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EDITORIAL

Dear readers,

We are presenting you this year's first double issue of the journal *Acta Universitatis Carolinae – Studia Territorialia*.

Among other contributions, this thematic volume brings together three original research articles covering U.S. Cold War history and Transatlantic studies.

The volume opens with a study, by Jiří Pondělíček, of McCarthyism and its social ramifications in the period of 1947 to 1954. Kryštof Kozák and György Tóth, for their part, each provide their own distinct theoretical and empirical perspectives on the use of collective memory in U.S. foreign policy and Transatlantic relations.

We hope you will find this reading both inspirational and rewarding.

On behalf of the editorial team,

Jan Šír

ARTICLES

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HERE BE SPIES: MCCARTHYISM, ITS RECEPTION AND CONNECTIONS TO THE IMAGE OF THE USSR IN THE US BETWEEN 1947–1954

JIŘÍ PONDĚLÍČEK

Abstract
The paper deals with the era known as McCarthyism in the context of the early Cold War. It focuses on how the Americans perceived the threat of domestic Communists and how their view was linked to the events abroad. Using poll data from Gallup Polls conducted in and around the years in question, it discusses the cause and effect relation between the public opinion and the hearings. The paper concludes that the negative and sometimes hostile opinion of Americans toward Communism was not caused by McCarthyism, but it rather worked as a catalyst for the politicians who wanted to build their career on the issue of Communist subversion. When the external factors helped ease the domestic tension, the careers of McCarthy and others collapsed.
Keywords: Cold War, United States, McCarthyism, public opinion, communism, anti-communism
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Introduction

In the minds of average Americans, the early Cold War was dominated by two things: the atomic bomb and the spies. The fear of subversive activities of the communists at home was not new to the US public in 1947. The Red Scare which gripped Americans after the Second World War had been preceded by the first Red Scare between 1919 and 1921. In the same way, the infamous House Un-American Activities Committee, HUAC, which investigated the political affiliations of regular citizens, entertainers and governmental employees, had been foreshadowed by the Dies committee operating between 1938 and 1944. However, neither of these

spurred as much controversy as the later anti-communist crusade. To this day, authors writing on this topic are deeply divided mainly among ideological lines: liberals tend to see it as one great abomination and a dark age for civil liberties, while conservatives defend it as necessary means to rid the government and the society of disloyal elements. Those condemning it as a witch-hunt choose more absurd allegations and accusations to paint the picture of an era of paranoia. Those defending it point out that many of those alleged communist spies had in fact been working for the USSR. Surprisingly, one does not necessarily contradict another.

On the one hand, it is true that the spectacular investigation of Hollywood in 1947 and the public interest it sparked had little to do with the communist infiltration in the higher echelons of the US government. The theatrical aspect of the proceedings are reflected in the extensive media coverage of this extravaganza and the cultural paranoia that made it possible to end the careers of screenplay writers, actors and producers because of their suspicious opinions or past associations with communist movements. On the other, the infiltration of the US government was not a mere fantasy.[1]

McCarthyism then was both an effort to find spies and potential threats within the US government apparatus and an exercise in propaganda campaigning. For Nixon, the part he played in HUAC gained him much popularity and was in effect a stepping-stone to the Vice Presidency. Additionally, ideologically and culturally subversive groups, though benign as a security threat, became viable targets: left-wing academics, union members and leaders, civil rights activists, and homosexuals. The anti-communist crusaders were often accused of racism and anti-semitism. This does not seem implausible given the fact that J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the FBI, "hated Slavs, Jews, Catholics, homosexuals."[2] McCarthy himself was accused of being an anti-semite.

Furthermore, it is true that the general suspicion towards alien elements in the society was nothing new in American history. As Richard Fried puts it: "In a nation groping for identity, opponents of radicalism naturally sought to curb immigration, on the theory that immigrants carried dangerous ideas."[3] There had been Alien and Sedition Acts before and the immigrants and foreigners, whether Catholics or Jews, had been affected deeply by the Red Scare after the First World

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1 See John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), Kindle edition.

2 Jonathan Miles, *The Nine Lives of Otto Katz* (London: Transworld Publishers, 2010), Ch. 12, Kindle edition.

3 Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Ch. 2, Kindle edition.

War. There is more evidence to support the fact that anti-semitism was, at least partly, a driving force behind the identification of the subversives. Six out of the Hollywood ten were Jewish. Professor Joseph Litvak from Tufts University, for example, argues that the Jewish origin of the victims played a significant role.[4]

This paper does not intend to conceal, condone, or even justify these transgressions. It should be stated here and now that the hunt for spies had its very ugly side and its many innocent victims. These, however, are not the focus of the paper. Neither is it to describe or judge all the individual cases. The scope of the paper alone forbids such a mammoth task. Moreover, it has been done by many authors before[5] and the controversy in some cases still persists.

However, some cases like the famous Hiss-Chambers case deserve a little closer attention. Not only because there are many even today who believe that Hiss was innocent despite the fact that the Venona files and the Soviet archives point to the opposite conclusion.[6] There are two more interesting cases, that of Harry White and Judith Coplon. The first two cases show us how their handling by the HUAC made the question of guilt and innocence an ideological battleground for many years to come. The third one shows that the hunt for spies was not limitless.

This will complement the main focus of the paper, which is to try and assess what was fueling the witch-hunt, how strong the popular support for the hearings was, and last but not least, how the image of the USSR influenced the process and was influenced by it. The research questions which I tried to ask myself are implied by these three areas. First, what was the moving force? The hunt was conducted by the politicians, but did they create or rather satisfied the demand for it? Second, how strong or weak were the support for some action and the support for the course of action taken by the politicians? Third, how did the hunt for spies and communists in all walks of life instill, enforce or make use of the image of the USSR as a hostile power? The questions should be answered by a short study organized on a loose chronological basis.

The paper is a historical study using results of sociological research. Apart from a selection of secondary literature, I will mostly use the results of Gallup polls conducted in and around the years in question. These will serve to illustrate the opinion of Americans towards Communism, the Soviet Union, HUAC hearings, and

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[4] See Joseph Litvak, *The Un-Americans: Jews, The Blacklist, and Stoolpigeon Culture* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).

[5] See M. F. Toinet, transl. Hana Hurtová, *Hon na čarodejnice* (Praha: Themis, 1999); Ellen W. Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1998); and Ellen W. Schrecker, *Age of McCarthyism* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).

[6] See Haynes and Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage*, Ch. 5, Friends in High Places.

McCarthy's activities. They should illustrate how the influence of McCarthyism was always dependent on the outside factors: tension with the Soviets, Soviet atomic test, loss of China, and Korean War.

For the sake of clarity and consistency, the term McCarthyism in this paper is used to describe all the anti-communist activities including those that had occurred before the senator's rise to fame. However, since the public seem to have reacted differently to investigations in different areas, I will make a distinction between the investigations of communist subversion in the entertainment industry and the investigations concerning government offices and spies.

The Show's Opening

The year 1947 brought about the widely publicized Hollywood hearings and loyalty oath program for the government employees. Doherty describes the first HUAC meeting as a "political-cultural fandango more akin to a gala premiere at Grauman's Chinese Theater than a somber legislative inquiry."[7] The hearings started on 20 October and the first "unfriendly" witness, John Howard Larson, testified for the first time on 27 October. The same month, on 22 October, a poll was conducted by Gallup in which nearly 58% of respondents agreed that there were many communists in Hollywood and 48% that the communists frequently got their propaganda into movies. In both cases there were fewer of those who answered "no" than those who had no opinion: 18% to 24% and 22% to 26% respectively.[8] It is clear from these results that the atmosphere was rather unfriendly towards the communists in the industry, real or presumed, when the hearings started.

However strongly people felt about the need to purge Hollywood of communists, they did not unanimously accept the harsh methods of HUAC. According to Gallup data, 43% of those who had heard about the Congressional Committee's investigation agreed that the writers who had refused to say whether they had been members of the Communist party (CPUSA) should be punished, 39% thought they should not and 18% did not have any opinion.[9] There are two ways of looking at these results. The 43% who supported the punishment for artists whose only crime was that they had declined to state their political affiliation is quite a high figure. However, in the era of anti-communist paranoia and fear, as it is often described, the 39% who valued the concept of the freedom of speech in the first amendment

[7] Thomas Doherty, *Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press), Ch. 2, Kindle Edition.
[8] The Gallup Poll #406, q. 14a, 14b (October 1947), in the *Gallup Brain*.
[9] The Gallup Poll #407, q. 11d (May 1947), in the *Gallup Brain*.

higher than mitigating a threat, the existence of which they believed, is a relatively high number as well. Therefore, while there was a solid consensus on the goals, there was none on the means.

Some authors, like Albert Fried, blame the growing anti-communist zeal on the congressional elections in 1946. Fried claims "[t]he rise of McCarthyism owed much to the smashing Republican victory of 1946. […] It was of major significance that they achieved their victory at the expense of Northern and Western liberals […]; Southern Democrats […] as usual suffered no losses. Congress was now very conservative."[10] This is why HUAC, which had existed before, became more active. However, the Republican victory itself was a result of deep anti-communist feeling within the American society. In 1946, Republicans did not play the red card because they had won the election, but they won the election because they had played the red card. At that time, Americans were already expressing unfriendly or openly hostile opinions towards communism and the Soviet Union. For instance, 49% thought that the members of the Communist party are loyal to Russia, while only 24% considered them loyal to America and 27% had no opinion. In the same poll, 80% expressed a belief that Russia had spies in the US and 69% thought that communists should not be permitted to hold civil service jobs.[11] This poll was conducted in July of that year, i.e. before the election.

The prevailing anti-communist and anti-Soviet sentiment in the society was only reflected in the 80th Congress; the increased number of Republicans in the Congress was a result rather than a cause of the sentiment. This does not contradict the fact that the more active Congress, or its HUAC public shows, reinforced this sentiment in the American people. This seems clear from the poll data from before and after Congress started its public show. In March 1949, 70% of Americans thought that the membership in the CPUSA should be forbidden by law and that figure had actually risen from October 1947, when 61% of Americans had expressed the same belief. Furthermore, the figure had been similarly high much earlier before, in May 1941.[12] In the same fashion, the number of those who would bar the members of the Party from holding Civil Service jobs rose from 69% in March 1947 to 84% in February 1949.[13] While these increases are by no means insignificant, the figures had been consistently high even before the activities of HUAC started. The communists only received a temporary and partial pardon

[10] Albert Fried, *McCarthyism: The Great American Red Scare, A Documentary History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 23.
[11] The Gallup Poll #375, q. 7a, 7b, 7e (July, 1946), in the *Gallup Brain*.
[12] Gallup polls #237 (May 1941), #406 (October 1947) and #438 (March 1949), in the *Gallup Brain*.
[13] Gallup polls #393 (March 1947) and #437 (February 1949), in the *Gallup Brain*.

from the American people during the Second World War. This indicates that the American public was more resistant to the propaganda aspect of the hearings and exercised much more common sense than popularly believed.

The first Hollywood hearings and the case of the Hollywood Ten, while undoubtedly stirring the public opinion, did not cause immediate and widespread hysteria or paranoia. The situation for the communists, however, was becoming worse. Historian Richard Fried claims that the landmark year in this process was 1949. He writes that "the fragile political balance that kept anti-communism in check in 1948 crumbled in the next two years as remote events bumped aside bosses and in-laws as concerns of the average Joe."[14] The worsening of the international situation, the Soviet atomic test and the loss of China harmed the image and the situation of the American communists more than any campaign could have done. The hearings continued and the blacklist grew. The popular opinion did not react to this with hysteria, though. The hostility towards the CPUSA had been high since 1946, as we have seen. The real extravaganza came with the man whose name serves today as the label of the era, but McCarthy gave his infamous Wheeling speech only in 1950 when the situation had become ripe. The question is, then, what had made it ripe.

The Cold War and the Public

The anti-communist crusade and public opinion influenced and at times reinforced each other rather than one being caused by the other. This is not to say that the hearings before HUAC were the best way to assuage the public opinion, or that it was legal to prosecute actors and screenwriters based on an affiliation to a party. It is just to say that these hearings reacted to the public demand for something to be done. Of course, propaganda might have been responsible for the general dislike of communism and communists, but there are other possible, and more plausible, explanations. Vladislav M. Zubok points out that the cause for the hostility was in fact Stalin's behavior on the world stage. He writes: "Stalin's pressure on Iran, combined with his belligerence toward Turkey, put the Soviet Union on a collision course not only with the Truman administration but also with broad segments of American public opinion."[15] This is another argument against the overwhelming influence of the Congressional anti-communist crusade on the public. It is

[14] Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, Ch. 4.

[15] Vladislav M. Zubok, *Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), Ch. 2, Kindle edition.

likely that it was Stalin's actions that turned Americans against communism and the communists at home and abroad, while the Republican red-baiting campaign made use of that already existing sentiment.

Furthermore, the Republican Party was not the only one who jumped on the bandwagon. Historian Richard Fried claims that the "GOP [Grand Old Party, the Republicans] had no monopoly on the issue. The Democrats did their own red-baiting, chiefly of Wallace and his party."[16] Wallace certainly was a suitable target. In fact, 51% of respondents of a poll conducted in June 1948 agreed that Wallace's Third Party is run by communists. Only 23% of them disagreed. This judgment seems too harsh on Wallace, but the fact remains that he was the only influential supporter of cooperation with the Soviet Union despite Stalin's aggressive policy towards Poland, Turkey and Iran. Zubok explains that "the most influential friends were gone [by the beginning of 1946]. Roosevelt's death and the subsequent departure of Harry Hopkins, Henry Morgenthau, Harold Ickes, and the other New Dealers forever ended the Soviet Union's 'special relationship' with the United States. The last ally Stalin had in the US Government was […] Henry Wallace."[17]

In his speech "The Way to Peace" Wallace succeeded in appearing both a proponent of *realpolitik* in the international relationships and a hopeless idealist regarding the Soviet intentions. On the one hand, he claimed that "on our part, we should recognize that we have no mare [sic] business in the *political* affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the *political* affairs of Latin America, Western Europe and the United States."[18] This is something that might have helped to ease Stalin's paranoia at that time by reaffirming the respective spheres of influence. On the other hand, Wallace also stated that

> the two ideas [capitalism and communism] will endeavor to prove which can deliver the most satisfaction to the common man in their respective areas of political dominance. But by mutual agreement, this competition should be put on a friendly basis and the Russians should stop conniving against us in certain areas of the world just as we should stop scheming against them in other parts of the world.[19]

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[16] Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, Ch. 3.
[17] Zubok, *Failed Empire*, Ch. 2.
[18] Henry A. Wallace, "The Way to Peace," New York, September 12, 1946, *New Deal Network*, http://newdeal.feri.org/wallace/haw28.htm.
[19] Ibid.

In September 1946, this seemed as nothing more than wishful thinking. Wallace was swept aside by the same wave of feelings as the proponents of the Hollywood Ten and other real or alleged communists in the entertainment industry. Just as it was enough to end careers in show business when one did not firmly deny being or having been a communist, being soft on the Soviet Union was enough to end political careers. Having accepted an endorsement from the CPUSA, Wallace received just 2.37% of the popular vote and no Electoral Votes.[20]

Communism as a political force, never having been strong in the US, was almost completely defeated at the end of the 1940s. However, it continued to play an important part in the public life in a different way; as the image of the enemy both inside and outside, real and fictional. The members of the CPUSA were considered a liability at best and traitors at worst. In the Gallup Poll #373 from 1946, the Americans were asked what should be done with the communists in the US. 24% said they did not know and 18% thought they should be left alone. When the same question was asked two years later in the Gallup Poll #418T, the respective figures were 16% and 9%. The number of those who answered that Communists should be shot rose from 3% to 21%.[21] It is questionable whether 21% would really support summary executions of the CPUSA members, but the growing tendency towards harsher remedies is obvious. However, the figures also show that there was no significant increase in those supporting some kind of action against the domestic Communists. Close examination of the results seems to indicate that while there was an increase in the number of those favoring a violent solution to the problem, the ratio between supporters of some legal action and those who did not want to do anything or at least take no legal action remained roughly the same.

There were twelve possible answers in that survey. Of those twelve, seven refer to some legal action being taken against the communists, three do not and two can be considered neutral. The two neutral are: no answer and a miscellaneous answer. The three moderate are: do nothing, should not encourage them, and let them rave but watch them. The seven calling for one form of legal action or another are: curb them, keep them out of governmental offices, try to get rid of them, deport them, shoot them or hang them, jail them, and outlaw them. The neutral group scored

[20] Of course, this poor result could have been caused by his other controversial views such as his opposition to segregation. This certainly made him unpalatable to the Southern Democrat voters, but a staunch segregationist Strom Thrumond fared only marginally better in the elections: 2.4% of the popular vote. Therefore, it seems safe to say that this was not a decisive issue for most voters. The red-baiting against civil rights activists, however, remains an interesting and shameful chapter in the US history.

[21] Gallup polls #373 (June 1946) and #418T (May 1948), in the *Gallup Brain*.

25% in 1946 and 20% in 1948. The second, moderate group of answers were chosen by 24% of the respondents in 1946 and 22% in 1948. The last group of answers gained support of 51% of the people asked in 1946 and 58% in 1948.[22] There is a shift, but certainly not as dramatic as the one from 3% to 21% in the support of executions. The radicalization is clear and the anti-communist campaign is the usual suspect. However, it seems that there was a movement towards extremity among those who had already supported some action before the hearings started rather than a radical shift of balance between the two groups.

American anti-communism negatively affected many. Also, the campaign against the reds was used to silence or at least marginalize other dissenting voices in the public discourse. Richard Fried claims "[a]dvocates of peace, civil rights, and other causes had the growing burden of proving that they were not acting as 'fronts' for of 'dupes' of communism. […] To be leftist was to be suspect."[23] At the time, when anti-communist and anti-Soviet sentiment ran high, it was tempting to label one's opponent as a communist and thus turning the public against him or her. Furthermore, condemning scores of actors and actresses, writers, and teachers merely for being communists or members of communist affiliated groups was an act that damaged the American concept of civil liberties more that the communists could have ever done. There is, however, an important difference between artists and educators and government officials, which the Americans seem to have respected and which is often overlooked.

At the time of a severe crisis or conflict, the sensitivity towards the rights of those who stand on the other side weakens. This has happened more than once in the American history, but the late 1940s and early 1950s seem to occupy a privileged position in the American conscience. The American concept of civil liberties does present a problem in dealing with opposition and dissent during a conflict. One such example is the suspension of the *habeas corpus* in Maryland at the outset of the Civil War. Lincoln defended his decision by saying: "Are all the laws, but one [the right of habeas corpus], to go unexecuted […] and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated."[24] While this caused much controversy at the time, it does not present a contentious topic today. Our tolerance for such exceptions depends on how serious we consider the threat to be and as we shall see later, the threat of communist infiltration of the government was all too real in the late 1940s. Granting that the methods of HUAC served little to shed light on

[22] Gallup polls #373 (June 1946) and #418T (May 1948), in the *Gallup Brain*.
[23] Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, Ch. 4.
[24] James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), Ch. 9, Kindle edition.

the communist subversion of the government, as would be demonstrated later, it is hard to deny that the government had the right to protect itself against the people who were secretly working towards its doom, which is something the Americans understood better than the prosecution of screenplay writers and artists.

Loyalty Oaths and the Question of Government Infiltration

The starting gun fired in 1947 when President Truman announced his loyalty program. Fried even labeled it "the key moment in the second Red Scare"[25] and he connects it more with Truman's foreign agenda than with the domestic policy when he claims that "without such a pledge to fight communists at home, the penny pinching, isolationist Republican Congress was unlikely to muster enthusiasm for fighting the Red menace abroad."[26] While Truman's plea in Congress for money for the Greek and Turkish governments and the program both occurred in March 1947, it is hardly conclusive evidence. John Earl Haynes provides another explanation why Truman started the program long after he had received information about the possible risks from the FBI. He claims "in late 1945 and in 1946, the White House had reacted with a mixture of indifference and skepticism to FBI reports […]. By early 1947, however, this indifference ended. The accumulation of information from defectors […], along with the Venona decryptions made senior Truman administration officials realize the reports of Soviet spying constituted more that FBI paranoia."[27]

Truman himself expressed his concern with the possible subversion of the US government. During a press conference on 3 April 1947, he was asked a question about his having called the communist threat a "bugaboo." He said: "I am not worried about the Communist Party taking over the Government of the United States, but I am against a person, whose loyalty is not to the Government of the United States, holding a Government job."[28] In his statement on the program on 14 November 1947, he repeated this by saying: "I believe I speak for all the people of the United States when I say that disloyal and subversive elements must be removed from the employ of the Government."[29] Truman was pushed by both

[25] Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, Ch. 3.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Haynes and Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage*, Ch. 1.
[28] President's News Conference, April 3, 1947, *Truman's Presidential Library*, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2178&st=loyalty&st1=.
[29] Harry S. Truman, "Statement on the Government's Employee Loyalty Program," November 14, 1947, *Truman's Presidential Library*, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1865&st=&st1=.

Republicans and his fellow Democrats to adopt his measures by necessity and the support for these was much stronger than for cultural subversion purges. Some even pushed him to pursue a more vigorous and aggressive policy.

