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CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

Welcome to the first 2017 issue of AUC Studia Territorialia. We hope you will find the texts both thought-stimulating and rewarding.

Apart from shorter materials including two critical book reviews as well as a report on a new data archive project, the present issue brings three full-length articles from the geographical areas covered by the journal's aims and scope. Two build upon and further expand our knowledge of transnational history of Europe; the third one is a contribution to the theory of warfare and our understanding of U.S. military strategy.

In her opening study, Natali Stegmann reconstructs the formation of the new European order following the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. The post-WWI territorial setting provided for the establishment of new states in East Central Europe on the ruins of former transnational empires. Of equal importance, the Versailles system inaugurated the creation of new international organizations aiming for lasting peace. The International Labour Organization (ILO), a branch of the newly founded League of Nations, was supposed to become the key institutional pillar of social and labor policies. Making use of archival holdings from ILO's offices in Warsaw and Prague, Stegmann explores how interwar Poland and Czechoslovakia developed their social insurance systems in line with the international labor standards set out by the ILO. Contrasting these impulses with the two states' inherited Austrian and German social welfare schemes, the study illustrates the complex interplay of social-policy making on national as well as international levels.

In the second article, Michel Christian, Sandrine Kott and Ondřej Matějka contribute to the study of international organizations in the Cold War era. The authors consider international organizations a platform for maintaining East-West contacts among various groups of actors across the Iron Curtain. Relying

largely on a biographical approach, they seek to explain the conditions and underlying factors that made these transnational contacts possible. Taking the examples of the ILO, the UN Conference on Trade and Development, and the World Council of Churches, the authors argue that specific "epistemic communities" sharing a compatible vision of modernity slowly emerged within these international organizations, in spite of ideological differences between East and West.

The third article, authored by Jan Beneš, traces the origins and evolution of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) in the context of post-9/11 War on Terror. The author identifies three main development phases of modern U.S. counterinsurgency strategy: shock and awe, population-centric approach, and targeted COIN. Using the concept of "strategic culture," he shows how deeply these changes in U.S. military thinking were embedded in the tradition of American exceptionalism.

Enjoy your reading.

Jan Šír

ARTICLES

2017 ACTA UNIVERSITATIS CAROLINAE PAG. 11–34
STUDIA TERRITORIALIA 1

THE ILO AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: INSIGHTS INTO THE EARLY POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK INTERWAR YEARS

NATALI STEGMANN
UNIVERSITÄT REGENSBURG

Abstract
The International Labour Organization (ILO) was a part of the international order established by the Treaty of Versailles, which considered social and labor policies as fundamental to the building of a modern peaceful world. Politically, the formation of the Polish and Czechoslovak nation states was also part of the new European order. This article explores the collaboration between the governments of those states and the ILO, concentrating on the intersections between the international standards put forward by the ILO and the institutional continuity of the German and Austrian social insurance systems in the region. It illuminates the so far underreported heritage of transnational policy-making. Analyzing the work of the ILO's national Correspondence Offices in Warsaw and Prague, the ratification of labor standards, and the enacting of social legislation, this article stresses, on the one hand, how standards of work became a subject of international and national control and, on the other, how a normative model of "work" arose.
Keywords: International Labour Organization (ILO); Poland; Czechoslovakia; labor standards; social insurances; work
DOI: 10.14712/23363231.2017.16

Introduction

The Treaty of Versailles established not only a new territorial order, but, with the League of Nations, also a supranational organization charged with maintaining

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The author expresses her thanks to Heike Karge, Katrin Steffen, Luminita Gatejel and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

lasting peace. Peace was to be assured in two main ways. The first of these was shared conflict management between nations; to a certain degree, each country was required to give up complete sovereignty and subordinate its home affairs to the ideas and directives of an umbrella organization.[1] The second aim was the establishment, internally, of what at the time was understood as "social peace."

The countries of East Central Europe were deeply affected both by the redrawing of the continental map and by the idea of social peace. The new, or rather, re-established nation-states of Poland and Czechoslovakia were built from territories that had belonged to the now fallen Russian, German and Habsburg empires. Poland and Czechoslovakia gained not only their own state territories but were also bequeathed a highly heterogeneous institutional and social landscape.[2] In the Czech lands, Slovakia and the former German and Austrian areas of Poland, the institutions included the beginnings of social insurance schemes.[3]

The International Labour Organization (ILO),[4] a branch of the League of Nations, was expressly concerned with establishing social peace. While some research on the work of the League of Nations and its branches has been done in recent years (including examination of their impact on non-European countries),[5] we know almost nothing about how the East Central European states collaborated with the ILO and what effect such collaboration had on the region. This applies to South-East and Eastern Europe as well, and suggests not only a gap in research, but, I would argue, also a blind spot that holds back our understanding of the legacy of social policy-making in Europe as a whole.

Because of national bias in historical studies written about the East Central European region, the impact of international collaboration has been largely

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1 Jay Winter, "Imagining Peace in Twentieth Century Europe," *Contemporary European History* 17, No. 3 (August 2008): 413–22, doi: 10.1017/S0960777308004554.

2 Sascha O. Becker et al., *The Empire is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Values and Human Interactions 90 Years after the Fall of the Habsburg Empire* (Regensburg: Osteuropa-Institut, 2010).

3 Béla Tomka, *Welfare in East and West. Hungarian Social Security in an International Comparison, 1918–1990* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004), 63–84; Tomasz Inglot, *Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919–2004* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 54–118. There were important personal and cognitive dimensions to what was inherited from the former imperial powers, but, for practical and analytical reasons, this article restricts its focus to institutions. Russian thinking is excluded from the discussion because, institutionally, Russian legislation on social insurance was only in its infancy before World War I.

4 International Labour Organization is the ILO's official name and spelling.

5 Magaly Rodríguez García, "Conclusion: The ILO's Impact on the World," in *ILO Histories: Essays on the International Labour Organization and Its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century*, ed. Jasmien Van Daele et al. (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2010), 461–77, here 461–62.

neglected, both in political history and in the politics of memory. This finding corresponds with Sandrine Kotts's statement that pan-European social policy-making in the interwar period became "invisible" in the 1920s and 1930s after the "nationalization" of discourse in the context of economic crises and the spread of dictatorship.[6] In her discussion of the construction of a "European social model," Kott mentions Czechoslovakia's active contributions to the ILO as well as a conflict with Poland concerning the administration of health insurance in the early 1930s.[7] However, she does not reflect upon the impact that the social policies and institutions of the Austrian, German and Russian predecessor states had on those newly founded nations. When writing about Germany's attempt to regain international influence in the 1920s by showing itself to be an "advanced" country with an "excellent" social policy, Kott refers to the German social model as an "imperial" project. Even though she quotes Czechoslovak sources, which presented Czechoslovak politics as progressive and exemplary, she says little about the Habsburg legislation inherited by Slovakia and the Czech lands.[8] It is precisely because of their former inclusion in larger states that Poland and Czechoslovakia did not belong to the group "Europe B," whose members were, in the view of the ILO, less-developed European countries, which had to catch up to acceptable social standards.[9]

At the time both states were established and the ILO was founded, Poland and Czechoslovakia already had certain social insurance institutions. They went on to create their post-war policies on that foundation. To understand this as simply the outcome of German influence and domination misconstrues the true phenomenon, as I hope to show in the following discussion. The East Central European countries were not fully "European," if that means being a powerful nation state, perhaps with some colonial dependencies attached, like some of the Western European countries. However, neither were those countries defined by the subordination, exploitation and allegations of "uncivilized" that were applied

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6 Sandrine Kott, "Constructing a European Social Model: The Fight for Social Insurance in the Interwar Period," in *ILO Histories. Essays on the International Labour Organization and Its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century*, ed. Jasmien Van Daele et al. (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2010), 173–95, here 174.

7 Ibid., 183–84, 193; concerning Czechoslovakia, see also Jakub Rákosník, Igor Tomeš et al., *Sociální stát v Československu. Právně-institucionální vývoj v letech 1918–1992* (Praha: Auditorium, 2012), 86.

8 Kott, "Constructing a European Social Model," 183–84, 187; on Germany's commitment to the ILO, see also Sandrine Kott, "Dynamiques de l'internationalisation: l'Allemagne et l'Organisation internationale du travail (1919–1940)," *Critique internationale* 52, No. 3 (2011): 69–84, doi: 10.3917/crii.052.0009.

9 Kott, "Constructing a European Social Model," 190.

to most non-European, non-Western lands at the time. Rather, the East Central European countries had distinct national traditions, forged in the context of shared imperial statehood and international conflicts. In their philosophical, technological and institutional traditions, they came within the sphere of European culture. What was special about them was that their foundation coincided with the establishment of the post-Versailles international order and that they were part and parcel of this new dispensation of power.

This history is important when we consider the heritage of social policy-making in Poland and Czechoslovakia. While recent research treats social policies above all as a matter of national institutions,[10] such institutions developed in the East Central European states under the strong influence of two supranational factors: a shared inheritance of pre-existing social insurance systems, and allegiance to the Versailles order, where the ideal of social peace was prominent. The coincidence of institutional continuity and international collaboration was very specific to the region, and getting to grips with that situation can help us understand supranational and European developments better: it gives us a tool to understand social policy-making beyond national politics. Poland and Czechoslovakia are perfect examples to illustrate this process, since both countries were bequeathed social institutions from their former empires, even if conditions thereafter differed in detail (which provides an opportunity for exciting comparisons). The time frame of this study begins with the state founding processes from 1918 to the mid-1920s, when most labor standards and social insurance schemes were enacted in the region. In the case of Poland, I touch upon the 1926 Piłsudski coup d'état. This was a turning point in how social policy-making by the former governments was presented to the people, and is especially noticeable in the texts written for the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the new nation states and of the ILO in 1928.

Against this general background, the present article explores the collaboration of the Polish and Czechoslovak states with the ILO and their support for the ideal of social peace. The article is based on analyses published in the *Sociální revue* (Social Revue), the journal of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Social Welfare, and *Praca i Opieka Społeczna* (Labor and Social Welfare), the journal of the Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, along with parliamentary speeches, legislative texts and several brochures produced by the ministries. Additionally,

[10] Monika Eigmüller and Nikola Tietze, A "Socio-histoire" of Europeanization: Perspectives for a Diachronic Comparison, SEU Working Papers 8 (August 2014), 2, https://www.uni-flensburg.de/fileadmin/content/seminare/soziologie/dokumente/working-paper-series/seu-working-paper-8-2014.pdf.

I studied the files of the Correspondence Office of the ILO in Warsaw as well as the first volumes of the official journal of the ILO, which were published in a range of languages.[11]

This article aims to show social policy-making at the intersection of the founding of state institutions and of international and national processes. Although at first glance Poland and Czechoslovakia seem linked by similarities resulting from previous "foreign rule," national movements and the achievement of statehood following World War I, this article will trace the divergent institutional and political developments in the two countries. At the institutional level, they differed in one key respect: the rebuilt Polish state consisted of areas ceded by several states with a diverse institutional heritage, while the Czechoslovak state was built on territories that had all belonged to the Habsburg Empire and thus benefited from institutional continuity that provided productive ground for international collaboration.[12] The Czechoslovak state consisted of Slovakia and the formally autonomous Subcarpathian Ruthenia on the one hand and the Czech lands on the other. Until 1918 the formerly mentioned territories were under Hungarian rule and the latter under Austrian control. Their legislative systems were not identical, but they were similar, which of course had a very beneficial effect on the establishment of a unified scheme of social welfare in post-war Czechoslovakia.[13] The Polish case was different. The "reborn" Polish Republic was built on territories held by the partition powers, Russia, Prussia (after 1871, the German Reich) and Austria (after 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Empire). Social policy legislation in all three areas differed substantially before independence, a fact that was to have severe consequences for the newly founded post-WWI state of Poland.

The following section examines how the ILO's ideal of social peace was addressed by the two new countries. It surveys the conditions of their national politics and the degree of their international collaboration. In the next section, the article traces the engagement of Polish and Czechoslovak policy-makers with the ILO. It takes as an example the implementation of international

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[11] I used the German version, *Amtliche Mitteilungen / Internationales Arbeitsamt*. The English version appeared under the title *Official Organ / ILO*, and the French one under the title *Bulletin officiel / Bureau International du Travail*.

[12] Jakub Rákosník, "Kontinuita a diskontinuita vývoje sociálního státu v Československu (1918–1956)," *Soudobé dějiny* 20, No. 1–2 (2013): 21–26; Rákosník, Tomeš et al., *Sociální stát*, 95; Milan Hlavačka et al., *Sociální myšlení a sociální praxe v Českých zemích, 1781–1939* (Praha: Historický ústav, 2015), 203–10; Ľudovít Hallon, "Pod ochranou zákonov. Sociálne zabezpečenie v medzivojnovom období," *História* 3, No. 6 (2003): 24.

[13] Rákosník, Tomeš et al., *Sociální stát*, 95.

standards concerning workplace safety and workers' rights, and focuses on the work of the ILO's Correspondence Offices in Warsaw and Prague. Furthermore, the article sketches the development of the Polish and Czechoslovak social insurance schemes and shows how a particular concept of "work" became standard in both countries.

The ILO and Social Peace

Whether the constructive or the destructive elements in European relations predominated or not during the interwar period is a topic of controversy. Earlier research stressed the destructiveness of policies in that epoch, arguing that the Versailles settlement left a lot of unresolved problems, for example, the status of national minorities,[14] the radicalization of left- and right-wing parties,[15] and the brutalization of populations by war and civil war experiences.[16] More recent publications insist on the constructive aspects of the period. They praise the supranational idea and see the League of Nations as the precursor of the United Nations. They show how the architects of the interwar order accepted basic principles that prepared the ground for long-lasting peace in Europe after World War II.[17]

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[14] Tara Zahra, "The 'Minority Problem' and National Classification in French and Czechoslovak Borderlands," *Contemporary European History* 17, No. 2 (2008): 137–65, here 144, doi: 10.1017/S0960777308004359; Pablo de Azcárte, *League of Nations and National Minorities* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945), 92–130; Richard Veatch, "Minorities and the League of Nations," in *The League of Nations in Retrospect: Proceedings of the Symposium organized by the United Nations Library and the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 6–9 November 1980*, ed. United Nations Library (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1983), 369–83; Christoph Gütermann, *Das Minderheitenschutzverfahren des Völkerbunds* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1979).

[15] Jost Dülffer, "Der Niedergang Europas im Zeichen der Gewalt: das 20. Jahrhundert," in *"Europäische Geschichte" als historiographisches Problem*, ed. Heinz Duchhardt and Andreas Kunz (Mainz: von Zabern, 1997), 105–27; Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010); Dietrich Beyrau, *Schlachtfeld der Diktatoren. Osteuropa im Schatten von Hitler und Stalin* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2000).

[16] George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *Die Kultur der Niederlage: Der amerikanische Süden 1865, Frankreich 1871, Deutschland 1918* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2007).

[17] Zara Steiner, *The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919–1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Patricia Clavin, "Europe and the League of Nations," in *Twisted Paths: Europe 1914–1945*, ed. Robert Gerwarth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 325–54; Margaret McMillan, *Peacekeepers. Six Months that Changed the World* (London: John Murray, 2003); John Horne, "The European Moment between the Two World Wars (1924–1933)," in *Moderniteit. Modernisme en massacultuur in Nederland 1914–1940*, ed. Madelon de Keizer and Sophie Tates (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2004), 223–40.

Above all, the Versailles order offered the East Central European countries an opportunity for the realization of democratic national statehood. Their national fates were highly dependent on the stability of the post-war international security system. The new states of Poland and Czechoslovakia were therefore a product not only of their own national ambitions and traditions, but also of the new order arising after Versailles and their founding fathers' success in persuading the Entente to support their desires for nationhood.[18] Institutionally, of course, these nations were also a product of the former order that had essentially imposed "foreign rule" upon them. In the growing field of research on internationalism and international organizations,[19] Poland and Czechoslovakia provide fascinating examples of the interdependence between national and international policy-making, as national ambitions and international encounters mirrored each other perfectly in the process of building the new nation-states after World War I. The war was clearly the catalyst for each state achieving independence. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the extent of its territory was peacefully negotiated at Versailles and with the help of the League of Nations.[20] Poland, by contrast, fought with the Bolsheviks over territory in the East right up until 1921, when the Treaty of Riga was signed. Because of this, the founding myths of the Polish republic were very much grounded in the border war, which encouraged an additional commitment to the Versailles order.[21]

The peacemakers at Versailles believed that good social policy was a basic prerequisite for a lasting peace. In the ILO, they created a supranational institution concerned with labor issues. The ILO did not operate in competition with national social institutions, but functioned in a way that complemented them,

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[18] Halina Parafinowicz, "Restoration of Poland and Czechoslovakia in Woodrow Wilson's Policy: The Myth and Reality," in *From Theodore Roosevelt to FDR: Internationalism and Isolationism in American Foreign Policy*, ed. Daniela Rossini (Keele: Ryburn, 1995), 55–67.

[19] Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, eds., *Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Sandrine Kott, "International Organizations – A Field of Research for a Global History," *Zeithistorische Forschungen / Studies in Contemporary History* 8 (2011): 446–50; Madeleine Herren, *Internationale Organisationen seit 1865. Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009).

[20] Jan Karski, *The Great Powers and Poland. From Versailles to Yalta, 1919–1945* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985): 31–46; Josef Kalvoda, *The Genesis of Czechoslovakia* (New York: Boulder, 1986); Antonín Klimek, *Říjen 1918. Vznik Československa* (Praha: Paseka, 1998); Zdeněk Kárník, *České země v éře První republiky I: Vznik, budování a zlatá léta republiky, 1918–1929* (Praha: Libri, 2003).

[21] Karski, *Great Powers*, 47–75; Jerzy Borzęcki, *The Soviet-Polish Peace of 1921 and the Creation of Interwar Europe* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); Stanisław Jaczyński, "Generalicja obu walczących stron. Próba charakterystyki i oceny," in *Rok 1920: Z perspektywy osiemdziesięciolecia*, ed. Andrzej Ajnenkiel (Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN, 2001), 25–36.

which hints at the entanglement of national and international thinking in the context of modern social policy.[22] The Peace Treaty itself mentioned the interconnection between social justice and peacekeeping. The rationale for establishing the ILO was set out in Part XIII of the treaty:

> Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice; And whereas conditions of labor exist involving such injustice, hardship, and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperiled; and an improvement of those conditions is urgently required [...] Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labor is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries; The High Contracting Parties, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity as well as by the desire to secure the permanent peace of the world, agree to the following: [...].[23]

The Versailles Treaty stipulated the implementation of international labor standards. Its framers strongly believed that reduction of social dissatisfaction was a major task in the job of achieving "peace and harmony in the world." Universal justice and humanity were to be realized through modern social policy-making. Responding to this call, the member states sent delegates to the ILO, who included not only governmental officials, but also representatives of social movements and an array of experts. Trade unions and employers from every single nation each sent an equal number of representatives as well (in so-called tripartism, along with the governmental delegates).[24] The ILO came up with very concrete measures to be implemented within its member states. Recent historical research considers the ILO as an agency for generating knowledge (an epistemic community), as an international bureaucracy, and as a network of politicians, social activists, specialists, and employers engaged in the field nationally and internationally, who together created a certain "ILO spirit." The ILO was a place for negotiating social rights on an international scale, reflecting national

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[22] Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia University Press, 2013), 3.

[23] The Versailles Treaty, June 28, 1919, Part XIII – Preamble, *The Avalon Project. Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy*, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partxiii.asp.

[24] Jasmien Van Daele, "Writing ILO Histories: A State of the Art," in *ILO Histories. Essays on the International Labour Organization and Its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century*, ed. Jasmien Van Daele et al. (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2010), 13.

developments onto international stages and vice versa. In that respect, twentieth century social policy-making clearly had an international component.[25] Before I give examples of that, I will show the different imprints the ILO's leading ideas left on Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Conditions of National Politics and Institutional Collaboration

The founders of the ILO began their work with great enthusiasm. Well aware of the utopian nature of an international organization dedicated to social justice, they shared a common belief in the need to create a permanent worldwide system of peace and social security, built on the principles of justice and redistribution.[26] In their opinion, the fair distribution of social goods would legitimize the modern democratic order at both the national and international levels. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the ILO, a celebratory publication referred to the "masses" whose dreams and needs "lay behind the initiatives of the statesmen":

> Without doubt, the people's desire for peace – the great dream of international reconciliation and social justice that they cherished throughout the dark days of war – lay behind those statesmen's initiatives. Without that unanimous spirit, which existed at the deepest levels in each country, there would have been no Peace Conference, no mandating Commission for the League of Nations and no Commission on International Labour Legislation. But the masses found it difficult to recognize things they had been striving for in the often complex legal texts that were presented to them.[27]

By the time of the ILO's tenth anniversary, Poland was still a member, but no longer was a democratic state. After the Piłsudski coup in 1926, Poland was led by an authoritarian regime with no clear ideological worldview. What had happened to the "masses" and the progressive "statesmen" there? Following the reestablishment of the Polish state in 1918, the country's constituent assembly decided to unify the different legislative bodies from the former partitioned areas, and the standard of social insurance maintained in the German and

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[25] Sandrine Kott and Joël Droux, "Introduction: A Global History Written from the ILO," in *Globalizing Social Rights. The International Labour Organization and Beyond*, ed. Sandrine Kott and Joël Droux (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 1–14.

[26] *Dix ans d'organisation internationale du travail*, ed. Bureau International du Travail (Genève, 1931): 21, 39.

[27] Ibid, 2.

