavel Tigrid. Chapter 5 looks at the activities of Radio Free Europe, Chapter 6 at the Charta 77 Foundation that was founded to provide material assistance to Czechoslovak dissidents who stayed in their country (especially support payments to those who had lost their jobs for political reasons). Chapter 7, perhaps the most valuable and revealing part of the book, looks at the Palach Press Agency in Britain and its precarious relationship with the European Nuclear Disarmament campaign (END) as well as the shady person of Jan Kavan, who was to become the Czech Foreign Minister in 1998 [sic]. Chapter 8 focuses on the Documentation Center for the Promotion of Independent Czechoslovak Literature (since its relocation from Scheinfeld, Germany, to Prague, known as the Czechoslovak Documentation Center, ČSDS), and the concluding Chapter 9 gives a survey of exile publishing houses like Sixty-Eight Publishers in Toronto (run by Zdena Salivarová and Josef Škvorecký), Index in Cologne, and Rozmluvy in London (by Alexander Tomský).

The author was able to interview no fewer than ten persons who were among the important players in exile or their close relatives. It goes without saying that they are likely to have colored their responses in their favor. Still, interviews are one of the strengths of the book under review.

Apart from the index of persons, the book provides two lists: a list of organizations and a list of individuals. The List of Organizations contains some errors and imprecisions: for instance, the original communist-dominated Soviet-style ČSM (Czechoslovak Union of Youth) broke up in 1968; its successor, the normalization-era SSM (Socialist Youth Union), a re-incarnation of the ČSM in the period between 1970 and 1989, is not included in the list. The Civic Forum was certainly not active in the "Czech part of Slovakia" (182). "Vlajkaři" (the correct name of the organization was Vlajka – "Banner" or "Flag") (187) did exist prior to World War II; this fiercely nationalist group was active throughout the 1930s, and during the German occupation it embraced racist Nazi ideology. Some items on the list are out of place, like the "Trotskyists" (187). There are a number of easily accessible sources to give information on this variety of communists. To a certain extent the List of Individuals seems to lack direction and focus. There are persons who have little or nothing in common with the subject of the book and are barely mentioned in the body of the book, like Václav Beneš-Třebízský, Karel Čapek, Fidel Castro, Karel Jaromír Erben, Franz Kafka, Karl Marx, Joseph Stalin, Josip Broz Tito. Jan Lopatka was not a Czech journalist but a Czech literary critic, together with Bohumil Doležal one of the key contributors to the 1960s intellectual and literary monthly Tvář. Perhaps the most important omission is that the index and the list of persons should have included the name of Professor Otto Pick, from 1983 the director of the Czechoslovak section of Radio Free Europe. Pick returned to Czechoslovakia in 1991 and played an important role in the revival of Czech foreign policy and education of students as well as diplomats.

It should also be mentioned here that two of the individuals on these lists, Vlastislav Chalupa and Vladimír Škutina, were communist secret police agents, the former a very prominent one.

The author claims that the "critical step in the 1989 changes in Eastern Europe took place in Prague when East German and Czechoslovak officials decided to permit East German refugees […] to leave for West Germany." (45) In fact, the unraveling of the block started several months earlier, with the forming of the non-communist government in Poland (August 1989) led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

For the sake of disambiguation and to prevent unfair identification with the German Nazis, the Národní socialisté (members and supporters of Česká strana národně sociální) should not be called National Socialists in English but "members of the Czech National Social Party." It needs to be emphasized that the party had a liberal democratic, center-left ideology.

A final correction is that the top-ranking Czechoslovak communists did not use the Orlík castle as their weekend retreat (80); their retreat was a secret luxurious facility built for the Party at Vystrkov, about 3 miles north of the historical castle.

In conclusion: Francis D. Raška's new book is based on very meticulous research, numerous interviews and extensive literature. The generally descriptive character of the book may be attributed to the fact that it represents, thankfully, the first attempt to map the subject area in a broader context. Raška should be credited for interviewing many of the surviving exiles who were trying to keep the vision of free Czechoslovakia alive in the difficult conditions of the period.