The chairman of HUAC, who also tried the Hollywood Ten, J. Parnell Thomas wrote Truman a public letter on 23 April, a month after the loyalty program was announced. In it, he urged Truman to "step in and take a hand in this matter and direct your Attorney General to throw the full weight of his Department behind an effort."[30] Truman's answer was very short, consisting of three sentences only one of which dealt with the subject matter. He wrote: "I think you will find the Attorney General will do his duty as it should be done and in the interest of the welfare of the United States."[31] However, Truman did not budge; the loyalty program remained relatively sensible both in its size and method. The same cannot be said about the hearings of HUAC. The purging of Hollywood was a mere overture to the most famous hearings of Harry Dexter White, Lauchlin Currie, and Alger Hiss. The three cases were sensational and spur controversy even to this day. Richard Fried is undoubtedly justified to say that "trials, like other political acts, have an educational (or theatrical) function."[32] As Doherty claims and as we shall see in the examination of Hiss–Chambers case, these trials undoubtedly did. This fact, however, does not rule out that they were, in fact, aiming at correct targets.

The question whether the infiltration of the government was real or just imagined, a result of the paranoid atmosphere of the early Cold War, is not a mere technicality. Even accepting that the methods of HUAC were doubtful at best, it still makes a difference whether there was a real basis for the allegations or they were all smoke and mirrors. As it has been argued earlier, agreeing that the threat is real weakens the insistence on the civil liberties, for better or worse. Americans believed this threat was real. But, was it justified?

Hayes argues that for many years, many influential authors denied any validity to the claims saying that "communists were depicted as innocent victims of an irrational and oppressive American Government."[33] He also argues that this is simply not true, claiming that "while not every Soviet spy was a communist, most were. And

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[30] J. Parnell Thomas, "Letter to Harry S. Truman," April 23, 1947, *Truman's Presidential Library*, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/loyaltyprogram/documents/index.php?pagenumber=3&documentdate=1947-04-25&documentid=10-11.

[31] Harry S. Truman, "Letter to J. Parnell Thomas," April 25, 1947, *Truman's Presidential Library*, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/loyaltyprogram/documents/index.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate=1947-04-25&documentid=10-11.

[32] Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, Ch. 4.

[33] Hayes and Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage*, Ch. 1.

while not every American Communist was a spy, hundreds were."[34] In August 1948, right after the first testimonies of White and Hiss before HUAC, 60% of those who heard about the Congressional investigations agreed that there was something to it.[35] It seems now that this was a justified fear.[36]

As it has been mentioned, there are three cases that are particularly interesting for the purpose of this paper. The limited scope of this paper does not allow us to examine the cases in detail and the topic of the article does not require it. It will suffice to describe how handling the cases planted a seed of controversy and mistrust harvest of which we have been reaping ever since.

Of the three cases, Coplon is the only one in which the person was tried in court for the actual crime of spying. Her case was quite important for two reasons. Firstly, as Richard Fried puts it, "[the trial] embarrassed the FBI, showing it had investigated such menaces as Henry A. Wallace supporters, Hollywood leftist, even the author of a thesis on the New Deal in New Zealand."[37] Secondly, it proved that while the legislative inquiry may have been much too eager to condemn the reds, the judicial system worked. Coplon appealed and both sentences were overturned because of the FBI's illegal activities during the investigation. Fried writes "the indictment stood and Coplon's guilt seemed obvious, but she was set free by the demands of due process."[38] Even at the height of the early Cold War tension[39] and even in the very strong case against Coplon, courts did not freely sacrificed due process.

This seemingly insignificant detail is the greatest single demonstration of the difference between McCarthyism and the political show-trials in the USSR and its East European satellites, to which it is often compared. Democracy cannot prevent hostility towards political groups viewed as alien and adversary. Neither can it prevent shrewd politicians from exploiting such sentiments. It makes it much harder for said politicians to hijack the system to serve the one overriding principle. It may not make much of a difference to the victims whose lives and careers were ruined, but it should to a scholar. The judicial system, with some exceptions, still honored legal process. HUAC, as a legislative body, obviously did not have to adhere to the same standards. In the cases of White and Hiss, the public trials

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[34] Ibid.

[35] Gallup Poll #423K, q. 10d (August 1948), in the *Gallup Brain*.

[36] See Alexander Vassiliev and Alex Weinstein, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America – Stalin Era* (New York: Random House, 2000); and Jonathan Miles, *The Nine Lives of Otto Katz* (London: Transworld Publishers, 2010).

[37] Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, Ch. 4.

[38] Ibid.

[39] The trials and appeals took place between 1949 and 1951, the time of the loss of China, the Soviet atomic test, and the Korean War.

before the committee were much more emotional than Coplon's, but again, their creating a mass hysteria in the American public is questionable.

Alger Hiss: A Botched Job

Harry Dexter White had been a subject of interest to the FBI long before he was accused of being a Soviet agent. On 8 November 1945 the FBI informed the president through his aide about the suspicion. In July and August 1948, White was accused of giving information to the Soviets by Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers. He appeared before the committee himself on 13 August and denied the charges. A few days after that, he died. To those who opposed the Congressional hearings or those who saw it as a political battleground, White became a martyr, "a victim, said his friends, of HUAC's hazing."[40] Many on the left saw his case as a part of a smear campaign against New Deal, just as they did with Alger Hiss and just as some see it now. Richard Fried says: "Throughout the Eightieth Congress, HUAC sought to discover the ties that it firmly suspected ran from Communist Party headquarters to the New Deal's inner sanctums."[41] That may be so, but the fact remains that some prominent New Dealers did not have a clear conscience.

Furthermore, it may be said that if destroying the image of the New Deal through linking it with communist subversion was the goal of HUAC, it failed miserably. In a survey of May 1952, when asked which type of presidential candidate they would favor, 63% of respondents answered that "one who claims some of the […] New Deal and […] Fair Deal policies have been good for the country and some […] bad."[42] At the same time, 19% would favor a candidate who claimed that almost all of them had been good and just 13% the one who claimed that almost all of them had been bad. New Deal and Fair Deal were not divisive issues in 1952 at the height of McCarthy's demagogic crusade. Americans were not turned against the New Deal and the New Dealers; they were turned against Communists.

While White died so shortly after his testimony that it would have been impossible to decide his guilt or innocence, even if HUAC had had the means to do so. The case of Alger Hiss remained in the spotlights for most of the period discussed in this paper. Both cases are similar in that the dispute over their guilt has persisted to the present. This paper does not try to bring any new information to the questions of guilt. Suffice it to say that Tony Judt, who can hardly be accused

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[40] Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, Ch. 3.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Gallup Poll #493, q. 15 (May 1952), in the *Gallup Brain*.

of being biased against liberals, once wrote that "for those who do not believe in fairies, the Hiss affair is now closed."[43] Furthermore, the allegations that were at the time hard if not impossible to prove were actually confirmed by both the declassified Venona files and the research in Moscow archives.[44] The same could not be said about the case of Harry White.

The more interesting question is how HUAC handled the case from the theatrical aspect and how this helped or hindered the quest for truth. The whole extravaganza of the hearings started in 1948 and coincided with the birth of the most influential mass media of the second half of the twentieth century, the television. Doherty points out how symptomatic the first televised broadcasts from Congress were: "On November 11, 1947, WMAL-TV […] telecast testimony from Secretary of State George C. Marshall before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. […] On August 25, 1948, the first telecast from the House […] offered another preview of coming attractions: the inquiry […] into the accusations by ex-communist Whittaker Chambers that Alger Hiss, […], had operated as a Soviet agent in the 1930s."[45] While the TV audience at that point was marginal compared with radio listeners and cinema goers, the publicity given to this trial was, nevertheless, substantial. The first testimony by Chambers was broadcast and filmed for newsreels; when Hiss refuted his allegations on 5 August he, despite being filmed, complained "[d]enials do not always catch up with charges."[46] To which Mr. John McDowell, representative from Pennsylvania, replied "[B]ut I think they will in your case."[47] He was right; the hearings became a spectacle first on the radio and in the cinemas and, not long after that, on television. Hiss was granted his chance to deny the charges.

The whole drama achieved little in terms of clarifying the role of Alger Hiss in the presumed spy ring. This was due to the fact that HUAC could only work in a very limited space and relied most heavily and almost exclusively on the testimonies. Even with this limited space, however, the committee worked surprisingly inefficiently.

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[43] Tony Judt, "An American Tragedy? The Case of Whittaker Chambers," in *Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2008), 299.

[44] See Vassiliev and Weinstein, *The Haunted Wood*, Ch. 12; and Eduard Mark, "In Re Alger Hiss: A Final Verdict from the Archives of the KGB," *Journal of Cold War Studies* Vol. 11, No. 3 (Summer 2009): 26–67.

[45] Doherty, *Cold War Cool Medium*, Ch. 6.

[46] Alger Hiss, Testimony before HUAC, August 5, 1948, University of Missouri – Kansas City (hereafter cited as Hiss's Testimony, August 5, 1948, UMKC), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/8-5testimony.html.

[47] Ibid.

The results of the HUAC hearings in Hiss–Chambers case were inconclusive; Chambers' testimony was corroborated by some other witnesses, but generally he offered no proof. Judt writes that "when Chambers repeated his charges […] on a radio program, without the benefit of the legal protection […], Hiss sued him for slander on September 27, 1948. Obliged now to come up with something more […], Chambers finally […] affirmed that Alger Hiss and others had been engaged in espionage. He backed his claim by […] documents and microfilms."[48] Only after that the evidence was strong enough to try Hiss by a grand jury for perjury. Before the Committee, the two men could have argued for hours, days and even months without offering any conclusive proof; Chambers repeating his testimony and Hiss producing new and new character witnesses for him.

The questions of HUAC did not help much either. The best example is Mr. Mundt's asking Hiss about the Yalta conference:

> Mr. Mundt: Did you participate in those parts which gave Russia three votes in the Assembly?
>
> Mr. Hiss: I was present at the conference and am familiar with some of the fact involved in that particular arrangement.
>
> Mr. Mundt: You would say you did participate in the formation of that part of the agreement?
>
> Mr. Hiss: I had nothing to do with the decision that these votes be granter. I opposed them.[49]

This answer, obviously, could not have been either confirmed or refuted before the Committee, since the documentation about this was still classified. Hiss easily scored points without having to prove anything. Mr. Mundt had had a similar stroke of brilliance two days before that when questioning Chambers.

> Mr. Mundt: As communism is now directed by Stalin from Moscow and as his tactics are now carried out, how would you differentiate between Stalin's communism and Hitler's nazism?

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[48] Judt, "An American Tragedy?" 301.
[49] Hiss's Testimony, August 5, 1948, UMKC.

> Mr. Chambers: I should find that very difficult to do. I would say that they are most totalitarian forms of government, if you like. I feel quite unable to answer that.[50]

This had nothing to do with the case, invoked the interrogated to formulate his opinion towards the whole ideology rather than to enlighten the investigators about certain facts. This question, and others like it, was an inevitable result of the hearing being a public political spectacle, but it did little to invoke confidence in HUAC. Mostly, it seemed that the whole ideology was on trial. The dilettantism of HUAC is, however, in itself not a proof of Hiss's innocence. It just shows us how dependent the belief in the guilt of Alger Hiss and many others became on the factors connected to the procedure and people involved. The truth did not matter much, as the whole case turned into an emotional popularity contest.

John Earl Haynes writes "[s]ince the information about Soviet espionage and American Communist participation derived largely from the testimony of defectors and a mass of circumstantial evidence, the public's belief in those reports rested on faith in the integrity of government security officials."[51] This was true for one of the members of HUAC more than for the others. Nixon was one of the most pursuant and active members of HUAC during his time in it and during this case in particular. Nixon himself understood the importance of the publicity for the hearings and the outcomes. He admitted in 1971 in a conversation about a different topic that HUAC "won the Hiss case in the papers. We did. I had to leak stuff all over the place. Because the Justice Department would not prosecute it. Hoover didn't even cooperate. […] It was won in the papers."[52] All these factors combined and the matter of Hiss's guilt became more a question of a public consensus rather than a judicial decision. This backfired in the years after Watergate. It is as Richard Fried writes: "As Nixon's star dimmed, Hiss's flickered anew."[53]

However, it was Nixon himself who invoked the ghost of the closed case first. In 1952, he used TV and the wide publicity that the activities of the Committee granted him to his personal political goal. As the press at that time acknowledged, he succeeded. Doherty quotes from the article in *Variety* about that interview. It reads: "If Senator Richard M. Nixon isn't elected Vice President, he can always get a job as a TV actor. […] He turned in the kind of a job that should have had GOP

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[50] Whittaker Chambers, Testimony before HUAC, August 3, 1948, University of Missouri – Kansas City, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/8-3testimony.html.
[51] Hayes and Kehler, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage*, Ch. 1.
[52] Stanley Kutler, ed., *Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes* (New York: The Free Press, 1997), Pt. 1, Kindle edition.
[53] Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, Ch. 1.

adherents gleeful at their sets and the Demos gnashing in frustration."[54] Although Nixon tried to revive the publicity of the trial that had happened two years before his interview and he admittedly succeeded at this, the time of the Committee had already passed and a new star rose among the publicly well-known anti-communists, Senator Joseph McCarthy. McCarthy gave a new impetus to the Hollywood investigation and also to the hunt for spies and communists within the government agencies. While the HUAC hearings were in no way immune to demagogic arguments and disrespect for civil liberties, McCarthy easily surpassed it in both respects. This was, paradoxically, the reason for both his great success and his fall.

The Climax: McCarthy Rises in Bad Times

McCarthy's vigorous anti-communist campaign did not create the anti-red sentiment in the US, much like HUAC had not done before him. Nevertheless, it is clear from the surveys quoted above that he came to an arena where anti-communism was predominant and well accepted. Yet, it was rather a consequence of the international situation development. Just as the American public had lost any kind of sympathy for the communist cause in 1946 and 1947 due to Stalin's ruthless foreign policy, it entered the frenzied state of mind in 1949 and 1950 because of the events on the international stage. In a survey conducted in August 1948, 55% of the respondents believed that there would be another big war in ten years. 41% of those who answered "yes" also thought that the responsibility for starting the war would rest on Russia, Soviet Russia, the USSR, communist countries, or Stalin. The second most frequent opinion expressed with just 4% was that groups of people, factions, capitalists, politicians, communists, political parties, Negroes, or Labor would cause the war.[55] Those figures alone show a high level of mistrust towards the USSR and communism.

The public opinion grew more hostile in the following two years. In a poll from January 1949, only 17% of respondents believed that the Russian government sincerely desired peace and 72% thought it did not. Almost a half believed that the war with Russia was just a matter of time.[56] That was the beginning of the year during which the Americans were to face two great shocks which presumably may have provided McCarthy the window of opportunity. First came the Soviet atomic test. Hayes claims that "when the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device

[54] Doherty, *Cold War Cool Medium*, Ch. 5.
[55] Gallup Poll #423K, q. 6a, 6b (August 1948), in the *Gallup Brain*.
[56] Gallup Poll #435K, q. 3a, q. 3b (January 1949), in the *Gallup Brain*.

in 1949, ordinary Americans as well as the nation's leaders realized that […] Stalin had just gained the power to destroy cities at will. This perception colored the early Cold War with the hues of apocalypse."[57] 44% of people believed that this had made another war more likely.[58] Again, whether the test itself gave Stalin the power to destroy cities is doubtful at best, but the shock of it undoubtedly contributed to McCarthy's rise. The second event was the emergence of the communist People's Republic of China.

As has been already pointed out, McCarthy started his career as a media shooting star by his speech at Wheeling, West Virginia. In this speech, the senator produced, from the propagandist point of view, a perfect mixture of fear-mongering and hope-offering. He painted a bleak picture of the outside world that is becoming increasingly communist and more and more hostile towards the American way of life. He stated the following: "Six years ago […] there was within the Soviet orbit 180,000,000 people. Lined up on the anti-totalitarian side there were in the world at that time roughly 1,625,000,000 people. Today […] there are 800,000,000 people under the absolute domination of Soviet Russia […]. On our side, the figure has shrunk to around 500,000,000."[59] However shaky the figures were,[60] they had an effect. After establishing that there is a clear and present danger and that communism is on the rise, McCarthy started pointing at the culprits. There were many of them and there were to be many more in the next four years.

The whole four years of McCarthy's crusade have been thoroughly studied and described; it is not necessary to repeat the well known facts here. Furthermore, this paper is concerned with the public reaction to it, rather than the proceedings themselves. It is enough to say that he employed the same methods even more ruthlessly and targeted the same groups of people, mostly government employees and artists. When the senator made his charges, the reaction of the public was mostly favorable. Three months after his speech, 88% of Americans had heard about his charges and 68% thought that there was something to those charges.[61] That certainly seems as an overwhelming approval, but contrary to the popular belief, there were serious doubts both about his charges and his methods right from the start. In June 1950, a poll was conducted in which 31% of those

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[57] Hayes and Kehler, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage*, Ch. 1.
[58] Gallup Poll #449, q. 4a (October 1948), in the *Gallup Brain*.
[59] Joseph McCarthy, "Speech at Wheeling," February 9, 1950, George Mason University, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6456.
[60] Clearly, it was China tipping the balance. However, what he meant by the "antitotalitarian" front is unclear and China's belonging to such a league less clear still.
[61] Gallup Poll #455, q. 3a, q 3b (April 1950), in the *Gallup Brain*.

respondents who had heard about McCarthy's charges expressed approval with them, 12% thought that there had to be a foundation for them but that they are greatly exaggerated, and 22% did not believe them at all.[62]

This does not seem as widespread hysteria; many people simply did not jump on the bandwagon, even though they considered the danger to be real and many more did not even believe there was any threat at all. McCarthy did achieve a political success with his accusations, because even though he was unable to prove his charges, the suspicion stuck and for some Americans that was enough. This was clear in the case of Owen Lattimore, as Richard Fried writes: "Though McCarthy could not confirm his charges against Lattimore, the Democrats [on the Tydings Committee] had a hard time proving the negative – Lattimore's innocence."[63] While the 31% believing the charges completely may not be a majority, it can prove to be a decisive factor if they rally behind one of the parties in the American politied system and if they consider the topic important. McCarthy did not need to be loved by all and he certainly was not. In July 1951, 58% of Americans either did not have an opinion on McCarthy or did not know him at all. A guarter held unfavorable or qualified unfavorable opinions and just 16% held favorable or qualified favorable opinions. It seems that many of those who believed there was a grain of truth in his allegations did not agree with his style and demagogy. However, McCarthy's influence on the issue had significant ramifications in a different way.

It has been established that due to unfavorable international development and foreign policy setbacks the sense of impending crisis had been strongly implanted into the American public by the early 1950s. It is clear how high the communist issue was on the minds of Americans from a poll conducted in March 1952 in the anticipation of the elections. The respondents were shown a list of twelve possible actions of the future president and they were supposed to choose the three most important to them. 36% selected cleaning out communism in the US; it was the second most frequent answer.[64] McCarthy may not have helped to raise the awareness of the issue, because it had been prominent even before his entry on the stage. Nevertheless, he gathered a group of supporters who cared little for how the cleaning out process would be conducted, and they viewed everyone who criticized this process with suspicion. This made him virtually untouchable within the Republican Party.

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[62] Gallup Poll #456, q. 4b (June 1950), in the *Gallup Brain*.
[63] Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, Ch. 5.
[64] Gallup Poll #488, q. 13 (March 1952), in the *Gallup Brain*.

Dwight Eisenhower offers one explanation for this in a letter he wrote on 18 May 1953 to Mr. Harry Bullis. He writes "this particular individual wants, above all else, publicity. Nothing would probably please him more than to get the publicity that would be generated by public repudiation by the President."[65] While denying McCarthy publicity could have been a valid strategy, in 1953 it was already too late for that. Richard Fried points out that Eisenhower "knew that many Republicans respected McCarthy. […] With the Republicans holding control of Congress by only a thin margin […], Ike sought to avoid alienating any members of his party."[66] In other words, the Republicans could have been hurt just as easily by the communist issue and they may have wanted just to avoid similar split as the Democrats had seen in 1947 and 1948. Either way, the Republican Party was too weak to get rid of McCarthy by its own power. In the end, his fall was preconditioned by the same thing that had enabled his rise; the international situation.

In the years following WWII, Stalin and his policy was the root cause for the reemergence of political anti-communism as a major political force. In the same way, Stalin's death was the single most important event behind the decline of this political force. Shortly after his death, the unpopular Korean War ended and as Albert Fried puts it: "It was a situation hardly conductive to McCarthy's political well being."[67] His fall, however, was not immediate. The support for McCarthy and his methods had been far from universal or even overwhelming even at the time of the crisis. In 1953, these figures began to decline and in 1954 they literally plummeted.

Apart from the easing of the tension between the US and the USSR, McCarthy experienced another setback in 1953. In July, J. B. Matthews was forced to resign from a position of a research director. Mr. Matthews had written an article called "Reds and Our Churches" in which he called Protestant clerics "the largest single group supporting the Communist apparatus in the United States today."[68] McCarthy, who wanted to keep him, had to yield, but the attack on churches proved to be more dangerous than attacking communists elsewhere. In March and April 1953, three months before the Matthews's affair, 51% of Americans disagreed with a Congressional investigation in the churches, while 76% approved the same investigation in schools and colleges and 66% believed that even former members of the Communist

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[65] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Letter to Mr. Harry Bullis," May 18, 1953, *Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library*, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/mccarthyism/1953_05_18_DDE_to_Bullis.pdf.