Austrian regions was extended to the larger but poorer former Russian zone. This precipitated new laws on health insurance (1920), pensions for invalid veterans (1921), social welfare (1923) and general age and disability pensions (1929).[28] A lack of precursor institutions in several areas, coupled with a dearth of other resources, hampered the uniform application of these laws. Therefore, the process of setting up a full social insurance system lasted for decades, and local institutions achieved very different results.

The Piłsudski coup has been explained as the result of people's frustrations with the parliamentary system in Poland and by the extreme difficulties it had in creating a modern state attuned to the ideas of the time.[29] This does not mean that politicians ceased to care about improving people's social well-being, or that Poland gave up its engagement with the Versailles order. Studies of the contemporary social policy in Poland do not regard the coup as a disruption of progress in that regard. Several initiatives were kept going, especially the provision of social insurance.[30] Institutionally, the Piłsudski government had to face inherited problems. It continued the policies of the democratic governments that had preceded it. In a way, it was even more effective, because ministers could act without consulting the Polish parliament, the Sejm. Politically, however, the Piłsudski regime insisted on national traditions and *étatisme*, on heroism, and on the personal leadership of Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935) as the defender of Polish interests.[31] This meant that the Piłsudski government's commitment to the Versailles order was ambivalent. It strongly emphasized national interests above international ties and used ideals of social justice as a way of wooing the "masses."[32] In the early years, too, the scarce resources of the Polish state were absorbed by an exhaustive border war. Ideologically (especially after 1926), the border war was the most important point of reference.

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[28] Bénédicte Zimmermann, *Arbeitslosigkeit in Deutschland. Zur Entstehung einer sozialen Kategorie* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2006).

[29] Janusz Żarnowski, "Rola państwa w kształtowaniu społeczeństwa Polski międzywojennej: Zarys problemu i uwagi wstępne," in *Metamorfozy społeczne*, ed. Janusz Żarnowski, vol. 8, *Państwo i społeczeństwo Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN, 2014), 19–21.

[30] Paweł Grata, *Polityka społeczna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej. Uwarunkowania – instytucje – działania* (Rzeszów: Uniwersytet Rzeszowski, 2013).

[31] Peter Hetherington, *Unvanquished. Joseph Pilsudski, Resurrected Poland, and the Struggle for Eastern Europe* (Houston, TX: Pingora Press, 2012).

[32] The most controversial issue was the agreement on the protection of minorities, which was seen by the Polish government as a *diktat* brought back to the country by Roman Dmowski, the Polish signatory of the Versailles Treaty. The agreement was canceled by the Polish government in 1934; see Paweł Korzec, "Polen und der Minderheitenschutzvertrag (1919–1934)," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 22, No. 4 (1974): 515–55.

This helps explain the low recognition given by Poles to its representatives in international politics. The most important politician working in this sphere was Franciszek Sokal (1881–1932). An engineer by training and a liberal democrat, he was one of the Polish delegation members at the Versailles Conference, along with Piłsudski's political rival Roman Dmowski and others. From 1918, he was head of the Department of Occupational Safety (Sekcja Obrony Pracy) and chief inspector at the newly established Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. He became head of this ministry in the Grabski government (1924–1925).[33]

Sokal represented Poland at several conferences of the ILO and published a booklet in Polish about the organization in 1920.[34] In 1925 he authored a brochure on the state of Polish social policy, which appeared in English and French versions.[35] He wrote a series of articles for the journal *Praca i Opieka Społeczna* on international social policy. Thus, he was clearly an important propagator of the cause of social peace. However, apart from an entry in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* (the Polish Dictionary of National Biography), no recent research has been done on him and his engagement in the field.

When Sokal died in 1932 in Bern, Switzerland, *Praca i Opieka Społeczna* ran an obituary. The journal listed all his posts, mentioning that he had held a mandate at the administrative council of the ILO since 1920 and had only returned to Poland to carry out his duties as a minister. The journal acknowledged his experience in the work of international institutions, including the ILO, underlining his strong belief in social justice. It also hailed him as a patriot, who always upheld the interests of his homeland in the international arena.[36] Sokal dedicated his life to the ILO, but he did not gain much recognition, either during his lifetime or posthumously. He was something of an outsider on the Polish political scene.

In complete contrast, Czechoslovak politicians who engaged in supranational affairs were lauded at home. Their work was seen as consolidating the so-called "revolution from abroad" that had created the new Czechoslovak state

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[33] Henryk Korczyk, "Franciszek Sokal," in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny,* vol. 40 (Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN, 2000–2001), 15–18.

[34] Franciszek Sokal, *Komisja pracy Konferencji Pokojowej w Paryżu 1919 r.* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Pracy i Opieki Społecznej, 1920).

[35] Franciszek Sokal, *Social Insurance in Poland* (Geneva: Albert Kundig, 1925); François Sokal, *Les Assurances Sociales en Pologne* (Warsaw: Le Ministère du Travail et de l'Assistance Sociale de la République de Pologne, 1925).

[36] "Die Beziehungen der Republik Polen zum Internationalen Arbeitsamt," *Amtliche Mitteilungen / Internationales Arbeitsamt* 5 (1922), 284–85; "Franciszek Sokal," *Praca i Opieka Społeczna* 12 (1932): 58–59.

by diplomatic action.[37] In many aspects, Czechoslovak social and international policy followed traditional paths. Almost all the Czechoslovak territories already had an institutionalized social policy, which made the situation much easier than in the Polish case. In the Czech and Slovak lands, health and disability insurance, along with disability pensions, had been enacted during the time of Habsburg rule. After the founding of the new state, this safety net needed only to be improved and extended to other forms of social insurance.

In addition, most prominent Czechoslovak politicians had served the Habsburg Empire. They were politically experienced and often highly educated, whereas in Poland, politicians from the former Austrian territories did not have the same reputation. The economic situation was much better in Czechoslovakia than it was in Poland,[38] and the political situation was marked by stability.[39] This stability was particularly due to the engagement of the state's founders, Tomáš G. Masaryk (1850–1937) and Edvard Beneš (1884–1948). Both had been professors in the pre-war period, Masaryk as a philosopher and Beneš as a sociologist, and Masaryk had been engaged in politics since the 1880s. Both men had pressed hard for a Czechoslovak nation-state at the Paris Peace Conference. Together with the Slovak Milan Rastislav Štefánik (1850–1919), they started a campaign to free the Czech lands and Slovakia from the Habsburg Empire.

In late 1918, with help from the "Czechoslovak Legion,"[40] this led to the foundation of the Czechoslovak state under the protection of the Entente.

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[37] Zbyněk Zeman, *Der Zusammenbruch des Habsburgerreiches, 1914–1918* (München: Oldenbourg, 1963), 230–40; Kárník, *České země*, 19–33; Dušan Kováč, "1918: Začiatok, alebo koniec? Dva transformačné modely v strednej Európe," in *1918: Model komplexního transformačního procesu*, ed. Lucie Kostrbová, Jana Malínská et al. (Praha: Masarykův ústav a Archiv AV ČR, 2010), 11–20; Maciej Górny, "Národ a revoluce. Rok 1918 v kontextu 'pokrokových tradic' národních dějin ve středovýchodní Evropě," in *1918: Model komplexního transformačního procesu* , ed. Lucie Kostrbová, Jana Malínská et al. (Praha: Masarykův ústav a Archiv AV ČR, 2010), 51–62.

[38] David F. Good, "The State and Economic Development in Central and Eastern Europe," in *Nation, State and the Economy in History,* ed. Alice Teichova and Herbert Matis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 133–58; Uwe Müller, "Regionale Wirtschafts- und Nationalitätenpolitik in Ostmitteleuropa (1867–1939)," in *Ausgebeutet oder alimentiert? Regionale Wirtschaftspolitik und nationale Minderheiten in Ostmitteleuropa (1867–1939)*, ed. Uwe Müller (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2006): 9–57; Cecylia Leszczyńska and Łucja Lisiecka, "Polish Lands before and after the First World War, Effects of Breaking the Economic Ties with Germany, Austria and Russia for the Polish Regions," *Studia Historiae Oeconomicae* 25 (2005): 11–26.

[39] Andrea Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle. The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914–1948* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Kárník, *České země,* 137–69; Eva Broklová, *Prezident Republiky československé. Instituce a osobnost T. G. Masaryka* (Praha: Masarykův ústav AV ČR, 2001).

[40] Gerburg Thunig-Nittner, *Die tschechoslowakische Legion in Rußland: ihre Geschichte und Bedeutung bei der Entstehung der 1. Tschechoslowakischen Republik* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1970); Jan Galandauer, "Československé legie a jejich komemorace," in *Česká společnost za velkých*

Masaryk became the country's first president and Beneš its first minister of foreign affairs. When Masaryk gave up the presidency in 1935, Beneš became his successor. Both embodied the founding myth of the "revolution from abroad," close political and ideological relationships with the Versailles order and the founding of the Czechoslovak state itself. When Beneš became president of the seventh session of the ILO (1925–1926), he pointed all this out in his introductory speech to the organization.[41]

Social policies were highly relevant to the legitimation of the new Czechoslovak democratic order, since fair social distribution had been a constant selling point for citizens during the transfer from Habsburg rule. Institutionally and ideologically, social policy provided a strong link between the government and the citizens and between the old and new political systems.[42] Czechoslovakia was therefore very much committed to the ILO, which to a substantial degree was the result of the fact that the country shared the heritage of enlightened Habsburg social politics. Czechoslovakia's collaboration with the ILO was as much a continuation of late nineteenth century and early twentieth century leftist (or worker advocates') internationalism, as it was the result of close national-international epistemic encounters in social policy-making during the interwar period. The only monograph on the topic, published in 1928, so contends.[43] Continuity in social policy was not the result of "imperial" German (or Austrian) domination, but of path-dependency. This was especially true of Czechoslovak activists on the issues.

To demonstrate that Czechoslovakia's ideological commitment to the ILO was based on personal continuities, let me show how the topic was presented in *Sociální revue* when Beneš took over the Czechoslovak presidency. Several articles dealt with Masaryk's legacy in social policy—his engagement in the early post-war years, his philosophical thinking on the topic, his political approach to

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válek 20. století (pokus o komparaci), ed. Jan Gebhart (Praha: Karolinum, 2003): 293–312; Ivan Šedivý, "Legionáři a mocenské poměry v počátcích ČSR", in *Moc, vliv a autorita v procesu utváření meziválečné ČSR (1918–1921)*, ed. Jan Hájek et al. (Praha: Masarykův ústav a Archiv AV ČR, 2008), 16–28.

41 "Zahajovací řeč předsedy VII. mezinárodní konference práce min. zahraničních věcí dra Beneše," *Sociální revue* 6 (1925): 161–65.

42 Natali Stegmann, *Kriegsdeutungen – Staatsgründungen – Sozialpolitik. Der Helden- und Opferdiskurs in der Tschechoslowakei, 1918–1948* (München: Oldenbourg, 2010), 81–85; Kott, "Constructing a European Social Model," 177–78.

43 Josef Skoch, *Mezinárodní organisace práce a Československo: Genese mezinárodní organisace práce, její působení a účast Československa na jejím díle* (Praha: Sociální ústav Československé republiky, 1928), 166–70.

social action, and his commitment to the social welfare of youth.[44] Lev Winter (1876–1935), who had been engaged in social politics since the turn of the century and who became the first Czechoslovak Minister for Social Welfare (and who held the post again from 1922 to 1926), stressed the great importance the president had attached to protecting the "socially weak" and that the "Czechoslovak republic had become a vivid exemplum of social progress." Winter was a member of the social security committee of the ILO. Thus, when he pointed out that the first statute Masaryk signed after independence was for an eight-hour working day, he was linking the presidency to the efforts of the ILO, since the regulation of working hours was a central part of its work at that time.[45]

All the articles in *Sociální revue* portrayed Masaryk as the embodiment of building a social state and of justice. Because Beneš had been closely associated with Masaryk's social program, the praise for the older politician also reflected on the younger one, who promised to maintain the record of good social policy-making in the Masaryk tradition. Adherence to the ILO was in harmony with policy-making at home and with the image the founders of the Czechoslovak state wished to project. Especially in the early 1930s, engagement with supranational organizations and commitment to robust social policy was of the highest importance for the Czechoslovaks, who took an active role in international policy-making. At the time of the tenth anniversary of the ILO, the country intensified its commitment.

Meeting International Standards: Correspondence Offices and Standards for the Workplace

What did all this mean for concrete policy-making at home? Let us begin with workplace standards, an issue which absorbed a lot of institutional resources. A great many of the articles in the official journal of the ILO, and also in the publications of the Polish and Czechoslovak ministries, dealt with the progress of implementing standards in the member states. The ILO's contribution was the immense collection and exchange of information, all very precise, down-to-earth

[44] Lev Winter, "Styk presidenta Masaryka s Ministerstvem sociální péče v prvních letech poválečných," *Sociální revue* 16 (1935): 69–70; Evžen Štern, "Masarykova sociální škola," *Sociální revue* 16 (1935): 71–80; Otakar Sulík, "Masaryk a úkoly sociální správy," *Sociální revue* 16 (1935): 81–86; Kamil Šlák, "Péče o mládež v díle Masarykově," *Sociální revue* 16 (1935): 87–92.

[45] Winter, "Styk presidenta Masaryka"; Jakub Rákosník, "Lev Winter (1876–1935) – Architekt der tschechoslowakischen Sozialpolitik," in *Sozial-reformatorisches Denken in den böhmischen Ländern 1848–1914*, ed. Lukáš Fasora et al. (München: Martin Meidenbauer, 2010), 236; Aug. Žalud, "Dr. Lev Winter (1876 – 26. ledna – 1926)," *Sociální revue* 7 (1926): 22–31.

and professional. Unavoidably, vast masses of material were produced and accumulated, frequently regurgitating one and the same issue in different forms and languages. As the organization had (theoretically) worldwide authority, this reduplication seems to be simply a sign of boring administration. The material is rather technical, aimed at giving information to professionals and politicians who had the task of putting the ILO's directives into effect. Hence there is considerable duplication in the different archival sources.[46]

Most of the documents from the Correspondence Office of the ILO in Warsaw reflect the content of the ILO's and the national journals. The Correspondence Office was in fact the place where the material was created. In Warsaw, it was Adam Rose (1895–1951) who managed this huge quantity of work from the opening of the Office in 1922 up to the year 1929. Rose had studied at the Agrarian Academy in Berlin and the Economics Faculty in Jena before he was appointed to his Warsaw post. Between 1922 and 1929 he was also an official of the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerstwo Rolnictwa i Reform Rolnych). In 1929, he was the main expert behind the agrarian reform of that year, and from 1930 he served as the director who implemented it. Most of his writings were about agrarian issues.[47] In his post at the local ILO office, Rose received a mass of questionnaires from Geneva, inquiring about the state of working conditions in different sectors. To answer them, Rose corresponded with a range of people and institutions in Poland, among them libraries, the offices of labor movements, deputies at the Sejm, the government's Statistical Office, and professional organizations, requesting specific pieces of information and statistics. Some of this information subsequently appeared in his contributions to the ILO's official journal. Rose also championed the ILO's work in the Polish press, occasionally, along with Sokal, reacting to statements it had published.[48]

The impression one gets from this correspondence is ambiguous. On the one hand, the material reveals the networks behind the work of the ILO, connecting the Head Office in Geneva with the local ILO office in Warsaw, and extending out to specialists, social movements and administrative institutions at both the national and international levels. Hence, the organization was successful in bringing information together. On the other hand, if we look at the Correspondence Office's files alongside the publications of the institutional bodies, it seems

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[46] Kott, "Constructing a European Social Model," 182–83.

[47] Zbigniew Landau, "Rose, Adam Karol," in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. 32 (Wrocław/Warszawa/Kraków: PAN, 2000–2001), 41–43.

[48] Oddział Korespondencyjny w Warszawie, Biuro Korespondencyjne 1922–1939, 1945–1950, Syg. 1–8. Zespół 26: Międzynarodowe Biuro Pracy, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warszawa.

to have been consumed by administrative work. As for data, the files do not contain much more than what was already to be found in the official publications of the institutions it dealt with.

The similar character of the sources allows us to conclude that the ILO Correspondence Office in Prague, led by Evžen Štern (1889–1942), functioned in much the same way as the one in Warsaw.[49] Štern, who had studied law in Prague and in Paris, was a social democrat and a supporter of Masaryk. He became one of the creators of the social insurance scheme in Czechoslovakia and was especially concerned with the problem of unemployment.[50]

The idea that work is a moral good was promulgated at the ILO conference in Washington in 1919 and in subsequent conferences. The member states formulated a list of labor standards which were stated to be universal and which national parliaments were required to enact into law. The most important task of ILOs work in the interwar period was harmonizing and internationalizing standards. This happened against the backdrop of socio-economic perceptions of the interplay between international economic competition and social policy-making.[51]

Among other things, ILO standards regulated hours of work (with the establishment of a maximum working day and week); labor supply; prevention of unemployment; provision of an adequate living wage; protection of workers against sickness, disease and injury arising from their employment; the protection of children, young persons and women; provisions for old age and injury; and protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own. The ILO defended the principle of freedom of association and endorsed the provision of vocational and technical education. As Pauli Kettunen emphasizes, counting the number of international treaties that were ratified, as was the practice of the ILO, hardly helps to understand the impact of the ILO's activities on national social policy-making. It is essential to follow the implementation of those treaties on the national level, too.[52]

In his brochure about the ILO, written in 1920, Sokal stressed how Poland should implement the ILO's requirements. Though he admitted the difficulty of uniting the country's disparate parts, he saw engagement with the ILO

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[49] "Beziehungen der Tschechoslowakei zum Internationalen Arbeitsamt," *Amtliche Mitteilungen / Internationales Arbeitsamt* 5 (1922): 175–76.

[50] "Štern, Evžen (1889–1942), Sozialpolitiker und Publizist," in *Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon*, vol. 60 (Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2008), 224–25.

[51] Pauli Kettunen, "The ILO as a Forum of Developing and Demonstrating a Nordic Model," in *Globalizing Social Rights. The International Labour Organization and Beyond*, ed. Sandrine Kott and Joël Droux (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 218–19.

[52] Ibid., 218.

as important for the progress of social reform throughout Poland and for the development of its statehood. He declared that his nation had always fought on the side of freedom and progress.[53] In the years following the Washington Conference, Poland ratified several international conventions. These included conventions on unemployment; on the minimum age in industry; on night work; on night work by young persons; on the minimum age for employment at sea and in agriculture; on the agricultural workers' rights of association; on workmen's compensation in agriculture; on the use of white lead in paints; on weekly rest periods for employees of industrial enterprises; on the minimum age for employment as trimmers or stokers; on compulsory medical examination of children and young persons employed at sea; and on hours of work for tram drivers.[54]

Czechoslovakia was also concerned about labor standards and maintained consistently constructive relations with the ILO. The Ministry of Social Welfare (Ministerstvo sociální péče) regularly reported back to the ILO, and gave details in its own publications about progress in passing relevant bills. By 1929, Czechoslovakia had implemented in legislation 11 out of the 28 international conventions formulated by the ILO. These conventions covered hours of work (limiting them to eight per day); night work by women; the minimum age for employment at sea and in agriculture; night work by young persons; agricultural workers' rights of association; the use of white lead in paints; weekly rest periods for employees of industrial enterprises; the minimum age for employment as trimmers or stokers; compulsory medical examination of children and young persons employed at sea; and weekly hours of work. The remaining 17 conventions were addressed, but had not yet been implemented legally.[55]

Of course, the list of treaty ratifications raises a lot of questions concerning their exact content and the national debates that surrounded them and their implementation. The complexity of the topic becomes apparent in the example of the failed ratification of the ILO Hours of Work Convention in Poland. Poland had issued a decree mandating an eight-hour day even before the convocation of the ILO's constituent assembly,[56] but by 1925 the Sejm had still not implemented the Washington convention on the same subject. As the process

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[53] Sokal, *Komisja Pracy*, 15.

[54] "Międzynarodowy ustawodawstwo pracy," *Praca i Opieka Społeczna* 5 (1925): 4–33.

[55] Josef Skoch, "Stav ratifikací mezinárodních konvencí pracovních a Československo," *Sociální revue* 10 (1929): 547–48.

[56] "Dekret o 8-mio godzinnym dniu pracy," *Dziennik Praw Państwa Polskiego*, No. 42 (1918): 104–105.

of international standardization came to a halt overall, Adam followed advice from Sokal to send an abstract of a stenographic note from debate in the British House of Commons to a deputy of the Sejm who had publicly brought up the question of whether the eight hour convention should be passed.[57] The British Minister of Labour, Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, had expressed his intent to ratify the convention, which implied, as he only explained after being asked, "informal communication" about the readiness of the German and the American governments to do the same.[58]

Indeed, that strategy was not successful; neither Germany nor Great Britain ever ratified the ILO Hours of Work Convention.[59] In general, ratification could be refused by national Parliaments even though their state representatives had signed a convention and the state already had a national law in accordance with the proposed international standards. Setting of standards, and implementing them into national law, was a complicated process of negotiating the interests of political parties and social partners (the trade unions and the employers). The ILO helped by producing arguments for social policy-making on the national level, even when the ratification of certain international standards failed in the national parliaments.[60] The example of Polish legislation on hours of work illustrates perfectly how communications from the ILO were woven into national and international policy-making.

As can be seen, the ILO justified its control over labor standards with very moralistic arguments, while the various local champions of the international program had to do all the everyday empirical work. Nevertheless, the national officials managed to enact a lot of the ILO's regulations successfully, and kept their overall faith in social reform. In this respect, there was no difference between Poland and Czechoslovakia in the early interwar years. After 1926, however, Polish collaboration with the ILO did go through something of a change. At a casual glance, the material from the Correspondence Office in Warsaw does not

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[57] Do Pana Posła Ziemięckiego, 19. września 1925, Oddział Korespondencyjny w Warszawie, Biuro Korespondencyjne 1922–1939, 1945–1950, Syg. 8. Zespół 26: Międzynarodowe Biuro Pracy, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warszawa. See also Bronisław Ziemięcki, "Czy konwencja o 8-godzinnym dniu pracy będzie ratyfikowana?" *Robotnik* (1925), 155.