Miloš Calda

Sally N. Cummings, **Understanding Central Asia: Politics and Contested Transformations.** Abingdon: Routledge, 2012, 240 pages. ISBN 978-0-415-29703-5

Central Asia is a region that has gained in importance rapidly since the demise of the Soviet Union due to the complex political, economic and security challenges. Despite its importance, it is quite difficult to portray this rather remote region in academia, partly due to the fact that not many high-quality introductory publications exist. Sally N. Cummings with her latest work, *Understanding Central Asia: Politics and Contested Transformations*, is striving to reverse this trend and open the academic treatment of Central Asia to a broader public. This is why it is worth to pay this textbook close attention.

Sally N. Cummings is a professor in the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews where she also serves as the Founding Director of the Institute of Middle Eastern, Central Asian and Caucasus Studies. Her principal research fields are security, politics of identity, nation- and state-building, and international politics with geographic

focus on Central Asia. She is especially well known for editing the Routledge Central Asian Studies book series.

The book is divided into eight chapters including Introduction and Conclusion that deal respectively with the definition of Central Asia; the region's modern history; authoritarian regimes; Islam, national and multiple identities; economics and political transformations; and the security in Central Asia. In addition, the book is supplemented with two appendices featuring further tables and maps, a bibliography and index. Whenever possible, the author synthesizes what Central Asian states have in common in the respective chapter's field. In the rest of the cases she rather picks the states one by one and tries to describe its peculiarities in respect to the topic.

Following a more general introduction, in Chapter 2, The region of Central Asia: What's in a name, Cummings deals with the question of what constitutes Central Asia and examines the broad variety of reasons that led to the coining of the term. This chapter discusses two main subjects. First, the terminological debate is expounded with a focus on geographical, etymological, historical-cultural and political and geostrategic definitions. Next, Cummings discusses the leitmotifs that played a role in the creation of the region's unique identity; she looks at the region as an intersection of nomadic and sedentary societies, and as a unity in diversity caused by its history of overlapping influences stemming from different empires, cultures, and religions. Elaborating on these characteristics, Cummings points out that the definition of the region is not steady and it evolves over time and space, a process which she demonstrates also by tracing how the term changed in the specific environment of Russian historiography over the course of the twentieth century.

Following the spatial definition, Cummings continues in the next chapter titled Empires, Soviet rule and sovereignty with the historical development of the region beginning with its transfer from the Russian to the Soviet Empire. Here she provides a detailed description of the fixing of the borders during the early years of the Soviet empire, investigates the Soviet rule and reviews a number of theories about the relations between Central Asia and Moscow. Against this backdrop, Cummings probes how tradition, modernization and Soviet legacy interacted in the specific processes of transformation after gaining independence from the Soviet Union.

Taking this as her starting point, the author next proceeds in her historical excursion into the post-Soviet era. In the chapter Authoritarian alternatives Cummings examines these countries' recently attained independence and looks into Central Asia's new quest to uphold its sovereignty in a post-Cold War environment. She describes the authoritarian nature of the new regimes largely as a natural continuation of the previous developments and the new nations' ambiguous identities. Special attention is dedicated to conflicting scenarios that unfolded in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, namely the Tulip Revolution, the Andijan uprising, and the Tajik civil war. Utilizing these examples, she explains how democratization and authoritarianism compete and how easy it is to fall into a vicious circle of rotating between descent into violence and the restoration of order.

In Chapter 5, Islam, nation and multiple identities in Central Asia, Cummings studies the linkage between nation and religion, mainly but not exclusively Islam. As the author puts it, identities of Islam in Central Asia have become fragmented over time. To better comprehend this, Cummings interrogates such concepts as the nation, tribe, clan, kinship and secularism. The author also explains how the ruling regimes throughout the region use Islam as one of the cornerstones of nation-building, but at the same time they suppress any kind of civic movements driven by Islam for fear of destabilizing their position.