[66] Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, Ch. 5.

[67] Albert Fried, *McCarthyism: The Great American Red Scare*, 178.

[68] Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, Ch. 5.

Party should be barred from teaching.[69] Americans were clearly much more sensitive to the attack on religion than on academic freedom.

Nevertheless, the greatest mistake that McCarthy made was his attack on another institution that Americans held in great esteem, the Army. It was Eisenhower who had declined to publicly condemn McCarthy, who took the action. As Albert Fried puts it: "For Eisenhower […] this was the last straw. He was determined to bring McCarthy down."[70] In the following Army–McCarthy hearings, which took place at the beginning of 1954, the defiant senator from Wisconsin lost the last vestiges of the public confidence. As early as towards the end of 1953, the support for the extraordinary legislative inquiries on communism was declining. Only 37% of Americans believed that the investigation of the communists in the government should be left to Congress while 43% believed it should be left entirely to the FBI and the Department of Justice.[71] By June 1954, the respective figures were 30% and 57%.[72] The very essence of McCarthyism, a public investigation by Congress, had lost support. There were to be no more show-trials.

Conclusion

McCarthyism placed great pressure on American civil liberties and public opinion. However, as we have seen, it cannot be said that the anti-communism of the late 1940s and early 1950s, which is undeniable, was provoked by the anti-red campaigning in the form of the HUAC hearings. It was rather a result of factors outside the US politics. The position of the domestic communists was very much connected to the image of the Soviet Union as a friendly or unfriendly power. The US politics and its inner dynamics did play their part in the way the process unfolded, but they were not the cause. The views on the domestic communists reflected the mistrust of the Soviet Union and the times of the most severe anti-communist feelings within the society coincided with the most tense moments in the international situation. The Soviet Union was viewed as the power pulling the strings attached to the communists in the US. The image of the communists and communism is, therefore, strongly linked to the image of the USSR itself.

McCarthyism affected the lives of many and that the hunt for communists meant large and extensive suppression of civil liberties. However, the suppression was far from being unprecedented and it was far from being universal. Not all

[69] The Gallup Poll #513, q. 15a, q. 15b, q. 17 (March 1953), in the *Gallup Brain*.
[70] Albert Fried, *McCarthyism: The Great American Red Scare*, 179.
[71] The Gallup Poll #524, q. 11b (December 1953), in the *Gallup Brain*.
[72] The Gallup Poll #532, q. 7b (June 1954), in the *Gallup Brain*.

Americans supported it, as we have seen, and courts did not affirm it. Considering the sense of an urgent threat that can be detected from the opinion polls, it is rather surprising that there were not more Americans calling for harsher methods. McCarthyism undoubtedly was a period of heightened fear which led to many unjust persecutions and personal tragedies. However, the danger was not at all imagined or fabricated. Furthermore, it never went without opposition and criticism and this critical opinion was always represented strongly, unlike the positive opinion towards the Soviet Union and communism.

Biographical Note

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TOWARDS A STUDY OF MEMORY IN US TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: THE LATE COLD WAR

GYÖRGY TÓTH

Abstract
Probing the intersection of Memory Studies and International Relations, this article traces the uses of collective memory in late Cold War US Transatlantic relations. First it surveys the existing scholarly literature on the topic and critiques some selected methodological models. Next it discusses the politics of cultural memory in the United States itself. In its main body, the study focuses on the core of the use of memory in US Transatlantic relations: historical reasoning in the fields of 1) foreign policy decision-making, and 2) public or cultural diplomacy. The author argues that while the US government may not have had a centrally articulated and overarching policy for the use of collective memory in US diplomacy, such a policy can nevertheless be assembled out of its foreign policy training and the cultural diplomacy practices of the United States Information Agency, both of which continued throughout the 1990s, the first period of the post-Cold War era.
Keywords: United States, Cold War, memory, foreign policy, cultural diplomacy, transatlantic relations
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In the spring of 2015 – the run-up to the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War Two – even an ordinary Internet search showed that recent public rhetoric has couched the ongoing crisis in the Ukraine in the terms of that past world conflict. It is not only sensationalist journalists, aged cold warriors or implacable Ukrainian nationalists who have been calling Russian president Vladimir Putin a modern day Hitler. Some of the highest dignitaries in the West who have made the same comparison include former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Britain's Prince Charles, and the president of Lithuania – all public figures who know the power of words, and who are fully aware that their reference to Europe's darkest period will have a serious effect on the framing of the current

crisis in Russian-Western relations.[1] While they may be intended as a rhetorical line in the sand for Russia, such uses of the past likely exacerbate the conflict rather than de-escalating it. On the other side, Ukrainian Russian separatists and the Russian media and government have consistently blamed the conflict on Western "fascists"[2] – which is their way of evoking their own narrative of the Great War in Defense of the Homeland against the Nazis and their collaborators 70 years ago – in order to mobilize their side in the current conflict.

Such heated rhetoric lays bare the potential of public memory to serve as a tool of propaganda or cultural diplomacy: to move, persuade, mobilize, and commit people to a cause or policy not only nationally, but also in international relations. Yet as important as they are, scholars, security analysts and government officials need to look not only for short-term preventative measures, but for a formulation of a coherent Transatlantic memory policy to support peaceful relations in Eastern Europe and the Baltics. In other words, government officials as well scholars of nationalism and memory should do more than include memory as one of the resources of international relations. They should identify what expressions of memory can be used in diplomacy, when and how – and develop models for a coherent memory policy.

This article looks for traces of such a memory policy in the use of collective memory in late Cold War US Transatlantic relations.[3] First I will survey the existing scholarship on the topic, and critique some of its methodological models. Next I will

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1 A few of the many media reports of such framing include "Hillary Clinton's Comparison of Vladimir Putin and Adolf Hitler Checks Out," *ABC News Australia*, March 31, 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-25/hillary-clinton-putin-hitler-comparison-checks-out/5325608; Guy Faulconbridge and Alissa de Carbonnel, "Prince Charles Provokes Diplomatic Row by Comparing Putin to Hitler," *Reuters*, May 22, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/22/uk-britain-putin-prince-idUKKBN0E20P920140522; and "Lithuanian President Likens Putin to Stalin and Hitler," *The Moscow Times*, June 23, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/lithuanian-president-likens-putin-to-stalin-and-hitler/502332.html.

2 A few of the media reports of such framing include Neil MacFarquhar, "Putin Accuses U.S. of Backing 'Neo-Fascists' and 'Islamic Radicals'," *New York Times*, October 24, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/world/europe/vladimir-putin-lashes-out-at-us-for-backing-neo-fascists-and-islamic-radicals.html?_r=0; and Shaun Walker, "Donetsk's Pro-Russia Rebels Celebrate Expelling 'Fascist Ukrainian Junta'," *The Guardian*, September 8, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/08/donetsk-pro-russia-rebels-ukrainian-junta.

3 This article discusses the author's preliminary findings in the multi-sited and multi-member research project "The Role of Collective Memory in Post-Cold War Transatlantic Relations," funded by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic. The article also benefited from the author's post-doctoral research fellowship at the at the Centre for Collective Memory Research at the Institute of International Studies, Charles University, Prague, the Czech Republic, as well as from the author's research fellowship at the International Forum for U.S. Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, USA.

discuss the politics of cultural memory in the United States itself, which I argue is dynamic, multi-player, yet still hierarchically structured. The main body of this study then focuses on the core of the use of memory in US Transatlantic relations: historical reasoning in the fields of 1) training for foreign policy decision-making; and 2) public or cultural diplomacy. First I will interpret as primary source a late Cold War university course textbook written to train future government officials in the application of historical analogies in decision making. I will conclude with an analysis of the United States Information Agency's overseas commemorative programming for the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution as a case study of the uses of collective memory in late Cold War US Transatlantic relations. My analyses demonstrate that while the US government may not have had a centrally articulated and overarching policy for the use of collective memory in US diplomacy, such a policy can nevertheless be assembled out of its foreign policy training and cultural diplomacy practices, both of which continued throughout the 1990s, the first period of the post-Cold War era.

1. The Role of Memory in Transatlantic Relations

Until early 2014, most scholars of US-European relations concluded that the Transatlantic bond has been weakened in the last decade, and some even seriously questioned its future.[4] The focal point of most discussions on Transatlantic ties has tended to be the role of values on which the partnership has been built. According to Robert Kagan, fundamental differences in the approach towards new security threats, the use of force versus negotiation, the nature and merits of a globalized economy, and environmental issues all stand in the way of developing an effective partnership across the Atlantic in the future.[5] On the other hand, Jeffrey J. Anderson, G. John Ikenberry and Thomas Risse suggested that the current disagreements may be neither fatal nor permanent, but minor and transient.[6] They conclude that the strains in Transatlantic relations notwithstanding, the current crisis by no means signifies the "end of the West." Timothy Garton Ash was even more optimistic about the prospects of Transatlantic cooperation than Anderson et al. when he insisted that "there are not two separate sets of values, European

[4] See Andrew Dorman and Joyce Kaufman, eds., *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perception, Policy and Practice* (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

[5] See Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 2004).

[6] See J. Jeffrey Anderson, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse, eds., *The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).

and American, but several intersecting sets of values," that allow for successful and productive transatlantic cooperation.[7]

In sharp contrast to the previous decade, by the time of this writing (the spring of 2015), the crisis in the Ukraine has opened a new chapter in Transatlantic relations. Combined with efforts to reduce the region's dependence on Russian-supplied energy, the recent US and Western European economic sanctions against the Russian Federation, their political pressure, aid to the Ukrainian government, and the sending of US military materiel and troops to Eastern Europe and the Baltic states signal a tightening of the Transatlantic alliance in the face of Russian expansionism and civil strife in these parts of Europe. As demonstrated above, the crisis is often framed in terms of the memory of World War Two. This current use of memory in Transatlantic relations locks the parties into the current conflict by mobilizing their sides through an uncritical use historical analogies. While historians of the Second World War can map out the faults of such analogies, this article is concerned with an apparent lack of policy planning for the use of memory in Transatlantic relations. By adding an analysis of the politics of remembering, collective memory and representations of the past to the current discussions about the prospects of Transatlantic relations, this paper aims to contribute to filling a gap in scholarly literature.

The study of memory has a voluminous literature. As Duncan S. A. Bell has observed, since the 1970s memory has become a veritable "organizing principle of scholarly [and] artistic work" in sociology, anthropology, history and cultural studies.[8] More recently, Patrick Finney has characterized the field of Memory Studies as a "vast interdisciplinary enterprise."[9] Theoretically developed first by Maurice Halbwachs,[10] in recent years the concept of collective memory has been advanced in particular by Jan and Aleida Assmann.[11] As Peter Novick argued, the key idea that emerged from this field was that the quest to reconstruct and codify an "objective history" was not as relevant to social reality as the *perceptions* of the

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[7] See Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West* (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 168.

[8] Duncan S. A. Bell, ed., *Memory, Trauma and World Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1, 7.

[9] Patrick Finney, "The Ubiquitous Presence of the Past? Collective Memory and International History," *International History Review* Vol. 36, No. 3 (2014): 445.

[10] Maurice Halbwachs, *La Mémoire Collective* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950). English translation *Collective Memory* (New York: Harper & Row Colophon Books, 1980).

[11] Aleida Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

past within collective memory.[12] Depending on the scale of analysis, a smaller or larger variety of actors contribute to the construction and reproduction of collective memory.

The idea that collective memory is located primarily in the minds of a given community and thus can be used as an analytical category has been critiqued by a number of scholars. For one, Pauli Bauer has pointed out that such analytical use of the concept of collective memory privileges it as some kind of monolithic concept, erasing the diversity and dynamism of its formation, expressions, reproduction and transmission, and shifts in remembrance.[13] Both Jeffrey K. Olick and Erica Resende and Dovile Budryte have argued that "memory should be treated as a 'sensitizing concept' (but not as an operational concept, a measurable phenomenon), drawing our attention to the importance of *representations* of the past (especially the traumatic past) in the construction of group identities."[14] As James V. Wertsch has cautioned, "We must remember that collective memory is a process and not a thing, a faculty rather than a place. Collective memory is something – or rather, many things – we do, not something or many things we have."[15] Heeding such warnings, this article will not try to define the *nature* of collective memory – rather, it will focus on its *manifestations*, such as historical rhetoric in decision making and anniversaries and commemorations, in order to understand how it was used in late twentieth century US Transatlantic diplomacy. Collective memory is a potent political force, as it serves as an important frame of reference for proposed policies as well as for their public justification. There is an inherent tension between the desire for a more neutral view of history based primarily on the critical examination of evidence, and the utilitarian interpretation of selected events to serve political purposes. As pointed out by Langenbacher and Shain, understanding collective memory as a *tool* to mobilize people is highly relevant for international relations and international politics.[16]

This article joins a growing body of scholarship on the role of memory in an international context. Mostly during the last decade, scholars have been examining

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[12] Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream. The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[13] Dr. Pauli Bauer, personal communication, October 2014.

[14] Jeffrey K. Olick, *The Politics of Regret. On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility* (New York: Routledge, 2007); and Erica Resende and Dovile Budryte, eds., *Memory and Trauma in International Relations: Theories, Cases and Debates* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 3.

[15] James V. Wertsch, *Voices of Collective Remembering* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 40.

[16] Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain, eds., *Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 11.

a variety of aspects of the topic, including the ways in which policy and decision makers utilize memory,[17] the relationship between trauma, memory, and international politics,[18] the multiplicity of actors who shape memory and thereby influence international relations,[19] the uses of memory in the Global War on Terror,[20] and the role of memory in the conflicts in post-Cold War Europe.[21] The scholarly consensus is that "there is copious contemporary and historical evidence that collective memories can impact upon the course of international relations."[22] Yet as Patrick Finney has argued, scholars of international history need to take memory more seriously than they so far have.[23] Among others, Finney's research agenda prescribes a renewed focus on the *role* of collective memory in international decision making[24] – which this paper will discuss in the context of late Cold War US foreign policy training. As I will show, however, this is a scholarly project fraught with

[17] William Inboden, "Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties of Historical Experience: A Taxonomy," *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 37, No. 2 (2014): 291–318; R. D. Schulzinger, "Memory and Understanding U.S. Foreign Relations," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. M. J. Hogan and T. G. Paterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 336–52; Roland Paris, "Kosovo and the Metaphor War," *Political Science Quarterly*, cxvii (2002): 423–50; and R. E. Neustadt and E. R. May, *Thinking in Time: the Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).

[18] Resende and Dudryte, eds., *Memory and Trauma in International Relations*; Olick, *The Politics of Regret*; and Bell, ed., *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*.

[19] Langenbacher and Shain, eds., *Power and the Past*.

[20] Omer Bartov, "September 11 in the Rearview Mirror: Contemporary Policies and Perceptions of the Past"; Michael Kazin, "The Eventful Dates 12/12 and 9/11: Tales of Power and Tales of Experience in Contemporary History"; Jeffrey Herf, "The Use and Abuse of History in Berlin and Washington since 9/11: A Plea for a New Era of Candor"; and Thomas U. Berger, "Of Shrines and Hooligans: The Structure of the History Problem in East Asia after 9/11", in *Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations*, ed. Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 147–60, 161–72, 173–88, and 189–202, respectively; D. B. MacDonald, *Thinking History, Fighting Evil: Neoconservatives and the Perils of Analogy in American Politics* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009); D. Hoogland Noon, "Operation Enduring Analogy: World War II, the War on Terror, and the Uses of Historical Memory," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, vii (2004), 339–66; and Liam Kennedy, "Remembering September 11: Photography as Cultural Diplomacy," *International Affairs* 79 (2003): 315–26.

[21] Dan Stone, "Memory Wars in the New Europe," in *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History*, ed. Dan Stone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 714–31; Maria Mälksoo, *The Politics of Becoming European: a Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries* (New York: Routledge, 2010); Paris, "Kosovo and the Metaphor War," 423–50; D. B. MacDonald, *Balkan Holocausts? Serbian and Croatian Victim-Centred Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002); and Jan-Werner Müller, *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[22] Patrick Finney, "The Ubiquitous Presence of the Past? Collective Memory and International History," *International History Review* Vol. 36, No. 3 (2014): 457.

[23] Finney, "The Ubiquitous Presence," 449, 450, 464.

[24] Finney, "The Ubiquitous Presence," 452.

pitfalls; instead, it is more fruitful to analyze how collective memory is *used* in US foreign policy – and this is my real project here.

Much of the recent scholarly discussions concerned the precise nature and dynamics of collective memory, and thus the very conceptual framework that is used to study it. Several scholars have warned against the proliferation and indiscriminate use of the term *memory*, and have called for greater theoretical rigor as reflected in terminology. For one, Jay Winter has discarded the original term altogether and recommended the adoption of *remembrance* to denote a focus on the actors and the politics of remembering.[25] The most nuanced of such interventions came from Duncan Bell, who advocated for a conceptual separation of collective memory and national mythology. For him,

> *Collective memory* is understood as the process whereby groups of individuals share and to some extent harmonize (autobiographical) memories of past experiences, and it is therefore limited spatially and temporally. *Myths*, meanwhile, can escape the bounds of experience – they are simplified, highly selective and widely shared narrations of an imagined past, the stories that people and groups tell about their location (and meaning) in time.[26]

In Bell's formulation, only war veterans', trauma survivors' and historical witnesses' recollections could be called memory. Anything outside of these – among them cultural representations, rhetorical invocations, and non-witness social rituals of remembering – would have to be termed national mythology. While he acknowledges that "they interpenetrate and overlap at various points," Bell nevertheless insists that "it is essential to try and delineate them, even if this undertaking can never be achieved completely."[27]

My formulation of memory takes issue with Bell's demarcation. Witnesses or participants of the original event are but one of the many groups in any society who shape collective memory; there is ample proof that while they exert some influence, they do not fully fix the meaning of historical events for the nation even in their own lifetime. Their experience and lessons derived from their (already multiple and conflicting) experiences of the original event are at best mediated through other social, cultural and political structures (including shifting political regimes, intergenerational communication, and the media and popular culture

[25] Jay Winter, *Remembering War: the Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 3.
[26] Bell, *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*, 27, emphasis added.
[27] Bell, 27.

industry). What is more, with the passing of this witness generation, their experiences are increasingly folded into representations of national memory. (In national crises or under repressive regimes, their memories may even be silenced or at least driven underground.) Thus, veterans are but one subculture of a larger national memory that can be discerned from its expressions. The scholarly consensus emphasizes the political nature of such understanding of the past: collective memory is constructed, enacted and contested by a multiplicity of actors.[28] The politics of cultural memory in the United States is a prime example of this – this will be discussed in part 2.

Of the many nuanced but contentious definitions of collective memory, my use of the term public memory is closest to Jan Assmann's concept of *cultural memory*, which denotes the ways of institutionalized remembering of (most usually) the national past. Assmann defines cultural memory as "that body of reusable texts, images, and rituals specific to each society in each epoch, whose 'cultivation' serves to stabilize and convey that society's self-image. Upon such collective knowledge […] each group bases its awareness of unity and particularity."[29] As Wulf Kansteiner subsequently elucidated, "Cultural memory consists of objectified culture – that is, the texts, rites, images, buildings and monuments which are designed to recall fateful events in the history of the collective. As the officially sanctioned heritage of a society, they are intended for the *longue durée*."[30] Part 3 of this article traces the deployment of such cultural memory in late Cold War US Transatlantic relations.

2. National Memory in the United States

As a historically diverse and dynamic albeit "imperfect" democracy, the United States is a prime example of the contested and multiple meanings of the national past. Historically, the continuing presence of the indigenous population during and after the European colonization of the continent, the Transatlantic slave trade, and immigration from Europe, Asia and Latin America have all made for subcultural collective memories that coexist as well as contend with the dominant

[28] Finney, "The Ubiquitous Presence," 448; Resende and Dudryte, eds., *Memory and Trauma in International Relations*, 62, 63, 71–73; Langenbacher and Shain, eds., *Power and the Past*, 8; Bell, *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*, 5, 15.

[29] Jan Assmann, "Collective Memory and Cultural Identity," *New German Critique*, lxv (1995): 126, 127, 132.

[30] Wulf Kansteiner, "Finding Meaning in Memory: a Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies," *History and Theory*, xli (2002): 182.

memory regime of the white Anglo-American middle class. African American commemorative traditions range from the "Mardi Gras Indians"[31] to the celebration of Juneteenth, the anniversary of the announcement of the abolition of slavery in Texas on June 19, 1865. As a result of massive immigration, European-derived US ethnic groups including the Irish, the Italians and the Poles also exert an influence on local and regional memory.[32] As Kryštof Kozák has shown, Mexican Americans have their distinct memory of the history of Texas and US-Mexican relations.[33]

Just as importantly, the ideal of equality enshrined in the United States Constitution as well as the widely accepted adage that "immigrants made this nation" have also provided a point of reference and a powerful justification for the attempts of subcultural groups to reinterpret the national past based on their memory. Thus, many of the nation's subcultural and historically marginalized groups – among them African and Native Americans, women, and dissenters – have both contested and used various anniversaries of the national past to commemoratively perform their own meaning of the original event, and make claims for political, social and cultural rights. The Civil Rights Movement's 1963 March on Washington used the hundred's anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation and the site of the Lincoln Memorial; the 200th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence saw commemorations by a so-called "Bicentennial without Colonies" coalition for social and political causes; and American Indians have been publicly counter-commemorating Columbus Day at least since the late twentieth century.[34] As a result of Euro-American preferences, ethnic activism, moral imperatives, and to appeal to ethnic voters in elections, several originally subcultural anniversaries such as Columbus Day, Juneteenth, Kwanzaa and Black History Month have also been lifted or reworked into state and federal government commemorative programming.