[58] Hours of Labour (Washington Convention), *Hansard*, June 16, 1925, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1925/jun/16/hours-of-labour-washington-convention#S5CV0185P0_19250616_HOC_188.

[59] Jasmien Van Daele, "Industrial States and Transnational Exchange of Social Polities: Belgium in the Interwar Period," in *Globalizing Social Rights. The International Labour Organization and Beyond*, ed. Sandrine Kott and Joël Droux (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 198.

[60] Kettunen, "The ILO as a Forum," 210.

show a significant disruption after the Piłsudski coup. On closer inspection, it becomes obvious that correspondence with Geneva decreased. Rose continued to collect material on working conditions in several industrial sectors in Poland, but he was now using his position to promote his own work on the Polish agrarian question.[61]

Social Insurance: Defining "Work"

As mentioned previously, social insurance policies were built on the institutional heritage from the former rulers of the Polish and Czechoslovak territories, and on international standards. Czechoslovakia was in a more comfortable situation than Poland in the area of inherited institutions and enacted more legislation. In both countries, the formation of a social insurance system contributed to a normative definition of work, regardless of how successful implementation of standards proved to be.

International social policy concentrated on the world of work, which was a natural result of national commitment to the Versailles Treaty and the ILO's engagement on labor standards. In the perception of the times, workers and the labor movement constituted a political power base and, together with the peasantry, embodied the nation itself. The ideal of social peace had this perception as its basis. Hence, work lay at the core of social policy on both the international and national levels. The provision of social insurances was (and still is) affected by institutional inertia, path dependency and the shape of expectations.[62]

When, in 1918–1919, the Versailles order came into being and Poland and Czechoslovakia were (re)established as independent states, national legislation was based on the institutional heritage from the pre-war powers. Those powers had instituted insurance for workplace accidents, and the system favored industrial workers and heads of families.[63] Definitions in the legislation implied a fixed (and also gendered) idea of what was meant by "worker" and "work," since the insurance scheme was directed at only a limited group.

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[61] Oddział Korespondencyjny w Warszawie, Biuro Korespondencyjne 1922–1939, 1945–1950, Syg. 8. Zespół 26: Międzynarodowe Biuro Pracy, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warszawa.

[62] Tomka, *Welfare*, 18–20; Eigmüller and Tietze, *A "Socio-histoire,"* 2–3; Thomas H. Marshall, "Staatsbürgerrechte und soziale Klassen," in *Bürgerrechte und soziale Klasse. Zur Soziologie des Wohlfahrtsstaates,* ed. Elmar Rieger (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1992), 67, 75.

[63] Erna Appelt, *Geschlecht – Staatsbürgerschaft – Nation. Politische Konstruktionen des Geschlechterverhältnisses in Europa* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1999), 161.

When the successor states enacted social insurance measures after the war, this original legislation served as a blueprint for further development. Following the logic of modernization, the same standards had to be extended to the less-developed parts of Poland and to less-developed nations beyond. The ILO established norms for the provision of social benefits throughout Europe,[64] and a recommendation to launch social insurance schemes was issued at its Washington conference.[65]

The first social insurance initiative after World War I in Poland was health insurance, while in Czechoslovakia it was the inauguration of pensions for the aged (something that was only introduced in Poland after World War II). For the Poles, the establishment of wider health insurance was complicated by the problem of unification. Czechoslovakia benefited from pre-existing laws it could build on and had an already functioning compulsory health insurance system for workers, which covered their family members as well.[66] It used this health insurance legislation as a blueprint for the implementation of old age pension insurance in 1924. Though the Czechoslovak politicians profited from earlier legislation and institutions, in their rhetoric they extolled the democratic, modernized character of their new state with its "Czechoslovak spirit." The deputies in parliament stressed how democracy and social policy went hand in hand, and how much they were developing the country, making no mention of former models.[67] This can be seen in the case of old age pension insurance, which was constructed in 1924 according to the principles of the older health insurance law, but which was heralded as a prestige project of the young republic and "proof of the socially-responsible character of Czechoslovakia."[68]

When Poland was unifying its health insurance system in 1920, the parliamentary deputy Ludwik Waszkiewicz (1888–1976), who was active in the workers' movement in Łódź and (like Sokal) was much involved in the Department for Occupational Safety,[69] got up to speak in the Sejm. He made one of the rare programmatic statements about social policy in the country. The health insurance the Sejm was enacting, he argued, was a fundamental element in the new political and cultural organization of Poland. In the process of democratization, it was important not only to continue the best social and political legacies of Ger-

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[64] Kott, "Constructing a European Social Model," 176–95.
[65] *Dix ans*, 177.
[66] Evžen Štern, "Deset let naší sociální politiky," *Sociální revue* 10 (1929): 16.
[67] *Deset let Československé republiky*, vol. 3 (Praha: [s.n], 1928), 88–90.
[68] Zdeněk Deyl, *Sociální vývoj Československa 1918–1938* (Praha: Academia, 1985), 85.
[69] Bolesław Pełka, "Ludwik Waszkiewicz," in *Archeion* 67 (1979): 347–49.

man and Austrian rule, but to improve them and extend them to all areas. Polish citizens – and here he included national minorities – would then appreciate the new state as a defender of their interests.[70]

Paradoxically, it was Czechoslovakia that had more success in winning over its citizens in this way, though improving upon the former legislation was not expressed as a program goal.[71] Polish politicians were less able to convince their citizens that social goods were being fairly distributed. Among other things, this was because of big regional differences in the implementation of insurance benefits in Poland. In the case of health insurance, the Polish law of May 19, 1920, stipulated compulsory insurance and covered a wide range of employees and their family members.[72] The former German and Austrian communities, where such cover was already established (as in Czechoslovakia), had existing money in their funds, but the newly established branches in formerly Russian areas needed subsidizing. This meant that a lot of communities, especially in the poorer East, were simply not able to run the system.[73] Hence, some regions of the country, along with the entire Polish agrarian sector, were excluded from the social insurance system. Inequality was not reduced at all.

Even though the system did not work consistently nationwide, it established who was to be counted in: those who earned regular wages at a workplace, along with their dependent family members. It also established an equitable system whereby workers' payments *into* the fund depended on size of their wages, whereas payments *out* to them in case of illness did not, and family members could benefit without any extra payment at all. In this respect, the Polish system did not diverge from the former model and from the practice in Czechoslovakia, Germany, Austria and several other European countries.[74]

The national and international obsession with work took on an even more striking form in the definition of unemployment and the allocation of unemployment insurance benefits. The post-war economies could not provide enough opportunities for everyone to get paid work – a circumstance that was especially

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[70] Sprawozdanie stenograficzne ze 129 posiedzenia Sejmu Ustawodawczego z dnia 12 marca 1920 r., col. 42, https://bs.sejm.gov.pl/exlibris/aleph/a22_1/apache_media/I83LDEX9QBVNP55CF97KGKC3B8SKDP.pdf.

[71] Natali Stegmann, "Die Habsburgermonarchie als Fundament: Sozialpolitik in der Tschechoslowakei, 1918–1948," in *Staatsbürgerschaft und Teilhabe. Bürgerliche, politische und soziale Rechte in Europa*, ed. Kathrin Boeck et al. (München: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015): 51–65.

[72] Zofia Daszyńska-Golińska, *Ubezpieczenia społeczne* (Warszawa: Wolna Wszechnica Polska, 1929), 10–12.

[73] Sokal, *Social Insurance*, 69.

[74] Inglot, *Welfare States*, 55–57.

hard on demobilized soldiers – so the ILO was particularly concerned about unemployment rates. This concern was noticeable in the field of statistics. Statistical tracking of social problems, done by the Statistical Branch of the ILO,[75] assumed great importance. As Bénédicte Zimmermann argues, ILO statistics were based on sets with given definitions and thereby on fixed categories.[76]

The modern idea of unemployment is a product of social welfare discourse and rests on a strict distinction between "proper" employment and non-employment. The non-employed came to be defined either as "unproductive" individuals, dependent on social welfare, or as persons who normally could work "productively" for an employer but who involuntarily suffered from occasional lack of opportunities to work. Only in the latter case was "unemployed" status granted. Both international and national policies between the wars adhered to this way of thinking about the issue and reinforced it in their manner of implementation of their insurance schemes. This is made quite clear in the ILO's unemployment policies.[77]

In Poland in 1923, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (Ministerstwo Pracy i Opieki Społecznej) declared that the "existence and the future of the Polish people" depended on "our work and productivity."[78] The government saw itself as the guarantor of social security and believed that politics should respond to the most up-to-date findings of economists. The Polish prime minister, Władysław Sikorski (1881–1943), announced the government's intention to enact a social insurance scheme but insisted that workers' productivity must be shown to justify it and make it possible.[79] When unemployment insurance was inaugurated that same year, unemployment was defined thusly: an unemployed person was one who had a work record and was able to work, but who was temporarily shut out of the job market. Only those who had already been employed and had paid into the insurance fund could benefit from the scheme.

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[75] *Dix ans*, 193–210.

[76] Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Semantiken der Nicht-Arbeit an der Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert: 'Arbeitslosigkeit' und 'chômage' im Vergleich," in *Semantiken der Arbeit. Diachrone und vergleichende Perspektiven,* ed. Jörn Leonhard and Willibald Steinmetz (Köln: Böhlau, 2016), 269–88, here 270.

[77] Ingrid Liebeskind Sauthier, "Modern Unemployment. From the Creation of the Concept to the International Labour Office's First Standards," in *Globalizing Social Rights. The International Labour Organization and Beyond*, ed. Sadrine Kott and Joël Droux (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 67–84.

[78] "Exposé Ministra Pracy i Opieki Społecznej, wygłoszone na posiedzeniach sejmowej Komisji Obrony Pracy," *Praca i Opieka Społeczna* 3 (1923): 58–61, here 58.

[79] "Prezydent Ministrów Gen. Władisław Sikorski o polityce społecznej w Polsce," *Praca i Opieka Społeczna* 3 (1923): 58–61.

In the Sejm debate, the unemployed worker was assumed to be providing for a family.[80] The main aim of the scheme was not to erase poverty, but to allow the unemployed person to maintain his status as a worker and his ability to provide for his family. The statute of June 31, 1924, worked the same way as health insurance: the insured worker had to pay contributions in accordance with his wage, but the payment was adjusted to make allowance for the number of his dependent family members.[81] As for the implementation of the scheme, the unemployment funds were started in September 1924. The system worked well in the big cities, but, in the early days, the Eastern provinces were unable to raise the necessary funds.[82]

Czechoslovakia established unemployment insurance in 1921, following the so-called Gent system. This had been pioneered in Gent in 1901 as voluntary self-insurance administered by non-state public institutions. The model had been established in some other cities and also nationwide in France (1905), Norway (1906), Denmark (1907), the Netherlands (1919) and in 1919 in some parts of Spain.[83] Czechoslovak unemployment insurance was organized by the trade unions and covered trade union members only. By paying their contributions workers insured themselves against unemployment. In case they lost steady employment, the trade union and the state paid the unemployment benefits in equal shares. Former employees and trade members got fixed amounts for themselves and a double sum if they were married, for a maximum of three months.

Due to economic difficulties, the system did not begin to run until April 1925. Even though the implementation of the Gent system was from the very beginning a compromise by the political parties, with some modifications it remained in force until 1938. However, only one-third to one-half of the working population came under the system.[84] While the idea behind the Gent system was corporatist (in that it used labor unions as non-governmental third sector institutions for the realization of welfare targets) and the insurance was voluntary, the underlying perception of employment, as well as the model of a male

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[80] Sprawozdanie stenograficzne ze 141 posiedzenia Sejm Rzeczypospolitej z dnia 2 lipca 1924 r., https://bs.sejm.gov.pl/exlibris/aleph/a22_1/apache_media/7Y1C2QP27F7JDF2ENSMFX7DCJM2Y17.pdf.

[81] "Ustawa z dnia 18 lipca 1924 r. o zabezpieczeniu na wypadek bezrobocia," *Dziennik ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, No. 67 (1924): 990–94.

[82] Sokal, *Social insurance*, 96.

[83] Jakub Rákosník, "Gentský systém v období I. Československé republiky," *Časopis Národního muzea – řada historická* 170, No. 3–4 (2001): 84–105, here 85.

[84] Jakub Rákosník, *Odvracená tvář meziválečné prosperity. Nezaměstnanost v Československu v letech 1918–1938* (Praha: Karolinum, 2008), 160–206.

breadwinner, were similar to those of the various national insurance schemes mentioned above.

What stands out from these few examples is how a defined idea of "proper" work came to be associated with social insurance. Thus, even if the insurance schemes failed in a technical sense, because they did not assure the welfare of all the needy, ideologically they did establish an understanding of "work" and "unemployment" that still prevails.

Conclusion

Social policy in interwar Poland and Czechoslovakia was forged at the intersection of two currents of influence: the heritage of the German and Austrian models and the impetus for reform supplied by the Versailles order, which highly valued "social peace." Both of the East Central European countries discussed here were deeply involved in the development of national and international social policy and thus provide perfect case studies of the entanglement of the two currents and of the interplay between national and international social policy-making. This widens our perspective on the heritage of European social welfare schemes.

As can be seen from the process of establishing labor standards and extending social insurance schemes, national and international social policies concentrated quite narrowly on the world of work. Whereas general labor standards were more or less wholly formulated at the international level and needed only to be ratified by national parliaments, individual countries had to implement their own internal social insurance schemes. Poland was more effective in the implementation of labor standards, while Czechoslovakia built successfully on a pre-existing heritage of social insurance. Political decisions about eligibility for the insurance scheme came to define what was perceived as "work" and "non-work," and fixed how we think about those categories. A concentration on work and on providing for families derives from the older German and Austrian systems and has become the European tradition in social policy-making. Despite the institutional and economic obstacles mentioned here, the social policies of the interwar years have not only served as a model for modern systems but have shaped expectations about what they should provide, and to whom.

2017 ACTA UNIVERSITATIS CAROLINAE PAG. 35–60
STUDIA TERRITORIALIA 1

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE COLD WAR: THE CIRCULATION OF EXPERTS BEYOND THE EAST-WEST DIVIDE

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Abstract
This article aims to explain the existence and longevity of East-West contacts across the Iron Curtain between groups of actors in various international organizations. Three particular organizations, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the World Council of Churches (WCC), were chosen, all of which were involved in social, economic, and cultural issues. The official discourses of the era were clearly built in opposition to each other on each side of the Iron Curtain. This study allows us to understand the necessary conditions for the constitution of the groups of experts in the organizations who succeeded in working together, while still acknowledging their ideological differences. A focus on individual and collective actors and their career trajectories enables us to examine a hypothesis that specific "epistemic communities" gradually formed, based on convergent conceptions of modernity. In order to emphasize the global aspects of this process, our analysis pays attention to the North-South dimension as well as the East-West contacts. It examines the roles and perceptions of

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recently decolonized countries inside the chosen international organizations in order to identify another element contributing to the organizations' stability.
Keywords: transnational history; international organizations; Cold War; epistemic communities
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Introduction

The end of the Cold War contributed to a change in the way historians regard that era of world history. Researchers are now more interested in the nature of that conflict than in the superpowers' respective responsibilities in the period.[1] Taking a global approach, historians emphasize the role of decolonized spaces and analyze them as historical actors in their own right, and no longer merely as places for confrontation between the two blocs. Some historians have demonstrated the porosity of the "Iron Curtain" and the previously unremarked scale of circulation of people, ideas, and skills between Europe's East and West. These circulations have been identified and studied from multiple angles (within nations, congresses, associations, and international organizations) and in several domains (science, culture, and politics).[2] This article aims to understand and explain the existence and longevity of these connections by examining certain groups of actors that established and maintained varied contacts within some international organizations.

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[1] Within this plethora of literature, see the remarks of Akira Iriye, "Historicizing the Cold War," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War,* ed. Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 15–32; and Pierre Grosser, *Les temps de la guerre froide: réflexions sur l'histoire de la guerre froide et sur les causes de sa fin* (Brussels: Complexe, 1995), especially 19–69. See also Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), and for an intriguing neo-Marxist approach, see Richard Saull, *The Cold War and After: Capitalism, Revolution and Superpower Politics* (London: Pluto Press, 2007).

[2] Among the rich and growing historiography in this field (labeled "new Cold War historiography") see in particular Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers, *Materializing Europe Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Jeremi Suri, "Conflict and Co-operation in the Cold War: New Directions in Contemporary Historical Research," *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, No. 1 (January 2011): 5–9, doi: 10.1177/0022009410383293; Peter Romijn, Giles Scott-Smith, and Joes Segal, eds., *Divided Dreamworlds?: The Cultural Cold War in East and West* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012); Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy, eds., *Reassessing Cold War Europe* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Frederico Romero and Angela Romano, eds., European Socialist regimes facing globalisation and European co-operation: dilemmas and responses, special issue of the *European Review of History* 21, No. 2 (2014); Egle Rindzeviciute, *The Power of Systems. How Policy Sciences Opened Up the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017); Matthieu Gillabert and Tiphaine Robert, *Zuflucht suchen. Phasen des Exils aus Osteuropa im Kalten Krieg / Chercher refuge. Les phases d'exil d'Europe centrale pendant la Guerre froide* (Basel: Schwabe, 2017).

We chose international organizations as our research fields because they are good observatories for identifying the nature and form of encounters and circulations. We will show that, far from being simply arenas where the states of each bloc faced off against each other, international organizations (and especially their secretariats) were sites of continuous discussion, mutual observation, exchange, and cross-acculturation. These interactions were closely connected to the very nature of these organizations, which are primarily sites for the elaboration and production of expert discourse to support the legitimacy of the organizations' recommendations and influence with states and other international organizations.[3] We discuss the extent of, and the conditions underlying, the ability of the international organizations to arbitrate, maintain, and produce communities of experts that possessed a common group culture (i.e. a set of persuasions, opinions, argumentative patterns, and institutional strategies linked to their professional socialization inside their organization and/or their area of expertise). We call these groups "epistemic communities." In this sense, we base our analysis on the well-known definition of epistemic community introduced by Peter Hass in the 1992 special issue of *International Organization,* which he meant to capture the reality of a "network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area."[4] We also take into account recent debates on epistemic communities, emphasizing the necessity of carefully examining their internal coherence and the specific internal group dynamics that to a varying degree limited or enhanced their influence in a transnational world.[5]

Our work is primarily based on the activities of three organizations: the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Conference on

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[3] Madeleine Herren, *Geschichte der internationalen Organisation* (Darmstadt: WBG, 2009), 15–32; Bob Reinalda, *Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day* (London: Routledge, 2009), 347–583. See also Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), especially 37–74; Sandrine Kott, "Par-delà la guerre froide: Les Organisations Internationales et les circulations Est-Ouest (1947–1973)," *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* 109 (January–March 2011): 143–55, doi: 10.3917/vin.109.0142; Sandrine Kott, "Cold War internationalism," in *Internationalisms. A Twentieth-Century History*, ed. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 340–63.

[4] Peter Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992): 1–35, here page 3.

[5] Mai'a K. Davis Cross, "Rethinking epistemic communities twenty years later," *Review of International Studies* 39, No. 1 (January, 2013): 137–60, doi: 10.1017/S0260210512000034; Yves Viltard, "L'étrange carrière du concept foucaldien d'épistémè en science politique," *Raisons politiques* 23 (2006): 193–202, doi: 10.3917/rai.023.0193.

Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the World Council of Churches (WCC). The choice of these three research sites was determined mainly by the quality and accessibility of sources,[6] but they also proved to be especially heuristic for two reasons. Firstly, the organizations are concerned with social, economic, and cultural themes about which the official discourses of the Cold War era held opposing views. This opposition of viewpoints did not, however, prevent observable convergence in how economic and social policies were formulated and implemented by each side. The convergence was the result of joint analysis of the issues of training, development, and secularization, whose rationales and genealogies we will try to reconstruct. Secondly, these organizations are diverse in their chronologies, domains of intervention, and modes of operation, allowing exploration of a great variety of actors representing diverse cultures, who nonetheless converged around a common episteme.

The ILO is the oldest of the three organizations. It was founded in 1919 to meet demands for reform formulated by socialist union organizations during World War I. It is comprised of representatives from states, employers, and labor. It promoted the internationalization of social reforms, clearly in response to the Bolshevik revolution. Initially focused on developing conventions promoting international social policy in response to unions' demands dating back to the nineteenth century, the ILO began offering technical and development assistance to less-developed economies during the economic crisis of the 1930s. This assistance was scaled up after 1945.[7] We will focus on this development program because it puts the circulation of experts and the convergences of policy-making into the sharpest relief.

UNCTAD is another example of international organization that promoted or created cross-cultural rapprochement in the economic domain. It was the

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[6] In order to complete the one-sided and one-dimensional perspective of their own action that international organizations present in their official documents, we made a systematic effort to get access to correspondences of the main actors (which we found in the ILO and WCC archives). We also consulted several national-level institutional funds and conducted interviews with accessible living witnesses (for the WCC and UNCTAD case studies).