Both the macro and micro economics of Central Asia are outlined in Chapter 6 titled Economics and political transformations. At the center of this part of the book is the relationship between political and economic transformation. The author explores two main models the new independent states have adopted regarding post-Soviet transition and liberalization of centrally-planned economies: the shock therapy and the gradualist approach. Regardless of which model of transition was applied and despite the abundance of natural resources, first of all oil and gas, Central Asia remains one of the poorest regions in the world. Due to corruption and nepotism, the poor are getting poorer while the richest are profiting from the status quo. In the following parts Cummings deals with the international political economy and asks the question of whether a "New Great Game" between major world powers is actually taking place in the region. The author concludes by arguing that according to statistics Russia has upheld its position as the biggest trading partner of Central Asia. However, Russian preponderant influence competes with the ever-growing presence of China and its hunger for the region's vast natural resources. The roles of the West, namely the EU and the USA, in the region are, according to Cummings, often exaggerated and once their military forces withdraw from Afghanistan, for these powers the region will once again become a peripheral one.

Finally, Chapter 7, Securing Central Asia, focuses on the most serious security threats the region has to face, namely terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational crime, and environmental challenges, and provides the reader with a theoretical basis to better understand the security issues present in the region. One by one, the author clarifies the constructivist, realist and liberalist approach towards Security Studies in order to supply the reader with a multifaceted picture of the region's evolving security setting.

In her conclusion, Sally N. Cummings sums up the peculiarities of the region that contribute to its unique identity. She specifically points to the dual legacies of the Soviet Union, where internationalism interfered with nationalism, the region being an intersection of various influences, and the chief goal of the regimes being self-preservation. She maintains that since their independence the five states of the region changed considerably, but the question remains about their directions. In the end Cummings warns against the danger of applying Western values and principles to this unique region and points out the perils of attempts trying to implement democracy from the outside.

Thanks to the various approaches mentioned and the many themes discussed in the book, one gets a very complex picture of the region, which I consider the greatest benefit of

the entire publication. It is remarkable how the author is able to survey such a vast amount of information and how she fits it all into a limited space of an introductory book to Central Asia Studies. Of special value are the book's early chapter concerning the definition of the region, and the chapter titled Economics and political transformations where Cummings has done a wonderful job in surveying scholarship in a simple but specific language.

In her attempt to depict the reality of Central Asia in a way as complex and unbiased as possible, however, the author often slides into lengthy, and sometimes unnecessary, explanations of theories in Political Science. Even though it was apparently the author's purest intention to introduce the student to the context of the region through presenting basic terminology, some parts amount to a rather incomprehensible exposition of different political theories. This primarily applies to the chapter regarding security and partly to the chapter dealing with identities in Central Asia. In both of these chapters much space is used to define basic terms and concepts (e.g. nation, tribe, clan, kinship) at the expense of devoting more attention to how they interact in the special settings of Central Asia. In addition, compared to the attention Cummings pays to the other countries of the region, I believe that some more space could have been devoted to Turkmenistan, which the book somewhat overlooked.

In summary, it is important to approach this publication as a work of a political scientist. One should not expect merely an account of dates and events related toward the region, but a textbook that instead of outright answers presents various problems from the field of Political Theory. Terms such as statehood, power, democracy, opposition, civil society and many others are examined within the various approaches, then evaluated and eventually applied to the region of Central Asia. All this makes *Understanding Central Asia: Politics and Contested Transformations* a valuable introductory book for an interested reader as it tries to at least touch upon all of the topics related to Central Asia, and thus serving as a good starting point for further study of this neglected region.

František Koudelka

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5. Reference Examples

Books

One Author or Editor

Richard Sakwa, *Postcommunism: Concepts in the Social Sciences* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999), 51–58.

Two Authors or Editors

Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth, eds., *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998).

Three Authors or Editors

Martha Brill Olcott, Anders Åslund, and Sherman W. Garnett, *Getting it Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 105–8.

More than Three Authors or Editors

Viktor N. Rudenko et al., eds., *Politicheskaia nauka i gosudarstvennaia vlasť v Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Novykh Nezavisimykh Gosudarstvakh* (Ekaterinburg: Uraľskoe otdelenie Rossiskoi Akademii Nauk, 2004).

Chapter or Other Part of a Book

Branislav Makyta, "Energetický dialóg EÚ a RF," in *Energie pro Evropu: energetická spolupráce Ruska a zemí postsovětského prostoru s Evropskou unií,* ed. Bohuslav Litera et al. (Praha: Eurolex Bohemia, 2006), 50–72.

Introduction, Foreword, or Similar Part of a Book

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