Yet the dominant Anglo and Euro-American memory regime continues to not only define US national memory, but – through its periodic reassertion often

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[31] See Joseph Roach, *Cities of the Dead: Circum-Atlantic Performance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); George Lipsitz, "Mardi Gras Indians: Carnival and Counter-Narrative in Black New Orleans," *Cultural Critique* No. 10 (Fall 1988): 99–121.

[32] John Bodnar, "The Construction of Ethnic Memory" and "Conclusion: Subcultures and the Regime," in *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century*, by John Bodnar (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 41–77 and 245–54, respectively.

[33] Kryštof Kozák, "Superiors, Victims, or Neighbors? The Collective Memory Divide between Anglos and Mexicans," *The United States as a Divided Nation – Past and Present*, ed. Marcin Grabowski, Kryštof Kozák and György Tóth (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 2014), 269–86.

[34] Sam Hitchmough, "'It's Not Your Country Any More': Contested National Narratives and the Columbus Day Parade Protests in Denver," *European Journal of American Culture* Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 2013): 263–83.

triggered by a perceived or actual crisis – to enact its edicts with an iron hand. Many of its official patriotic rituals and stories were developed or codified in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries as part of US nativist efforts to "Americanize" immigrants thought to be significantly different from the Anglo-European settlers. Conservative Anglo-Americans and national leaders also responded to the appearance of leftist ideologies, the struggles of organized labor, US involvement in two world wars, and the Cold War by devising such cultural-political "litmus tests" as the rituals around the national flag, the Pledge of Allegiance, and other "invented traditions" of civil pageantry.[35] Historic battlefields and the war dead in country and abroad are venerated through serious rituals not only by the national government, but also by veterans' groups, civic associations, and historical re-enactors.[36] The resurgence of iron-clad patriotism bordering on intolerant nationalism as a response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks is but the most recent and obvious example of the continued hegemony of this national memory regime in the United States.[37] Out of sincere patriotism, self or group interest, or a pressure to acculturate, most subcultural groups at least strategically subscribe to the patriotic values and rituals represented by the dominant American memory regime.

The functions of this hegemonic US national memory are predictable. Above all, the official, public history and educational version of the national past aims to maintain unity, coherence, and loyalty to the status quo in politics, society, and culture. As early as around the birth of the new nation, the British-American painter Benjamin West created pictures such as his 1770 *Death of General Wolfe* to remind seething elites on both sides of the Atlantic of their shared British patriotism, which had recently won a war against France.[38] Painting his *Washington Crossing the Delaware* in 1850–51 in Düsseldorf, Germany, German-American painter Emmanuel Leutze deliberately picked the theme of patriotic courage turning the tide of the American Revolution in order to invoke the glorious past shared both by slaveholders, moderate US politicians, and abolitionists, who were now inching closer to a civil war. As David Blight has shown, by the early twentieth century veterans' reunions, popular romances and plays, and political rhetoric had managed to purge the memory of the US Civil War of its racial component, and

[35] Bodnar, *Remaking America*; Richard M. Fried, *The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming! Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold-War America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

[36] Edward T. Linenthal, *Sacred Ground: Americans and their Battlefields* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1991).

[37] Among others, see Susan Faludi, *The Terror Dream* (New York: Picador, 2007).

[38] Benjamin West's 1770 painting titled *Death of General Wolfe* depicted a scene from the Battle of Quebec in 1759, waged against France as part of the Seven Years' War.

slavery as a cause of the conflict was erased by the official white reconciliationist remembrance.[39]

Even more than in other countries, another powerful player in the expressions as well as shaping of US national memory is the media and popular culture industry. Early film showed its potential to influence interpretations of history through D. W. Griffith's 1915 *The Birth of a Nation*, which popularized a white supremacist and reconciliationist revision of the memory of the Civil War and Radical Reconstruction. The Disney Company's *Davy Crockett* television series in the 1950s tapped into a yearning for guidance from the past about American values that could help US society fight the Cold War. Since the late twentieth century, historical documentaries directed by Ken Burns have powerfully shaped the ways in which Americans represent their past as well as how they understand it[40] – his 1990 *The Civil War* aimed to create order out of the diversity of multiculturalism for his mainstream white middle class older male audience.[41] In the twenty-first century, TV period fiction drama shows like *Deadwood*, *Mad Men* and *Hell on Wheels* use a historical epoch as a backdrop to intricate plots of social intrigue. At the same time, the major US history cable channels have come to be dominated by reality TV-style documentaries relying on low-cost re-enactments[42] and often focusing on the sensational parts of history; their products such as *The Deadliest Warrior* have influenced the computer animation and video games, as well as popular content on the Internet.

The reigning mode of media remembrance of US history, especially of wars, is highly personalized, demands identification with characters,[43] and emphasizes the everyday life and struggles of its subjects. This is combined with a demand for accuracy of detail in design and props not unlike in historical re-enactment – it is no wonder that many historical documentaries rely on re-enactment even more than the Ken Burns methods of film making. Especially evident in war movies and shows such as *Saving Private Ryan* and *Band of Brothers*, such "tyranny of details"

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[39] David W. Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 2001).

[40] Gary R. Edgerton, "Mediating Thomas Jefferson: Ken Burns as Popular Historian," in *Television Histories: Shaping Collective Memory in the Media Age*, ed. Gary R. Edgerton and Peter C. Rollins (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 168–90.

[41] Gary R. Edgerton and Peter C. Rollins, eds., *Television Histories: Shaping Collective Memory in the Media Age* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 4–5.

[42] One instance where re-enactment is a positive development in historical documentary film making is the American Indian history documentary series *We Shall Remain* (dir. Chris Eyre, Public Broadcasting Service: 2009), in which re-enactment serves to empower Native Americans to represent their own history, and thereby also becomes an expression of their memory. For more on the film, see http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/weshallremain/.

[43] Edgerton and Rollins, eds., *Television Histories*, 2–3.

tends to privilege the immediate experience of "being there"[44] and the microhistorical struggles of the little man over critical reflection about the wider historical context, and it obscures or erases the moral dimension of history, the responsibility of political and other leaders, as well as the larger historical structures and forces that conditioned the struggle of the characters.

Yet the American popular culture industry's memory regime does not go unchallenged by the historical professions. "Traditional" entities like history museums, archives, libraries and universities have made inroads in popular history through their ingenious use of digital social media.[45] Even in a narrower sense, professional historians continue to exert influence on US collective memory. Not only do they serve as consultants for documentary and nonfiction feature films, a few of them also influence the thinking of presidents. While David Blight was historical consultant for the 2012 movie *Lincoln*, directed by Steven Spielberg and starring Daniel Day-Lewis, in his first term President Barack Obama claimed he gave much thought to the lessons in Doris Kearns Goodwin's book *Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln*.

Not unlike in other countries, the post-Cold War period witnessed intense struggles over the ideological content of expressions of memory in the United States. Veterans' groups and conservatives in politics and the media fiercely reasserted their patriotic memory regime by criticizing the critical interpretation of the role of art in the conquest of the West in the Smithsonian's 1991 exhibition titled *The West as America, Reinterpreting Images of the Frontier, 1820–1920*,[46] as well as the perspectives of the US nuclear strike on Japan in its 1995 display *Crossroads: The End of World War II, the Atomic Bomb and the Cold War*.[47] Over the same years, former chairperson of the National Endowment for the Humanities Lynne Cheney criticized the US history curriculum for teaching a negative view

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[44] Edgerton and Rollins, eds., *Television Histories*, 3.

[45] One example of the many is the Internet and digital social media use of the Special Collections and University Archives of The University of Iowa: they regularly work through a Facebook profile, Twitter, Pinterest and Tumblr account, as well as projects of digitization and "crowdsourcing" (asking Internet visitors to interactively improve content) on their own websites. Online respectively, http://uispeccoll.tumblr.com/.

[46] Stephen C. Behrendt, Review of *The West as America: Reinterpreting Images of the Frontier, 1820–1920*, ed. by William H. Truettner, *Great Plains Quarterly* 1, 1 (1992), 289–90, http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly/652/. See also "Vox Populi" readers' comments book, *New York Times*, July 7, 1991, http://people.virginia.edu/~mmw3v/west/reviews/nyt_commentbook.pdf.

[47] Neil A. Lewis, "Smithsonian Substantially Alters Enola Gay Exhibit After Criticism," *New York Times*, October 1, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/01/us/smithsonian-substantially-alters-enola-gay-exhibit-after-criticism.html. Also see "The Enola Gay Controversy," History on Trial. Lehigh University Digital Library, http://digital.lib.lehigh.edu/trial/enola/.

of the national past – emphasizing the injustices committed against American minorities and other nations over the country's exceptional achievements and values of Christian faith, U.S. capitalist enterprise, democracy, technological and scientific progress, and the U.S. as a world power.[48] Chilling progressive efforts to influence popular history, such attacks were part of a larger conservative revival and mobilization in politics to gain power for the Republican Party and its patriotic-nationalist ethos.[49]

3. The Legacy of the Cold War for Memory in US Transatlantic Relations

For over 40 years, the government of the United States functioned under the ideological assumptions of the Cold War, for which some of the best and the brightest of the country developed corresponding security apparatuses and operating procedures. Accordingly, American policy and decision makers as well as of the larger circles of the national elite attempted to utilize all realms of knowledge that could plausibly assist them in containing if not winning their global struggle. In order to understand the outlook of some of the power players in US government *beyond* the end of the Cold War, it is necessary to study their use of memory in the late phase of the global contest.

Collective Memory and Decision Making

For Patrick Finney's research focus on the role of collective memory in international decision making,[50] one potential smoking gun is R. E. Neustadt and E. R. May's 1986 book *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers*.[51] Because of the timing of its publication and its likely influence on decision making processes,[52] the book bears closer examination.

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[48] See Lynne Cheney, *Telling the Truth: Why Our Culture and Our Country Have Stopped Making Sense – And What We Can Do About It* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).

[49] See James Davison Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (New York: Basic Books, 1991); and Richard Jensen, "The Culture Wars, 1965–1995: A Historian's Map," *Journal of Social History* 29 (October 1995): 17–37.

[50] Finney, "The Ubiquitous Presence," 452.

[51] Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*.

[52] What Neustadt and May called "historical reasoning" or "historical analogies" fits into my formulation of collective memory, which is comprised of personal memory, the dominant and official memory regime, the influence of the historical professions, popular culture, cultural memory, and subcultural memories. Hence I use the authors' terms to refer to memory here.

Published in 1986 by Macmillan USA, reprinted in 1988 by Free Press, and deemed profitable enough to issue on e-readers in 2011,[53] Neustadt and May's book continues to be assigned in graduate-level university courses,[54] and it is featured under "Leadership and Management" on the recommended reading list of the American Foreign Service Association, the professional association and labor union of both the US State Department and USAID.[55] Academic and professional communities continue to find the book relevant and make it part of the expertise needed by those in high government office. Written by two professors at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, both of whom had also served in or worked with several presidential administrations and advised those in power or close to it, the book is as close to being a manual or policy paper for a conscious and "routine" use of historical reasoning in decision making as a document can be. In the late Cold War and the post-Communist period, *Thinking in Time* was used in the training of generations of people who went into public service, some of whom subsequently worked their way up to high levels of government and policy making, and are still there in the second decade of the twenty-first century. In this sense, the book offers both descriptive and prescriptive insights into the role of memory in decision making in the United States government.

To answer the question "could better routine staff work have achieved better results?"[56] the book examines a number of case studies from the 1950s through the 1980s of right and wrong decisions based on historical analogies. Yet even as they draw conclusions, Neustadt and May go beyond the usual judgment by professional historians that government does not know or use history. The authors focus

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[53] Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, on Barnes and Noble, http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/thinking-in-time-richard-e-neustadt/1111508544?ean=9780029227916.

[54] Among others, the book is assigned as a reading in courses at the Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University (http://www.hart.sanford.duke.edu/index.php/courses/syllabus/hist_195s.06_-_leadership_in_american_history); the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, Florida International University (http://sipa.fiu.edu/about-us/sipa-senior-fellows-1/dexter-lehtinen/syllabus/); Tufts University (http://ase.tufts.edu/polsci/curriculum/syllabi/fall2014/ps101.pdf); the American Academy of Diplomacy (http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/programs/Diplomacy_and_Education/AAD_Member_Course_Syllabi/Edelman%20SAIS_Diplomatic%20Disasters%20Syllabus.pdf); the School of International Relations, the University of Southern California (dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/32/docs/IR_341_Fall14_Syllabus-2.doc); the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs, George Mason University (http://spgia.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/PDFs/Syllabi/2014/Fall/PUBP/Rhodes-PUBP700-006-Fall-2014.pdf); the University of Colorado at Boulder (http://www.colorado.edu/history/chester/IAFS1000Syllabus2006.htm); and Oberlin College (http://new.oberlin.edu/dotAsset/1713746.pdf).

[55] Recommended reading list. American Foreign Service Association, http://www.afsa.org/PublicationsResources/FSReadingList/AFSARecommendedReading.aspx.

[56] Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, xiii–xv, 3.

on formulating micro-procedures for even marginally better results in decision making, working within the confines of contingency situations at the highest levels of government. Accordingly, the book recommends a to-do list of fast background research and conceptual moves that lead to better situation assessment, options and decisions.

Neustadt and May's criticism of the usual use of historical reasoning in decision making is not that government officials do not use analogies from the past – it is that they use them without adequate reflection and without questioning their appropriateness for the current situation. Most such situations begin with a crisis that requires an urgent response, which forces decision makers into a reactive position. Leaders are often tempted to use historical analogies as shorthand for the complex current scenario – regardless of their appropriateness for it. Combined with the pressure to act, such ready-made parallels make careful deliberation difficult.[57] The authors' lessons from successful decision making show that careful reflection and an examination of the presumptions of historical parallels and proposed options tend to yield better policy results. For example, Secretary of State Dean Acheson intervened in the Kennedy cabinet's deliberations during the Cuban Missile Crisis by explaining why the current situation was *not* analogous to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, causing the president's war council to change their positions.[58]

Among others, successful decision makers ask about the history and memory of their and their adversaries' institutions and well as persons, thus arraying for patterns of behavior that can be used to predict actions and reactions in the current crisis. At the same time, such leaders also envisioned their own challenge on a time line of the history of the topic at hand.[59] Neustadt and May illuminate that what often allows for better decision making is buying time for careful deliberation and keeping policy options open.

In their book, Neustadt and May paint a revealing picture of the culture of those in power. Leaders do not usually think about history for their own decisions; they have little time to focus on an issue even when it presents them with a crisis; and their decisions are mostly reactive, aimed at alleviating crises and averting disasters, thus postponing rather than permanently resolving problems. Yet it is precisely such dynamic that would call for a formulation of a policy for the use of memory in diplomacy. A memory policy would provide the conceptual as well as

[57] Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, 4–5.
[58] Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, 7.
[59] Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, 235–36, 238, 246.

material (deliberative/advising, communicative, implementation) infrastructure and personnel to go beyond reactive work, and into a proactive mode.

Neustadt and May's study of the use of historical reasoning in decision making is tempting to apply for late Cold War US foreign policy and beyond. Yet the authors themselves reveal some of the methodological pitfalls of their own framework. For example, while the transcripts of the Kennedy deliberations over the Cuban Missile Crisis show references to Pearl Harbor and Suez, no one mentioned any earlier historical periods – yet in the president's official speech he referred to the "clear lesson" of the appeasement policies to Nazi Germany in the 1930s.[60] This shows how difficult it is for scholars of the use of memory in government to verify claims in the absence of accessible contemporary internal documents. Political speeches like Kennedy's and public diplomacy materials like those issued by the US State Department use collective memory rhetorically, but they do not readily yield insights into the dynamic of government decision making or formulations of policy.

Some scholars have cautiously applied Neustadt and May's framework for post-1990 US decision making,[61] notwithstanding the methodological questions that plague the project. As William Inboden has shown, President Bush the elder used the 1938 Munich Agreement to understand the situation between Iraq and Kuwait in 1990 and decide for US intervention – both in a speech in Prague and in a private letter. Bush also referred to the lessons of the US involvement in Vietnam for the first Gulf War in his diaries.[62] Confronted with the new global political landscape after the end of the Cold War, the Clinton administration looked to the aftermath of World War Two and early Cold War for blueprints to set up international organizations.[63] Scholars have also shown how Secretary of State Madeline Albright's memory of Munich informed the Clinton administration's public position on the war in Kosovo in 1999.[64] For his own part,

> During his presidency, [George W.] Bush frequently invoked the Truman administration's strategic posture during the early Cold War years as precedents for the Bush

[60] Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*, 8.

[61] One fascinating use of Neustadt and May's study is its application to cyber security threats. See David Sulek and Ned Moran, "What Analogies Can Tell Us About the Future of Cybersecurity," Policy paper. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/virtualbattlefield/08_SULEK_What%20Cyber%20Analogies%20Can%20Tell%20Us.pdf.

[62] William Inboden, "Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties of Historical Experience: A Taxonomy." *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 37, No. 2 (2014): 291–92.

[63] Inboden, "Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties," 308–9.

[64] Paris, "Kosovo and the Metaphor War," 435, 437.

> administration policies in the Global War on Terror. For example, in his […] West Point commencement address, Bush drew the Truman parallels at great length. These were not limited to public rhetoric. Bush also privately studied Truman's presidency, and saw in Truman's persona and challenges numerous parallels to his own. These included a populist diction style, low approval ratings, an unpopular localized hot war amidst a global ideological conflict, disputes with Congress and the Supreme Court over executive authority, efforts to forge new domestic and international institutions to address the prevailing security threat, and confidence in the eventual vindication of history.[65]

Inboden not only supports his analysis with evidence from contemporary newspaper accounts and scholarly treatments, but also cites Bush's memoir. Yet much of this may still be interpreted as public relations, government rhetoric or retrospective justification by a leader of his own decisions in order to shape his own historical legacy – if it wasn't for the fact that Inboden himself had "also worked on the National Security Council staff from 2005–2007, and responded to Bush's interest in Truman by writing multiple memos drawing on the lessons of the Truman presidency."[66] However, without such internal evidence, such studies lack verifiable data about memory in policy making.

Thus, even as Neustadt and May's study illuminates the internal dynamics of high-government decision making, their model is difficult to apply in recent historical or current scholarship. Hence, instead of studying its *role* in policy making, it is more feasible to examine the *uses* of collective memory in Transatlantic relations. Since many relevant Cold War US government documents are still inaccessible,[67] the remainder of this article attempts to "reverse engineer" traces of US memory policy from declassified government papers as well as public diplomacy

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[65] Inboden, "Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties," 309.

[66] Inboden, "Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties," 309.

[67] The National Archives "has generally not yet accessioned records dated after the mid-1970s, although in some cases there are records dating to 1999." Records of the U.S. Information Agency (RG 306). Cold War Era Agencies. National Archives, http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/related-records/rg-306.html. The Department of State "Central file records dating 1980 and later remain in the custody of the Department of State. Researchers must file a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request directly with the Department to request access to records in their custody." Central Files 1973–1979: State Archiving System (SAS)(RG 59). Department of State Records. National Archives, http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/state-dept/rg-59-central-files/1973-1979.html. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection was donated to the University of Arkansas by the United States Information Agency in 1983. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection (CU) Records, ca. 1938–1984. University of Arkansas Liberaries Special Collections, http://libinfo.uark.edu/SpecialCollections/findingaids/cuaid/.

materials. Accordingly, its findings will be preliminary, pending the fuller declassification of internal government documents.

The Cold War Apparatus for Memory Policy: The United States Information Agency

Building the material infrastructure and human bureaucracy of the Cold War took decades, and its structures predictably survived for years after the end of this ideological world system. Accordingly, for much of the 1990s, the United States government had in place an apparatus for the use of memory in its Transatlantic relations.

Among the many tools the United States government used during the Cold War to win the hearts and minds of those living in the developing world and counter Communist propaganda was American history. Scholars like Richard Pells have discussed the ways in which American Studies, the academic study of US history, culture and society, was transplanted in Europe through the educational diplomacy of the US government's Fulbright Program, professional organizations, and private foundations.[68] Yet academia is only one player or mechanism in the larger dynamic of the politics of collective memory within and between countries. The US government used cultural memory in its programming which commemorated various anniversaries of the national past – as a way to support its foreign policy objectives. In the late Cold War and beyond, most such programming was carried out by three government agencies: the United States Information Agency, the Department of Defense, and commemorative presidential commissions.

Created in 1953 by presidential executive order, the United States Information Agency (called "Service" at its end points overseas; henceforth USIA/S) was to centrally conduct the US government's previously disparate foreign information activities.[69] In 1978 another presidential order merged USIA/S with the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs[70] into a new entity called the United States International Communications Agency. In 1982 the agency was

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[68] See Richard Pells, "American Studies in Europe," in *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II*, by Richard Pells (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 94–133; also Michael Denning, "'The Special American Conditions': Marxism and American Studies," in *Culture in the Age of Three Worlds*, by Michael Denning (London, New York: Verso, 2004), 169–92.