[7] The number of publications on the ILO has proliferated in recent years, adding to classics such as Antony Alcock, *History of the International Labour Organisation* (New York: Octagon Books, 1971) and Victor-Yves Ghebali, *The International Labour Organization: A Case Study on the Evolution of U.N. Specialised Agencies* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989). See also recent edited volumes by Jasmien van Daele et al., eds., *ILO Histories: Essays on the International Labor Organization and its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century* (Bern: Lang, 2010); Isabelle Lespinet-Moret and Vincent Viet, eds., *L'organisation internationale du travail: origine, développement, avenir* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2011); Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux, eds., *Globalizing Social Rights: The ILO and Beyond* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

fruit of an inaugural conference in 1964, and was then institutionalized in the form of an international organization with a General Secretariat initially headed by Raul Prebisch. UNCTAD's mission is promoting development through trade. Its activities are not limited to studying and reducing tariff barriers (like the institutions responsible for the GATT, for instance), but instead also address the conditions that make free trade possible, be they material (transportation fleets, communications networks) or institutional (banking institutions, removal of economic barriers, and inter-state agreements).[8] Economic development was the central concern at UNCTAD. It relegated Cold-War antagonisms to the background while acknowledging the differences between systems, as shown by the existence of a Division for Trade with Socialist Countries, which we will study in particular detail.

In the seemingly quite unrelated domain of religion, the ecumenicalism preached by the WCC allowed it to function as another site for overcoming Cold War hostility. The WCC was founded in Amsterdam in August 1948, but the idea for such an organization had been under discussion since the 1930s. In the decades after its founding, the Geneva-based WCC managed to bring together most of the non-Roman Catholic churches in the world (147 in 1948, 348 in 2017).[9] Its membership was predominantly Protestant and Euro-American in the 1950s, but the WCC's profile and identity changed in the 1960s with the entry of several Eastern Orthodox churches and new independent churches from decolonized countries of the world's South.[10] The global spread of the WCC crowned

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[8] Most of the literature on UNCTAD dates back to the 1970s, when the organization was viewed as a central actor in redefining the "New International Economic Order," see Georges Merloz, *La CNUCED. Droit International et Développement* (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1980); Boualia Benamar, *La CNUCED et le nouvel ordre économique international* (Paris: Université de droit, d'économie et de sciences sociales, 1984); Robert L. Rothstein, *Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979). UNCTAD has just recently attracted a new wave of interest from historians, especially since the 2008 financial crisis: see Johanna Bockman, "Socialist Globalization against Capitalist Neocolonialism: The Economic Ideas behind the New International Economic Order," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, No. 1 (2015): 109–28, doi: 10.1353/hum.2015.0010; Sönke Kunkel, "Contesting Globalization: The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Transnationalization of Sovereignty," in *International Organizations and Development, 1945–1990*, ed. Sönke Kunkel, Corinna Unger, and Mark Frey (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 240–59.

[9] See "What is the World Council of Churches?," official website of the WCC, http://www.oikoumene.org/en/about-us.

[10] Besides classical, certainly well-informed, WCC-sponsored accounts of the organization's history, including Ruth Rouse and Stephen Neill, *A History of the Ecumenical Movement 1517–1948* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1986) and Harold E. Fey, *The Ecumenical Advance: A History of the Ecumenical Movement* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1986), the WCC

the efforts of the group of theologians that headed the WCC until the late 1960s. They were distinguished by a particular conception of ecumenicalism that was closely tied to the dialectic theology of Karl Barth, which decried any attempt to identify a religion with a political system.

We will use these three research sites to demonstrate the conditions precedent for the constitution of groups of "pan-European" experts who succeeded in working together while acknowledging or even asserting their ideological differences. We will then explore whether their collaboration is evidence of the existence and gradual evolution of a specific language among them, or even a common epistemic foundation based on convergent representations of modernity. In that way, we can address the question of whether those groups may be considered as epistemic communities. To study the construction of this common culture we will start by identifying the individual and collective actors who supported it. We will first describe the profiles of these groups or communities, and then try to understand the reasons for their cohesiveness by tracing back their long genealogies. Lastly, in order to identify an element contributing to the stability of the expert groups, we will examine how they perceived recently decolonized countries and how they related with that part of the world.

1. The Creation of an Episteme

All officials and experts participating in the activities of international organizations during the Cold War were faced with the split between "East" and "West," which played out in large international conferences and in the United Nations Security Council. Representatives of international organizations chose different strategies for navigating this conflict. They differed in their terminological choices for designating Eastern, Western, and non-aligned countries. They also differed in the approaches they took to the Cold War divide, which they could ignore (the ILO), surpass (UNCTAD), or integrate into their own initiatives (the WCC). In each case, these strategies spoke to the existence or constitution of a specific group culture based on the exchange of information and cross-acculturation.

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has attracted the attention of a younger generation of researchers, among them Matti Peiponen, *Ecumenical Action in World Politics: The Creation of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), 1945–1949* (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 2012) and mainly Katharina Kunter and Annegreth Schilling, *Globalisierung der Kirchen: der Ökumenische Rat der Kirchen und die Entdeckung der Dritten Welt in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014).

1.1 Sites and Institutions Where Groups Were Created

International organizations were founded to favor the exchange of information and to encourage peace and harmony between nations. They are dedicated to being spaces for discussion and reconciliation, including (or even especially) during tense periods of political conflict. In this respect, all three of our research sites demonstrate that the Cold War was an especially fertile time for international organizations that could serve as meeting places, especially for a Europe that was cut in two.

This bridging role could even be the reason for an organization's very existence and an important element in its legitimacy, as was the case for the WCC. Indeed, the WCC positioned itself early on to overcome the division of Europe arising from the Cold War. Ecumenicists from the East and West accepted the new geopolitical division and turned it into an opportunity to demonstrate the value of building ecumenical unity. Because of its rarity in the bipolar world, "political ecumenicalism" contributed to the WCC's prestige. The WCC secretariat's strategic gamble was to display opposition to the Cold War in an especially striking way and assert the WCC's unique ability to overcome it. Arbitrating between the extreme positions represented by John Foster Dulles, a staunchly anti-communist Presbyterian and future U.S. Secretary of State, and the Czech theologian and communist sympathizer Josef L. Hromádka,[11] the WCC's founding assembly of 1948 ended up under the influence of the Swiss theologian Karl Barth. It adopted a motion expressing an ecumenical position with respect to East-West antagonism: "the Christian churches should reject the ideologies of communism and laissez-faire capitalism and should seek to draw men away from the false assumptions that these extremes are the only alternatives."[12] This position was rare in the frozen context of the early Cold War period. It guided the efforts of the WCC's secretariat, headed by Willem Visser 't Hooft of the Netherlands, who managed to maintain the participation of representatives of the East in the WCC throughout the 1950s.[13] The secretariat's strategy, supported

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[11] File 31.004/01, 02, 03, World Council of Churches Archives (WCCA), Geneva. On Hromádka, see a recent biography by Peter C.A. Morée and Jiří Piškula, *Nejpokrokovější církevní pracovník: protestantské církve a Josef Lukl Hromádka v letech 1945–1969* (Benešov: EMAN, 2015).

[12] File 31.003/15, WCCA, Geneva. See also the testimonial by Lukas Vischer, "The World Council of Churches and the Churches in Eastern Europe during the Time of the Communist Regimes: A First Attempt at an Assessment," *Religion, State and Society* 25, No. 1 (1997): 62.

[13] For example, file 42.3.035/4, WCCA, Geneva. The continuing presence of representatives of the East would, of course, have been impossible without a sometimes more or less tolerant attitude on the part of the Communist regimes. In the Czechoslovak case, it is possible to observe different

by the WCC ecumenicists' worldwide ambitions, was crowned with success in 1961, when the Soviets decided to authorize the Russian Orthodox Church to join the organization. For the WCC leadership, this expansion to the East symbolized the organization's having overcome the double limitation of being Euro-American and Protestant, a perception that had typified the ecumenical movement since the late nineteenth century.[14] From their perspective, the Cold War allowed them to deepen an integrative ecumenical process which certain observers termed a "second Reformation."[15]

A different process was underway at the ILO, where moving beyond ideological oppositions resulted less from an initial ecumenical will than from a rapprochement based on convergences that had appeared in ILO practice without necessarily being explicitly formulated. Training programs for labor and management, one of the ILO's specialties under the UN development program, were places where encounters could take place and convergences between Eastern and Western Europe could emerge. These training programs were supported by a common productivist objective that led to the export of skills from the West to the East in the 1950s, by means of development programs implemented by the ILO's secretariat under the auspices of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). There were three discernible contexts for these encounters, the first being study trips. Between 1957 and 1960 several Polish fellowship recipients studied in professional reconversion programs in West Germany, France, and Great Britain.[16] The Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs received ILO grants for industrial managers to pursue studies relevant to Romania's strongest industries (petroleum, textiles, and agro-food) in Western countries[17]; the Bulgarians

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ways in which East-West contacts were instrumentalized inside the WCC by Communist leaders on both the national and international level. On this point and on the use of Josef Lukl Hromádka as an "export good," see Ondřej Matějka, "Jsou to berani, ale můžeme je využít. Čeští evangelíci a komunistický režim 1948–1956," *Soudobé dějiny* 14, No. 2–3 (2007): 305–40 and Ondřej Matějka, "Apprendre à vivre dans une dictature. Le milieu protestant tchèque 1948–1956," *Transitions* 47, No. 12 (2007): 13–31. The Czechoslovak secret police (*Státní bezpečnost*) was understandably very intensely interested in the activities of all Czechoslovak citizens involved in international organizations. Most of the key domestic files on them were destroyed shortly after 1989, however. We can thus work with only fragmentary sources – for example files 10336 and 10453 in the archival holdings of the *Hlavní správa rozvědky*, *Archiv bezpečnostních složek* (Security Services Archives, Prague).

14 Willem Adolph Visser 't Hooft, *Memoirs* (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1987), 254–76.

15 "The Russians Join the World Council," *Time*, December 1, 1961.

16 See request addressed to Director General David Morse, files Z 3/64/2 and OTA 50-1 (A), International Labour Organization Archives (ILOA), Geneva.

17 File Jenks Papers 1968, ILOA, Geneva.

followed suit.[18] During the period of economic reform in the 1960s, when Eastern bloc businesses were granted greater independence, management training became essential. Upon the request of the political leaders of several socialist countries, the ILO Office established management training centers, which were the second context for East-West encounters. The first such center was established in Warsaw in 1965, and all Eastern Bloc countries (with the exception of the German Democratic Republic [GDR] and the USSR) would eventually get their own centers.[19] In Romania the CEPECA (Centrul de Perfectionare a Cadrelor de Conducere din Întreprinderi), founded in 1967, has remained a model to this day. Bulgaria got a management training center for engineers, scientists, and government bureaucrats in 1969.[20] The Turin training center for management in developing countries represents the third setting for encounters. The Czechoslovak government sent its first group of managers there in 1969.[21] It was during these trips and at these centers that leadership from the East met its peers of the West, and this is where a common language and episteme gradually developed between them.

UNCTAD's vocation for development was initially backed by the "Group of 77." UNCTAD successfully imposed a way of working and forms of discourse on its members, which reduced the divisions of the Cold War without erasing them. Its approach was characterized by numerical and political domination by "developing countries" (group A) and Latin American countries (group C) over "developed market-economy countries" (group B) and "socialist countries" (group D), both in the UNCTAD General Assembly and in its executive body, the Trade and Development Board. Cross-cutting alliances were impossible because each of these groups had its own deliberative process for arriving at a common position. This situation favored the independence of the "developing countries" group, despite its heterogeneity. Legitimized discursive forms, starting with the nomenclature used to designate the country groups, were also significant factors in neutralizing antagonism. To be acceptable, they had to be formulated in terms of increasing opportunities for trade benefiting the development of countries in groups A and C. The perspective shifted from competition between two opposing political models to one based on a single value scale: development.

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[18] File UNDP 10-2-C-2-2 (1), ILOA, Geneva.
[19] Correspondence 1966–1969, file Z/1/10/1/1, ILOA, Geneva.
[20] Wynne Roberts report on mission to Bulgaria, October 10–17, 1970, file MI 221, ILOA, Geneva.
[21] File TAP 0-17, ILOA, Geneva.

This discursive and practical adjustment proved to be particularly good for Eastern Bloc countries. There was even an office in the UNCTAD General Secretariat called the Division for Trade between Countries with Different Economic Systems, which was specifically charged with promoting trade between developing and socialist countries (as revealed by its shortened name, the "TRADSOC division"). This division's very existence, with no equivalent on the side of developed market-economy countries,[22] was an implicit privilege granted to socialist countries. Likewise, its composition seems to be the result of a compromise with the Eastern Bloc countries, the USSR chief among them: the division directors were invariably from the Soviet Union and division members were predominantly from Eastern Bloc countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and including Yugoslavia). Some members were civil servants from developing countries (Algeria, India, Pakistan) and neutral European countries (Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Sweden).

1.2 The Gradual Constitution of a Common Culture of Modernity

These development programs were able to function properly thanks to an enculturation process and the elaboration of a common language whose grammar was supplied by international-level officials and experts. This process assumed different forms and degrees of importance depending on the organization.

In the ILO's Office, the language used to discuss economic and social issues became increasingly technical and was marked in particular by the disappearance of certain words such as "capitalism" and "socialism." This is what made it possible for officials from the ILO Office and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) to establish a Regional Training Institute in the Balkans (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey) without giving a second thought to its compatibility with the economic and social systems in the countries it served.[23] This project was developed by a specific group in the Office in charge of such programs that was composed of professional and management training experts schooled in the business culture of English-speaking and Nordic coun-

[22] There were other sites of East-West encounters in the area of trade relations such as the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), but they had a rather limited impact. For more details on UNECE see Daniel Stinsky, "A Bridge between East and West? Gunnar Myrdal and the UN Economic Commission for Europe, 1947–1957," in *Planning in Cold War Europe: Competition, Cooperation, Circulations (1950s–1970s)*, ed. Sandrine Kott, Michel Christian, Ondřej Matějka, forthcoming in De Gruyter.

[23] File UNDP 10-2-C-2-2 (2), ILOA, Geneva.

tries. Rhys Wynne-Roberts, who was responsible for the Office's management division from 1954, came from the British Institute of Management after an earlier career in the aeronautic industry.

In practice, ILO culture was disseminated by sending out experts who shared the same background. This is how W. Carver, of the renowned Cranfield School of Management in Bedford (England), came to establish and coordinate three seminars between 1973 and 1975 in Czechoslovakia on scientific management and rationalization in industrial companies. Carver hired only British experts to run these seminars.[24] John McDonald, who took charge of the labor training program in Bulgaria, was a civil servant in the American State Department, but he surrounded himself with British experts from the same managerial culture.[25] These Western experts' encounter with the "natives" entailed a phase of cross-acculturation. At the beginning, both sides contributed to discord. Eastern authorities found the perspective adopted by the trainers to be too blatantly Western. On the other hand, in Bulgaria for example, ILO Office employees and experts complained that some of the courses on the "new economic order" were couched in overtly propagandistic language.[26] By the 1970s, however, language and references were clearly converging. Furthermore, circulation was in two directions. The system of training by modules ("modular employable skills") instituted by the ILO Office in the late 1970s by two British-trained professional training experts, John. D. Gilmore and William Plumbridge, actually seems to have been particularly well-suited to socialist economies, where every task in the economy was enumerated under a planning framework.[27] The Soviet system of planning in turn inspired some British experts.

The shared objective of development and modernization, paired with the concept of economic and social engineering, opened possibilities for dialogue. At UNCTAD, whose purpose was to promote trade in the service of development, the difference between socialist and developed market-economy countries was clearly secondary to that between "developing countries" and "developed countries." Among the latter, however, UNCTAD did further distinguish between "developed market-economy countries" and "socialist countries." This way, Eastern Bloc countries preserved their ideological distinctiveness while avoiding language that implied that they were "developed," which would place them vexingly close to Western Bloc countries. The linguistic categories

[24] File UNDP 17-2-b-1-1, ILOA, Geneva.
[25] File MI 221, ILOA, Geneva.
[26] Wynne Roberts' report on mission to Bulgaria, October 10–17, 1970, MI 221, ILOA, Geneva.
[27] Plumbridge's report on mission to Bulgaria, July 1980, UNDP 10-2-C-2-2 (2), ILOA, Geneva.

developed at UNCTAD attest to a compromise with the schism of the Cold War that favored the Eastern Bloc countries. The organization had to make a constant effort to impose these categories on all collaborating actors, who in many cases were required to revise their own statistical data to respect UNCTAD nomenclature. Countries such as Turkey (a member of NATO) were counted among developed market-economy countries, while Yugoslavia, Cuba, China, and Vietnam were considered to be developing, not socialist, countries.

In the case of the WCC, Eastern and Western actors' ability to place themselves between or above the two blocs depended on a theological identity that predated the Cold War and the WCC's founding, but which took on a new meaning during the post-1945 period. The vocabulary and grammar of the WCC's language were based on Karl Barth's dialectic theology, which dominated the protestant theological landscape from the 1930s through the 1960s.[28] Among its most fervent followers were Willem Visser 't Hooft (Dutch), Pierre Maury (French), and Josef L. Hromádka (Czech). Barthian theology rejected the anthropocentrism of pre-1914 liberal theology and relied on a resolute affirmation of the transcendence of God. These theologians made a radical distinction between the human and the divine and rejected any confusion of the theological and the political.[29] Their theology (and its Eastern European variant in particular) hailed the end of the "Constantinian era," or in other words, the end of privileged relations between church and state.[30] This laid the groundwork for the WCC to become a site for inter-bloc dialogue in the late 1950s, and even made the (more rapidly) secularizing East seem like a source of inspiration for the West. Indeed, the theologians dominating the WCC favorably assessed the "unique contribution" of Eastern European Christians living in atheistic (even actively anti-religious) states. Those states had already passed into the "post-Constantinian era" and thus possessed an experience that could be particularly enriching for the West.[31]

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[28] Conrad Simonson, *The Christology of the Faith and Order Movement* (Leiden: Brill, 1972), 100–105.

[29] Daniel Cornu, *Karl Barth et la politique* (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1968). On Barth's contacts with Czech Protestants see Jan Štefan, *Karl Barth a ti druzí: pět evangelických theologů 20. století: Barth, Brunner, Tillich, Althaus, Iwand* (Brno: CDK, 2005).

[30] Jan Milíč Lochman, "Eine Konstantinische Kirche," *Communio viatorum* 1 (1958): 40–44; see also his contributions to preparatory volumes for "Church and Society" conference in 1966: John C. Bennett, ed., *Christian social ethics in a changing world: an ecumenical theological inquiry* (London: SCM Press, 1966), 231–52.

[31] Jan Milíč Lochman, *Church in a Marxist society: A Czechoslovak view* (Evanston IL: Harper & Row, 1970); Cornu, *Karl Barth*, 184.

Curiosity about the communist experience was compounded among Western experts by social radicalism, a self-critical attitude toward Western civilization and a high regard for intellectual non-conformity (manifested in rejection of anti-communist discourse). These views typified the culture specific to Western actors inside the WCC. The German historian Hedwig Richter, who is quite critical of the WCC, qualified it as a *linksrevolutionäres Pathos* (leftist revolutionary pathos). She claimed that it would pave the way for the WCC to engage in world politics alongside the radical elements in the Third World in the 1970s and 1980s.[32]

2. Experts for the Duration of the Cold War

The stability, efficacy, and ultimate social impact of the groups that formed or appeared within the three organizations studied here also depended on those groups' ability to impose their views at a given time and place. In each of those international organizations, the experts managed to unite into a larger group that related to a longer history and that surpassed the original organization.

2.1 The Constitution of a Broader Group of Experts

In the organizations we studied, the core epistemic communities were composed of managers, permanent staff, and international officials. Their level of engagement was based on their rank in the bureaucratic organization, but also on their vocation and their recognized expertise in their field. For example, the Secretary General of the WCC between 1948 and 1966, Visser 't Hooft, was both a highly experienced international official (thanks to his career in the Young Men's Christian Association [YMCA] and the World Student Christian Federation [WSCF] in the 1920s and 1930s) and a respected theologian, possessing a doctorate that lent legitimacy to his active participation in all the WCC's doctrinal debates.

Outside experts gravitated to these core officials. International organizations called on the outsiders in part because their financial means were limited and in part because their political strategy called for the gradual construction of internationally recognized expertise.[33] Some of these outside experts were

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[32] Hedwig Richter, "Der Protestantismus und das linksrevolutionäre Pathos. Der Ökumenische Rat der Kirchen in Genf im Ost-West-Konflikt in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 36, No. 3 (2010): 408–36, doi: 10.13109/gege.2010.36.3.408.

[33] On the importance attributed to this expertise, see critical analyses in Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, eds., *Lawyers and the Construction of Transnational Justice* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

engaged as occasional consultants, and indeed such consultants produced most of the reports of the Division for Trade with Socialist Countries under UNCTAD's supervision. In other instances, they were members of international expert commissions. At the WCC, the work performed in such specialized commissions, which were painstakingly staffed according to geographical and confessional divisions, was the heart of its programmatic activities. They were numerous (19 in the 1960s) and the nomination procedure for participation on them was the result of complex negotiations.[34] A similar reliance on commissions was seen in the ILO's Office as well.[35] On the other hand, UNCTAD's Division for Trade with Socialist Countries only rarely relied on this type of commission.[36]

Around the edges of each group within the organization was an assortment of actors who participated indirectly in the epistemic community's activities. They were mainly students on fellowship in the international organization and academics seeking data and information about a particular domain of interest. In the ILO-UNDP program, they were either people trained by experts to be sent out into the field or the recipients of fellowships (the latter were usually "cadres" from socialist regimes).[37] There were directors of state enterprises (as was the case for the Czechoslovaks sent to Turin in 1969[38]) and people working as technical managers in governmental ministries. One of them was Helena Maria Larek, who was sent from Poland to France in 1958 and later became a psychological advisor in the professional expertise division of the department for vocational rehabilitation of the disabled of the Polish Ministry of Labor and Welfare.[39] Lastly, there were researchers who worked in institutes with ties to power, such as the Czechoslovak experts sent to Western Europe between 1975 and 1978 for training in methods for rationalizing workflow and managing by objectives.[40] These grantees' files reveal that most had previously received funding from international programs, which indicates that such academics were

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[34] Visser 't Hooft, *Memoirs*, 315.