[69] See Richard Arndt, "The Birth of USIA," in *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, by Richard T. Arndt (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2005), 264–87.

[70] History and Mission of ECA. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. United States Department of State, http://eca.state.gov/about-bureau/history-and-mission-eca.

rechristened to its original name, which it used until is abolition in 1999, when its media functions, including the Voice of America, were assigned to the State Department and the International Broadcasting Bureau.[71] In a regretful act of shortsightedness, the US government's primary arm of cultural diplomacy, the USIA/S was dismantled just two years before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, which prompted the government to put in place a new apparatus for public diplomacy.[72]

After its 1978 reorganization, USIA/S was a government agency with formidable activities. Every year, its Fulbright program gave out some 5000 grants for sending overseas or bringing to the United States individuals for teaching or academic study. Its equivalent for non-academic professions, the International Visitors Program facilitated the trips to the US of some 2000 people every year. Like US public diplomacy in general, both of these programs targeted foreign elites and would-be elites (most often students or vocational apprentices) in order to mold their attitudes towards the United States both in their own professions and more generally, as a geopolitical player. In this, they were assisted by USIA's English teaching and book programs, as well as its actual facilities overseas: embassy libraries, America houses and other cultural centers, with their own programming. USIA/S also facilitated the tours of art exhibitions and performing artists overseas, including in Eastern Europe and the USSR, as well as in the third world. [73]

The Reagan administration not only gave the agency its old name back, but it also updated it in its own image. In keeping with the resurgence of hard line anti-Communism in US foreign policy, the USIA/S was to shift back from being a facilitator of international cultural exchange and democratic dialog to being an instrument of US overseas propaganda, and a weapon for winning the Cold War.[74] Accordingly, with increases in funding, the agency launched Radio (and later TV) Martí, targeted at Cuba; it implemented Worldnet, a satellite linkup for policy discussions between US and foreign government officials; and it modernized the technology of the Voice of America.[75] The institution's overseas libraries were con-

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[71] Records of the U.S. Information Agency (RG 306) description. Cold War Era Agencies. Foreign Affairs. National Archives of the United States, http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/related-records/rg-306.html.

[72] Also see Christopher Merrill et al., *Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy.* Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, September 2005, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54374.pdf.

[73] Richard T. Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2005), 521, 524.

[74] Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings*, 527, 532.

[75] Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings*, 527.

verted into Information Resource Centers, equipped with electronic apparatuses, but were also guarded by heavier security and a requirement of appointments for visitors. Both the Fulbright and the International Visitors Program came under more control and ideological programming; and USIA/S inaugurated a new program to bring high school students to the US for one year to win them over for democracy before their ideological positions hardened.[76] Meanwhile, responding to ideological disagreements with a suspension of multilateral cultural exchange, the United States officially withdrew from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, pulling a quarter of UNESCO's operating budget.[77]

In order to understand how USIA "projected" American collective memory around the world, it is important to know the sources of its materials. Passed by US Congress in 1948, the so-called Smith-Mundt Act forbade government materials designed for foreign consumption to be disseminated within the United States, in order to prevent the government from propagandizing its own population. The law, however, still allowed materials originally designed for domestic consumption to be used in overseas cultural diplomacy. This meant that USIA/S could both produce brand new materials and use the visuals, documents, films, exhibitions produced domestically and disseminate them overseas, however much adapted to their different audiences and circumstances.

The Bicentennial of the United States Constitution in US Transatlantic Cultural Diplomacy

A USIA report from this period provides a window into how the agency worked in tandem with a presidential commission to use collective memory as part of its cultural and public diplomacy activities. The Commission on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution was established in September of 1983 by the US government

[76] Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings*, 529. The US government's cultural and educational programs for high-school age youth overseas were a response to the upheavals of the 1960s and especially the "global" 1968, in which student activism challenged not only their own national hierarchies and norms, but also articulated criticism of US foreign policy. For more, see "Student Protest and International Relations," in *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixities*, by Martin Klimke (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 194–235.

[77] Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings*, 534, 531–32. Also see "Communication from the Secretary of State of the United States of America Concerning the Withdrawal of the United States of America." Item 5.1 of the agenda. Hundred-and-nineteenth Session. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Executive Board. Paris, May 11, 1984, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0005/000595/059531eo.pdf; "Text of Statement by U.S. on its Withdrawal from UNESCO," *The New York Times,* December 20, 1984, http://www.nytimes.com/1984/12/20/world/text-of-statement-by-us-on-its-withdrawal-from-unesco.html.

in order to plan activities commemorating the September 17, 1787, signing of the United States Constitution, the formation of the three branches of government, and the subsequent addition of the Bill of Rights to the nation's foundational legal document. Headed by former Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Commission had some twenty members, and commanded considerable prestige. The most logical partner for the Commission's overseas initiatives was the United States Information Agency, the government's propaganda and cultural diplomacy arm. As USIA's late 1987 "Four-Year Review Update" explained,

> The foundations of the Bicentennial of the Constitution programming were laid in 1984 and 1985. Beginning in 1986, on-going [USIA/S] programs such as the International Visitor, Youth, Teacher, and Fulbright exchange programs and the Book and Library programs began to include a Constitutional component. In addition, overseas posts and USIA Washington elements have developed special seminars, conferences and publications designed to maximize the impact of the Bicentennial abroad and to increase knowledge and understanding of American culture and society in the context of our governmental system.[78]

While the Commission on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution was mandated by Congress to coordinate commemorative activities, most such programming outside of the country was implemented as well as designed by the United States Information Agency, the cultural diplomacy arm of the US government. Thus, USIA/S received a second-hand mandate from the Commission for overseas commemorative programming – which it did first by incorporating and foregrounding the US Constitution in its already existing programs, and subsequently by having its posts and offices design new activities with a more exclusive constitutional focus.

While the agency's programs extended hemispherically to the Americas as well as to world regions such as Africa, the Middle East, the Pacific and south Asia, the geographical foci of its Transatlantic activities were the North European countries (the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland), the region of Central and Southern Europe (West Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain), with incursions made into the West (France), the Eastern Bloc (Poland, Romania), and the nonaligned

[78] Mark Blitz, "Four-Year Review Update" of the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution programming. Memorandum for the director of the United States Information Agency. October 20, 1987. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution." Commission on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution. Office of Federal and International Programs. National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

world (Serbia in Yugoslavia). Countries that received considerable attention in USIA/S commemorative programming because of their special geopolitical importance to the United States were the old Transatlantic ally Great Britain, the Cold War's "frontline" country of West Germany (the youth of which had become more critical of the US since the 1960s), Italy, which had a strong political left, and Spain, which had been transitioning from General Franco's dictatorship to democracy since 1978. Attendees of the commemorative events came from these countries as well as others in and outside Europe.

The target audiences of USIA/S commemorative programming were the respective host countries' elites: academics, educators, lawyers, journalists, government officers and politicians, and university and high school students. (One prototypical example for this was a special course at Madrid University exclusively devoted to the bicentennial of the US Constitution.) The highest-ranked guest in attendance was British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who was also awarded a prize of recognition for her public service.[79] USIA's bicentennial programming reached hundreds of the national elite in each country directly – and thousands more through literature, as well as tens of thousands more through media coverage.[80]

Funding for the commemorative programming of the bicentennial of the US Constitution came from the Commission, USIA, private donors (e.g. Italian banks), professional bodies, and educational institutions like the University of Bologna. Activities also received in-kind assistance from foreign governments, which hosted receptions and events with a diplomatic profile in their own facilities. (Events were otherwise mostly held either at US embassy and USIA/S libraries and centers, or at university centers.) The magnitude of the funds spent on commemorative programming is suggested by some examples. Its Paris post requested from USIA's educational and cultural bureau a grant of 15,000 USD for a conference on the current status of US civil rights (voting, education and employment), which was to be co-sponsored by relevant departments of the University of Paris. USIA's Dublin post received 10,000 USD from the Fulbright program's 1987

[79] "Embassy Commemoration of the Constitution Bicentennial." American Embassy London cable to USIA Washington, D.C., September 1987. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

[80] One Spanish TV program's viewership was an estimated 750,000 people. Like those of any other government office, the reports of the United States information Agency were produced with a subtext that attempts to justify and argue for continued funding for the activities of the authors; thus, their perspective is self-celebratory and has a potential for overstating their reach and effectiveness. "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

budget to organize a commemorative academic colloquium with the Irish Association for American Studies in Galway.[81]

USIA needed this money not only for its events but also for the materials it produced and distributed in its programming. The agency's repertoire included an impressive array of types of products and media, most of which was mass-produced or replicated for its overseas posts. The USIA created and shipped abroad a number of copies of its poster show, a book exhibit, a variety of old and new book translations, bibliographical guides, professional journal issues, video tapes for schools, its TV broadcasts made for VHS tapes and aired on satellite linkup, and it planned a BBC documentary series for the 1988 presidential elections.[82]

In the Commission's alliance with USIA, Justice Burger especially used his professional network to mobilize the legal and academic world for overseas commemorative programming. Commemorative speakers were mostly US academics and legal experts, high court justices and clerks, as well as their European counterparts, especially university professors of American Studies from a variety of disciplines, especially Political Science. The fields and topics of the US Constitution's bicentennial commemorative events reflected both Justice Burger's interests and USIA's foci in Transatlantic cultural diplomacy. Predominant in the programming were academic and processional conferences in the fields of History, Political Science, Constitutional Law, and related disciplines in the Social Sciences and Public Administration. The bicentennial's major topics in focus were *The Federalist Papers*, federalism, regionalism, the religious conscience in the US Constitution, the Constitution and party politics, elections, the presidency, Supreme Court cases about contemporary issues, the Court's schools of interpretations of the Constitution, the Constitution's influence on European law and integration (e.g. "comparative U.S.-Italian constitutional law"), and civil and human rights.

The bicentennial celebrations' structure was dominated by professional and academic events. These included academic-style conferences, professional development seminars and symposia such as the 1987 Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, and "representational events," i. e. receptions at diplomatic posts and foreign governments. It is unclear how open these events were to the public at large – especially since most were likely only by invitation, involved serious literature for distribution to attendees, and featured mostly academic and professional speakers and attendees. The academic practice of respondents giving feedback on the lectures sounds democratic on the surface; however, in many cases this likely

[81] "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."
[82] "Four-Year Review Update."

consisted of nothing beyond a colleague's accolades and intellectual posturing, filling time that otherwise could have been spent with open general questions and answers, or undirected discussion.

For over three decades, USIA/S had been the overseas propaganda and cultural diplomacy arm of the United States, and its style and content of messaging reflected its goals: to counter anti-US propaganda, persuade foreign audiences to become allies and adopt US-style democracy and capitalism wholesale, and to "manage" the "image" of the United States abroad. A predictable rhetorical trope serving this purpose was the presentation of the past as the genealogy of the present and a guidepost for the future: "Celebrating our common heritage flagged the fact that we share common interests in the contemporary world." Accordingly, USIA's commemorative conferences in West Germany "reinforced the basic theme of shared values" between two countries which had waged two world wars against each other, and had recently emerged from a rather lopsided postwar relationship of "re-education" or "reorientation." In London, on the other hand, the launching of a fund-raising campaign for the restoration of the Benjamin Franklin House was a way of "highlighting the common roots of Anglo-American heritage, and could serve as an important center for cooperative programming by the embassy."[83]

Yet USIA/S posts tailored commemorative communication to their needs and special circumstances in each country. USIA programming in West Germany especially reached out to "left-of-center" elites, described as "knee-jerk critics of the United States." The agency's Munich post had been trying for years to "counter […] left-of-center stereotypes of American society, values and domestic policies." Now the post used the Constitution bicentennial's commemorative conference to engage the "Bavarian left" about a common US-West German foreign/security policy – to emphasize their "common democratic traditions which lead to common foreign policy goals." Likely recalling the West German students' anti-Vietnam movement of the 1960s and 1970s,[84] "U.S. Minister in Berlin John Kornblum […] made an eloquent speech warning that younger generations on both sides of the Atlantic no longer looked to the past to moor the Atlantic Alliance, but must seek common interests in the multi-polar world." Yet the West German posts' report of their programming remained fundamentally defensive: "the twelve Americans who attended the conference served as

[83] "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."
[84] See Martin Klimke, *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixities* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

resource people to counter much of the stereotype[d] arguments that are the hallmark of German leftist debate."[85]

Several USIA/S country posts remade the commemorative topics according to their host country's interests, and possibly also engaged in some US domestic politics in the process. The US Embassy in Dublin used Fulbright money to jointly hold a commemorative academic colloquium with the Irish Association for American Studies, titled "The Place of Minorities in American Society." In their request for a serious grant for a gathering with the theme of "What is the State of Civil Rights in the U.S. Today," the Paris post argued that "[a]s the conference will stress the legal remedies available for the redress of grievances in these areas, it has particular relevance to the celebrations commemorating the bicentennial of our Bill of Rights, the French Revolution, and, in particular, the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen*."[86] The post's proposed list of US participants was so heavy on civil rights organizations and activists that a researcher might wonder if the program was put together by a progressive embassy worker partly to spite the conservative Reagan administration by showcasing its less then sterling civil rights record in a country whose citizens had a tradition of criticizing the United States.

According to scholarly consensus, US and Western collective memory is contested ground in that it is often used by the commemorative actors to wage struggles over current issues by making meaning of the past.[87] As a foundational text that continues to shape and be shaped by contemporary events, the history of the United States Constitution lends itself especially well to such commemorative dynamic. In this sense, the running subtext of the bicentennial of the US Constitution's celebrations consisted of US foreign policy (Reagan's hard-line anti-Communism and its overt and covert operations), and domestic political developments (in addition to the Iran-Contra scandal, Reagan's failed nomination of Robert Bork for the United States Supreme Court).[88] Not surprisingly, USIA/S personnel, US and European

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[85] "Tutzing Conference on Bicentennial of the Constitution." American Embassy Bonn (and post in Munich) cable to USIA Washington, D.C., August 6, 1987. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

[86] "Request for Grant for October 1988 Conference on Civil Rights." American Embassy Paris cable to USIA Washington, D.C., December 1987. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

[87] Finney, "The Ubiquitous Presence," 448; Resende and Dudryte, eds., *Memory and Trauma in International Relations*, 62, 63, 71–73; Langenbacher and Shain, eds., *Power and the Past*, 8; and Bell, *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*, 5, 15.

[88] The time period of the Constitution's bicentennial celebrations (1984–88) coincided with a variety of significant events in US domestic politics and foreign policy. News about the Reagan Administration's Iran-Contra operations broke in November 1986, and the Tower Commission began conducting its investigation of the National Security Council in December, and published their findings

speakers, and foreign media and audiences used the Constitution's bicentennial to discuss the recent issues and events in US society and foreign policy.

Some commemorative actors addressed current issues quite explicitly. Several open discussions related the US Constitution to recent political events (1984 elections, Supreme Court cases), and treated the central law as a flexible and living text, which enables a self-correcting mechanism in US government. The US consul general in Zurich, Switzerland, at the 1987 commemorative reception at his residence "referred to the two principle themes in Washington this summer, the Iran-Contra hearings and the nomination of a new Supreme Court justice in which the fundamental question of checks and balances between the executive and legislative also figured into the political discussions."[89] At USIA's commemorative academic colloquium with the Irish Association for American Studies, held on Galway and titled "The Place of Minorities in American Society," one US speaker discussed the importance of the Senate confirmation hearings and rejection of Robert Bork for the post of Supreme Court justice.[90] At a week-long international university seminar on the Constitution's bicentennial in Spain, Stanford University American Studies professor Jack Rakove argued that the Vietnam war resulted in shifts in the constitutional framework for US foreign policy, and he explained the intricate dynamic of policy making.[91] Sometimes the most trenchant criticism of the recent past and present came from US participants who could not be controlled by USIA/S. At the 1987 Tutzing Conference on the Bicentennial of the US Constitution, "former Senator George McGovern […] argued that virtually all U.S. presidents since WWII ha[ve] violated the [C]onstitution through illicit military interventions. His speech launched a debate on the limits of U.S. executive

in February 1987. Committees in the US House of Representatives and Senate held hearings on the topic between May and August 1987, and published a joint report in November of that year. President Reagan nominated Robert Bork for the United States Supreme Court in July 1987, which was followed by long and intense debate in the Senate, and confirmation hearings in the Judiciary Committee. After a firestorm of opposition, Bork's nomination was rejected by the United States Senate in late October 1987.

89 "Media Reaction: Celebration for the U.S. Constitution in Zurich." American Embassy Bern cable to USIA Washington, D.C., September, 1987. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

90 "Celebrating the Bicentennial of the Constitution." American Embassy Dublin cable to USIA Washington, D.C., December, 1987. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

91 "Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution Amparts." American Embassy Madrid cable to USIA Washington, D.C., September, 1986. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

power in foreign affairs."[92] At their best, such conferences provided a forum for an open and critical discussion of current issues as rooted in the past.

Yet even such open debate on the relevance of the past for the present had to be conducted on the terms of the organizers and US participants. The USIA post from Milan reported that the conference in Trieste and Padova featured Italian experts who were intimately familiar with the US system of constitutional law, and they also followed it to be able to apply some of its elements in their own legal system.[93] One of the few conflictual exchanges mentioned in the record involved an attendee's public criticism of the US government's foreign policy in Nicaragua and Grenada. Dubbed a "far-leftist member of the Bologna city council" by the US post in Florence, Italy, the attendee had to be "ejected" from the conference. The speaker attempted to save the situation by ascribing the criticism to the open nature of US and Western democracy[94] – a rather dubious response after the physical exclusion of this dissenting voice from this "open" commemorative event.

Questions and comments by attendees and the host countries' national media often expressed concerns about local issues as much they reflected on the past and present of the United States, or critiqued its role in the world. An Irish expert who had authored a British study on job discrimination in Northern Ireland said that US anti-discrimination legislation was applied as a model in recent UK policies against sex-based discrimination in hiring. He claimed that recently the UK and some other European countries had been more progressive than the US in such anti-discrimination legislation – likely referring to the demise of the Equal Rights Amendment in the state-by-state ratification process in the United State earlier in the decade.[95] Spanish TV asked a US speaker questions about the death penalty in the US, the advantages of the jury system, and how the law protects US citizens

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[92] "Tutzing Conference on Bicentennial of the Constitution." American Embassy Bonn (and post in Munich) cable to USIA Washington, D.C., August 6, 1987. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

[93] "Bicentenary of the Constitution: Program at U of Trieste and Padova." American Embassy Rome cable to USIA Washington, D.C., December, 1987. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

[94] "Bicentennial of the Constitution: Report on Bologna Conference on the Constitution and What It Means Today, May 27–29, 1987." American Consul in Florence cable to USIA Washington, D.C., June, 1987. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

[95] "Celebrating the Bicentennial of the Constitution." American Embassy Dublin cable to USIA Washington, D.C., December, 1987. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

from "political abuses."[96] These questions may have especially resonated with audiences in a country that had transitioned out of General Franco's dictatorial rule only a decade earlier.

Other voices expressed an anxious desire to keep the US government involved in European affairs. In Spain, the bicentennial programming were organized by national professional and academic bodies, who requested a few American speakers from the US embassy. After the conference on the US Constitution in Trieste and Padova, the USIA/S post from Milan reported that "the mayor of Trieste thanked USIS for staying on in the city and expressed hope that the U.S. consulate in Trieste, which was closed a year ago, would reopen."[97] According to the post's report, Italian lawyers and academics likewise praised the series of commemorative academic conferences sponsored or organized by USIA/S.

The ultimate subtext of the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution was one of the very bedrocks of Western democratic political systems: the rule of law. Thus, in their commemorative activities, participants struggled over the meaning of the history of American rule of law in the present, and its implications for the future of the United States, its Transatlantic relations, and their own European countries: they debated the overarching question of whether, how long and in what form can the rule of law endure in the United States, as well as in the countries who had developed or adopted political or legal systems similar to or different from, the United States Constitution.

The perennial question of how to measure the impact of cultural diplomacy is always most burning for those who have to justify continued or increased funding for it, and USIA's late Cold War reports grappled with this challenge. The agency used a variety of ways to measure the success of its commemorative programming: their yardsticks included the events' reach; the quality of the academic and professional conferences, especially of their discussions; the level of the event's profile; and the composition and ideology of its participants and attendees. USIA's success can also be measured with its potential for influence among the elites (academics, opinion and policy makers, legal experts) and its trickle-down among students of university and secondary school age. While quantitative stock taking would involve the numbers of people who moved across the Atlantic on US

[96] "Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution Amparts." American Embassy Madrid cable to USIA Washington, D.C., September, 1986. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

[97] "Bicentenary of the Constitution: Program at U of Trieste and Padova." American Embassy Rome cable to USIA Washington, D.C., December, 1987. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

cultural diplomacy program in any given period, qualitative measures would size up the advancement of these same people – such as the alumni of the Fulbright program – into national positions of power, and their public professional or political position *vis-à-vis* United States foreign policy. This highlights the networks which educational and cultural exchange programs build. The commemorative events allowed one US speaker in Spain to reunite with an old friend who had just been declared first in line for the leadership of Spain's major opposition conservative party. After their private council, the speaker briefed the embassy about the meeting and his knowledge of the politician.[98]

Another measurable example of the impact of USIA's commemorative programming was a 7-page article in the major independent Polish *Tygodnik Powszechny* newspaper in 1986 – with no apparent government censorship. The article's author claimed that in their Constitution, "Americans first of all stated the conviction that there are certain indispensable human rights that no government, under any pretext, has any power to question. […] The state, with all its institutions, cannot therefore exceed the boundaries of its carefully limited authority. […] Every person has the unquestioned right to decide matters which affect him, either directly or through his representatives; a government which is not elected is always usurpation and tyranny."[99] "The bicentennial of the American constitution has meaning not only for citizens of the USA but equally so for all those all over the globe for whom the ideals of freedom, equality, democracy and respect for human rights are dear. […] As a result of the Revolution, that American message became understandable for everyone: liberty, human rights, equality of opportunity." In the conclusion of the article, the author emphasized the uniqueness of the American circumstances, and left it open to interpretation whether their Constitution can be applied as a model abroad – even as he noted its influence on the Polish constitution of 1791.[100] Whether in collusion with the US Embassy or as a spokesperson of the democratic opposition emerging with Solidarity, the author used the occasion of an anniversary in another nation's collective memory to articulate grassroots demands for democratic freedoms and rights – and implicitly against the Polish Communist regime.