[35] For more details, see Sandrine Kott, "Une 'communauté épistémique' du social? Experts de l'OIT et internationalisation des politiques sociales dans l'entre-deux-guerres," *Genèses* 71, No. 2 (2008): 26–46, doi: 10.3917/gen.071.0026.

[36] It did so in 1977 (on multilateral payments) and in 1984 (on the methods and means for promoting trade between countries with different economic and social systems).

[37] Sandrine Kott, "Les elites socialistes et le pouvoir. Le cas de la RDA," in *Le communisme et les élites en Europe centrale. Destructions, mutations, conversions*, ed. François Bocholier and Nicolas Bocquet (Paris, PUF, 2006), 169–86.

[38] File TAP 0-17, ILOA, Geneva.

[39] File OTA 50-1 (A) Fs-3, ILOA, Geneva.

[40] File UNDP 17-2-A-1-1-FS (1), ILOA, Geneva.

already internationalized and serving as interfaces between the socialist and capitalist worlds. While they were not necessarily an epistemic community, it is conceivable that they were a pool of recruitment for the expertise needed in the transition to capitalism after 1990.[41]

The impact of these communities depended on the diversity of the publics with which they interacted. Thus, in the late 1960s, upon the initiative of representatives from Eastern Europe, the WCC jointly organized and funded several meetings between (primarily European) Marxists and Christians to discuss their ideological differences and commonalities.[42] Following this initiative, Ladislav Prokůpek, a Czechoslovak Marxist (and a former member of the ecclesiastical department of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Culture charged with controlling religious activities) spent several months on a WCC grant researching protestant theology at the Bossey Ecumenical Institute in Switzerland.[43]

Among all these circles there were natural career pathways that contributed to the construction of a common episteme. For instance, some of Hromádka's former students and theology advisees were progressively included in WCC working commissions.[44] Some academics who consulted for UNCTAD were called back to participate in expert commissions, as was the case for Sumitra Chishti of the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade. Having worked upon several occasions as a consultant for the Division for Trade with Socialist Countries, Chishti was asked to participate in an international commission "on the methods and means of promoting trade between countries with different economic and social welfare systems."[45]

2.2 Pre-existing Networks

A biographical approach makes it possible to map these career transitions and show that certain "epistemic communities" were actually rooted in an older shared framework. Links that were forged in the period between the world

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[41] See the analysis of Johanna Bockman, *Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism* (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

[42] Central Committee Report Heraklion (1967), file 37.0045, WCCA, Geneva.

[43] File 42.03.36, WCCA Geneva; authors' interview with Ladislav Prokůpek, August 28, 2006.

[44] Namely Jan M. Lochman, Josef Smolík, and Milan Opočenský; see Minutes from Central Committee Meetings 1961–1968, WCCA, Geneva.

[45] File ARR 40/1830, 67, TDO 287/6, UNCTAD, United Nations Archives (UNA), Geneva. Reports of the ad hoc group of experts to consider ways and means of expanding trade and economic relations between countries having different economic and social systems, March 1984–July 1984.

wars lasted throughout the Cold War.[46] In this respect, certain countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland had privileged positions as go-betweens, aided by their strong presence in international organizations before World War II. Actors who had played a part in pre-war internationalization again played a crucial role in the circulation of people and ideas during the Cold War.

The "ecumenical Barthians" who dominated the WCC's first twenty years were a case in point.[47] This community began to take shape in the mid-1920s, when future members of WCC governing bodies and staff such as Visser 't Hooft, Maury, Hromádka, and von Thadden (who was German) met through the YMCA and the WSCF. Those international Christian organizations were growing rapidly at the time and were actively involved (using North American funding) in the (re)construction of the educational infrastructure for Eastern European youth. YMCA and WSCF leaders such as John R. Mott devoted particular attention to Czechoslovakia because they could rely on a national-level political elite that was very open to the West (particularly those officials who were close to President Masaryk).[48] Local supporters were ready to use the state budget to help fund their initiatives. Protestant elites at the local level had already been internationalized for historical reasons.[49]

The Czechoslovak success story (exemplified by the YMCA) was extensively instrumentalized for publicity in the West. Contacts in Czechoslovakia were soon sought out as favored partners by their Western peers in international organizations. As secretary general of the WSCF in 1928, Visser 't Hooft engaged his friend Hromádka (a professor of Protestant theology in Prague and a member of the Czechoslovak YMCA's national board) in his international endeavor to

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[46] Among the growing literature on that topic see Martin Kohlrausch, Kathrin Steffen, and Susan Wiederkehr, eds., *Expert Cultures in Central Eastern Europe: The Internationalization of Knowledge and the Transformation of Nation States since World War I* (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2010); Frank Hadler and Matthias Midell, eds., Verflochtene Geschichten: Ostmitteleuropa, special issue of *Comparativ: Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung* 20, No. 1–2 (2010); Johan Schot and Vincent Lagendijk, "Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years: Building Europe on Motorways and Electricity Networks," *Journal of Modern European History* 6, No. 2 (2008): 196–217, doi: 10.17104/1611-8944_2008_2_196.

[47] Conservative American Protestants had already started denouncing this Barthian domination by 1948; see *The Christian Century* 65, No. 40 (October 1948): 1033.

[48] For more on this aspect, see Ondřej Matějka, "Erziehung zur 'Weltbürgerlichkeit:' Der Einfluss des YMCA auf die tschechoslowakische Jugend der Zwischenkriegszeit," in *Jugend in der Tschechoslowakei. Konzepte und Lebenswelten (1918–1989)*, ed. Christiane Brenner et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016), 153–79.

[49] Until 1918, there were no university institutions for training Czech Protestant ministers, so they studied in Western Europe and as a result created a rather rich network of contacts in English- and German-speaking countries.

create a Barthian network, notably through *Student World* magazine. Visser 't Hooft's choice of Hromádka, as a Central European, was meant to manifest the global impact of dialectic theology.[50]

Hromádka escaped the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in April 1939, just before the outbreak of World War II, thanks to his friends in the WSCF, who "exported" him to the United States to win over followers for the "new European [Barthian] theology."[51] He was made a professor at the Princeton Theological Seminary in 1940 and gradually became the most respected Central European theologian in North America. After 1945, he leveraged his position to bring some twenty young Czechoslovak theologians to the West. Funded by the nascent WCC, the young theologians benefited from the hospitality of seminaries in North America, Great Britain, and Switzerland.[52] Some of them (such as Josef Smolík and Jan M. Lochman) in turn joined WCC working commissions in the early 1960s and contributed to the influence of the community of ecumenical Barthians in the organization.

Likewise, the managerial tradition had spread throughout Eastern Europe in the inter-war period, in the wake of the penetration of the region by capitalist interests. British (including the Bedaux Britain consultancy), German, and Dutch companies established offices in most Central European countries.[53] The ILO staff had possessed significant relevant skills since the inter-war period,[54] but it had not participated in exporting management techniques to the East. The ILO did, however, hire experts at the time who would later bridge East and West in the field of training. In that regard, the Polish ergonomist Jan Rosner, hired by the ILO in 1933, played an important role. In the 1950s he would negotiate the first-ever fellowship program allowing Polish students to get training in Western Europe.[55]

Czechoslovakia is another country that illustrates biographical continuities across time that are vital to explaining the constitution of a community of social

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[50] Correspondence file, Josef Lukl Hromádka (1928), Archives of the World Alliance of the YMCAs, Geneva.

[51] Files 213.11.7.16 and 42.0039/2, WCCA, Geneva.

[52] File 425.06.001, WCCA, Geneva.

[53] J. Poor and A. Milovecz, "Management Consulting in Human Resource Management: Central and Eastern European Perspectives in Light of Empirical Experiences," *Journal of Service Science and Management*, 4, No. 3 (2011): 300–14, doi: 10.4236/jssm.2011.43036.

[54] Thomas Cayet, *Rationaliser le travail, organiser la production: Le bureau international du travail et la modernisation économique durant l'entre-deux-guerres* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2010).

[55] Files P 2765, P 14/11/41 and Z 3/64/2, ILOA, Geneva.

welfare experts in both Eastern and Western Europe. Anton Zelenka, head of the social insurance department in the ILO Office, encapsulates these continuities well. Born in Prague in 1903, after completing his studies he held leadership positions in the 1920s and 1930s in the Czechoslovak First Republic's central administration for social insurance. He then moved to the ILO, where he worked closely with two other Czechs who were key actors in the field of social insurance in the inter-war period[56]: Oswald Stein, director of the ILO's social insurance department from 1937 to 1943,[57] and Emil Schönbaum, who began developing insurance systems in the Balkans before being sent to Latin America during the war.[58] In 1957, it was Zelenka who negotiated with the Czechoslovak minister Evžen Erban to hold a seminar on social insurance in Prague, with the ILO's backing, that was open to third-world countries.[59] As we shall see, the exportation of expertise to the global South was a powerful tool used by this group of "social engineers" to realize their common objectives.

2.3 The Renewal of Actors Starting in the Late 1960s

Although some of the observed circulation of people and ideas between the two blocs can be explained by the existence of networks that took shape between the wars, that source had dried up by the late 1960s. This necessitates the identification of other factors that could explain the continuity, and even the further development, of this circulation.

There was significant generational renewal in international organizations from the 1970s onward. At UNCTAD, most officials in the Division for Trade with Socialist Countries in the 1980s were between 30 and 40 years old. As a group, they had grown up and been educated in a bipolar world where the existence of "different economic and social systems" was a given. This kind of international experience is etched in the biographies of the Division's young officials of the time: Bijan Eslanloo, an Iranian hired by UNCTAD in 1978, had previously negotiated trade agreements for Iran with North Korea and Vietnam; the Finn Eila Jounela had worked at a Finnish trade agency in Eastern Europe

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[56] On Stein and Schönbaum's role, see Sandrine Kott, "Par-delà la guerre froide: Les Organisations Internationales et les circulations Est-Ouest (1947–1973)," *Vingtième siècle. Revue d'histoire,* No. 109 (2011): 143–55, doi: 10.3917/vin.109.0142.

[57] File P1289, ILOA, Geneva.

[58] File P3926, ILOA, Geneva.

[59] Letter, Rens to Morse, July 24, 1957, file TAP 14-57, ILOA, Geneva. See also Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964).

before coming to UNCTAD in 1981; the Soviet Igor Artemiev spoke Spanish and English and had already been a specialist in the Americas at the Academy of Science in Moscow before his transfer to UNCTAD, for the period 1981–1986. These three examples of individuals who were under 40 in the 1970s show that the lasting context of peaceful coexistence ended up producing social conditions propitious to maintaining and renewing circulation between the two blocs. This benefit is also found in the kinds of careers these individuals had: while most of those who came from countries of the West and South had had governmental or academic experience prior to pursuing long-lasting careers in international organizations, their peers from the East were only temporarily transferred from their original institutions and were then returned to them with a higher rank. The circulation of individuals was thus favored by the career model that Eastern European states imposed on their senior civil servants. Starting in the 1960s, the community of experts from East and West would find fertile ground for cooperation in their competing but shared development policies for countries of the global South.

3. The East as Bridge between West and South

The notion of the "Third World" emerged in the 1950s, based on a distinction between developing and developed countries that would help to reduce the divisions created by the Cold War and bring the trajectories of the European countries in both blocs closer, sometimes to the point of merging their interests. In this context, Eastern European countries sometimes played a distinctive role. Between the world wars, they were the under-developed periphery of Europe and the locations of the first international development programs. During World War II, the Polish economist Rosenstein-Rodan, an expert in development who would soon become an official at the World Bank, described them as experimental spaces for development and as models for the countries of the global South.[60] Regardless of such labels, after 1945 the countries of the East achieved economic development independently through socialist economic policies. From the 1950s onward, the appearance of the "Third World" on the international scene

[60] Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe," *The Economic Journal* 53, No. 210/211 (June – September 1943): 202–11; Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "The International Development of Economically Backward Areas," *International Affairs* 20, No. 2 (April 1944): 157–65. On Rosenstein-Rodan as well as other Polish economists, see Michele Alacevich, *The Political Economy of the World Bank: The Early Years* (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).

not only contrasted a developing South in opposition to a developed North, but also reflected the previous relationship between East and West that was a legacy of the inter-war period and was still evident in international organizations. Actors in these organizations saw Eastern European and Balkan countries as a sort of intermediate zone between the West, seen as the center, and the underdeveloped periphery.

Experts in international organizations thus facilitated the circulation of knowledge and skills from West to East, and then to the South. Examples of this can be found in Poland, which sent grantees to the West for ILO training on the occupational integration of disabled persons, who then in turn began offering a seminar on the subject (with the ILO's help) in Warsaw for African and Asian countries.[61] The organization's support for this Polish initiative indicates a common vision of Eastern European countries as central to promotion of the development policies intended for Southern countries. In this vision, Bulgaria had a privileged role. Management experts from the ILO Office organized training for personnel from the Bulgarian Institute for Social Management and then encouraged the Bulgarians to export the knowledge they gained to Cuba in the form of seminars in the early 1980s.[62] More generally, the ILO experts hoped to make Bulgaria a major center of training in management techniques for recently decolonized countries.[63] The same mindset reigned in other fields, such as mountain agriculture. In 1970 Jean Ozet, director of the ILO's office for the rural sector, encouraged the creation of a Center for Rural Development in Bulgaria that he claimed could be a "hub" of learning for Southern countries.[64]

A similar phenomenon could be found in the WCC. The WSCF had invited Hromádka to its world congress in India already in the inter-war period, when Visser 't Hooft saw him as a representative of "one of the so-called new countries of Europe," able to speak to the youth of "East and West." Hromádka was considered to possess a "double authority" based on the fact that he was from a country that was both European and developing, from a theological (but also social and political) point of view.[65] The same logic held 40 years later, but with more global resonance, when the WCC in 1966 organized a world conference in Geneva on the theme "Church and Society." This conference facilitated unprecedented

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[61] File TAP 14-119, ILOA, Geneva.
[62] File UNDP 10-2-B-2-1-1, ILOA, Geneva.
[63] File UNDP 10-2-C-2-2 (2), ILOA, Geneva.
[64] Jean Ozet to Blanchard, 11 October 1970, File MI 221, ILOA, Geneva.
[65] Correspondence file, Josef Lukl Hromádka (1928), Archives of the World Alliance of the YMCAs, Geneva.

participation by countries from the global South. It contributed to expanding the WCC's global reach, shifting the North-South balance within the organization, and addressing new issues such as development.[66] This encounter was a shock to Westerners, who were concerned by recourse to notions of revolution and revolutionary violence "to bring about more rapid development."[67] Czech theologians offered themselves, once again, as mediators between the West and South, based on their own experience of socialist revolution. In a series of articles published in English- and German-language theological reviews in the latter 1960s, they analyzed contemporary revolutionary movements against the background of revolutionary elements of the Gospel and emphasized intersections, parallels and convergences between different geographical areas and historical periods.[68] Strikingly, the Czech theologian Lochman was invited to the organizing committee of the Geneva conference. Two years later, he was also named chairman of the key Section III (for development) of the WCC General Assembly held in Uppsala in 1968.[69]

UNCTAD's activities in its Division for Trade with Socialist Countries also illustrate how Eastern European countries could be used as a conduit connecting West and South. This division did not much concern itself with intra-European trade, which fell more under the responsibility of the UN Economic Commission for Europe.[70] It did get involved, however, when intra-European relations could have consequences for trade with Southern countries.[71] This was the case with so-called "tripartite industrial cooperation," which, in the spirit of *détente* between the superpowers in the 1970s, was intended to associate economic actors (businesses, governmental agencies) of the East and West in assisting the growth of a third country of the global South.[72] This division's mission was

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66 Kunter, Schilling, *Globalisierung der Kirchen*, 38–48.

67 Report for the Executive Committee, February 1967, File 38.0009, WCCA, Geneva.

68 See especially *Communio viatorum* 10, No. 4 (Winter 1967); but also *Scottish Journal of Theology* 21 (1968), and *Evangelische Theologie* 27 (1967).

69 File 34.008/10-12, WCCA, Geneva. After the Soviet invasion in August 1968, Lochman decided to leave Czechoslovakia. Thanks to his extensive network of contacts in the West, he became professor of systematic theology at the University of Basel.

70 UNCTAD Research Programme Division for Trade with Socialist Countries, October 11, 1974, UNCTAD, Trade and Development (TD) 802/1, UNA, Geneva.

71 Ibid.

72 On this point, see Sarah Lorenzini, "Comecon and the South in the Years of Détente: A Study on East–South Economic Relations," *European Review of History/Revue européenne d'histoire* 21, No. 2 (2014): 183–99, doi: 10.1080/13507486.2014.888708; Francis Arkwright and Patrick Gutman, "La coopération industrielle tripartite entre pays à systèmes économiques et sociaux différents, de l'Ouest, de l'Est et du Sud," *Politique étrangère* 40, No. 6 (1975): 621–55.

to conduct a survey of these cooperative ventures, analyze them and formulate recommendations to promote similar programs. In that spirit, the Division for Trade with Socialist Countries held a seminar in December 1975,[73] during which it submitted for discussion its initial study, published in June 1974.[74] The Division's director, Mikhail Davydov, went on to participate in a conference organized by the GDR Academy of Sciences in Dresden in March 1976,[75] which was attended by academics from the United States, the USSR, Poland, and Great Britain. Among them were the Austrian Franz Nemschak, director of the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, from which Davydov later ordered a study of tripartite industrial cooperation in 1978.[76] An identical order was given to the West German economist Klaus Bolz of the Hamburg Institute of International Economics.[77] In 1979, UNCTAD published yet another study on the same topic, probably authored by Davydov himself.[78] Starting in 1981, the topic of tripartite cooperation was handed over to a new official in the division, Eila Jounela. Using her experience in Finnish trade agencies operating in Eastern Europe, she increased contacts with academics in Germany, Austria, and Hungary; with representatives of governmental ministries and banks of Eastern European countries; and with engineers and sales directors in companies in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (Siemens), Switzerland (Müller Martini AG), and Austria (Voest Alpine).[79] Jounela prepared a third and final UNCTAD produced study on the subject in 1984.[80]

The actual scale of tripartite cooperation should not be overestimated: there were only 140 projects in 1975, which made up only 6–7% of all finalized agreements between the East and West in 1979, and represented a "marginal share" of trade with Southern countries.[81] Tripartism nonetheless enjoyed special attention

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[73] Report on the Seminar of Industrial Specialization through Various Forms of Multilateral Co-operation, held in the Palais des Nations on December 2–5, 1975, February 23, 1976, UNCTAD Trade and Development Board (TD/B) 599, UNA, Geneva.

[74] Motivations, patterns, problems and prospects in industrial co-operation between enterprises of socialist and developing countries, June 21, 1974, UNCTAD TD/B 490, UNA, Geneva.

[75] UNCTAD and tripartite industrial co-operation, March 25, 1976, UNCTAD TD 830, UNA Geneva.

[76] File UNCTAD TD 820/5(2), UNA, Geneva.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Tripartite industrial co-operation and co-operation in third countries, April 20, 1979, UNCTAD TD/B 243, UNA, Geneva.

[79] File UNCTAD TD 820/5(2), UNA, Geneva.

[80] Recent developments in East-West co-operation in third countries and in tripartite co-operation, June 6, 1984, UNCTAD TD/B 1000, UNA, Geneva.

[81] File UNCTAD TD/B 243, UNA, Geneva.

from organizations like UNCTAD because it reinforced a pre-existing UNCTAD goal, making Eastern European countries intermediaries between West and South. The 1979 study was an example of an agreement anticipating "not only the construction of industrial facilities in Bulgaria [by a Belgian business consortium] but also a joint study for the delivery of this kind of facility, specific machines, complete production lines, and certain goods to a third country."[82]

Likewise, Davydov's presentation at the 1976 Dresden conference presumed a similar division of managerial and productive tasks, affirming that "the Western partner may possess certain managerial technologies or skills that might lead to the success of the project," while "socialist countries may show themselves capable of more innovation to adapt to the host country's demands."[83] These statements still resonate, especially because tripartite cooperation was a specifically European phenomenon that only tangentially concerned the competition between the two superpowers. In 1979, nearly ninety percent of such agreements were found in Western European countries (the FRG and France, followed in time by Italy and Austria) and in Eastern European countries (Poland and Hungary, followed by Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and Romania).

Eastern Europe's position on the near periphery of Western Europe was never explicitly recognized in the work of UNCTAD experts, however. The first report on tripartite industrial cooperation indicated that "each kind of cooperation has distinctive elements, advantages, and limitations."[84] To understand this statement, a reminder of the objective that UNCTAD had set for itself is in order: to arrive at a worldwide structural adjustment, applicable to both developing and developed countries, that would be capable of creating material and institutional conditions for genuine free trade, rather than merely lowering tariffs and barriers.[85] This objective explains UNCTAD's interest in the planned economies of socialist countries, which it saw both as interlocutors in a possible multilateral negotiation (among sovereign states) and as instruments of economic implementation (of the UNCTAD plan). Eastern Bloc countries, well aware of this interest, tried to respond by abandoning their Cold War rhetoric and converting their ideological goals into objective advantages: long-term intergovernmental

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[82] File UNCTAD TD/B 243/Supp. 5: §23, UNA, Geneva.

[83] UNCTAD and tripartite industrial co-operation, March 25, 1976, UNCTAD TD 830, UNA, Geneva.

[84] File UNCTAD TD/B 490, UNA, Geneva.

[85] Johanna Bockman, "Socialist Globalization against Capitalist Neocolonialism: The Economic Ideas behind the New International Economic Order," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, No. 1 (2015): 109–28, doi: 10.1353/hum.2015.0010.

trade agreements, the acceptance of reimbursement for exports in kind or in national currency, guaranteed technology transfers,[86] and certainly the prospect of reallocating the international division of labor.[87] The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (also known as Comecon, or CMEA) was also showcased by UNCTAD, partly as a regional organization likely to interest other geographical groupings[88] and partly as a multilateral intergovernmental organization providing a model for trade negotiations.[89]

UNCTAD's interest in socialist countries led its officials to characterize them more as a model for development than as a conduit for it. They sometimes even went so far as to reproach Eastern European consultants for having a vision "devoid of any Marxist analysis and careful to never critically compare projects backed by socialist and capitalist countries."[90] In that sense, East-West conflict was something to overcome, but it was best to keep the different economic and social systems, because they facilitated the accumulation of different experiences thought to be useful to advancing the international structural adjustment the organization was working to achieve. This acceptance of two equally viable models resonated well among officials of the Division for Trade with Socialist Countries, most of whom grew up after 1945. They took the existence of two stable competing models as a given, and at least those who hailed from the countries of the global South considered themselves halfway between East and West: simultaneously critical of their limitations and open to reciprocal exchange of ideas.[91]

Conclusion

Case studies of the ILO, WCC, and UNCTAD demonstrate, on the one hand, the remarkable diversity of the configurations that were possible inside international organizations during the Cold War. On the other hand, the studies indicate a number of important common features and tendencies that help explain the stability and persistence of circulation of experts and their expertise

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[86] File UNCTAD TD/B 243, UNA, Geneva.

[87] Statement by the Secretariat to introduce item 10 – Trade among countries having different economic and social systems – at the 15th Session of Trade and Development Board, August 1, 1975, UNCTAD TD 804, UNA, Geneva.

[88] Especially in the Middle East; see From Pankine to Senin, March 7, 1974, and TD 806/5, Davydov to Velkov, January 12, 1981, UNCTAD TD 808/1, UNA, Geneva.

[89] Letter, Davydov to Luft, May 5, 1980, UNCTAD TD 808/1, UNA, Geneva.

[90] Letter, Ganiastos, December 16, 1977, UNCTAD TD 588/1(3), UNA, Geneva.

[91] Bijan Eslanloo (former UNCTAD officer), interview with authors, July 13, 2015.

in management, development and secularization across and beyond the great East-West divide. We specifically identified countries that had constructed a role for themselves as go-betweens since the early days of internationalism in interwar period. They produced several generations of actors in international organizations that assured the continuation of flows between two halves of the European continent despite the ideological differences represented by the Iron Curtain. Czechoslovakia and Poland stand out as reservoirs of this expertise, mainly in the case of the ILO and the WCC. That interwar legacy of personnel constituted, without any doubt, an essential part of the social and symbolic capital represented by the international experts coming from these nations even in the 1950s and 1960s.

Furthermore, we have been able to reconstruct another important dimension of the coherence and influence of these groups of experts from both East and West: their shared persuasions and culture, based on similar (Euro-Atlantic) conceptions of modernity and modernization, which formed the basis for a common (expert) language that facilitated dialogue and cooperation with colleagues from the other side of the Cold War barricade. These convergent characteristics were only reinforced by the growing role of the "Third World" in the rhetoric and deeds of international organizations. Rapidly rising interest in the notion of development in post-1945 internationalist discourse, together with more or less explicit thematization of Central and Eastern Europe's position on Europe's near-periphery further strengthened the (sometimes) advantageous intermediate position of the "second world" between West and South.

The case of UNCTAD enriches these findings in yet another way. We observed in UNCTAD the appearance in the late 1960s of a new generation of East-West-South mediators when the heirs of pre-cold War intra-European networks left the scene. This phenomenon illustrates the underlying and overarching importance of the experts who made reality intelligible and offered economic and social engineering-based solutions for modernization, irrespective of Cold War political divisions.

Can we conclude, however, that these actors constituted a genuine "epistemic community?" In fact, these groups of officials, experts, and students continued working on the production of shared knowledge and even creating a common specialist culture that could be qualified as an episteme. It was not a foregone conclusion that they would form a community as such. The identities and the strategies of these experts were not limited to establishing discursive norms and advancing the intellectual work in progress in international organizations. Their biographical trajectories were diverse. They could just as well have applied the

skills they gained from working in an international organization to other fields of endeavor. This observation calls for a reexamination of the notion of epistemic community as a process rather than a fixed reality.

At the same time, reconstructing the history and following these groups opens a new perspective, which leads to a possible re-consideration of the Cold War as a global moment when the three "worlds" built a new kind of relationship. Beyond the bellicose rhetoric (and practice) that characterized the global conflict, it was also a time when skills circulated between competing but similar systems. International organizations proved to be particularly rich sites for observation that allows us to shed light on this hidden aspect of the Cold War and to understand the speed of the political changes that occurred in the 1990s.

2017 ACTA UNIVERSITATIS CAROLINAE PAG. 61–79
STUDIA TERRITORIALIA 1

U.S. STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE GENESIS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

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Abstract
Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is a very special strategy in the art of war, which involves significantly different tactics than does conventional warfare. U.S. doctrine for combat against insurgents has gone through several changes, the most dramatic of which occurred after 9/11, when the U.S. military faced a new kind of enemy: a global network of fighters, often described as a "global insurgency." This paper traces the genesis and further development of modern U.S. COIN doctrine. It asks two main questions: How has U.S. COIN doctrine changed after the 9/11 attack? How have its methods, organization and execution changed during the War on Terror? The author assumes that the driving force behind the development of U.S. COIN doctrine is an inter-subjective interpretation of the enemy, the threats and the situation on the battlefield, which can be described as a "strategic culture." This article uses strategic culture to analyze the genesis and development of modern U.S. COIN doctrine. It also traces the changes in military tactics, strategic priorities and operational procedures that have occurred since 9/11. The author suggests that there have been three phases in the development of U.S. COIN doctrine during the War on Terror: Shock and Awe, Population-centric COIN and Targeted COIN. These phases reveal how the U.S. military has reacted to the emerging challenges it faces.
Keywords: United States; counterinsurgency; strategic culture; War on Terror; Afghanistan; Iraq
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I. Introduction: The Clash with the Global Insurgency

The doctrine of counterinsurgency appeared at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The U.S. military was facing the task of defining its role at "the end of history."[1] The massive use of aerial bombing was believed to have the capability of solving any international crisis that might appear to threaten regional stability in a unipolar post-Cold War world. Operation Desert Shield proved in the early 1990s that regardless of difficulties of terrain, there is no conventional army in the world that can stand up to the United States in battle and win. After 9/11, the military realized that terrorism, professionally used as a military tactic, can inflict serious damage on even the greatest of adversaries. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the military realized that this new enemy could not be defeated by an overwhelming, technologically superior force. The two major conflicts connected with the War on Terror (Iraq and Afghanistan) turned swiftly from classical military campaigns into something the Pentagon had not expected – low intensity conflicts which blurred the lines between politics and warfare. Uncertain distinctions between combatants and civilians and unconventional fighting methods employed by insurgents created new moral dilemmas and required special new skills in which troops had never before been trained. The military environment went swiftly through radical changes. Academics gave the new warfare many names: fourth generation warfare,[2] new wars[3] and asymmetrical warfare.[4] The outcome is nevertheless one that the famous Israeli military theoretician, Martin van Creveld, foresaw immediately after the end of the Cold War. He opened his book on the subject with the following statement: "A ghost is stalking the corridors of general staffs and defense departments all over the 'developed' world – the fear of military impotence, even irrelevance."[5]

The post-9/11 enemy is different from anything the traditional military has seen before. The enemy is everywhere and nowhere. The enemy may embark

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1 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 2006).

2 Thomas Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zenith, 2006); William S. Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation War," *Military Review* 84, No. 5 (2004): 12–16.

3 Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

4 Christopher Coker, *Waging War without Warriors? The Changing Culture of Military Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

5 Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991).

from any country and strike anywhere at any time. In the past, there were many insurgencies with combatants recruited from civilian populations, wearing no uniforms and appearing and disappearing in difficult environments. Now, Al-Qaeda and hundreds of associated groups, gangs and militias have pushed insurgency to another level. Terrorist cells can be found anywhere, not only in enemy territory or on occupied soil, but also among the society at home. The fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, known in the West as Islamism, together with the anti-Western and anti-establishment message of Al-Qaeda's preachers, has spread all over the Muslim world, inspiring thousands of groups and fighters to start their own insurgencies against the global hegemony of Western thought. Western strategists have realized that those insurgencies are interconnected in an almost impenetrable network of loyalties, messages, trade, training, support, and inspiration. David Kilcullen labeled this phenomenon the "global insurgency."[6] How to break that network? The Pentagon decided to cut off the head of the snake, by destroying the sanctuaries of the "Al-Qaeda core." The campaign in Afghanistan, and also the campaign in Iraq that followed (regardless of its controversial political nature), has shown that after a short conventional military campaign, the U.S, army is "impotent and even irrelevant" in the effort to destroy the Al-Qaeda network and its allies, stabilize the countries where they hide, and deny them any possible sanctuary.[7]

In an attempt to grasp the fluid nature of modern conflict, regain the initiative, and win, the U.S. military leadership decided to revive counterinsurgency (COIN) theory. A classic military strategy from colonial times has again found a purpose in modern warfare. COIN has become the dominant military activity in the War on Terror. To win the longest war in U.S. history means succeeding at counterinsurgency. One of the key features that COIN strategy offers is flexibility; it reacts to moves by the enemy, and it can adapt to various environments, strategies and adversaries. The doctrine is as fluid as modern conflict itself.[8] This paper seeks to analyze the genesis and track the development of contemporary U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine from its beginnings at the outset of the War on Terror to the present. Studying modern U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is vital to understanding twenty-first century security, defense and military strategy.

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[6] David J. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, No. 4 (2005): 597–617, doi: 10.1080/01402390500300956.

[7] See "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February 2003)," Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf.

[8] David J. Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 2–13.

COIN doctrine very well reflects U.S. thinking on these matters. Furthermore, it reflects the dynamics of rapidly developing modern military thought itself.

The purpose of this article is to illuminate, explain and contextualize the genesis and evolution of modern U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. It seeks to clarify how COIN doctrine has changed in terms of methods, organization, and execution during the War on Terror, from its inception to the present.

II. Conceptual Framework

This article is based on the assumption that U.S. strategic culture is the driving force behind the development of modern U.S. COIN doctrine. Ontologically, it treats U.S. COIN activity as an objective, observable phenomenon that appeared under specific circumstances in a particular environment. U.S. COIN doctrine is a distinctive military doctrine that has its own internal dynamics, including strategic objectives, operational procedures, range of activities, scope of involvement, and different traditions to which it adheres. The U.S. political and military leadership, as well as the whole strategic community (the top political, military, bureaucratic and academic elites, NGOs and key private sector figures involved in the deliberation of the strategy) run the development of COIN doctrine. The U.S. leadership and those from the strategic community who are involved react to objective political and more importantly, military realities.

Strategic culture can be understood as a kind of lens through which decision-making actors perceive reality. Strategic culture determines how issues are analyzed, understood and transformed into particular decisions and strategies. This research therefore uses U.S. strategic culture to understand how the U.S. reacted to specific political and military situations that appeared during the long years of the War on Terror by tracking the genesis and development of modern U.S. COIN doctrine. Showing the development of COIN in this era is beneficial for understanding the development of the modern military itself.

COIN

COIN is a military doctrine for combating insurgencies. It is a counter-underdog strategy, which means a strategy developed by "the stronger." A sovereign authority employs it against a non-state, irregular insurgency operating within the territory under the sovereign's control. COIN strategy has been around for centuries, but it was Carl von Clausewitz who elaborated it into a theory of the possible strategies that could be used against insurgents and

their counterparts.[9] Later, COIN became an essential part of imperial policies in the late French and British empires. David Galula, a military theoretician and a French colonial officer serving during the Algerian War, created one of the most notable academic traditions of COIN theory. He described COIN as a complex military doctrine, which combines military action with political activity. Simply destroying insurgent forces is never sufficient, he claimed. That destruction must be accompanied by actions centered on gaining the support of the population. It is the population that ensures the survival of an insurgency, and as long as the population favors it, the insurgency cannot be defeated. The heart of COIN therefore lies in a combination of propaganda, institution-building, good governance and military operations to win over the population and disconnect it from the insurgents.[10]

The British military went through many tough struggles with insurgencies, notably in Afghanistan, Sudan, Malaya and Kenya, where the Brits gained experience in executing counter-underdog strategies in varied environments. The British tradition of COIN theory is represented mainly by Robert Thompson and Frank Kitson. It was summarized by the legendary T. E. Lawrence as emphasizing enlightened imperial policies, good governance and a combination of policing, military action, political planning and ideological superiority.[11] The key difference between the French and British approaches is that aside from military operations, the British focus on strong, effective and credible institutions, while the French approach combines propaganda, humanitarian aid and close contact with the population.

The American COIN tradition dates back to the Indian Wars. Later, during its struggle with the Philippine insurgency, the U.S. successfully combined good governance practices (establishing a university, building and expanding infrastructure) with relatively harsh military methods and the deployment of modern military technologies.[12]

During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military strategically used overwhelming force to repel attacks by the Vietcong. They also adopted strategies to eradicate

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[9] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War: Sixth Book: Defence* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

[10] David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (London: Praeger Security International, 2006), 53–59.

[11] Robert F. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1972), 50–60; Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (London: Faber & Faber, 2011).

[12] Mike Fowler, "Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now," *Small Wars Journal* 7, No. 1 (January 2011): 58–62.

and clear out insurgents from hostile or potentially hostile territories. Despite efforts to challenge enemy forces with a "fight or run" strategy, forcing the enemy combatants either to fight (and eventually lose) or run (and leave the territory), the U.S. never gained the momentum needed to thwart either small-scale ambushes or major attacks like the Tet offensive.[13] Later, when this "enemy-centric" COIN seemed to be ineffective, generals Westmoreland and Abrams adopted a more "population-centric" COIN strategy. Despite limited success, they did not manage to reverse the situation.[14]

The U.S. military later achieved minor successes in El Salvador and Lebanon. Before 9/11, U.S. COIN strategic doctrine was still the classic military approach. That approach was enemy-centric, involving massive air strikes, large-scale operations, and the deployment of Special Forces.

Strategic Culture

American strategic culture is a widely-discussed topic. To understand U.S. military development in the twenty-first century, it is necessary to understand U.S. military logic. When classic theories of international relations became insufficient to fully understand a nation-state's strategic choices, Jack L. Snyder of the RAND Corporation followed the lead of classical military theoreticians like Thucydides, Sun-Tzu and Clausewitz, and showed that the Soviet Union was an enemy with its own way of understanding strategic issues in the international arena. He claimed that Soviet elites do not decide solely on the basis of rational choice, but are influenced by intersubjective shared cultural, institutional and ideological background, which has significant impact on their perception of strategic issues. Snyder provides an explanation of Soviet behavior in the strategic field through the concept of "strategic culture." Strategic culture in his view is a distinct mode of strategic thinking shaped by national spirit, history, ideology, organization, relationships between politicians, military and bureaucracy, and shared images of war among the decision makers.[15] A whole generation of authors continued in this effort, using and modifying the concept of strategic culture in an attempt to

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[13] James M. Bright, "A Failure in Strategy: America and the Vietnam War 1965–1968" (MA dissertation, Quantico: USMC Command and Staff College, 2001), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a401184.pdf.

[14] John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 168–69.

[15] Jack L. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1977), https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R2154.html.

understand the behavior of various other actors in the sphere of international relations as a culture. Alastair Johnston understood strategic culture as a rejection of acultural and ahistorical conceptions of international relations. According to him, the actors in international relations are not rational players, but are embedded in history, culture and national sentiment.[16]

Andrew Scobell defines strategic culture as a set of "assumptions about the role of war in human affairs and the efficacy of applying force held by a country's political and military elites."[17] It is an intersubjective filter between objective reality and the final decision taken by an elite. Facing the same situation, Russia would react differently than Germany or the United States, because they have different strategic cultures. The actors responsible for their country's strategic choices interpret reality via their strategic culture. Strategic culture is a set of traditions and habits. It includes successful and unsuccessful military tools, strategies, tactics, and operational procedures that impact future decision-making.

U.S. Strategic Culture

U.S. strategic culture is deeply rooted in exceptionalism. Liberal Protestantism and the exceptional role of America envisaged by "Manifest Destiny" are still strong influences on U.S. foreign policy.[18] U.S. foreign policy has never been a monolith, but has always varied between several different traditions of interventionism and isolationism, which have been described as the four main archetypes of US foreign policy: Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, Hamiltonian and Wilsonian.[19] Even though these different foreign policy traditions are based on varying interpretations of the U.S. role in international relations, they can all be traced to a common U.S. strategic culture, especially when war is imminent.

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[16] Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 1–22.

[17] Andrew Scobell, *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2 as quoted by Christopher P. Twomey, "Chinese Strategic Cultures: Survey and Critique" (Report for Defense Threat Reduction Agency, October 31, 2006), 4, https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/chinese.pdf.

[18] James W. Ceaser, "The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism. American Political Thought," *A Journal of Ideas, Institutions, and Culture* 1, No. 1 (Spring 2012): 1–25, doi: 10.1086/664595.

[19] Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

The U.S. understanding of war has always been very different from the European. Clausewitz defined the classical European understanding of war when he said that war is a "mere continuation of policy by other means."[20] Americans never viewed war that way. War in the American mind is always a moral act. War can only be waged against evil. War is never waged for power or territory, and it is always a clash between good and evil. If there are any ambitions for power, they are preferably hidden.[21] The enemy is often described as pure evil, the personification of the devil. In the popular mind, the enemies of the U.S. have been nothing but totalitarian ideologies, ruthless dictators and cruel bandits. The U.S. government was never a monarchy and it therefore couldn't wage war simply on the whim of the king's court – war had to be justified to the public. The only just war, in the American view, is a war on evil.[22] War is not a continuation of policy, but something very different. War is foreign to the politics of moral men. On the other hand, when one is fighting evil, there is no room for politics. Politics and war are ideologically separate.

Framing war as an act of Christian virtue and a battle with evil has serious strategic consequences. Waging war on evil requires total war. Europeans understand the concept of limited war much better than Americans. They understand that a state may start a war, reach its limited objectives (gain territory, secure its borders) and be done with it. On the other hand, fighting evil does not involve such clear objectives. Allowing evil to survive is hardly moral. The U.S. therefore almost always settles on the objective of total surrender. In other words, it is not enough to get Hitler out of France; he and his armies must be completely destroyed. As long as the Soviet Union existed as an "Evil Empire," the Cold War could never end. This logic creates a problem: producing an effective and credible exit strategy.

Another important aspect of U.S. strategic culture is the impatience of the American public. The U.S. public wants a short war leading to a clear victory. The American people are not willing to sacrifice their soldiers in a war without clear goals, one that has no end in sight or that is based on a crooked pretext. An important election is held every two years, presidential, congressional, or both.

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[20] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War: A Timeless Analysis of Political-Military Strategy* (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2013), 36.

[21] Thomas G. Mahnken, "United States Strategic Culture" (Report for Defense Threat Reduction Agency, November 13, 2006), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dtra/mahnken_strat_culture.pdf.

[22] Glenn A. Moots, "The Protestant Roots of American Civil Religion," *Humanitas* 23, No. 1–2 (2010): 78–106.

The President and/or his party are then held accountable for the results of any war they (or their predecessors) have undertaken.[23] Long-term strategies that require patience, limited goals, complicated strategy, and hard, invisible struggle are therefore unpopular and almost impossible to wage.

Colin Gray contends that the U.S. has always cared mostly about material superiority. The belief that the materially and technologically superior side will inevitably win strongly influences U.S. military thinking. Concern for the allocation of resources, logistics, technology and material support has far exceeded strategic and operational thinking on the battlefield.[24] Most theoreticians of American military culture point out that it includes the desire to win a war swiftly.[25] U.S. strategists seek out the decisive battle and then apply massive military force, concentrating most of the deployed military power in combination (aircraft, artillery, ground forces) in order to spectacularly defeat the enemy.

Casualties are another important factor. Most strategic authors write about the unwillingness of the American public to accept casualties. The goal of reducing U.S. casualties and, if necessary, transferring them to the civilian population of a foreign country is crucial to grasping U.S. military thinking.[26] The famously "tragic" battle in Mogadishu, where the U.S. public could not bear to suffer a mere 18 casualties but did not spare much thought for the more than 500 Somalians who were killed in combat, is a good example.[27] The effort to avoid U.S. casualties at all costs leads to an abstract vision of a war fought without any casualties.[28] The acceptance of collateral damage, but refusal to accept U.S. casualties is an extremely important aspect of US strategic culture.[29]

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[23] David Karol and Edward Miguel, "The Electoral Cost of War: Iraq Casualties and the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election," *The Journal of Politics* 69, No. 3 (2007): 633–648, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00564.x; David R. Mayhew, "Wars and American Politics", *Perspectives on Politics* 3, No. 3 (2005): 473–93, doi: 10.1017/S1537592705050309.

[24] Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," *International Security* 6, No. 2 (1981), 22.

[25] E.g. Russell Frank Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973).

[26] Edward N. Luttwak, "Towards Post-Heroic Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 74, No. 3 (May/June 1995), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/chechnya/1995-05-01/toward-post-heroic-warfare.

[27] Mahnken, "United States Strategic Culture."