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98 "FY-87 Ampart Albert Blaustein." American Embassy Madrid cable to USIA Washington, D.C., December, 1986. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

99 "Bicentennial of American Constitution." American Embassy Warsaw cable to USIA Washington, D.C., July, 1987. In "Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution."

100 Ibid.

4. Conclusion

Even a cursory case study such as this indicates that the apparatus most readily available and skilled at using collective memory in late Cold War US Transatlantic relations was the State Department's United States Information Agency/Service. USIA/S worked in partnership with the government-appointed Commission on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution. Whether or not the US government or the Commission had a general and overarching policy for the use of collective memory in foreign policy, USIA/S undertook this task first by incorporating the Constitution's bicentennial to its ongoing programming, and subsequently by designing, creating and implementing new cultural diplomacy activities with a specific constitutional focus. USIA Washington and its overseas country posts had significant freedom in tailoring such programming to the special circumstances of each host country, as well as to the needs of US diplomacy there. In its commemorative programming, USIA targeted the host countries' political/government, academic and professional elites, as well as their university and high school students. USIA's bicentennial materials, conferences, seminars, and receptions emphasized the importance of the United States Constitution not only for the democratic political evolution of the American system, but also for its comparative influence on various European countries' legal and political mechanisms. While the public diplomacy messages of these bicentennial celebrations often relied on the trope of their shared past and values as the reason and impetus for their current and future alliance, both US and host country actors used the US Constitution's past to take measure and make meaning of the present struggles in their own countries as well as of the Transatlantic partnership. The ultimate subtext of the US Constitution's bicentennial celebrations was how much American rule of law endured, and how much it could be replicated in the Transatlantic realm.

This article surveyed the existing scholarly literature on the role of collective memory in international, and more specifically, Transatlantic relations. In order to develop a framework to study the uses of the national past in US Transatlantic diplomacy in the Cold War and beyond, I critiqued the methodologies of some scholars, and sketched out the dynamic, multi-player, but nevertheless hierarchically structured politics of national memory within the United States itself. Next I analyzed how historical reasoning was used in academic training for government service and foreign policy decision making in the late Cold War. In the final section of this article, I analyzed the United States Information Agency as the Cold War apparatus for a memory policy in Transatlantic relations. As my case study of the US Constitution's bicentennial programming demonstrated, while such a memory

policy may not have been articulated in any single central US government document, it can still be assembled from the blueprints for foreign policy training, and the public statements, diplomatic correspondence, and commemorative practices of the time. The United States Information Agency was capable of implementing such a Transatlantic memory policy during the Cold War and much of the 1990s. The question for researchers of the post-Communist era is to what extent USIA engaged in such memory diplomacy after the end of the Cold War – and who took on this function after the agency was dismantled in 1999.

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COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: IN SEARCH FOR THE TIES THAT BIND

KRYŠTOF KOZÁK

Abstract
Transatlantic relations are a key element of the current international system. As various factors influence the complex relationship, it is not clear what are the main driving forces that keep the ties strong in spite of numerous differences and disputes. The article explores the notion that collective memory serves as the crucial frame of reference supporting Transatlantic ties. It does so first by linking the concept of collective memory to international relations theory and then applying it to the main paradigms in Transatlantic relations. Main findings suggest that collective memory is indeed a highly relevant concept with respect to Transatlantic relations and that further research is needed to support this claim more robustly.
Keywords: Transatlantic relations, collective memory, international politics, commemorations, liberation
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This article is part of a bigger research project which analyzes the role of collective memory in Transatlantic relations. Its main purpose is to establish the relevance of the topic. It does so first by linking the concepts of collective memory with international relations theory, demonstrating clear complementarity of the two approaches. Second, the article explores several specific uses of history in constructing Transatlantic ties, confirming that the selected approach is worth pursuing in more detail in further research.

1. Collective Memory in International Relations

Collective memory is a relatively new concept to be deployed in the field of international relations, despite its long-term salience in history and cultural

anthropology.[1] Introduced as part of the "culturalist" turn in international relations in efforts to better understand the influence of past traumas on current decisions of policymakers, the concept is applicable in all instances when memory of past events plays an integral role in framing of mutual relations. Drawing on constructivist critique of rational calculations of interests as the sole basis of analyzing international relations,[2] the effort to include collective memory in our understanding of current events is based on the notion that memory creates a rather rigid mental frame, which constrains and distorts the worldview and consequently also decision making of policymakers.[3] At the same time, collective memory is relevant in international relations also with respect to general public, as people demand and support political options that are consistent with their prevalent collective memories. These popular influences can be very strong, as collective memory is also inextricably linked to the core sense of identity of the given community.[4]

Just to underline the potential importance of memory, some authors even claim that all human actions are directly conditioned by memory and we all have much less conscious agency than we would like to think.[5] If this were the case, successful shaping of collective memories within a given society would have lasting impact on domestic as well as international level. Case studies on German-Israeli relations or U.S.-Mexican relations demonstrate the importance of collective memory for interpreting and understanding mutual ties.[6]

At this point, the somewhat elusive notion of collective memory requires some clarification. Originally coined by French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs when he claimed that all memory is in some way relational, i.e. social,[7] there have since been numerous attempts to define it more precisely. While going into the definitional subtleties that take into account various disciplines related to collective

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1 Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain, eds., *Power and the past; collective memory and international relations* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010).

2 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," *International Organization* Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992): 391–425.

3 William Inboden, "Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties of Historical Experience: A Taxonomy," *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 37, No. 2 (2014): 292.

4 Patrick Finney, "The Ubiquitous Presence of the Past? Collective Memory and International History," *International History Review* Vol. 36, No. 3 (2007): 466.

5 Alon Confino, "Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method," *The American Historical Review* Vol. 102, No. 5 (Dec., 1997): 1387.

6 Krystof Kozak, "Superiors, Victims or Neighbors?" in *United States as a Divided Nation. Past and Present,* ed. by Marcin Grabowski, Gyorgy Toth and Krystof Kozak (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 2014), 286.

7 Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory* (New York, Harper & Row Colophon Books, 1980), translated from *La mémoire collective* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1950).

memory would be beyond the scope and intent of this paper, the current working definition can be summarized as any memory which is shared by a group of people and is consciously reproduced in the form of commemorations, textbooks, monuments or public rhetoric. It is distinct from individual memory through the inherent social context and social reproduction.[8] The concept of "historical memory" is closely related, but it is narrower as it applies primarily to preserved memory and interpretation of events in the past. Historical memory thus heavily influences the wider concept of collective memory.

Observing artifacts and documents related to formation of collective memory is often straightforward, as there are monuments, texts and speech acts which usually clearly state that their purpose is to contribute to the shaping of collective memory. Analyzing the potential impacts of collective memory is more challenging, because it has its presumed greatest effect deep in people's minds, be they the elite decision makers or the general public. Furthermore, chances are that some people are highly conditioned by individual as well as collective memory, while for others memory might play only a minor role in their thinking. To add to this, given the fact that part of the influence of memory operates also on the subconscious level creating basic frameworks for interpreting the surrounding reality, not even the actors themselves are necessarily aware of memory's seminal role. For these reasons, it is not easy to analytically assess the precise role collective memory plays in specific individual decisions.

On the social level, similar problem arises. Even though we can clearly observe efforts to shape collective memory in various forms, be it textbooks, commemorative events or official discourse, their actual impact on the population is hard to assess. The vigorous long-term efforts of communist regimes to shape a specific version of collective memory in order to legitimize their existence should serve as a caveat, as they were eventually largely unsuccessful in achieving the desired mobilization and support for the ruling party (this despite starting from early age in elementary school textbooks and including lavish mass commemorative events with mandatory attendance). Individual memory and day-to-day experience coupled with a dose of skepticism of the government's motives served as antidotes to the official heavy-handed promotion of the one and only government-approved version of collective memory. At the same time, it is possible that in other circumstances and contexts, extensive as well as more subtle efforts to shape collective memory could be more successful. Methodologically, the reception of collective memory presents a problem, as even if we clearly observe efforts to

[8] Finney, "The Ubiquitous Presence of the Past?" 465.

influence collective memory, the only way to measure their real impact is indirect, through surveys and opinion polls. Even these might not provide an accurate picture given the partly subconscious ways in which memory operates.[9]

Another challenge arises given the fascinating interplay between living memory and collective memory preserved in textbooks, monuments, official rhetoric and commemorations. Even if there is always a relational component in individual memory, it is to some extent immune to external efforts at shaping collective memory which would be at odds with it. At the same time, it can powerfully reinforce collective memory when congruent with it. This creates a special problem for Transatlantic relations, as people who remember the U.S. liberation of Europe are dying out. Also, the fall of communism is becoming only a vague and distant memory for the younger generation, for whom the more recent experiences of the 9/11, U.S. invasion of Iraq or the financial crisis are more defining in terms of their views of the United States, affecting also the related instances of collective memory of Transatlantic relations. This is relevant also from the standpoint that crises and wars usually affect collective memory more profoundly than positive events. Efforts by policymakers and other actors seeking to influence Transatlantic ties to present a certain version of collective memory resonates very differently in various age groups, depending on their particular life experiences. Nevertheless, much depends on transfer of key features of Transatlantic ties in the form of collective memory to the younger generation in a situation when living memory of important events in the past (namely World War II and its immediate aftermath) gradually fades.

Some authors suggest that given the methodological problems described above, even if the role of collective memory could be relevant, it is not possible to study it with sufficient rigor and we should therefore "forget" about it.[10] Such a position is untenable as we can't abandon a potentially crucial concept that evidently has major impact in international relations just because it is difficult to work with or quantify. Intense, acrimonious clashes over preservation of memory have been very common in very different settings all around the globe, which adds to the salience of the topic.[11] The objections should nevertheless be taken seriously and addressed by providing persuasive interlocking evidence linking collective memory to international politics.

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[9] Confino, "Memory and Cultural History," 1388.

[10] Gavriel D. Rosenfeld, "A Looming Crash or a Soft Landing? Forecasting the Future of the Memory Industry," *Journal of Modern History*, lxxxi (2009): 155.

[11] Dan Stone, "Memory Wars in the New Europe," in *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History*, ed. by Dan Stone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 714–16.

2. Divergence and Convergence Across the Atlantic

Since the end of the Cold War and the removal of the common threat in the form of the Soviet Union, various observers predicted significant deterioration of Transatlantic ties in the future. As if to confirm these predictions, serious tensions developed within all three pillars that are usually referred to as sustaining the close Transatlantic bonds: security, economy as well as shared values.[12]

With respect to security, the asymmetric NATO alliance has been searching for a new mission that would legitimize its existence as well as its considerable expenses. From a realist viewpoint, the interests of European countries were at odds with views in Washington on diverse issues ranging from the Middle East peace process, conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia to relations with Russia. Unwillingness of European partners to allocate more resources for military purposes added to the strains in the Transatlantic relationship. These divergent views were laid bare before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was highly unpopular in most countries in Europe, with leaders of both France and Germany vigorously opposing the military operation.[13]

On the economic level, there exist numerous reasons that could easily lead towards major disputes between U.S. and its European partners. Given the largely similar structure of advanced post-industrial economies but very different regulatory framework, there is a significant potential for trade disagreements, protectionism and even trade wars. U.S. and European companies compete head to head in several major industries. The long-running major legal dispute between Boeing and Airbus is indicative of a wider trend that could easily escalate into a trade war. Such a scenario would benefit many narrow-minded domestic producers, who could use their political clout to actually push for such an outcome even if it would hurt consumers both in Europe and in the U.S.

With respect to third pillar of shared values, divergent trends were already present with respect to the proper role of government within the society as well as the economy. The conceptual tension between European model of welfare state and U.S. emphasis on rugged individualism seeped also into moral judgments, with Europeans and Americans both feeling superior to the other in this respect.[14]

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[12] John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), 4–6; or Lester Thurow, *The Future of Capitalism* (Penguin Books: New York, 1996), 225.

[13] Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 11–15.

[14] Timothy G. Ash, *Free World. America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West* (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 7–9.

After the War on Terror was declared by the George W. Bush administration, new fault lines emerged with respect to human rights abuses by U.S. security forces and disclosures of mass surveillance by U.S. national security agencies. Moreover, major rifts emerged with respect to attitudes towards environmental protection, with European countries spearheading efforts to reduce global warming and U.S. effectively sabotaging it on the international arena. These disagreements could feed on long-term undercurrents of anti-Americanism in Europe as well as negative stereotypes about Europe in the U.S.[15]

To add to these tensions, spectacular economic growth and corresponding rise in importance of Asia led to more emphasis on Transpacific ties in the case of the U.S., both with respect to national security and economy.[16] Preoccupation of U.S. as well as European leaders with Asia, which has become the engine of world economic growth, meant less time and energy for managing and sustaining the Transatlantic partnership.

All these developments suggest that there exist relevant reasons for potential deterioration or serious weakening of Transatlantic ties.[17] Yet, despite these tendencies, the U.S. offered quick and unequivocal support for Ukraine in the form of targeted sanctions against Russia in the crisis over Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, demonstrating its commitment and active interest in European security. German and other European soldiers were eventually deployed in Afghanistan alongside U.S. forces. Instead of a trade war, complex negotiations over Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership are underway and if successful, the project would bring an even closer economic integration between Europe and the U.S. This suggests that apart from trends which are putting strains on the relationship, there still exist powerful forces that pull both partners together.

Transatlantic relations are no doubt very complex, given the wide range of issues they cover and given the numerous actors that try to influence them, especially in the context of decision-making processes in Europe. This complexity notwithstanding, understanding their key determinants is of vital importance especially for European partners, who are still basing their core national security strategy on the NATO alliance, effectively trusting the U.S. to honor its Article 5 commitments to come to their aid with vastly superior military power in case of dire need. As indicated above,

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[15] Andrei S. Markovits, *Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 4.

[16] Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy* (October 2011), http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/.

[17] Andrew Dorman and Joyce Kaufman, eds., *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perception, Policy and Practice* (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 5–6.

purely rational calculations of relevant policymakers based on narrowly defined self-interest are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of this close relationship. This paper is part of a larger project searching for the key factors which contribute to persistent cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic. Based on recent cutting-edge theoretical scholarship on the role of collective memory in international relations, it analyzes the potential of this concept in the context of Transatlantic ties. The main thesis is that collective memory in the U.S. as well as in Europe could function as one of the crucial linkages explaining the persisting close ties in spite of numerous divergent trends and interests on both sides of the Atlantic.

The following sections present and analyze two instances of collective memory which have potential to influence Transatlantic ties. These preliminary observations are then supplemented with a discussion of methods to provide more detailed and thorough analysis, which would also include the key linkage to actual policy-making decisions.

3. Collective Memory of the Birth of the U.S.: It Is in the Family

With respect to Transatlantic relations, several key periods can be identified, which serve as cornerstones for the development of collective memory on both sides of the Atlantic and consequently affect also current Transatlantic ties. First of those is the memory of the birth of the United States. Historical memory in this instance serves to support a classical foundation myth which is like in other societies crucial both for self-identity as well as for subsequent interpretation of the surrounding reality all the way to the present.[18] The narrative of the glorious origins of the U.S. has been deeply ingrained in all Americans through textbooks, monuments, memorials as well as official holidays. Even though it is rooted in verifiable historical past, the story of the birth of the nation and its fathers takes on mythical proportions in the sense that it is rarely questioned and serves as a normative guideline to this day. This myth is then perpetuated through conscious cultivation of collective memory, as in other societies, and thus becomes an integral part of national identity. This national identity subsequently influences political attitudes and choices both of elite decision makers and of the general public.[19]

The amount of resources and energy devoted to shaping and preserving the historical memory of the birth of the U.S. is difficult to quantify exactly, but it is

[18] Mircea Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return: Cosmos and History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 3–6.

[19] Frederick A. Mayer, *Interpreting NAFTA. Science and Art of Political Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 23.

staggering, as can be casually observed for example on the scale and magnitude of monuments in Washington, D.C. celebrating the foundation of the republic or the lavishness of official ceremonies related to 4th of July. Not only children in schools, but also people who want to become citizens are now required to answer questions related to this crucial period, contributing to its preservation in the collective memory of United States.

First, the reading of the foundation myth does not look that promising for cordial Transatlantic ties, as the archetypal symbolic monster to be slain in order to give birth to the new entity is the European monarch, or more precisely its tentacles in the form of British redcoats who fight hard to keep the new country within their dominating power. Efforts to portray the English as foundational villains necessary for the appeal of the myth can be overblown, as was the case both in Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* or in the 2000 blockbuster movie *Patriot* by Mel Gibson, which led to complaints from British historians over the unfair depiction of the British.[20] Such dramatic antagonization is understandable on the U.S. part, as the founding myth requires the "good" and "evil" side, but it only diverts attention from the more fundamental message: England (and in the larger sense the whole Europe) plays the role of the symbolic Mother, which needs to be killed in order for the (teenage kid) U.S. to achieve independence, and thus be born in the political sense. Frequent use of the idiom "mother colony" attests to this notion of family relations.

Fortuitously for Transatlantic ties, the contribution of "good uncles" from France in the struggle with the imposing Mother is part of the foundational myth, which further underlines the European connection. The resonance of this fact in collective memory can be demonstrated on the often-mentioned phrase "Lafayette, nous voila" coined in a speech over Lafayette's tomb in July 1917 by U.S. General Stanton when U.S. soldiers were seen as returning the favor to the embattled French.[21]

More importantly than the revolutionary strife with England, the political birth of the U.S. is in collective memory clearly linked to European origins and European ideas, sidelining for example the Native American contributions and often also their mere existence in the official discourse. This creates a deeply ingrained notion of symbolic family ties that can be drawn upon in critical

[20] "British press up in arms over 'Patriot' mis-history," *Baltimore Sun*, June 21, 2000, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2000-06-21/features/0006210173_1_robert-rodat-revolutionary-war-benjamin-martin.

[21] Broune Heywood, *The A. E. F. With General Pershing and the American Forces* (New York: Appleton, 1918), 35.

situations. It does not mean that the relations between Europe and U.S. are necessarily friendly or cordial (as in many real families), but that the problems, controversies and disputes are addressed within a qualitatively different framework based on familiarity and similarity despite existing differences – witness for example the treatment of Japanese and German adversaries in World War II, when the former were effectively dehumanized in the war propaganda (propaganda poster in Figure 1 presents them as mere rats), whereas the latter were considered as misguided and manipulated by perverse and dangerous ideology (propaganda poster in Figure 2 presents a sophisticated but pervert and morally bankrupt officer).[22]



Figure 1: "Jap Trap."
Source: "Jap Trap," World War II propaganda poster, United States Information Service, 1941–45. From Densho Digital Archive, http://www.densho.org/. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration (Ctrl.#: NWDNS-44-PA-2156; Office of Government Reports. United States Information Service. Division of Public Inquiry. Bureau of Special Services, OWI), denshopd-i37–00498. Available at http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/8332/.

[22] Anthony W. Sheppard, "An Exotic Enemy: Anti-Japanese Musical Propaganda in World War II Hollywood," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* Vol. 54, No. 2 (Summer 2001): 307.

Figure 2: "This is the Enemy."
Source: This original WWII poster was created by Karl Kowhler and Victoria Ancona in 1942. "This is the Enemy" with its chilling image of a hanging reflected in the monocle of a Nazi military officer was the winner of the National War Poster Competition of 1942 held under the auspices of the Museum of Modern Art. Available at http://www.icollector.com/Rare-WWII-Karl-Koehler-and-Victoria-Ancona-s-This-is-the-Enemy-Propaganda-Poster_i11405706.

In Europe, the historical memory of the founding of the United States also clearly includes the family connection. U.S. is portrayed as the young offspring, and the discourse used is eerily reminiscent of parents or grandparents commenting critically on the behavior of children or inexperienced juveniles (including the juvenile delinquency in the form of the invasion of Iraq).[23] While such condescending attitude does not bode well for constructive cooperation on pressing issues (as any sulky teenager confronted by her parents would affirm), the overarching family framework makes such disparaging comments on the part of Europeans less threatening, less hostile and more motivated by the sincere but nonetheless

[23] Markovits, *Uncouth Nation*, 17.

obnoxious desire to educate. In the long run, the consequences are less damaging, as can be seen for example by pragmatic return to cooperation after the heated disagreement over Iraq.