[28] Niklas Schörnig, "The Vision of War without Casualties: On the Use of Casualty Aversion in Armament Advertisements," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, No. 2 (2006): 204–27, doi: 10.1177/0022002705284827.

[29] Although some have argued against this idea – see Richard A. Lacquement Jr., "The Casualty Aversion Myth", *Naval War College Review* 57, No. 1 (2004): 39–57; or Timothy S. Mundy, *Casualty Aversion: Dispelling the Myth* (BiblioScholar, 2012) – their opinions are rather marginal in the field of strategic studies.

III. Genesis of U.S. COIN Efforts

First Phase: Shock and Awe

Following 9/11, U.S. policymakers held a strong belief that the scenario of the 1991 Gulf War would repeat itself and the renewed war with Iraq and the action in Afghanistan would be quickly over and done with, providing a great story of revenge and justice. The war in Afghanistan in particular was described in strong moral terms, as seen from President Bush's address to Congress on September 20, 2001. To defeat the Taliban, the U.S. decided to use heavy aerial bombardment and proxy forces. The Taliban government in Kabul was overthrown in two months.[30] However, the Taliban, which represented a brutish tyranny of the worst kind and adhered to the most rigid interpretation of Islam, managed to hang on to control of most of its territory. Despite its cruel form of government, Taliban ended the chaos and imposed a form of rule of law. The government of Hamid Karzai, installed and supported by the U.S. military, was not able to do that where it held sway.[31] Al Qaeda survived, as did the radical wings of the Taliban, and the insurgency began.

COIN was supposed to quickly tame the insurgents, who were believed to be merely divided and scattered remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda that had survived the decisive battles for Kabul and other major cities. The goal of the American strategy was not to repeat Soviet mistakes. They deployed small units of Special Forces, which were mainly expected to find and destroy high profile terrorists. This strategy, termed the "Light Footprint," was focused on diminishing collateral damage to Afghanistan, reducing casualties, and avoiding alienating the population.[32]

The American military started an intensive program aimed at eradicating the insurgents. Several large-scale operations were conducted to confirm the U.S. victory. In Operation Anaconda, launched in March 2002, the U.S. Army coordinated efforts by intelligence agencies, Special Forces, ground units and strategic and tactical aircraft to purge Afghanistan of the insurgency. Hundreds

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[30] Stephen Tanner, *A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban* (Philadelphia, PA: Da Capo, 2009), 289–321.

[31] Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 62–66, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595.html.

[32] See Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010); Robert M. Cassidy, *War, Will, and Warlords: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001–2011* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2012).

of insurgents were killed, hundreds more were cast out of their dens and only eight U.S. soldiers died.[33]

Despite the large-scale military operations, insurgent activity grew rapidly in 2002 and in subsequent years. Islamic insurgents took advantage of the vague Afghani borders and smuggled weapons and explosives into the country. They radicalized people all over Afghanistan, mainly in the southern and north-western parts of the country, and conducted terrorist attacks on U.S. soldiers, government officers, members of the newly established Afghan National Army and the Afghan national police.

Meanwhile, the U.S. launched operation Iraqi Freedom, ousting Saddam Hussein and his regime from Baghdad. Almost 150,000 soldiers were deployed to defeat the Iraqi dictator.[34] American strategists decided to use the classic doctrine of "Shock and Awe" that had proved successful during the Gulf War in 1991.[35] However, the unsuccessful post-war administration of Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led to an increase in insurgency.[36] Programs for dissolving the military, de-Ba'athification of government administration, and massive privatization proved problematic for the CPA. These policies were responsible for the collapse of state authority and the rule of law. Insurgents filled the gap. The United States now faced a global insurgency on two major battlefields. The doctrine of shock and awe, which is extremely efficient in situations when a superior force launches a conventional military conflict, was ineffective in what was becoming a long-term engagement.

The U.S. tried to physically and mentally isolate the insurgency from the population. Doing so is a postulate of classic COIN.[37] The U.S. military command in Iraq decided to use the Light Footprint strategy, using local proxies to isolate the insurgents in the minds of the local population. Psychological operations (PSYOPS) were launched. American PSYOPS depicted the conflict as a battle in black and white by freedom and democracy against darkness, oppres-

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[33] Richard Kugler, "Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle" (Case Studies in National Security Transformation No. 5, February 2007), http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/files/2006/12/Case-5-Operation-Anaconda.pdf.

[34] See Keith L. Shimko, *The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[35] See Defense Group Inc, *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance* (Washington, DC: U.S. G.P.O., Superintendent of Documents, 1996).

[36] Seth G. Jones, The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad, *International Security* 32, No. 4 (2008): 26–33, doi: 10.1162/isec.2008.32.4.7.

[37] David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1964); Gordon McCormick, *The Shining Path and Peruvian Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1987), https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7297.html.

sion and evil.[38] Massive military operations in mountain areas, deserts and other mostly unpopulated areas, where U.S. intelligence discovered the hideouts of the insurgents, were aimed at destroying what was regarded as an isolated insurgency. This strategy was supplemented with a "search and destroy" approach. "Search and destroy" in this case meant the liquidation of high value targets (political leaders, military commanders, inspirational figures, key sponsors), typically conducted with cooperation between intelligence and Special Forces. Destroying key opposition figures was very important to "winning over" the U.S. public.

These strategies proved to be unsuccessful, however. Support for both wars among the U.S. population was diminishing.[39] As the number of American and allied casualties grew steadily, the terrorist threat still remained.

Second Phase: A Population-Centric Approach

The necessity for a change in the strategic course was apparent. The U.S. was stuck in its own strategic culture. The American public, as well as the strategic community, was becoming impatient. Efforts to avoid casualties limited American maneuverability and intensified anxiety that the 9/11 terrorists would go unpunished, leaving the U.S. exposed to a potentially even larger threat.

Proponents of U.S. strategic thinking began looking for solutions. In the ensuing debate, the idea of returning to the roots of COIN doctrine prevailed. In 2006, Gen. David Petraeus issued military handbook, *FM 3-24*, in which he changed the shape of U.S. COIN efforts in the War on Terror. He proposed a return to the philosophy of Galula and Thompson and other major military thinkers from the golden era of COIN. This new approach favored "population-centric COIN." A need was seen to enhance communication with the local public, highlight the benefits of the foreign military presence, focus on governance, improve cooperation with regional authorities, boost the local economy, and ensure the delivery of basic goods, social welfare, and healthcare services. To put it simply, the insurgents must be disconnected from the population. The U.S. military would win the "hearts and minds" of the people and show them

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[38] Arturo Munoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001–2010* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1060.html.

[39] Gallup, War on Terrorism, survey by the Gallup Institute, 2014, http://www.gallup.com/poll/5257/War-Terrorism.aspx#1.

that it was committed to protecting civilians and fighting for the interests of the common man.[40]

The manual became the strategic blueprint for this era of COIN.[41] "Country teams" were created to unify and coordinate efforts to win over the population. COIN would no longer be a solely military matter. It would involve NGOs, the private sector, and the diplomatic corps.[42]

The number of deployed soldiers rapidly increased. They worked closely with private companies, NGOs, regional governments, diplomats and various foreign advisors to build better infrastructure, working sanitation, and affordable housing. In Afghanistan it was necessary to build all basic installations of water, gas, governmental power and public services from the ground up. In the "green zones" the basic foundations of democratic procedures were protected. Between 2006 and 2010, the amount of US development aid to Afghanistan grew more than 400%.[43] In Iraq, the situation was different. The country's level of development was much higher. Despite the damage caused to the country by endless fighting since 2003, the overall accessibility of basic services was far ahead of Afghanistan. Combined political/military/NGO teams aimed to mediate the conflicts between Sunnis, Shias and Kurds in the country to create a stable environment.[44] These efforts were very ambitious. They sought to convince the local population that the U.S. presence was beneficial, strip the insurgents of local population support, and give the War on Terror a humane face in the United States.

In 2008, a new handbook, *FM 3-07*, was issued. It suggested continuing the population-centric effort, but recommended that local armed forces rather than coalition troops be responsible for public security.[45] This was a response to the growing number of U.S. casualties and an omnipresent feeling that the war was endless. The American public, many politicians, and Pentagon officials demanded a clear plan for concluding the war. Gen. McChrystal opposed that idea. In 2009, he issued the *ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance*, stating that the current situation in the battlefield simply would not allow a transfer of

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[40] David Petraeus, *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006).

[41] David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 94–95.

[42] Petraeus, *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency*.

[43] Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy" (CRS Report, December 2, 2014), 74.

[44] Ibid.

[45] *FM 3-07: Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008).

responsibility to local forces. According to the General, the overall success of COIN depended on the welfare and security of the local population, which could not be maintained by corrupt, ineffective and unreliable local security forces.[46] He demanded another 40,000 foreign troops for Afghanistan. Development aid grew significantly in an effort to secure population centers and win the hearts and minds of the local population.[47]

Nevertheless, as David Kilcullen points out, there were operational limits to this approach: "Population centers need to be secured 24 hours a day; otherwise, the enemy reinfiltrates the area and intimidates or co-opts the population."[48]

Without the omnipresence of coalition forces, the population-centric approach didn't work properly. Often, some local people did identify with the coalition/U.S. effort and embraced their aid and assistance. However, intimidation, terror and sometimes familial and clan affinity with the insurgents were stronger.[49] This problem became widely known among the U.S. security community. For a long time, the only solution was to increase the number of American personnel on the ground, but the problem never disappeared.

The Obama administration came up with the idea of pulling troops out of a then seemingly stable Iraq and of saving Afghanistan before leaving it. The U.S. presence in Iraq was officially terminated in 2011. Only small teams of guards, political and military advisors and private contractors remained on the ground. On the other hand, the troop presence in Afghanistan was increased. The financial expenses of the Afghan war in 2011 were nearly double what they were in 2008.[50] The Obama administration also significantly increased the U.S. presence in Afghanistan from 23,700 troops in 2007 to 99,000 in 2011.[51]

Population-centric COIN entailed enormous financial, logistical and, most of all, human costs. The growth in the number of soldiers deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq led to greater casualties. This left the U.S. public with the uneasy feeling that the War on Terror was futile.

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[46] Stanley McChrystal, "ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance," 2009, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf.

[47] Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance*, 74.

[48] Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla*, 94.

[49] See David Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq," *Military Review* 1, No. 1 (January/February 2006): 2–12.

[50] Amy Belasco, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11" (CRS Report, December 8, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf.

[51] Alan McLean and Archie Tse, "American Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq," *The New York Times*, June 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/06/22/world/asia/american-forces-in-afghanistan-and-iraq.html.

Third Phase: Targeted COIN?

U.S. strategic culture demands visible victory in a short time with few casualties, in a morally undisputable war against evil. The War on Terror cannot possibly offer that combination because the enemy is invisible and the goals and purpose of the war itself are unclear. The U.S. administration and Pentagon strategists thought the War could be waged with limited casualties and could actually end the global insurgency.

A new COIN strategy, with fewer U.S. troops deployed and promising fewer casualties, took off in three main directions. First, there was an effort to transfer responsibility for Iraqi and Afghan security and defense to local armed forces. Second, private contractors increasingly replaced U.S. Army troops. Third, drones were deployed to tame the insurgency's leadership, using targeted killings by remotely controlled machines, guided by intelligence gathering and Special Forces operational groups.

The Bush administration began the transfer of responsibility for security to local governments, but the Obama administration gave that responsibility concrete shape. In a 2009 speech, President Obama announced a plan to withdraw from Iraq, replacing U.S. soldiers with local Iraqi troops. This allowed the United States to boost its engagement in Afghanistan, but with the stated purpose only of preparing for a transition of security duties to the Afghan government.[52]

In his famous article "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife," COIN theoretician John Nagl stressed the necessity for a gradual transfer to the Iraqis, while keeping responsibility for training and operational planning in the hands of the U.S. That transition, he stated, far exceeded the transfer of responsibility for policing. It required the creation of a legal framework, political authority and reliable governmental policies.[53] Nagl's recommendations had already been incorporated into the U.S. Army's *FM 3-07* stabilization operations manual, which called for the creation of a local force that would use its knowledge of the local environment, culture, language and atmosphere to effectively enforce the rule of law.[54]

The plan failed in many respects. Local forces were corrupt, ineffective, and incapable. They also lacked training, money, experience and, most of all, willingness to serve. Insurgents often managed to infiltrate the newly created armies

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[52] Barack Obama, "The New Way Forward – The President's Address, 2009," The White House, December 1, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address.

[53] John. A. Nagl, "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife," *World Affairs* 161, No. 4 (1999): 193–99.

[54] *FM 3-07: Stability Operations*.

and police and conduct deadly attacks on coalition troops – so called "green-on-blue attacks."[55] In Afghanistan, there was no sense of statehood or state authority. New recruits didn't understand the need for loyalty to the army/police and preferred to remain loyal to their own clans or families. In Iraq, capable and constructive elites were expelled from public life, even as U.S. and Allied training increased the size of the official army by 200%.[56] Stabilization operations proved that resisting insurgents was an extremely complicated business. The imperial experience teaches us that building a sustainable security environment is the work of decades, not years.

Another option for increasing forces on the ground was private contractors. In accord with U.S. strategic culture, private contractors were "out of sight" of the media coverage and institutional control, which enabled them to operate in a longer-term framework. Deaths among private contractors are covered up and are not discussed in public debate,[57] which comports with the usual American intolerance of casualties among actual soldiers. Private contractors are of course a somewhat desperate option. American strategic culture teaches us that the U.S. Army should be the one "righteously" upholding the values of liberty in the dark corners of the world. However, the moral impetus of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq had by then already evaporated and hiring privateers seemed to be a viable solution to the ongoing security problems.

The Bush administration used private contractors to supplement U.S. military involvement. Over time the use of private contractors exceeded the numbers of deployed U.S. troops. In 2008, there were 142,000 U.S. soldiers deployed in Iraq and more than 160,000 private contractors. In 2012, there were 46,000 U.S. troops in Iraq and more than 60,000 contractors. Contractors suffered 64% of all deaths in Afghanistan.[58] The U.S. military had difficulty maintaining its control over the contractors, a problem that was never solved satisfactorily. The contractors often used excessive force, causing chaos, frustration, and injustice, which undermined local governments. On the other hand, private companies

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[55] Ehsan Mehmood Khan, *Anatomy of Green-on-Blue Attacks* (Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2012).

[56] Obaid Younossi et al., *The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG845.html.

[57] Micah Zenko, "The New Unknown Soldiers of Afghanistan and Iraq," *Foreign Policy*, May 29, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/29/the-new-unknown-soldiers-of-afghanistan-and-iraq/.

[58] Defense Science Board, "Contractor Logistics in Support of Contingency Operations" (Report for the U.S. Department of Defense, June 2014), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/CONLOG_Final_Report_17Jun14.pdf; Zenko, "The New Unknown Soldiers"; "Afghanistan Coalition Military Fatalities By Year" and "Iraq Coalition Military Fatalities by Year," http://icasualties.org/.

like DynCorp did provide successful training and established relatively beneficial relationships with local authorities and security forces.[59]

The use of aircraft diminished over time due to unacceptable levels of collateral damage to local citizens. Collateral damage called into question the moral superiority of the United States and alienated local populations, destroying the effort to implement a population-centric version of COIN. In 2008, an ISAF directive all but forbid aerial support for ground troops.[60] For this reason, drones largely replaced joint military missions targeting the insurgency's leaders, undertaken by special forces and regular ground troops with massive aerial support.

Although the first drone strikes took place in the early 2000s, it was the Obama administration that significantly expanded the activities of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the drone campaign for targeted killings under the supervision and command of the CIA.[61] The new strategy of COIN was to kill Jihadi leaders, without being present on the ground and without the loss of American lives. Such targeted killing was a solution that corresponded to U.S. strategic culture. Drones were also supposed to cause relatively little collateral damage in comparison to aerial bombing or troop activity on the ground. The U.S. security community sincerely believed that "targeted strikes conform to the principle of proportionality – 'the notion that the anticipated collateral damage of an action cannot be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage' – given the precision of the technology."[62]

President Bush believed targeted killing of renegade Iraqis showed that the war in Iraq was not being waged against the Iraqi people per se, but against the regime of Saddam Hussein.[63] Despite one great success, when Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden was killed in 2011, this "decapitation" strategy generated several serious problems.

Although collateral damage from drone attacks is moderate in comparison to the havoc caused by massive military operations, the psychological effect of their use is significant. Drones are an imminent, omnipresent and lasting threat. They exhaust everyone involved and deprive whole populations of a sense of security. Nothing limits the time when drones may attack. Conventional military

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[59] Christine Fair, "Clear, Build, Hold, Transfer: Can Obama's Afghan Strategy Work?" *Asian Affairs* 37, No. 3 (2010): 119–23, doi: 10.1080/00927678.2010.503923.

[60] NATO/ISAF Headquarters, Tactical Directive Afghanistan, Kabul, July 6, 2009, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf.

[61] Jaclyn Tandler, "Known and Unknowns: President Obama's Lethal Drone Doctrine," *Notes de la FRS* No. 7 (2013), 1.

[62] Ibid., 4.

[63] Shimko, *The Iraq Wars*, 153.

operations by an army commence and terminate at given times, but drones may fly over the peoples' heads for years, without any foreseeable end. Exhaustion often leads to resignation, anger and the spread of insurgency.

IV. Conclusion

COIN strategy is an advanced military doctrine that requires complex military thinking. It has been difficult for the U.S. military to succeed in this field. U.S. strategic culture is not suited to COIN. It lacks patience, a sense of detail, the ability to learn, and most of all the ability to admit error. It relies on technological superiority, which is deceptively attractive to military strategists facing a counterinsurgency. It focuses on conventional "Clausewitzian" war. Its exceptionalism, which demands swift and spectacular results, prevents U.S. military strategists from achieving limited victories.[64] Moreover, the emergence of a global insurgency changed COIN from a series of isolated struggles into a global conflict. Insurgencies have created among their adherents complex networks of loyalties, supply chains, military support, military advisors, messaging, recruitment and preaching. To defeat such a complicated adversary, the U.S. has had to "step out of the box" and start thinking differently.

Modern COIN is a reaction to the urgent need to tame this rising insurgency. Traditional military approaches won in the early stages of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but they failed to keep that victory alive. U.S. commanders, together with the strategic community, based their new COIN strategy on an "enemy-centric" approach which privileged spectacular military action over patient policies of winning over populations. Their new COIN doctrine was embedded in U.S. strategic culture much more than in the earlier traditions of COIN. Modern U.S. COIN doctrine had to develop beyond the enemy-centric approach in order to produce results. This article proposes dividing the genesis and development of U.S. COIN strategy into three simplified phases to help us understand how the U.S. military's thinking progressed. First, the U.S. used its classic set of tools, which had been so successful in the 1991 Gulf War, against insurgents. After that failed, faced with a protracted conflict with "no end in sight," U.S. strategists managed to understand their mistakes and even admit failure. The most progressive military minds like Gen. Petraeus and Gen.

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[64] See Robert M. Cassidy, "The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture," *The US Army Professional Writing Collection* (2005), 115–25, http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume3/november_2005/11_05_2.html.

McChrystal tried to learn from the past. They revived old classics like Galula, Thompson and Lawrence, and moved toward a population-centric version of COIN. Population-centric COIN involves a remarkable cooperative effort on the part of the civilian sector, different types of military forces, NGOs, governmental officials, local forces and intelligence. The U.S. adopted new methods despite their military traditions. However, frequent mistakes, the nature of the global insurgency and perhaps even the nature of the War on Terror itself all led to failure. The third phase of COIN doctrine relies on high-tech equipment. It avoids casualties among its own troops by transferring them onto the local population. There is one significant difference between the first and the third phases. The first phase involves open warfare, with clear objectives, U.S. troops on the ground, allied casualties and war heroes. The third phase is a hidden war, one that is undeclared, vague and maybe unending.

Through its changing COIN doctrine, the U.S. military has proved its ability to be creative and to change according to the environment. The U.S. army had to overcome its own strategic culture to adapt to a form of warfare that is in contrast with the U.S. style of waging war. On the other hand, its lack of unqualified success means it has failed to create an example worth following. When future academicians, military theorists and commanders study the U.S. counterinsurgency effort in the War on Terror, they would probably learn more from its mistakes than from its best practices.

REVIEWS

Lívia Šavelková: **Stvořitelova hra na cestě světem: Identita Irokézů v procesu revitalizace a globalizace**. DVD with ethnographic film Global Lacrosse Village. Pardubice: Univerzita Pardubice, 2015. 178 pages. ISBN 978-80-7395-960-9

Stvořitelova hra na cestě světem [The Creator's Game on Its Way throughout the World] focuses on lacrosse, a traditional Native American game and a cultural phenomenon that reflects Native policies of self-representation and identity construction. The book's author, anthropologist Lívia Šavelková, uses the game to examine the ongoing process of cultural, ethnic, and political revitalization of the Haudenosaunee (or the Iroquois Confederacy, which consists of six nations: Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Seneca, Cayuga, and Tuscarora) within a local (North American) and global contexts. The publication is accompanied by a DVD with an ethnographic bilingual (Czech and English) film *Global Lacrosse Village*, which documents the 2011 Aleš Hřebeský Memorial, an international championship in box lacrosse, held in Radotín, Czech Republic, and the tournament's history. The film provides another view of lacrosse and its development outside the United States and Canada, specifically in the Czech Republic. The book and the film are grounded in a careful historical research and extensive field work conducted between 2001 and 2015 among the Haudenosaunee – mainly in Canada – and lacrosse players in Europe. The collected oral and visual sources from both sides of the Atlantic allow for a comparative approach to the subject and more complete insight into the game and its meanings for the diverse players and fans. This also allows the participants in the study to, quite literally, speak for themselves.

The book has two parts, one historical, the other focused on lacrosse's role in the processes of revitalization among the Haudenosaunee. In the historical section, Šavelková introduces the pre-colonial origins and history of the game and its variations among different Native American nations. Further, she traces the development of lacrosse as a sport among non-Native Americans and Canadians. The author points out the influence of different approaches to lacrosse and its function in society regarding the development of the sport and its two forms, box lacrosse and field lacrosse. She demonstrates how these attitudes (an idea of nation-building, amateurism, and citizenship in Canada and association with Ivy League universities in the United States) led, over time, to the marginalization of Native players in the sport and, in Canada, to their eventual banning from non-Native teams (pp. 29–37). While marginalized by the dominant society, American Indians continued to preserve and practice specific forms of lacrosse in their communities. However, even those were affected by the dominant society, especially by government Indian policies, such as the Indian removals in the 1830s and 1840s (which interrupted inter-tribal relations and social practices, including lacrosse) or the assimilation policy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which ironically helped to preserve the game through boarding school sports teams (pp. 43, 47–49). This section of the book is mostly based on secondary literature and provides an informative overview of the history of lacrosse. This historical synthesis is enhanced by reflections of the game and its history, collected by the author during her field work among Native lacrosse players,

which effectively documents the long tradition and importance of the game to Native communities.

Towards the end of the historical section, Šavelková turns her attention to the interest in and development of lacrosse outside North America, focusing on Europe. She identifies university study abroad programs and American popular culture, namely films such as the now cult comedy *American Pie*, as two major reasons for the popularity and spread of lacrosse outside the US and Canada (pp. 53–61). However, the Czech Republic, the former Czechoslovakia, represents an exception. The author traces the roots of interest in lacrosse to the Scout and Woodcraft movements and the image of "Noble Indian" in the early twentieth century. Since the knowledge of lacrosse was limited to a small number of available sources, especially during the Cold War era, the game's fans created a specific form of lacrosse, the so-called "Czech lacrosse" (p. 62). In this section, Šavelková demonstrates the flow of ideas and cultural images, as well as players – namely university students – through transnational networks and their role in the adoption of new practices. As she argues, the case of "Czech lacrosse" also demonstrates the process of *glocalization*, the adaptation of an international (or global) phenomenon around local particularities. The arguments and conclusions in this section are well supported by the author's field work among European lacrosse players, which she quotes extensively, and historical research into the Scout and Woodcraft movements in the country. Overall, the historical part of the book serves to establish a useful context for the following analysis of lacrosse and its roles in Native American societies and their revitalization.

The second part of the book discusses the various roles lacrosse plays in Haudenosaunee efforts for cultural and ethnic revitalization and political sovereignty. Šavelková positions her examination of the game and the Haudenosaunee national team, the Iroquois Nationals, within larger discourses of identity construction and (ethno)nationalism, national revival movements and nation-building, and cultural "authenticity" and "purity."

The spiritual and cultural aspect of lacrosse is of particular importance to the Haudenosaunee and their expression of specific identity through the game. This stands in contrast to the secularized views of non-Native players, who in general perceive the game purely as a sport. The collected interviews with Iroquois players indicate lacrosse is an inseparable part of their culture and cosmology, a gift from the Creator and a way of healing and conflict solution (pp. 79–82). The author's analysis of the spiritual meanings of lacrosse is somewhat limited, partly due to the fact that until recently Haudenosaunee spiritual leaders kept this aspect hidden from non-Natives (p. 82). It was only in the late 1970s that the first text about lacrosse from a Native point of view was published. It presented the origin story of lacrosse and a contemporary reflection of its influence on the game (pp. 82–83). Secondary sources, used by Šavelková for her discussion of spirituality and lacrosse, also indicate that this topic is relatively new to scholars, as most of the sources were published in the past ten years.

Šavelková also examines lacrosse as a tool to assert political sovereignty and self-representation. When competing at international tournaments the Iroquois Nationals participate as representatives of the Six Nations, not as a team from the US or Canada. The team

expresses Haudenosaunee sovereignty visually as well, through symbols based in their cultural traditions. For example, the team's main logo is the head of a dancer with eagle headdress, while recently added logos on the team's helmets depict a traditional wampum belt and another emblem representing the Iroquois Confederacy and Haudenosaunee clans. The team also flies its own flag (with the wampum belt) and plays its own anthem (p. 129). Further assertion of sovereignty is the team's insistence on traveling internationally only on Haudenosaunee rather than American or Canadian passports. This practice goes back to the 1920s and poses many challenges as not all countries are willing to accept the travel documents (pp. 100–103). In her discussion, Šavelková effectively demonstrates the potential of sport as a tool for cultural and political self-representation and ethnic revival based on traditions and a way for indigenous peoples to challenge the dominance of the settler-states. To better illustrate the role of sport in national revival movements, she provides a comparison to the role of sport and specifically the Sokol organization in the Czech national revival of the nineteenth century (pp. 115–116).

While traditions are important for the formation of identity and cultural and ethnic revitalization, they can sometimes become sources of contention and debates. The author demonstrates this regarding the issue of gender and lacrosse. While the attitudes toward female lacrosse players have differed among Native nations, among the Haudenosaunee the game was traditionally considered to be a male domain. The Onondaga and Tonawanda communities, considered to be the most conservative traditionalists, continue to view lacrosse as a male-only game. However, today the Haudenosaunee have a national women's lacrosse team as well. Even so, since the team does not have the support of the traditionalist leaders, it does not use the name Iroquois Nationals, but goes by the name Haudenosaunee. As the author's fieldwork indicates, some Haudenosaunee are now re-evaluating their position on women lacrosse players, but the issue of gender and lacrosse, as a part of the cultural and ethnic revitalization efforts, remains one of the most contested (pp. 88–90, 140–142).

The issue of gender raises an interesting point about the project's methodology and sources. Šavelková reflects on the issue of gender and accessibility of information at the beginning of the book. She discusses the work on the documentary film *Global Lacrosse Village* that focuses on box lacrosse, a game that remains predominantly a male domain. The film crew included the author's two male coworkers who had access to the "male spaces" that remained closed to her. Because of this ability to access otherwise "closed" information, the documentary team was able to form a more complex interpretation (p. 21). As someone who also works with oral history and often considers my own role and its effects on the information I receive, I would be interested to see more of the author's reflection on the influence of gender on her work. For example, did she and her male crew experience different attitudes from the men and women they interviewed? Were there differences in the interactions with members of the more conservative traditionalist communities and others? Such reflection could further illuminate the discussion on gender and the different attitudes between conservative traditionalists and other Haudenosaunee.

With any project involving historically marginalized peoples, such as this one, it is important to reflect on the questions of our moral and ethical responsibilities as researchers. The nature of this project, both the book and the movie, touches on the issues of "objectivity" and "subjectivity," representation of those we work with, and the balance between professional standards and responsibility to our subjects. These issues can sometimes lead to dilemmas and hard choices, as the author demonstrates. Šavelková directly addresses these questions in the opening of her book, where she discusses her experience while working on her first ethnographic documentary about lacrosse, *Lacrosse – It's a Way of Life* (2014). The film follows the Iroquois Nationals' first visit to the Czech Republic during the box lacrosse World Championship in 2011. The original version of the film included few short scenes – an injured player leaving a playing field and team members sitting with a glass of beer – that were objectionable to the Haudenosaunee traditionalists. The author was asked to consider removing those scenes. In situations like these, one has to consider the impact of the representation on the communities involved. Showing an injured player may mean nothing to Czech audience, but, as the author points out, it can have important impact on the Native player, due to the spiritual aspect of the game. Similarly, a scene with alcohol in it may mean nothing to a European audience, but given the existing problems as well as prevailing social and racial stereotypes in the US and Canada, showing Native Americans with beer can potentially perpetuate those stereotypes. It would be interesting to know whether similar considerations and debates went into *Stvořitelova hra na cestě světem* and the film *Global Lacrosse Village*. One example may be the author's somewhat limited analysis of the spiritual meanings of lacrosse and its origin stories as many of these aspects are still considered sacred by the Haudenosaunee and not appropriate for scholarly inquiry.

One topic I would like to see discussed more fully is the issue of cultural appropriation. The book briefly addresses the question of the game's contested "ownership." Šavelková debates the claims of Canada and the United States to lacrosse as their national games, while they excluded Native Americans from the story. She points out the bitterness Native players have felt due to the expressed superiority of white elite teams toward them throughout the twentieth century (pp. 114–115). Native Americans have had ample experiences with forced assimilation and destruction of their cultures, as well as Anglo-Americans and Europeans "playing Indians." For example, in the early twentieth century, the Boy Scouts of America "played Indians" during their summer camps, a practice supported by a contemporary evolutionary theory that linked Indians – savagery – and children's developmental stages. It would be interesting to see a deeper analysis of how lacrosse, originally a Native American game that has expanded through the world and is now dominated by non-Natives, fits into the larger discourse of cultural appropriation. What are Native views on the spread of lacrosse throughout the world? Have these views changed through interactions with non-Native players? And if so, how?

Stvořitelova hra na cestě světem will be of interest to academics and non-academics alike. Lacrosse players and fans interested in the history and development of the sport and its two forms, box lacrosse and field lacrosse, will appreciate the wealth of factual

information on these topics. Students of Native American history and culture will find engaging discussions about the role of sport in identity construction, expression of political sovereignty, and cultural and ethnic revitalization. Together the book and the ethnographic film *Global Lacrosse Village* provide a complex picture of the game's roles in Native American culture and identity construction, as well as a formation of global connections and networks and local practices.

Lucie Kýrová
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Peter Pomerantsev: **Nothing is True and Everything is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia**. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2014. 241 pages. ISBN 978-1-61039-455-0

Peter Pomerantsev's debut book teeters on the edge between a memoir and a chronicle in real time. It mostly revolves around the use and misuse of media and language in contemporary Russia, as well as the impact that has had on the Russian population and its mentality. For several years during the last decade, the Kiev-born British journalist worked as a producer for various Russian television companies, in particular TNT (or *Tvoye Novoye Televideniye* in Russian, one of the largest commercial TV channels in the country). In the process, Pomerantsev learned about the many oddities of the Russian political and social system and its postmodern nature. The author's personal experience serves as the foundation upon which his carefully presented views are based.

Though he was always a well-known journalist, correspondent and documentary producer, and the book reflects that career, in recent years Pomerantsev has come to the Western world's attention as a renowned expert on Russian propaganda. He fulfills an important role as a professional consultant to government agencies and policy think tanks, and publishes works on the topic for major international media. *Nothing is True and Everything is Possible* largely kickstarted his newfound reputation as an expert in the field. The book displays not so much his academic expertise as the extensive first-hand experience he obtained living and working in Russia.

Pomerantsev's ambition is to make his book a relevant piece of social science literature. However, analyzing it from a proper academic perspective is difficult, because he offers no clear underlying hypothesis, no citations to literature, or any of the other trappings of academic writing. Needless to say, confirmation of the validity of Pomerantsev's first-hand testimony (if that were possible at all) is beyond the scope of this review. For simplicity's sake, all of Pomerantsev's quotations and his accounts of various events will be considered at least accurate enough to be accepted as a paraphrase of reality. Apart from what seems to be the occasional slight embellishment, there is little that would warrant an extraordinary amount of skepticism or caution on the reader's part.

The book's primary objective is laying the groundwork for Pomerantsev's own concept of "postmodern dictatorship," i.e., a non-democratic regime that employs some

specifics of postmodern art and philosophy, such as distrust of ideologies, denial of objective truths and an omnipresent skepticism.[1] That much is quite apparent from the title alone. However, the book makes no statements of that goal, and proceeds straight to its meat instead.

Nothing is True and Everything is Possible is segmented into three more or less chronological "acts" in which the author focuses on different aspects of the Russian media matrix. Act I, "Reality Show Russia," unassumingly, through the use of story-telling, introduces Pomerantsev's concept of postmodern dictatorship, a term he uses no more than once throughout the entire book. Even then, the concept is introduced with the words "some sort of" in front of it (p. 42). Pomerantsev intentionally avoids a strict conceptualization that would require him to walk the path of complex definitions. He trades off rigorousness for better readability.

Act II, "Cracks in the Kremlin Matrix," deals with some of those people who oppose the Putin regime. It includes a lengthy chapter about the 2006 arrest and imprisonment of Yana Yakovleva, then a successful Russian businesswoman (though not an oligarch), who was overnight accused of being a drug dealer. Act II continues with a story about those who attempt to protect the last few vestiges of historic Moscow, as the city eats itself a bit more from within every time a newly-favored oligarch wants to erect his personal monument in the Kremlin's vicinity. The next-to-last chapter is dedicated to a human rights group that criticizes the inhumane treatment of army conscripts. Finally, Act II concludes with a piece about a whimsical self-made millionaire who is driven into emigration. This middle part of the book has a certain *belles-lettres* quality to it. The individual stories are only loosely connected to the premises of the previous act. However, they are fascinating and deserve to be properly examined in some more academic case studies.

The third and final act of the book takes a darker turn and delves into the psychological aspects of the Russian political and media elite's manipulation of the people. Here, Pomerantsev does not shy away from exploring the infamous Rose of the World scandal, which was brought to light by the suicides of two fashion models. Both had participated in lectures sponsored by a Moscow-based cult, Rose of the World, which Pomerantsev, in his role as a journalist, had infiltrated. Based on his knowledge of the cult and their practices, he depicts the drug-like effect of the cult's meetings, together with its harsh rules and the vulnerable psyches of its acolytes who grew up in an ideologically amorphous and manipulative Russia. At one point, Pomerantsev references Émile Durkheim, who attributed spikes in national suicide rates to, among other things, periods of transition and social change (p. 186). Pomerantsev's literary skill is apparent, but he only loosely connects his story to the atmosphere of today's Russia. The final chapters of the book are about the last days Pomerantsev spent in Moscow and his return to London. He reformulates his views and concludes that, at this point, Russians have all but lost whatever

[1] For his concept of postmodern dictatorship, see Peter Pomerantsev, *Russia: A Postmodern Dictatorship?* (London: Legatum Institute, 2013; Transition Lecture Series), 3–4, http://www.relooney.com/NS4053/00_NS4053_179.pdf.

remains of their faith in ideologies, the most prominent of which would be communism and democracy. The result, he says, is the rise of a "changeling" regime. Pomerantsev's is a bold and interesting conjecture – one that is worthy of further examination.

From whatever angle one views Pomerantsev's work, one thing is undeniable – the uniqueness of his journey toward a deeper understanding of what makes the Russian propaganda machine tick and what it is capable of – something that became widely apparent after the sudden annexation of Crimea in 2014. While working as a producer of Russian television reality shows, Pomerantsev encountered all sorts of the archetypes that exist in post-Soviet Russian society. Be it a former gangster, a gold digger (essentially a modern-day upper-class courtesan) or a Night Wolves biker, the book gently highlights the one aspect they all have in common: they shape-shift according to their whim. The gangster becomes a film director, the gold digger recites Pushkin and the biker starts promoting the Orthodox church. Pomerantsev considers shape-shifting to be the underlying theme of contemporary Russia. In his words, "(t)o believe in something and stand by it in this world is derided, the ability to be a shape-shifter celebrated" (pp. 73–74). Nothing is accepted as settled, and the country's very identity is malleable between the Kremlin's hammer and its anvil. One can truly get rid of all opposition when adopting any ideology at all becomes possible. Pomerantsev states, "The Kremlin's idea is to own all forms of political discourse, to not let any independent movements develop outside of its walls. Its Moscow can feel like an oligarchy in the morning and a democracy in the afternoon, a monarchy for dinner and a totalitarian state by bedtime" (p. 67). It is this observation that allows Pomerantsev to grasp the most astute tactics behind the success of the Putin regime. The other two acts at times exemplify and argue for the idea of shape-shifting, but hint at it covertly rather than spelling it out.

Pomerantsev's book conspicuously features his productions for Russian television, now that he is unhindered and free from the burden of being a PR tool for the regime. Pomerantsev seems to be aware of one criticism that suggests itself: his own personal involvement in the enormous Russian propaganda machine, something that might undermine his credibility. He addresses this in Act III, "Forms of Delirium," albeit very briefly, explaining that the regime seems to be requiring people to act decently in private, but dirty in public (p. 200):

> It's almost as if you are encouraged to have one identity one moment and the opposite one the next. So you're always split into little bits and can never quite commit to changing things. [...] But there is a great comfort in these splits, too: you can leave all your guilt with your "public" self. That wasn't you stealing that budget/making that propaganda show/bending your knee to the President, just a role you were playing; you're a good person really. [...] You can see everything you do, all your sins. You just reorganize your emotional life so as not to care.

Although the author's excuses sound sincere, whether to accept them as sufficient is a subjective matter up to the reader. Additionally, what motivates or allows people to become a willing part of the regime (beyond their need for self-preservation) is something that perhaps should have been explored more thoroughly.

In spite of being clearly non-academic, Pomerantsev's first full-length book has already caught the attention of both casual readers and researchers alike. The more Russian disinformation campaigns infect the West, the more relevant the book is for those who are concerned about and interested in that threat. It serves as a unique qualitative account by someone who has worked in the nether region where the cold cynicism of a postmodern dictatorship is transformed into a haze of surreal and confusing messages fed to the public. This is where the Putin regime's uniqueness lies. It is the reason why its propaganda is so effective, and it is the point at which the regime becomes truly "postmodern." Pomerantsev had a unique opportunity to observe the mechanisms by which Russia's everyday reality is being calculatingly scripted. He became a part of it.

Nothing is True and Everything is Possible has broken completely new ground. It should be considered essential reading for anyone, in or out of the academy, who is interested in the contemporary Russian PR machinery.

Martin Kincl
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REPORTS

The Czech Social Science Data Archive, a resource for social science survey data

The Czech Social Science Data Archive (CSDA) is a repository of survey data that constitutes the largest resource for secondary data analysis in the Czech Republic. Its data library covers various research domains, including sociology, political science, social work, economy and demography. On its website, http://archiv.soc.cas.cz, the CSDA provides open online access to survey data to academics, students and others interested in the study of Czech society.

The CSDA is a department of the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences, one of the leading Czech research organizations in the domain of the social sciences. The main purpose of the CSDA is to aggregate data suitable for secondary analysis, store it and make it available to the public. The CSDA also provides technical and organizational support for Czech participation in large-scale survey research programs, e.g., the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the European Social Survey (ESS), and the newly established Czech Household Panel Survey (CHPS). The archive is a member of the Consortium of European Social Science Data Archives (CESSDA), which seeks to connect as many European archives as possible into a chain of data repositories that affords users from all over the world easy access to survey data from individual European countries.

The CSDA has recently been granted the internationally recognized Data Seal of Approval (DSA). With this certification, the CSDA has officially been recognized as a trustworthy survey data resource for international research and as a reliable data repository for the European Commission's Horizon 2020 projects. With the DSA, the Czech archive will be able to expand by storing more datasets in its library.

In general, DSA regulations establish guidelines for an archive's management of data and ensure that an archive provides usable data in a comprehensive manner. The certification assures data producers and funding providers that their data will be stored securely and always be ready for use. Data users profit from the DSA as well, because as the archive's library grows, users will have access to more data for their analyses and can be sure that the data is authentic and trustworthy.

The community of data archives certified by the DSA is composed of more than sixty survey data repositories in the world, among them the oldest and most prestigious European archives – the United Kingdom Data Archive and the German Data Archive for the Social Sciences (GESIS).

Johana Chylíková

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

1. Manuscript Submission

The journal Studia Territorialia AUC publishes original scholarly manuscripts that have not been published anywhere else, are not currently awaiting publication in other journals, and are not being considered for publication by another journal. Manuscripts are accepted in English, Czech, and German. In the case of English-language manuscripts, American English is preferred, but British English is also acceptable so long as the quality of the writing meets the necessary standards and the spelling is consistent. Insofar as style is concerned, authors should consult either the Chicago Manual of Style or the Oxford Style Manual.

Manuscripts for consideration are to be uploaded online through the AUC Studia Territorialia journal management system, or sent to the editorial team via the e-mail address stuter@fsv.cuni.cz, in a standard document format (.docx, .doc, or .rtf). All correspondence between the author and the editorial team will take place via e-mail.

Manuscripts considered for publication shall be sent to external anonymous reviewers. The period between the submission of manuscripts and their return to respective authors for authorization, resubmission of the revised manuscripts based on reviewers' comments, or with an outright rejection will not exceed four months. The editorial team reserves the right to edit the article in accordance with its own editorial standards or to reject the article with no further obligation to provide reasons.

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An article should normally be between 25 and 40 pages in length, whereas a book review would ideally be 5 to 10 pages in length. Longer texts may also be considered if the subject matter warrants such treatment. All articles, regardless of language, must contain an English-language abstract between 100 and 150 words in length as well as four to six keywords.

A submitted manuscript must contain the following items: title page, abstract, keywords, main text, and annexes (if there are any). In a covering letter, the author must provide his or her full name, institutional affiliation, a brief biographical note in the language of the manuscript, an address to which author's copies are to be sent, and additional contact information. Articles by more than one author must have a single contact person designated for the purposes of correspondence.

Words from other alphabets must be provided in the Latin alphabet. A transliteration table valid for the given language must be consulted when transliterating bibliographical items in footnotes (Library of Congress, Oxford Dictionary, ČSN). Standard transcription should be used for foreign terms and names in the main text.

4. Reference Style

Authors should adhere to the classical reference style. References should be presented in the form of footnotes. Bibliographical information from consulted works should be included in the footnotes themselves, not in a separate bibliography. Journal articles should always include a DOI (Digital Object Identifier), if the journal has one. Electronic sources may be cited including the access date, if appropriate.

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