The memory of common ancestry also contributes to another vital aspect of Transatlantic relations – the long-term perception of the lack of existential security threat from the other side. The British burning of Washington, D.C., in 1814 could still be viewed in the framework of the Mother country refusing to fully accept the rejection of her presumably benevolent sovereignty. Since that time, U.S. did not feel directly threatened by an invasion from Europe. This feeling of fundamental security despite potential deep disagreements is consistent with intra-family ties and serves as an important context for Transatlantic relations that affects both policymakers in difficult negotiations as well as general public engaged in day-to-day interactions.[24]

There is one more potentially relevant element which is related to the collective memory of the European origins of the United States, which is race, namely the white one. The family connection described above can be easily converted to a racial one on the symbolic level, which would help explain also the above-mentioned sidelining of Native Americans in the founding myth as well as the difference of attitude towards the Japanese and the Germans. This racial context undoubtedly strengthens the Transatlantic relationship for people who are sensitive to this reading. The problem is that emphasizing and remembering the European origin helps to support the exclusive narrative of the white Anglo-Saxon dominance within the U.S., thus de-emphasizing the contribution of other races and cultures to the U.S. society of today.[25] This is a clear example where privileged carriers of memorial discourses (such as the U.S. Department of State) can selectively commemorate events relevant primarily for one particular group within U.S. society, namely those of Anglo-Saxon European origin. Polemic debates around the massive official quincentennial commemoration of "discovery" of America in 1992 serve as a clear reminder of this problem.[26]

For example, grave problems on the southern border of both U.S. and Europe with respect to migration policy can easily be interpreted racially, and for those who are prone to such interpretation, cooperation of the embattled "white"

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[24] Samuel Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 11–14.

[25] Amy Kaplan, "Left Alone with America: The Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture," in *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993), 3–22.

[26] Cf. Howard Zinn, *1492–1992: The Legacy of Columbus* (PM Press, 1992).

governments both in Europe and in the U.S. seems both natural and necessary. It is no accident that the white supremacist group that got into headlines because the House majority whip Rep. Steve Scalise scandal is called "European-American Unity and Rights Organization."[27] Highlighting the historical memory of European origins here serves a specific political goal. If the so-called "new racism" is as powerful as its proponents claim, Transatlantic relations will remain very close also for this very peculiar reason.[28]

4. Collective Memory of U.S. as a Savior of Europe

Apart from the collective memory of family origin, the other defining narrative myth in the commemorated history of Transatlantic ties is the U.S. as the military savior of Europe. According to this reading, in the twentieth century U.S. armed forces saved Europe first from the danger of German imperialism, then that of Nazi domination and lastly that of Soviet communist rule. Within the framework of the family presented above, it is the U.S. as the strong young adult reluctantly intervening first to stop the deadly psychotic breakdown of the aging parents (WWI), then to prevent a manic and oppressive uncle taking over the whole family (WWII) and lastly to preserve the basic shape of the old family in the face of dangerous new ideas of the family outcasts (Cold War).

Collective memory of U.S. as savior of Europe has serious political implications for Transatlantic ties. In the instances mentioned above, U.S. was in fact not just "saving Europe," but a particular vision of how Europe should look like. Imperial and Nazi Germany as well as Soviet Union threatened to reshape the basic political structure of the continent in such a way that it would diverge substantially from the U.S. From this perspective, the U.S. was trying to save Europe as its mirror image, however distorted the old mirror might be. Special relationship with Great Britain should be interpreted in this light as well, as in Great Britain this affinity is the most pronounced. The well-preserved collective memory of U.S. (and British) victories in these war efforts serve to this day as a powerful affirmation of the winning principles of capitalist liberal democracy that in principle values individual freedom. This interpretation gives new

[27] Lamar White, "How I busted Steve Scalise: Inside a GOP political scandal — and its ongoing coverup," *Salon,* January 6, 2015, http://www.salon.com/2015/01/06/how_i_busted_steve_scalise_inside_a_gop_political_scandal_and_its_ongoing_coverup/.

[28] Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, "'This is a White Country': The Racial Ideology of the Western Nations of the World-System," *Sociological Inquiry* 70 (2000): 193.

meaning to the well-known Rammstein hit with the refrain: "We are all living in America …"

In the United States, the memory of fighting and winning in Europe is a source of great pride and self-satisfaction. Especially the spectacular operation of mass landing in Normandy is well suited as a source of frequent commemorations both in official U.S. discourse and in numerous mainstream blockbuster films such as Saving Private Ryan. In textbooks from different years and different publishers, powerful image of the landing usually features more prominently than other visuals (see Figure 3). This self-congratulating aspect in U.S. collective memory also serves the important function of tying the future of Europe to the United States: The victory and all the corresponding effort and sacrifice would be in vain should Europe be in any way "lost." On the symbolic level, the violent and victorious act of return to the Mother can be also interpreted as the ultimate act of caring. The lavish commemoration ceremonies in Normandy are supposed to soothe all those who are afraid the U.S. does not care anymore (and would not repeat the landing again).



Figure 3: "D-Day, June 6, 1944."
Source: Edward Ayers et al., American Anthem (Austin, TX: McDougall-Holt, 2010), 346, photograph by author.

In parts of Europe liberated from Nazi rule by U.S. armed forces, collective memory of the event is equally potent, but with a slightly sinister twist – the memory serves also as a stark reminder of the fact that the liberation was not possible through domestic efforts and resistance, but had to rely heavily on an external savior, who might have decided not to show up this time around. Politically, this kind of memory serves to support the idea that Europe can't be trusted with managing its own security and therefore the U.S. needs to be lured into providing guarantees, effectively promising to repeat the sort of Normandy operation in the future if the need arises to do so.[29] Serendipitously for Western Europe, the perceived Soviet threat coupled with the fresh memories of dangers that the severely weakened Europe posed for the U.S. established such a guarantee in the form of Article 5 of the 1949 NATO treaty.

In comparison, the fact that the external savior from Nazi occupation came in the form of Stalin's Red Army is rather uncomfortable after 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe, which can be demonstrated also by significant de-emphasizing of the related commemorative activities. With Russia's influence in the region rising, commemorative events are used to bring back memories of Soviet liberation and thus the symbolic vision of Russia as the natural "savior" of the region. A military parade in Belgrade to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the liberation by Red Army was used by Vladimir Putin to achieve his goals in this respect.[30]

The collective memory myth of the U.S. savior has one more fascinating aspect that is potentially relevant for Transatlantic ties: the typical gendered representation. Even though America was historically also represented as a female figure, the dominant image became that of Uncle Sam, whose sex and orientation are abundantly clear. Europe, however, is always symbolically portrayed as a woman (the fact that the name is derived from a female mythological figure helps in this respect). This gives the collective memory of the saviors from the U.S. special salience, as it can draw on the ancient archetypical story of damsel in distress. This sort of imagery can be very helpful when enticing the young self-absorbed U.S. prince to go on the perilous quest to uphold the honor of his older European sister in danger (see Figure 4). This story includes a serious normative element, no doubt questionable in feminist reading, in that the refusal to help the weaker female character would be not only morally reprehensible, but at the same time it would also shatter the

[29] Jeffrey J. Anderson, John G. Ikenberry and Thomas Risse, eds. *The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 3–6.

[30] Andrew MacDowall, "Vladimir Putin welcomed with cheers in Belgrade," *Telegraph*, October 16, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/11168133/Vladimir-Putin-welcomed-with-cheers-in-Belgrade.html.

fundamental tenets of the traditional male identity. As long as Uncle Sam is defined primarily in masculine terms, U.S. will always be hard-pressed to rescue the female Europe from existential threats if the situation is constructed in these terms, especially when the collective memory already exists to support it.[31]

Figure 4: "Destroy this Mad Brute."
Source: H. R. Hopps (1869–1937): Destroy this mad brute/Enlist, 1917. Available at http://catalogue.swanngalleries.com/.

End of the Cold War: The Second Coming?

Last but not least, the idea of the U.S. as a savior resonates strongly in the countries that were behind the Iron Curtain, for which the fall of communism represented a symbolic second liberation. Huge increases in military spending under Ronald

[31] Cynthia Enloe, *Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 195.

Reagan and his inspiring discourse of the evil empire are the principal causes of the fall of communism in this version of collective memory. The implications are clear: assertive U.S. military might is key to preserving and upholding liberal as well as humanistic ideas and values both domestically and around the globe. Václav Havel's support for assertive military action also against civilian targets in Serbia in 1999, which surprised some of his more pacifist friends, should be understood within this framework, regardless of the complex responsibility-to-protect debate.[32] Also, by highlighting the indispensable role of U.S. in the collapse of communism, proponents of this vision often simultaneously dismiss almost all social policies and government regulations on the domestic level as a symbolic return to the oppressive Soviet model. The neo-liberal economic transition in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is therefore seen as a sort of "second coming" of the U.S., the first being the liberation of Western Europe in 1945.

It is in this context that Donald Rumsfeld was correct when he tried to divide Europe into the Old and the New, as collective memories of the United States differed between countries which were liberated in 1945 and in 1989. The countries which had fresh memories of being supposedly liberated from communism by Ronald Reagan's militarism became part of Rumsfeld's New Europe, which was more sympathetic to U.S. interventionist foreign policy. Even though his efforts were motivated by political expediency of these divisions, Rumsfeld nonetheless clearly demonstrated that linkages between international politics and collective memory are strong, indeed. In countries where collective memory of U.S. as a savior is prevalent, it becomes an important factor also when confronted with U.S. foreign policy today.[33]

However, more recently the collective memory of U.S. as a savior from communism became contested, because it is directly linked to current political choices and dilemmas. There is another version of collective memory related to the fall of communism, which puts the main emphasis on internal moral as well as economic bankruptcy of the regimes, coupled with hopes for a better life as observed in Western countries.[34] The role of the U.S. is limited merely to providing an example of an affluent society with vibrant culture and economic opportunity. Implications of this kind of memory framework on the international level are that military

[32] Richard A. Falk, "Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law," *The American Journal of International Law* Vol. 93, No. 4 (October 1999): 848.

[33] Transatlantic Trends 2014, Country profiles, German Marshall Fund, http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/country-profiles-2014/country-profiles-poland-2014.

[34] Cf. Jack F. Matlock, *Superpower Illusions: How Myths and False Ideologies Led America Astray–And How to Return to Reality* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).

posturing and expenditures are of limited value. The crucial problem domestically in post-communist countries suddenly ceases to be an anti-government crusade inspired by Reagan and neoliberals, but it becomes the creation of society that people would want to live in. Politically, this can now involve some of the "socialist" projects such as universal health care, free education for every child from kindergarten to university and basic social security for old age, guaranteed by the state. The role of the U.S. and specifically the collective memory of Reagan then become more problematic, as U.S. Democrats are more aligned with this type of thinking.

The clash of these conflicting versions of memory of the fall of communism and of the role U.S. played in it reaches even the highest levels of government. For example, in the Czech Republic an official Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes was established by right-wing government in 2003 with the primary purpose to document and commemorate the "two evils" of Nazism and communism. Over time, and coincidentally after the government became more centrist, suddenly a major crisis erupted at the Institute, as some employees wanted to place less emphasis on the communist political persecutions in the 1950s and highlight the day-to-day lives of citizens under socialism. The whole affair became public, political and acrimonious, which is another testimony to the importance placed on collective memory.[35] As mentioned above, the implications of these different versions of collective memory of U.S. role can be quite dramatic – either support U.S. military interventions as they bring freedom and security, or disagree with military solutions and focus more on the strength as well as weaknesses of U.S. society and try to get inspiration for internal changes.

Political use of memory was clearly observable in the controversy regarding possible placement of U.S. army base with a radar in Czech Republic. There, the Czech government, which wanted the base, relied heavily on emphasizing the U.S. role as the savior of Europe, with frequent references to U.S. liberation of Pilsen. Well-known country singer Jan Vyčítal, who was supportive of the base, even made a song and a video, literally cordially inviting the U.S. army and the radar. The lyrics also included references the liberation of Pilsen in 1945. The video was featuring girls with U.S.-flag bikinis wielding M-16 rifles.[36] Czech Minister of Defense at that time was so thrilled about the song that she arranged for herself to sing along in the refrain and then presented the CD as an official gift to President G. W. Bush when he was visiting Prague.[37] Not even this helped and majority of

[35] Jaroslav Spurný, "Volba šéfa ÚSTR podle amatérských kritérií," *Respekt* No. 14 (April 10, 2014).
[36] "Dobrý den, prapore hvězd a pruhů," http://vimeo.com/3505259.
[37] Czech News Agency, "Vlasta Parkanová nazpívala pro Bushe písničku," *Novinky.cz*, June 4, 2007, http://www.novinky.cz/koktejl/116357-vlasta-parkanova-nazpivala-pro-bushe-pisnicku.html.

Czechs were still against the U.S. army base – living memory of problems with Soviet army bases was widely used by the campaign against the placement. This episode further demonstrates the salience of collective memory in international affairs as well as the complexity of analyzing competing memory frameworks in an individual case. Nevertheless, the memory of U.S. as a savior of Europe has clear policy implications and mobilizing potential that can be drawn on in times of crises.

5. Preliminary Conclusions and Research Agenda

Based on the overview of theoretical literature both on collective memory and on international relations, the connection between these two concepts is relevant and promising with respect to explaining as well understanding of Transatlantic ties. Cursory exploration of the main memory frameworks underlying Transatlantic relations, namely the idea of European role in the origins of the U.S. and the idea of the U.S. as a savior of Europe revealed that indeed, these concepts are highly relevant for Transatlantic ties, and as such they are also at times vigorously contested. These preliminary findings encourage further research into the topic.

Given the methodological difficulties in trying to assess the role of collective memory in Transatlantic relations, the research agenda needs to rely on creative gathering of indirect circumstantial evidence which will eventually present an emergent picture that can be interpreted with the help of the available theoretical framework. The following proposals are diverse with respect to selected methods and each will serve to answer only a specific aspect of the wider topic.

1. Analysis of official rhetoric of the highest officials over the last 25 years using the tools of discourse analysis, searching for importance placed on Transatlantic ties as well as main contexts in which it is used. The main question that will be answered concerns the changes in time: Are Transatlantic relations really losing on importance? Is it a gradual process, or has there been a specific event that triggered the changes in the dynamic?
2. Structured interviews with officials responsible for Transatlantic relations. These people are at the forefront of decision-making processes and are thus key figures both in the sense that they are influenced by memory and at the same time they are in the position to actively work with collective memory. What are their principal memories related to Transatlantic ties? Are they aware of the role of collective memory in Transatlantic relations? Are they trying to shape collective memory in any way? What tools are they employing when dealing with issues related to memory?

3. Analyze official programing of American Centers in Europe and corresponding European institutions in United States, looking for ways how the past is represented within these venues. Main questions to be answered are: What role does collective memory play in these institutions? What kind of collective memory is presented there? Have there been any substantial changes on emphasis or topics?
4. Analyze available diplomatic documents related to the topic of collective memory in Transatlantic relations. What are the topics that arouse most interest? Are there any shifts in emphasis over time? Is there a discernible effort to present a specific version of events? Are the diplomatic officials aware of the significance of the role of collective memory?
5. Analyze major commemorative events related to Transatlantic relations. The upcoming seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II will be analyzed with respect to symbolic posturing as well as current implications of the presented discourse. Czech Republic, which was liberated both by U.S. and Soviet forces will be especially fascinating to observe in this respect. Is United States depicted as a savior? What are the political ramifications of the commemorative events?
6. With the help of N-gram viewer analyze the changing frequency of key terms related to collective memory in Transatlantic relations. Even though it is a crude tool, it presents a basic picture of the emphasis placed on selected topics in any given year. By choosing relevant terms, the findings can either support or contradict the findings in other areas.
7. Analyze existing surveys of attitudes in the U.S. towards Europe and Europeans towards the U.S. over time. This should demonstrate the long-term stability or volatility in the attitudes of general public, as well as general trends as they evolve in time. Even though the causal relation to collective memory is hard to establish, the findings will serve as an important corrective to other parts of the projects.

If successful, we will be able to understand the current state, recent dynamics, major topics as well as salience of collective memory in Transatlantic relations when compared with other driving forces in the relationship. The findings will have implications for policymakers involved in Transatlantic relations, as they will become aware of how collective memory shapes their own views and how it can be effectively deployed with respect to transatlantic ties. As the relevant literature persuasively suggests, memory is a fluid concept which is constantly undergoing shifts and changes not only because of generational changes, but also based on

commemorative activities by governments, NGOs, artists and other social actors. The controversies arise often not from arguments about historical truth which can be uncovered by evidence, but from emphasizing and de-emphasizing certain events and figures from the past. In this sense, we construct our collective memories, as they are outcomes of struggles over importance and the weight of past events with political as well as moral implications. For example, the Czech big-budget project *Paměť národa* (Memory of the Nation) focuses on the stories of courageous and principled people who fought Nazi and communist persecution and could serve as guiding lights and empowerment for the younger generation.

We should be aware that all interventions with respect to collective memory are in some way distorting the past, usually for the benefit of the present. This benefit can come in the form of cynical manipulation for political gain or in the form of presenting inspiring events that emphasize our shared values or moral commitments. That said, the way we choose to employ collective memory and emphasize specific events in Transatlantic relations has an important normative element which says a lot about ourselves in the first place. In an open and democratic society, people should be aware of the complex processes which emphasize and de-emphasize some aspects of the known historical truth. If we directly confront the fact that as a society we choose to remember certain events while choosing to forget others, we should become more responsible about presenting our shared past. Acknowledging the linkage of collective memory to current political as well as normative choices, we thus become more responsible also for the present. With respect to maintaining friendly Transatlantic ties, it is a clear message for carriers of memorial discourses to identify and emphasize the positive shared heritage that serves as the foundation of the relationship.

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REVIEWS

Jeffrey A. Bader, **Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy**. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012. 171 pages. ISBN 978-0815724469

Jeffrey A. Bader served as a senior director for East Asian Affairs in President Obama's National Security Council between January 2009 and April 2011. Bader, a long associate of the Brookings Institution, major Washington-based think tank, also served in different capacities at the Department of State and Office of the United States Trade Representative. He has deep expertise in China and U.S. China policy, as he has maintained a long-term focus on Asia Pacific.

In his latest contribution, Bader offers an insider account of Obama's approach to Asia Pacific, with special focus on China. The book primarily describes policy making and implementation and thus offers, given Bader's hands-on participation in the process, an unprecedented access into the decision-making process. By uncovering the behind-the-scenes diplomacy, he seeks to explain and justify some of the Administration's moves and thus challenge negative media reporting and accusations of kowtowing to China. Bader's text aims to show that the White House had a clear strategy to deal with foreign policy issues, despite dealing mostly with domestic issues during the first two years of Barack Obama's presidency. This does not come as a surprise since Obama, as candidate for president in 2008, tried to position himself as a foreign policy president. He wanted to demonstrate that the Democratic Party could have a strong, successful foreign policy and thus erase the popular image that the Republican Party was stronger on national security issues.

Bader proceeds more or less chronologically to examine some of the key issues that arose in the Asia Pacific region that the Obama Administration had to address. He explains how the Administration laid the groundwork and set priorities for U.S.–China relations during Secretary of State Clinton's first trip to Asia (chapter two and three), how it reacted to North Korean missile tests in 2009 (chapter four) and sinking of Cheonan (chapter nine), what were the key issues in the U.S.–Japan relations during the transition from the Liberal Democratic Party to the Democratic Party of Japan (chapter five) and the tsunami aftermath (chapter twelve). One chapter is dedicated to the Obama Administration's effort to build stronger ties with Southeast Asia, which included both strengthening bilateral ties as well as increasing U.S. participation in multilateral regional fora, a major shift from Bush administration.

Bader starts with a closer look at Obama's approach towards Asia Pacific during his 2008 presidential campaign. He examines the composition of Obama's foreign policy team, which consisted of seasoned experts with previous experience in service for the government. According to Bader, Obama's conceptualization of his vision for U.S. Asia policy "did not involve dramatic changes … [as] the problems in U.S. leadership in Asia were not the consequence of Asia-specific policy errors, but rather of the spillover of misguided U.S. policies elsewhere in the world" (p. xvii).

In this context, we can infer that Obama's approach to China, the focus of the book, was influenced by two major factors. First, President Obama followed up on President

Bush's China policy, which was generally seen as a success, and therefore most Obama's advisors found it relatively easy to build upon many of Bush's initiatives. The Bush Administration, for example, laid important groundwork for bilateral (and some multilateral) dialogues that promoted government to government or military to military exchanges but also served as a means of building mutual trust, the lack of which continues to be a key challenge in Sino-American relations. The key dialogues however focused mostly on economic issues. Therefore, the Obama Administration, particularly Hillary Clinton, wanted to increase the prominence of political and security issues in bilateral discussions, leading to creation of so-called Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The discussion of political and security issues was deemed critical since the rise of China and its impact on the world order was of a fundamental concern to Obama and his foreign policy advisors as they were working on the Administration's broader policy towards Southeast Asia. Bader himself joins many of his predecessors in optimism that the United States could have a constructive relationship with Beijing, one that could shape China into a "responsible stakeholder," as he writes on p. 7: "America's relationship with China could be shaped to maximize the chances that China's rise will become a stabilizing and constructive force rather than a threat to peace and equilibrium."

Second, Obama decided to pay more attention to the Asia Pacific region as a whole. Bader, while praising Bush for establishing good relations with Beijing, is critical of the previous president for neglecting Southeast Asia (p. 1). For example, the Bush Administration, mistrustful of multilateral organizations, skipped some of meetings of regional multilateral fora such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In times when the U.S. influence was seen as waning, particularly in the aftermath of Iraq and Afghanistan, President Obama and his staff felt it was important to address the mounting concerns of many Southeast Asian countries about the rise of China and its impact on the region. Consequently, Bader argues that under Obama, an adjustment of policy was needed (p. 6): "The Asia-Pacific region deserved higher priority in American foreign policy. With wealth, power, and influence gradually shifting from Europe toward Asia in the past several decades, the region has emerged as the world's center of gravity for economic, political, and security decision in the twenty-first century." Since President Obama deemed reassurance of U.S. allies in the region as crucial, the Administration ramped up U.S. involvement in the region's multilateral fora, intensified bilateral cooperation with many of the U.S. allies in the region, and most importantly announced the policy of "Pivot to Asia" or "rebalance" with its key component of Trans-Pacific Partnership. This strategic shift, as some perceive it, came after Bader's departure from the White House and therefore is not covered in the book, but it can be seen as a natural outcome of the U.S. foreign policy adjustments that Bader initiated with his colleagues.

While Bader promises to take a closer look at the phenomenon of the rise of China and the Obama Administration's reactions to this process, this topic is covered only in a part of the book. Bader focuses mostly on the evolution of the Sino-American relationship. In this respect, chapter six is the most interesting. It provides a glimpse into the behind-the-scenes decision-making related to several important episodes regarding Southeast Asia during

Obama's first year in office, such as the cancellation of the Dalai Lama visit, Obama's visit to China and the climate Summit in Copenhagen. In the case of the Dalai Lama, Bader attempts to explain the logic behind the cancellation and counters some of the media reporting accusing the Obama Administration of caving to Chinese pressure. He points out that the cancellation of the meeting enabled the U.S. officials to exert pressure on China with respect to the Tibet issue – Beijing pledged to renew dialogue with Dalai Lama's representatives, a promise that was upheld in January 2010 (p. 74). Similarly, in his account of Obama's visit to China, Bader expresses frustration with some of the coverage the President received. He describes, for example, President Obama's town hall meeting in Shanghai – Bader believed that the president made his mark, speaking of "tribute to the U.S. system of democracy, freedom, protection of human rights, and constitutional law," but the U.S. media chose to criticize the fact that the speech was broadcast on Chinese terms, exposing efforts of the Chinese to constrain the event (p. 58–59). Bader critiques efforts to portray the U.S. approach to China as kowtowing: "[i]n terms of American public perceptions of the trip, the Western media coverage of these events damaged both the trip and the administration's ability to manage China policy" (p. 60). Bader thus personally experiences the "difficulty of conducting a serious foreign policy in a public domain dominated by superficial discourse, in which sound bites substitute for a sound assessment of the costs and benefits of different approaches." (p. 52)

In the following, seventh chapter, Bader looks at increasing tensions in Sino-American relations which threatened to undermine the Administration's goal of strengthening the cooperation between Washington and Beijing. The tensions were caused by President Obama's decision to approve arms sales to Taiwan, which Beijing had traditionally opposed, negotiations over Iran sanctions, and most importantly by China's activities in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. China's behavior in the South China Sea particularly drew media attention, leading many scholars as well as journalists to speak of China's increasing assertiveness. Bader notes that Beijing's growing assertive behavior most likely reflected an internal discussion in China on the U.S. post-2008 financial meltdown distraction or even decline: "The impression that China was rapidly overtaking the United States was rampant not only in Chinese literature but also in American media" (p. 80). Bader also notes a more confident stance of Chinese diplomats: "It is evident in retrospect that the Chinese were debating the direction of Chinese foreign policy in the last few months of 2010. For most of the year, the advocates of a more assertive Chinese policy had gone unchallenged publicly, while those favoring the more traditional cautious foreign policy had been effectively silenced" (p. 122).

The tensions between the United States and China influenced Hu Jintao's visit to the United States in 2010, described in chapter eleven. Bader describes in detail the preparation of the visit and the topics that needed to be put on the discussion agenda. These included issues of military relations, bilateral trade, such as the trade imbalance and undervaluation of Chinese yuan. Here, Bader remarks on p. 113 that he personally was comfortable with a tougher trade policy, a stance that probably was not welcome at the Department of Treasury. Other

important international issues that the U.S. wanted to be on table for discussions included combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Iran and Korea, combating terrorism and stabilizing Pakistan etc. The Administration drew a lesson from Obama's China visit and focused carefully on messaging in an effort to prevent media from hijacking the agenda-setting as well as positive outcomes of the trip. The visit thus focused on the Administration's priority of building a cooperative relationship with Beijing while at the same time getting China to cooperate on international issues. Encouraging China's leader to turn China into a "responsible stakeholder" was however successful only partially. China resisted the U.S. pressure to uphold universal standards, which Bader illustrates by Hu Jintao's reluctant answer: "China is making strides in this area but still had a long way to go." (p. 127)

Only one chapter is dedicated to building stronger ties with Southeast Asia (chapter nine), one of the key priorities of the Obama Administration. Bader briefly describes the U.S. effort to increase activity within regional multilateral fora, such as the ASEAN or East Asia Summit, as well as building strong bilateral ties with key regional players, such as Indonesia, Thailand, or Vietnam. Bader also highlights Obama's announcement of his commitment to negotiate the Trans-Pacific Partnership, free trade agreement, which has been the key economic component of Obama's rebalance policy.

In the concluding chapter, Bader summarizes the necessary principles for U.S. foreign policy, which should, in his opinion, guide Obama's Asia policy. These were in fact later, after Bader's departure, transformed into the "Pivot to Asia" concept, which involved the following goals: devote a higher priority to the Asia Pacific region, react in a balanced way to the rise of China, strengthen alliances and develop new partnerships, including joining regional institutions that the United States had so far stayed away from, expand the overall U.S. presence in the western Pacific and maintain its forward regional deployment. It was also deemed essential to work towards breaking the cycle of North Korean saber-rattling and ultimately dismantle Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. Last but not least, the United States pledged to speak and act with clarity on the universality of human rights while taking into account the differences between societies (p. 142). Most importantly, it is essential, according to Bader, to understand that it would be impossible to pursue a sound policy without economic recovery at home.

As an insider to the decision-making process, Bader generally offers a positive account of President Obama's Asia policy making. Bader offers a candid assessment of U.S.–China relations, especially in response to reports of China's increasing belligerence. He remarks that "those of us who had decades of experience with China could not recall ever seeing it quietly roll over in the face of foreign demands" (p. 80). Bader believes that at the moment of his departure, the Administration's rebalance to Asia led to a "strengthened U.S. position in the region, and more constructive Chinese behavior … [and] stable U.S.–China political/security relationship." (p. 120)

Jeffrey Bader wrote an interesting, engaging book that provides an overview of President Obama's policy towards Asia Pacific in the two first years of his administration. Bader offers an explanation and, in some cases, also justification of President Obama's approach

to the Asia Pacific, and to China in particular. However, despite the title, it is not a thorough study of the U.S. strategy towards the rise of China. It rather offers snippets from the world of foreign policy making and diplomacy; it is a memoir rather than an academic study. Still, Bader shows the world of painstaking diplomacy where planning every last detail is important and even small, insignificant missteps can throw off months of planning and negotiation. The book thus offers an interesting insight for experienced students of U.S. foreign policy, the practice of diplomacy, and the U.S.–China relations. Bader writes for those who already know the basics and want an insider's detailed account.

Jana Sehnálková

Michael Cox, Timothy J. Lynch, and Nicolas Bouchet, eds., **US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama**. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. 224 pages. ISBN 978-0-203-55037-3 (ebk); 978-0-415-67980-0 (pbk)

Since the end of the Second World War and, moreover, since the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion has come to be considered an intrinsic feature of U.S. foreign policy. The maintenance of a liberal world order became the hallmark of the Cold War ideological confrontation. Not only was the creation of a free, democratic world considered to be morally correct, it was also perceived to be the only world order that could fully preserve U.S. interests, safety and "way of life." Thus, when the ideological struggle ended with the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States – from its position of world hegemon – had enough leeway to shape the world order to its liking. Yet, challenges (both internal and external) to the United States' nearly unlimited spread of liberal values soon emerged. For a rising China, the liberal world order may not be the most strategically convenient international architecture and in the not-too-distant future, Beijing may seek to revise certain aspects of the present order. Furthermore, George W. Bush's initiation of the intervention in Iraq in 2003 on the premises of democracy promotion has arguably done great harm to the policy – both in its perception on the international scene and amongst the U.S. population.

This edited volume, compiled by the most renowned democracy promotion scholars, maps the range of challenges and opportunities that the policy of promoting democracy faced throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and examines the individual roles of a number of U.S. presidents in the process. Given the vital importance of the policy to basic American interests and values, the subject of democracy promotion is by no means understudied in U.S. and world scholarship. But to put it simply, most research focuses on providing an (at least partial) answer to two basic questions: What type of democracy (or political system) is, in fact, being promoted? What is the proportion between the normative and practical U.S. interests (that is, value-based and material-based) while formulating the policy?

In analyzing the intellectual and practical approaches to the policy of promoting democracy (in other words, promoting a liberal world order) of a number of U.S. presidents, this

publication attempts to juxtapose the various differences and similarities of each approach and thereby provide an elaborate comparative study. In reference to the two above-mentioned questions, such a comparative approach has the potential to uncover the true intentions behind democracy promotion and thus implicitly provide the desired answers. This is where the publication fills a void in scholarship. The EU and other rising democracies (Turkey, Brazil) are steadily building their democracy support infrastructure, but none of these actors' strategies in promoting democracy have been placed in a comparative perspective with that of the U.S.[1] Yet it is precisely the question of "how, why and when" individual democracies promote democracy in third countries, that can provide a vantage point for examining the workings of normative and material interests in policymaking. Why does state A support democracy (or a democratic transition) in state X, while state B prefers to support democracy in state Y, rather than in state X? The same question can be applied to the decision-making of U.S. presidents. In this sense, the publication presents a valuable methodological contribution to democracy promotion research.

The volume opens with a theoretical introduction to the topic of democracy promotion, which is followed by chapters devoted to individual presidents.[2] In the first chapter, Tony Smith of Tufts University and Harvard University graphically typifies the U.S. liberal worldview as a four-sided diamond, with each facet representing an elemental feature of the current international system. The four facets of the "liberal diamond" are U.S. hegemony, capitalism, democracy and multilateralism. These points are in essence interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Implicitly, one can assume that in the absence of a single one of these facets, the liberal world order would become unsustainable. At the same time it is necessary to ask which of the four points of the diamond is most important. In reading *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama*, one can observe that each U.S. president placed emphasis on a different facet and shaped their democracy promotion policy accordingly.

Theodore Roosevelt is very seldom associated in any way with democracy promotion. However, as Adam Quinn of University of Birmingham demonstrates, Roosevelt had indeed set the groundwork for the United States to become an active force in promoting a liberal world order. It was Roosevelt's belief that a state must be militarily strong and internationally active in order to be capable of pursuing and protecting its national interests that once and for all changed the American foreign policy course from "inward-looking" to "outward-looking." Similarly to a number of late nineteenth / early twentieth century European statesmen, Roosevelt maintained a typically colonial and imperialist mindset. He believed that the United States should play its part "in the great work of uplifting mankind."

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[1] See Thomas Carothers and Richard Youngs, eds., *Non-Western Roots Of International Democracy Support* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014).

[2] The book offers chapters about Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosvelt, Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama.

Though unpronounced at the time, Roosevelt would have been an advocate of U.S. hegemony as the most important point of the "liberal diamond."

Woodrow Wilson, on the other hand, preferred multilateralism. Considered to be the first proponent of "liberal internationalism" in foreign affairs, Wilson contended that democracy is built by slow habit. He knew of the pivotal role of education in fostering a truly democratic society and consequently did not believe that democracy could be simply imposed from the outside. Wilson's primary aim was to "make the world safe for democracy" – in other words, to create a world order that would foster indigenous pressures for democratization, thereby letting democracy take root in a "natural" manner.

The 1930s presented a sudden challenge to democratic regimes. The Great Depression gave way to a number of populist and authoritarian regimes in Europe and president Franklin D. Roosevelt quickly understood the need to focus on strengthening democracy at home to withstand similar domestic political pressures. For FDR, a strong democracy at home was a prerequisite to fight autocracy abroad. He also provided one of the first formulations of what later became the so-called democratic peace theory[3]: in 1936 he noted that "autocracy in world affairs endangers peace and that such threats do not spring from the nations devoted to the democratic ideal."

This vision was shared by Harry S. Truman. Set into the bipolar ideological confrontation, the support for emerging democracies became the focal point of Truman's foreign policy (most notably represented by the aid provided to Greece and Turkey). However, as Martin H. Folly of Brunel University argues in his chapter, during the Truman administration, being "democratic" became too simplistically equated with being "anti-communist." During the entire Cold War this turned out to be a precedent that led the United States to support any regime opposed to the Soviet Union. As a consequence, Washington labeled seemingly undemocratic regimes as "democratic" only to legitimize its support to them. In turn, the United States was often accused of hypocrisy and applying double standards in dealing with foreign nations.

John F. Kennedy can be considered to be the first U.S. president to attempt to institutionalize democracy promotion in some form. Surrounded by a team of advisers from academia, Kennedy fell for the idea of "nation-building" and "modernization theory."[4] For Kennedy, "nation-building" was a potential means by which the United States could contain the Soviet Union by literally imposing democracy (or a pro-U.S. regime) in underdeveloped countries; the objective was to show Third World political elites that democracy is a more attractive political model than communism. To pursue this goal, the Kennedy administration founded the Peace Corps and more importantly the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1961. Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, slightly

[3] The democratic peace theory states that democratic regimes do not engage in military conflict with other democratic states. For a discussion see Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).

[4] Modernization theory claims that the growth of per capita GDP has a causal effect on democratization – i.e. the higher the per capita GDP, the more society will struggle for political freedoms.

shifted the focus from outward-looking democracy promotion to a more inward-looking policy of strengthening democracy at home (although this shift was most likely caused by developments in the civil rights movement). Johnson's lack of a profound strategic interest in supporting democracy abroad was manifested, for example, by his lukewarm reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Jimmy Carter's foreign policy is most often associated with his emphasis on human rights. Though his human rights agenda should be perceived as an intrinsic part of his democracy promotion efforts; by highlighting the communist bloc's breaches of human rights, he gave a voice to Russian and Eastern European dissidents and put the Soviet Union ideologically on the defensive. Although efforts have been made to measure the impact of Carter's human rights agenda across the globe, none have conclusively proven that the policies affected the behavior of rights-abusing governments. Nevertheless, John Dumbrell of Durham University concludes that Carter was never given enough credit for playing his part in toppling the Soviet Union. Carter's approach to democracy promotion, he claims, can be labeled as "post-imperialist" – meaning that the moral and normative imperatives played a sincere and decisive role in shaping the policy.

While for Carter the main facet of the "liberal diamond" was democracy (or democratic values), for Ronald Reagan it was a form of U.S. hegemony. Reagan was a staunch proponent of a United States that sets the example for all the rest to follow. He did not propose to remake the world in America's image, but wished to "inspire people everywhere." In terms of his democracy promotion policy, Reagan's 1982 speech in Westminster became a focal point. In the speech, he outlined his vision to "foster the infrastructure of democracy" and a few months later, he presented legislation to Congress to set up the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and its affiliated institutes.[5] The "infrastructure of democracy" that Reagan created reflected his vision of how democratic governments should be installed in third countries. Reagan was mostly sympathetic to civil society, or indigenous democratic movements. In this sense, his administration was committed to a "bottom-up" construction of democracy. Focusing on the grassroots level, Reagan envisaged a novel idea of giving direct grants to non-governmental organizations in third countries. This approach has proven successful and it remains in place until present day.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union presented U.S. foreign policy with the challenge of reformulating its core priorities. A number of voices claimed that to keep America safe, containment must be succeeded by democracy promotion as the main feature of foreign policy. Bill Clinton's administration was keen on integrating democracy promotion into its foreign policy strategy and in the event openly added another aspect to it – that is, the spread of capitalism. The Clinton administration emphasized the necessity to foster "*market* democracies" around the globe and with this stated goal the total amount of aid allocated to supporting democracy rose from 100 million to 700 million dollars during the eight years

[5] Namely the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the Center for International Private Enterprise and the Free Trade Union Institute.

of his presidency. However, Clinton's mistake, identified by the chapter's author Nicolas Bouchet, was that he equated Boris Yeltsin with Russian democracy and supported him under any circumstances. This led to further criticism, which claimed that despite the nearly unlimited opportunities to spread liberalism and democracy after the demise of the Soviet Union, Clinton never fully used the chance and in fact "squandered the potential." But perhaps Clinton's presidency, in fact, exposed the limits of spreading democratic values around the world: in the 1990s, the U.S. only supported processes that were already happening.

The final two chapters discuss the contribution of the two latest presidents – George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Although a first impression may point to the assumption that the policies of Bush and Obama are vastly different, a closer look reveals that, in fact, their approaches to democracy promotion bear many similarities.

Tony Smith admits that "however controversial [Bush's] policies may have been, there is at least agreement about one thing: that by associating his intervention in Iraq with the idea of democracy promotion it did great damage to the idea." Smith goes on to say that due to Bush's policies, democracy promotion "almost became a dirty word." No matter if the Bush administration's democracy promotion policies were sincerely driven by normative ideals or by purely material interests, it is quite clear today that the policies were counterproductive. As Timothy J. Lynch of University of Melbourne asserts: "Bush's deluded pursuit of democracy […] resulted in the diminution of American power and prestige." To underline the deleterious effects of Bush's policies, Lynch argues that the 2003 Iran Democracy Act and the 2006 Iran Freedom and Support Act "convinced the Iranian government to seek a nuclear deterrent."[6]

With such a legacy of democracy promotion left over by the preceding administration, Barack Obama entered the White House determined to significantly shift the U.S. approach to democracy support. However, as Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace says, the shift only occurred on the rhetorical level. "Rather than jettison [Bush's approach to democracy promotion], Obama recalibrated it for a more global audience." The Obama administration (at least in its first term) was cautious not to sound like the preceding administration in preaching other countries on how to govern and relied more on the multilateral facet of the "liberal diamond." Nevertheless, Obama was forced to tailor his approach to democracy assistance in relation with the so-called Arab Spring uprisings that swept nearly the entire Middle East. Hence, the overall budget allocated to democracy, governance and human rights assistance increased from 2.24 million dollars in 2008 to 2.48 million dollars in 2010.

But Carothers points to another critical observation. In connection with the Arab Spring, Obama was often criticized for his irresoluteness and his lack of a coherent strategy to deal with the developments. Here, Carothers notes that while democratization of Eastern

[6] The 2003 Iran Democracy Act pledged "to support transparent, full democracy in Iran"; the 2006 Iran Freedom and Support Act claimed "to hold the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and to support a transition to democracy in Iran."

Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall was a clear strategic imperative for the United States, democratization of the Middle East was a dilemma that could possibly jeopardize American interest in the region (such as access to Gulf oil, cooperation on counterterrorism, etc.). This observation shows a much broader picture, which could form the conclusion of the entire publication – but only if there was a concluding chapter.

Despite the publication's lack of a comprehensive conclusion that would place all the examined approaches to democracy promotion in a common perspective, the reader is compelled to make constant comparisons between the divergent policies of each president.

Apart from examining the presidents' emphasis on the various facets of the "liberal diamond," it is interesting to also look at their respective regions of focus. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, paid most attention to Latin America (hence the so-called Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine[7]); Franklin D. Roosevelt to democracy at home; Kennedy focused on the Third World countries; Truman on Europe and Bush on the Middle East. From this list one can observe that the application of democracy promotion policies fittingly correlates with U.S. geopolitical and strategic interests. In Theodore Roosevelt's time, a safe "near abroad" was crucial to national security and served as a buffer against the (waning) European powers. During Franklin D. Roosevelt's era, the danger to U.S. democracy came first from the inside and later from the outside and Roosevelt chose war to protect democracy. Truman identified the growing Soviet influence in Europe as a threat to U.S. interests and envisaged plans to support regimes that could be saved from the Kremlin's expanding sphere of influence. A similar approach was overtaken by Kennedy, who furthered the concept of employing democracy promotion as a soft power weapon in the ideological confrontation of the Cold War. Finally for Bush, the greatest danger to U.S. national security was terrorism that originated in the Middle East and therefore he focused his democracy promotion policies particularly on this region.

US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama shows that nearly every U.S. president pursued the Wilsonian vision of "making the world safe for democracy." Although this is a noble goal, at the same time it is basically a euphemism for "making the world safe for U.S. democracy." This statement, however, is not intended in a pejorative manner. As for any other nation, national interests come first for the United States. The reviewed publication demonstrates that historically, U.S. presidents always needed to have a geopolitical or material interest that compelled them to formulate democracy promotion policies.

Jan Hornát

[7] The corollary stated that the United States had the responsibility to preserve order and protect life and property in Latin American countries (and more broadly in the Western Hemisphere) and that Washington reserved the right to intervene in any conflict between European powers and these states.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

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5. Reference Examples

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